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you should suppose death to befall God. So also, when you hear "unbegotten," you should think that the being of God is attached to no cause nor origin. And in general, from each of these we are taught not to fall into improper notions in our conceptions about God. Therefore, in order that we may recognize the exceptional property of God, we forbid one another in our discourses about God from bringing our minds to what they ought not, lest men ever suppose God to be one of the perishable things, or one of the visible things, or one of the begotten things. So that through all these forbidden names, there is, as it were, a denial of what is foreign, as our thought is articulated and lays aside its conceptions about what does not belong to him. Again, we call God good, and just, and creator, and judge, and other such things. As, therefore, in the former case the terms signified a certain rejection and prohibition of things foreign to God, so here they indicate the affirmation and existence of things proper to God and fittingly contemplated in connection with him. From each kind of appellation, therefore, we are taught, either concerning things that belong, that they do belong, or concerning things that do not belong, that they do not belong. But "unbegotten" is significant of things that do not belong; for it declares that generation does not belong to God. And whether one wishes to call this something privative, or prohibitive, or negative, we shall not differ. That "unbegotten" is not significant of things that exist in God is, I think, sufficiently shown by what has been said. But the essence is not one of the things that do not belong, but the very being of God, which to count among non-existent things is the utmost madness. For if the essence is among non-existent things, hardly could any other of the things spoken of exist. But "unbegotten" has been shown to be classed with the things that do not belong; so that he who posits that this term is declarative of the essence itself is wrong. But he, vexed as if at the absurdity of saying something about God by way of privation, takes refuge, forsooth, in what is more pious, in placing "unbegotten" in the essence itself, 29.537 and bringing his argument to its main point for himself, he writes thus: {EUN.} Therefore, if it is neither by conception, nor by privation, nor in part (for he is without parts), nor in him as something other (for he is simple), nor other than him (for he is one and alone unbegotten), it would be itself unbegotten essence. {BAS.} He has brought his argument where he wished, and having detached "unbegotten" from everything else, he has driven it into, as he supposed, the essence itself; saying about the God of all, that he would be himself unbegotten essence. But I myself would also say that the essence of God is unbegotten, but not that the unbegotten is the essence. Furthermore, it is worth noting that he separates from one another the indivisible and the simple, which are the same in concept (for indivisible is that which is not composed of parts, and likewise simple is that which does not have its constitution from many things), as if they differed in their subject. Then he forbids the need to divide God, or to suspect that one part of him is unbegotten and another begotten; nor again to think that "unbegotten" exists in him as one thing in another. But I shrink from refuting the futility of these things. For the one who contradicts seems in a way to become like the one who speaks idly. Therefore, I think, the wise Solomon advises not to answer a fool according to his folly. For he has brought under division arguments that were never spoken nor said, so that he might seem, among the many things enumerated, to have properly discovered one single way in which "unbegotten" is said. But we would perhaps need more argument for the demonstration of the falsehood, and to show that "unbegotten" is not the essence of God, if the things enumerated by him in his division had not been clearly refuted. For even if his argument were strong, that "unbegotten" is understood neither by conception nor by privation, not even so would the conclusion have followed by any means. For what is the necessity, under one

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οἰηθῇς θάνα τον προσγίνεσθαι τῷ Θεῷ. Οὕτω δὴ καὶ ὅταν ἀγέννη τον, ὅτι Μηδεμιᾶς αἰτίας μήτε ἀρχῆς ἐξῆφθαι τὸ εἶναι τοῦ Θεοῦ νομίσῃς. Καὶ ὅλως, ἐξ ἑκάστου τούτων διδασκόμεθα μὴ εἰς ἀπρεπεῖς ἐννοίας ἐν ταῖς περὶ Θεοῦ ὑπολήψεσι καταπίπτειν. Οὐκοῦν ἵνα τὸ ἐξαίρε τον ἰδίωμα τοῦ Θεοῦ ἐπιγνῶμεν, ἀπαγορεύομεν ἀλ λήλοις ἐν τοῖς περὶ Θεοῦ λόγοις, μὴ καταφέρειν τὰς διανοίας εἰς ἃ μὴ δεῖ, ἵνα μήποτε οἰηθῶσιν ἓν τῶν φθαρτῶν, ἢ ἓν τῶν ὁρατῶν, ἢ ἓν τῶν γεννητῶν τὸν Θεὸν ὑπάρχειν οἱ ἄνθρωποι. Ὥστε διὰ τούτων γε ἁπάντων τῶν ἀπηγορευμένων ὀνομάτων, οἱονεὶ ἀπάρνησίς τίς ἐστι τοῦ ἀλλοτρίου, διαρθρου μένης ἡμῶν τῆς διανοίας, καὶ τὰς περὶ τῶν μὴ προσόντων αὐτῷ ὑπολήψεις ἀποτιθεμένης. Πάλιν, ἀγαθὸν λέγομεν τὸν Θεὸν, καὶ δίκαιον, καὶ δημιουρ γὸν, καὶ κριτὴν, καὶ ἄλλα ὅσα τοιαῦτα. Ὡς οὖν ἐπ' ἐκείνων ἀθέτησίν τινα καὶ ἀπαγόρευσιν τῶν ἀλ λοτρίων τοῦ Θεοῦ ἐσήμαινον αἱ φωναὶ, οὕτως ἐν ταῦθα θέσιν καὶ ὕπαρξιν τῶν οἰκείων τῷ Θεῷ καὶ πρεπόντως περὶ αὐτὸν θεωρουμένων ἀποσημαίνουσιν. Ἐκ τοίνυν ἑκατέρου τοῦ εἴδους τῶν προσηγοριῶν διδασκόμεθα, ἢ περὶ τῶν προσόντων, ὅτι πρόσεστιν, ἢ περὶ τῶν μὴ προσόντων, ὅτι μὴ πρόσεστι. Τό γε μὴν ἀγέννητον τῶν μὴ προσόντων ἐστὶ σημαντικόν· δηλοῖ γὰρ τὸ μὴ προσεῖναι γέννησιν τῷ Θεῷ. Τοῦτο δὲ εἴτε ἀφαιρετικὸν, εἴτε ἀπαγορευτικὸν ἢ ἀρνητικόν τι τοιοῦτον βούλοιτό τις προσαγορεύειν, οὐ διοισό μεθα. Ὅτι δὲ οὐ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων τῷ Θεῷ σημαντι κόν ἐστι τὸ ἀγέννητον, ἀρκούντως οἶμαι δηλοῦσθαι τοῖς εἰρημένοις. Ἡ δὲ οὐσία οὐχ ἕν τι τῶν μὴ προσ όντων ἐστὶν, ἀλλ' αὐτὸ τὸ εἶναι τοῦ Θεοῦ, ὅπερ ἐν τοῖς μὴ οὖσι καταριθμεῖν παρανοίας ἐστὶ τῆς ἀνω τάτω. Εἰ γὰρ ἡ οὐσία ἐν τοῖς μὴ οὖσι, σχολῇ γε ἂν ἄλλο τι τῶν λεγομένων εἴη. ∆έδεικται δὲ ἄρα τὸ ἀγέννητον τοῖς μὴ προσοῦσι συντεταγμένον· ὥστε ψευδὴς ὁ τιθέμενος τῆς οὐσίας αὐτῆς εἶναι τὴν φωνὴν ταύτην δηλωτικήν. Ὁ δὲ, ὡς ἐπ' ἀτόπῳ τῷ κατὰ στέρησίν τι λέ γεσθαι περὶ Θεοῦ δυσχεραίνων, ἐπὶ τὸ εὐσεβέστε ρον δῆθεν καταφεύγει, τὸ εἰς αὐτὴν τὴν οὐσίαν 29.537 τίθεσθαι τὸ ἀγέννητον, καὶ συνάγων ἑαυτῷ τὸν λόγον πρὸς τὸ κεφάλαιον, οὕτω γράφει· {ΕΥΝ.} Οὐκοῦν, εἰ μήτε κατ' ἐπίνοιαν, μήτε κατὰ στέρησιν, μήτε ἐν μέρει (ἀμερὴς γὰρ), μήτε ἐν αὐ τῷ ὡς ἕτερον (ἁπλοῦς γὰρ), μήτε παρ' αὐτὸν ἕτερον (εἷς γὰρ καὶ μόνος ἀγέννητος), αὐτὸ ἂν εἴη οὐσία ἀγέννητος. {ΒΑΣ.} Ἤγαγε τὸν λόγον ἐφ' ἃ ἐβούλετο, καὶ παν ταχόθεν τὸ ἀγέννητον ἀποσπάσας, εἰς αὐτὴν συνήλασεν, ὡς ᾤετο, τὴν οὐσίαν· εἰπὼν περὶ τοῦ Θεοῦ τῶν ὅλων, ὅτι αὐτὸ ἂν εἴη οὐσία ἀγέννητος. Ἐγὼ δὲ τὴν μὲν οὐσίαν τοῦ Θεοῦ ἀγέννητον εἶναι καὶ αὐτὸς ἂν φαίην, οὐ μὴν τὸ ἀγέννητον τὴν οὐσίαν. Ἔπειτα μέντοι κἀκείνῳ προσέχειν ἄξιον, ὅτι τὸ ἀμε ρὲς καὶ τὸ ἁπλοῦν, ταυτὸν ὑπάρχον κατὰ τὴν ἔννοιαν (ἀμερές τε γάρ ἐστι τὸ μὴ ἐκ μερῶν συγκείμε νον, καὶ ἁπλοῦν ὡσαύτως τὸ μὴ ἐκ πλειόνων τὴν σύ στασιν ἔχον), οὗτος ὡς διαφέροντα τῷ ὑποκειμένῳ διίστησιν ἀπ' ἀλλήλων. Εἶτα ἀπαγορεύει μὴ δεῖν κα ταμερίζειν τὸν Θεὸν, μηδὲ τὸ μέν τι αὐτοῦ ἀγέννη τον, τὸ δὲ γεννητὸν ὑποπτεύειν· μηδ' αὖ ἐγκεῖσθαι ὡς ἕτερον ἐν ἑτέρῳ νομίζειν αὐτῷ τὸ ἀγέννητον. Τού των δὲ τὸ μάταιον ἀποκνῶ διελέγχειν. Ἔοικε γάρ πως συνεξομοιοῦσθαι τῷ ματαιολογοῦντι ὁ ἀντιλέγων. ∆ιόπερ, οἶμαι, ὁ σοφὸς παρεγγυᾷ Σολομὼν μὴ ἀπο κρίνασθαι τῷ ἄφρονι κατὰ τὴν ἐκείνου ἀφροσύ νην. Τοὺς γὰρ μήτε εἰρημένους μήτε λεχθέντας ποτὲ λόγους ὑπὸ διαίρεσιν ἤγαγεν, ἵνα δόξῃ ἐν πολ λοῖς τοῖς ἀπηριθμημένοις, καθ' ἕνα μόνον τρόπον, οἰκείως ἐξευρίσκειν λεγόμενον τὸ ἀγέννητον. Ἡμῖν δὲ ἴσως πλείονος ἔδει λόγου πρὸς τὴν τοῦ ψεύδους παράστασιν, καὶ πρὸς τὸ δεῖξαι, ὅτι περ οὐκ οὐσία Θεοῦ τὸ ἀγέννητον, εἴπερ τὰ ἐν τῇ διαιρέσει παρ' αὐ τοῦ ἀπηριθμημένα μὴ σαφῶς ἐξελήλεγκτο. Εἰ γὰρ ἰσχυρῶς εἶχεν ὁ λόγος αὐτῷ, ὅτι οὔτε κατ' ἐπίνοιαν οὔτε κατὰ στέρησιν λαμβάνεται τὸ ἀγέννητον, οὐδ' οὕτω μὲν ἂν πάντως ἀκολουθίαν εἶχε τὸ συναγόμενον. Τίς γὰρ ἡ ἀνάγκη, ὑπὸ ἓν