OF SAINT JUSTIN PHILOSOPHER AND MARTYR, AN OVERTHROW OF CERTAIN ARISTOTELIAN DOGMAS.

 And concerning these things, all the prophets sent from God to all men continued to think the same things, and there was no disagreement among them b

 posited, must necessarily come to be by composition but if the mode of generation by composition fits every generation, it has been superfluously dis

 is another thing besides the destruction of all that is, but if matter has this, how is its being matter not also destroyed? Further, if when the form

 by its presence and absence, then the principles will be both generated and destroyed by each other, and not eternal for the eternal does not need th

 ·having been said concerning the philosophers among the Greeks, how they did not make their arguments concerning beings according to demonstrative sci

 animal, but in the generation of the animal simply the substrate was not seed, how is the animal coming to be from not-animal not contrary to nature?

 and matter is deprived of being the matter of something, but it is not deprived of being matter itself, therefore matter will be being and not-being,

 Saying If, when the form is present, then the privation does not remain, it is clear that when the form is not present, the privation remains. How th

 The eternally uncreated has this same [quality] with respect to something coming to be from it by nature and by art. How then was God able to make som

 and of change, but in another way the form and the shape according to reason. For just as art is said to be that which is according to art and the art

 he subjected to generation not only to the spontaneous one, but also to that through intellect and nature which is manifestly absurd, that the one wh

 sible, but it is among the impossible things for that which is going to be to be ungenerated, both without beginning and without end, both having and

 And that, if the infinite in no way exists, many impossibilities occur, is clear: for time will have a beginning and an end, and magnitudes will not b

 is in potentiality, but not in actuality but the amount taken always exceeds any definite quantity. But this number is not definite, nor does infinit

 second to providence but if place is ungeneratedly and without beginning what it is and has what it has, then place is ungenerated and first of all t

 Where is that which is in a place? And if not every being is in a place, how will some beings not be the same as non-being, if indeed not being in a p

 to have come into being. For those things to which belong the generable and having come into being, from these of necessity the eternal and the unorig

 38. From the same discourse. Whatever neither moves nor is at rest, is not in time for to be in time is to be measured by time, and time is the measu

 time to be, so also has the past been. But the future time, just as it has a future coming-into-being, so also it has a beginning and just as there i

 to be straight. The principles of things that always come to be according to nature cannot be eternal. For if they transmit the nature they have to th

 And this is the case for any single one of the things that come to be, but it is necessary for something else to be moved previously among the things

 according to which some things have come to be above nature, and others according to nature. If before and after is ungenerated, then there will b

 we say, of which there is no demonstration. But God and nature do nothing in vain. If there were contrary motions in the locomotion of bodies, either

 worlds to come into being from it, but having been used up for the genesis of one world, did it stop the unwilling god from making more worlds? 51. Fr

 and an enmattered principle in matter, through which 'for heaven to be' is different from 'for this particular heaven to be'? If heaven cannot do by w

 each other. But now this much is clear, for what reason there are more circular bodies: that it is necessary for there to be generation, and generatio

 and the outcome in things that happen by choice is secondary to the choice), how does it exist in eternal things that this particular thing is because

 chance can exist in eternal things, but the heaven is eternal and its circular motion, for what reason then does it move in one direction, and not in

 to suffer it. These things, therefore, are heated because they are carried through the air, which through the striking by the motion becomes fire but

 it was moved by nature the motion by which it is now moved, how was it not bound to the sphere in vain? But if it was not moved this way according to

 always? If to things that are always in motion the spherical shape was given as suitable, how is it that of the things having a spherical shape, one i

 and have what they have? If the stars ought not to move, why do they move at all by means of others? But if they ought to move, why do they not move b

 of an element besides the things here, but at other times from the same elements, how is he not speaking falsely in one of the two ways? 63. From the

 and the bricks. Therefore, since matter is not substance, who is it that has made from it the things that have come from it, since both nature and art

 change, but into the opposite in the same genus, for instance in quality a change does not occur from white to large but to black, in what way then do

and of change, but in another way the form and the shape according to reason. For just as art is said to be that which is according to art and the artificial, so too nature is said to be that which is according to nature and the natural. What then should we call that which is according to matter and the material, if not matter? Say what else? But if we should call this matter, then matter will be matter, when it is that which is according to matter and the material; for nature is then nature, when it is that which is according to nature and the natural; and likewise also art. For things expressed in the same manner have the same relation to one another. But if matter exists then, when it is that which is according to matter and the material, then matter is not ungenerated. 9. From the same, from the same discourse. So that in another way nature would be the form and the shape of things having in themselves a principle of motion, not being separable except in thought. But that which is from these is not nature, but by nature, such as man. If man is according to nature and a natural animal, how is man not nature? For having defined it, he said: Nature is said to be that which is according to nature and the natural. 10. From the same discourse. Therefore, in things according to art we make the matter for the sake of the work, but in natural things it pre-exists. Since there is another work which is neither according to nature nor according to art, where is the matter of this work to be placed? For an animal comes from an animal; and if the animal is not first, neither does an animal come from an animal. And an animal from an animal comes to be according to nature, but the animal simply is not according to nature. But if in things according to art the matter is from without, and in things according to nature the matter is in the natural things, it is clear that in works that are neither according to art nor according to nature the matter exists in another way; of which if he who is treating of natural things should not make the definition, he renders unstable even the things already defined. For if we think we know each thing then, when we know the first causes and the first principles, how could anyone know the animal from an animal, who is ignorant of the animal not from an animal? For that is the principle and cause of this. 11. From the same discourse. Since spontaneity and chance are causes of those things of which mind or nature might be the cause, when something becomes a cause of these same things by accident, and nothing which is by accident is prior to that which is in itself, it is clear that neither is the accidental cause prior to that which is in itself. Therefore spontaneity and chance are posterior to mind and nature; so that even if spontaneity is in the highest degree the cause of the heaven, it is necessary for mind and nature to be a prior cause both of many other things and of this universe. In these things he not only stated the order of the first and second causes, which he did not observe, but also the heaven, which he himself in the second book of the Physics in the preceding parts excluded from spontaneous generation, here

καὶ μεταβολῆς, ἄλλον δὲ τρόπον ἡ μορφὴ καὶ τὸ εἶδος τὸ κατὰ τὸν λόγον. Ὥσπερ γὰρ τέχνη λέγεται τὸ κατὰ τὴν τέχνην καὶ τὸ τεχνικόν, οὕτω καὶ φύσις τὸ κατὰ φύσιν λέγεται καὶ τὸ φυσικόν. Τί οὖν ἂν εἴποιμεν τὸ κατὰ τὴν ὕλην καὶ τὸ ὑλικὸν εἰ μὴ ὕλην; Eἰπὲ τί ἕτερον; Eἰ δὲ ὕλην λέγοιμεν τοῦτο, ἔσται ἄρα τότε ὕλην εἶναι τὴν ὕλην, ὅτε τὸ κατὰ τὴν ὕλην καὶ τὸ ὑλικόν· καὶ γὰρ ἡ φύσις τότε φύσις, ὅτε τὸ κατὰ φύσιν καὶ τὸ φυσι κόν· ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἡ τέχνη. Τὰ γὰρ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ἐκφωνούμενα τὸν αὐτὸν πρὸς ἄλληλα ἔχει λόγον. Ἀλλ' εἰ τότε ἡ ὕλη ὑπάρχει, ὅτε τὸ κατὰ τὴν ὕλην καὶ τὸ ὑλικόν, οὐκ ἄρα ἀγένητος ἡ ὕλη. θ. Τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ λόγου. Ὥστε ἄλλον τρόπον ἡ φύσις ἂν εἴη τῶν ἐχόντων ἐν αὑ τοῖς κινήσεως ἀρχὴν ἡ μορφὴ καὶ τὸ εἶδος, οὐ χωριστὸν ὂν ἀλλ' ἢ κατὰ τὸν λόγον. Τὸ δὲ ἐκ τούτων φύσις μὲν οὐκ ἔστι, φύσει δέ, οἷον ἄνθρωπος. Eἰ κατὰ φύσιν ἐστὶν ὁ ἄνθρωπος καὶ φυσικόν τι ζῶον, πῶς οὐκ ἔστι φύσις ὁ ἄνθρωπος; ∆ιορισάμενος γὰρ ἔλεγε· Φύσις λέγεται τὸ κατὰ φύσιν καὶ τὸ φυσικόν. ι. