I was being taught to praise and speak a eulogy about someone, which was not true, I willingly submitted. Therefore, not even now, setting out to praise him, do I think it necessary simply to exalt this man by the censures of others; or I would be speaking ill of the man, by the failings of others, so that I might have something greater to say about him, by comparing his blessed life; we are not so foolish; but I will confess the very thing that I have experienced, without any comparison or rhetorical cunning.

11 This man first and alone urged me to philosophize the philosophy of the Greeks, having persuaded me by his own character both to hear and to endure a discourse on ethics, I who would not have been persuaded, as far as the other philosophers were concerned (I confess again), not rightly, but almost to our misfortune. At any rate I did not encounter many at first, but some few who professed to teach, but for all of them, philosophy stopped at words. But this man first urged me to philosophize with words, having anticipated the exhortation through words by his deeds; not merely reciting rehearsed phrases, but not even deigning to speak, unless he should do so with a sincere mind that was also striving to do what was said, or trying to present himself as such a man as he describes in his words the one who will live well, and setting forth an example, I would have liked to say, of a wise man; but since the discourse from the start has promised us truth, not elegance, I do not yet call him an example of a wise man; although wishing to say it and for it to be true; but I let this go for now. Not a perfect example, therefore, but one willing to be very much like it, striving with all zeal and eagerness, if one must say so, even beyond human power; and moreover, to mold us into others like himself, not masters of words and experts on the subject of impulses, but of the impulses themselves; pressing us toward deeds and words and bringing to bear no small part of each virtue, and perhaps even all of it, if we could have contained it, in the very study; compelling us to act justly, if one must say so, through the minding of one's own business by the soul, which he persuaded us to adopt; leading us away from the meddling of life and the troubles of the marketplace, and lifting us up to examine ourselves and truly to do our own business. And that this is to act justly, and this true justice, some of the ancient philosophers also have said, speaking of minding one's own business, it seems to me, as more conducive to blessedness both for themselves and for those who approached them; if indeed it is the part of this virtue to assign to each his due and his own. For what else could be the soul's own business, or what so worthy, as to care for itself, not looking outside nor minding others' business nor, to speak concisely, wronging itself with the worst injustice, but turned inward toward itself, rendering itself to itself and acting justly? Thus he educated us, compelling us, if one must say so, to act justly; and again, no less, to be wise by being turned toward itself and by both wishing and trying to know ourselves; this, indeed, the noblest work of philosophy, which indeed is also attributed to the most prophetic of deities as an all-wise command, namely: Know thyself. And that this is truly the work of wisdom, and that this is divine wisdom, is well said by the ancients; being truly the same virtue of God and man, of the soul itself practicing to see itself as in a mirror and the divine mind, if it should become worthy of this fellowship, being reflected in itself and tracking out a certain ineffable path of this deification. And consequently, also to be temperate and to be courageous; to be temperate, on the one hand, by preserving this wisdom of the soul knowing itself, if ever this should happen to it; for this again is temperance, being a kind of sound wisdom; and to be courageous by abiding in all the aforesaid practices, and not falling away either voluntarily or by any necessity, but guarding and being in control of the things mentioned; and that this is this virtue, being a kind of preserver and guardian of principles.

ἐδιδασκόμην, ἐπαινεῖν καὶ λέγειν περί του ἐγκώμιον, ὅ τι μὴ ἀληθὲς ἦν, ἑκὼν ὑπέμενον. Οὐ τοίνυν οὐδὲ νῦν ἐπαινεῖν προθέμενος, ἁπλῶς τοῖς ἑτέρων ψόγοις τοῦτον ἐξαίρειν οἶμαι δεῖν· ἢ κακῶς ἂν ἔλεγον τὸν ἄνδρα, τοῖς ἄλλων πταίσμασιν, ἵνα τι περὶ αὐτοῦ μεῖζον δὴ λέγειν ἔχοιμι, παραβαλὼν τὸν μακάριον αὐτοῦ βίον· οὐχ οὕτως ἀφραίνομεν· ἀλλ' αὐτὸ ὃ πέπονθα δίχα τινὸς παρα βολῆς καὶ πανουργίας τῆς ἐν λόγοις ὁμολογήσω.

11 Οὗτός με πρῶτος καὶ μόνος καὶ τὴν Ἑλλήνων φιλοσοφίαν φιλοσοφεῖν προὐτρέψατο, τοῖς ἤθεσι τοῖς ἰδίοις αὐτοῦ καὶ τοῦ περὶ ἠθῶν ἀκοῦσ<αι> καὶ ἀνασχέσθαι λόγου πείσας, οὐκ ἂν πεισθέντα, ὅσον ἐπὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις φιλοσόφοις (πάλιν ὁμολογῶ), οὐκ ὀρθῶς μέν, δυστυχῶς δὲ μικροῦ δεῖν ἡμῖν. Οὐμενοῦν οὐδὲ πλείοσιν ἐνέτυχον τὸ πρῶτον, ὀλίγοις δέ τισι τοῖς διδάσκειν ἐπαγγελλομένοις, ἀλλὰ γὰρ πᾶσι μέχρι ῥημάτων τὸ φιλοσοφεῖν στήσασιν. Οὗτος δέ με πρῶτος καὶ τοῖς λόγοις φιλοσοφεῖν προὐτρέψατο, τοῖς ἔργοις φθάσας τὴν διὰ λόγων προτροπήν· οὐκ ἀπαγγέλλων μόνον ῥήματα μεμελετημένα, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ λέγειν ἀξιῶν, εἰ μὴ σὺν εἰλικρινεῖ τῇ γνώμῃ καὶ πρᾶξαι τὰ εἰρημένα ἀγωνιουμένῃ τοῦτο ποιοῖ, ἢ τοιοῦτον ἑαυτὸν παρασχέσθαι πειρώμενος, οἷον τ<οῖς> λόγοις διέξεισι τὸν καλῶς βιωσόμενον, καὶ παράδειγμα μέν, ἐβουλόμην εἰπ<εῖν>, ἐκθέμενος σοφοῦ· ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ ἀλήθειαν ἡμῖν, οὐ κομψείαν ἐπηγγείλατο ὁ λόγ<ος> ἄνωθεν, παράδειγμα μὲν αὐτὸν σοφοῦ οὐδέπω λέγω· καίτοι γε εἰπεῖν ἐθέλ<ων> εἶναι τ' ἀληθές· ἀλλὰ ἐῶ νῦν τοῦτο. Οὐ παράδειγμα τοίνυν ἀκριβές, ἐξομοιοῦν δὲ καὶ ἄγαν ἐθέλοντα, σπουδῇ πάσῃ καὶ προθυμίᾳ βιαζόμενον, εἰ δεῖ λέγειν, καὶ παρὰ τὴν ἀνθρώπων δύναμιν· καὶ μέντοι καὶ ἡμᾶς ἑτέρους τοιούτους πλάττειν, οὐ λόγων ἐγκρατεῖς καὶ ἐπιστήμονας τῶν περὶ ὁρμῶν, τῶν δὲ ὁρμῶν αὐτῶν· ἐπὶ τὰ ἔργα καὶ τοὺς λόγους ἄγχων καὶ οὐ μικρὰν μοῖραν ἑκάστης ἀρετῆς, τάχα δὲ καὶ σύμπασαν, εἴπερ ἐχωρήσαμεν, ἐπιφέρων ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ θεωρίᾳ· δικαιοπραγεῖν μὲν καὶ ἀναγκάζων, εἰ δεῖ λέγειν, διὰ τὴν ἰδιοπραγίαν τῆς ψυχῆς, ᾗ προσθέσθαι ἡμᾶς ἔπεισεν· ἀπάγων μὲν τῆς κατὰ τὸν βίον πολυπραγμοσύνης καὶ τοῦ τῆς ἀγορᾶς ὀχληροῦ, ἑαυτοὺς