Chapter 6 (variant)

Division is the first section of the thing. Thus, for example, the animal is divided into rational and irrational. Subdivision is the section and division of one part into two segments. Thus, for example, when the animal has been divided into rational and irrational, then we divide one part—say, the rational—into mortal and immortal. And we have redivision when we have made a division of a thing and then make another kind of division of the same thing over again. Thus, for example, man is divided into male and female—that is division. Then man is divided over again into soul and body—this is redivision. However, division and redivision is not always done, but only when everything is not covered by the first division. It is done in this case, because in both the male and the female body and soul are to be considered.

One should know that the two species into which the same genus is divided are said to be divided by dichotomy. For example, the animal is divided into rational and irrational; so, the rational and irrational are said to be divided by dichotomy.

There are, moreover, eight modes of division: either as genus into species, as the animal is divided into rational and irrational; or as species into individuals, as man is divided into Peter and Paul and all other individual men; or as the whole into parts. This last is of two kinds, for the parts are either alike or they are unlike. They are alike when they admit of the name and the definition of the whole and of one another, as when we cut up pieces of flesh into several pieces of flesh, for then each piece of the flesh is called flesh and admits of the definition of flesh. But they are unlike when they do not admit of the name or of the definition either of the whole or of each other, as when we divide Socrates into hands and head and feet. In this case neither the head, nor the hands, nor the feet admit of the name or of the definition of Socrates, nor do they of each other. Or division is that of an equivocal term divided into its various meanings. This is of two kinds, being either as a whole or as a part. It is as a whole as in the case of the term ‘dog/ for this is used for a land-dog, and a dog-star, and a sea-dog, which precisely are wholes and not parts of an animal. It is, however, as a part, when the word ‘tongue’ is used for the top part of the shoe, for the endpiece of the flute, and for the organ of taste in animals —which are all some sort of parts and not wholes. Or, again, division is that of substance into accidents, as when I speak of some men being white and some black. Or it is as that of accidents into substances, as when I speak of some white things being animate and others inanimate. Or it is as that of accident into accidents, as when I speak of some cold things being dry and others wet. Or it is as the division of those things which are derivative and relative. We have derivative in the case of a medical book and a medical instrument, which derive from medicine; whereas we have relative in the case of a healthful drug and healthful food, for these relate to one thing, namely health. Now, according to this mode the being is divided into substance and accident.

One must know that that which is by nature prior and posterior and that which is more and less is not divided into parts by any mode of division except that of those things which are derivative and relative.

See alternate