δὲ περισκοπεῖν ἐπάρας καὶ τὰ αὑτῶν ὄντως πράττειν. Τοῦτο δὲ εἶναι τὸ δικαιοπραγεῖν, καὶ ταύτην τὴν δικαιοσύνην τήν γε ἀληθῆ καὶ τῶν ἀρχαίων φιλοσόφων τινὲς εἰρήκασι, τὴν ἰδιοπραγίαν λέγοντες ἐμοὶ δοκεῖν καὶ ἀνυσιμώτερον πρὸς μακαριότητα ἑαυτοῖς τε καὶ τοῖς προσιοῦσιν· εἴπερ γέ ἐστι τῆσδε τῆς ἀρετῆς τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν ἀπονέμειν καὶ τὰ ἴδια ἑκάστοις. Τί γὰρ ἂν ἴδιον εἴη ψυχῆς ἕτερον, τί δὲ οὕτως ἄξιον, ἢ τὸ ἐπιμέλεσθαι ἑαυτῆς, οὐκ ἔξω βλέπουσαν οὐδ' ἀλλο τριοπραγοῦσαν οὐδὲ συνελόντα εἰπεῖν ἀδικοῦσαν ἑαυτὴν τὴν χειρίστην ἀδικίαν, ἀλλ' ἔνδον πρὸς ἑαυτὴν ἀπεστραμμένην, αὐτὴν ἑαυτῇ ἀποδιδοῦσαν καὶ δικαιοπραγοῦσαν; Οὕτως μὲν δίκαια πράττειν, εἰ δεῖ λέγειν, ἀναγκάζων ἐπαίδευε· φρονεῖν δὲ πάλιν οὐχ ἧττον τῷ πρὸς ἑαυτὴν εἶναι καὶ ἑαυτοὺς γινώσκειν ἐθέλειν τε καὶ πειρᾶσθαι· τοῦτο δὴ τὸ ἄριστον φιλοσοφίας ἔργον, ὃ δὴ καὶ δαιμόνων τῷ μαντικωτάτῳ ἀνατίθεται ὡς πάνσοφον πρόσταγμα, τό· Γνῶθι σαυτόν. Τὸ δὲ εἶναι ὄντως ἔργον φρονήσεως, καὶ ταύτην εἶναι τὴν θείαν φρόνησιν καλῶς τοῖς παλαιοῖς λέγεται· τὴν αὐτὴν ὄντως οὖσαν θεοῦ καὶ ἀνθρώπου ἀρετήν, αὐτῆς τῆς ψυχῆς ἑαυτὴν ὥσπερ ἐν κατόπτρῳ ὁρᾶν μελετώσης καὶ τὸν θεῖον νοῦν, εἰ ἀξία γένοιτο τῆς κοινωνίας τῆσδε, ἐν αὑ<τῇ> κατοπτριζομένης ὁδόν τε ἀπόρρητόν τινα ταύτης ἀποθεώσεως ἐξιχνευομένης. Ἀκολούθως δὲ καὶ σωφρονεῖν καὶ ἀνδρίζεσθαι· σωφρονεῖν μέν, διασωζομέ νους τὴν φρόνησιν τήνδε τῆς ψυχῆς ἑαυτὴν γινωσκούσης, εἴ ποτε αὐτῇ τοῦτο γένοιτο· ταύτην γὰρ εἶναι πάλιν τὴν σωφροσύνην, σώαν τινὰ φρόνησιν οὖσαν· ἀνδρίζεσθαι δ' ἐπὶ πᾶσιν ἐμμένοντας ταῖς εἰρημέναις ἐπιτηδεύσεσι, καὶ οὐκ ἀποπίπτοντας οὔθ' ἑκουσίως οὔθ' ὑπό τινος ἀνάγκης, φυλάττοντας δὲ καὶ ἐγκρατεῖς τῶν εἰρημένων· καὶ ταύτην εἶναι, σώτειράν τινα καὶ φύλακα δογμάτων οὖσαν, τὴν ἀρετὴν ταύτην.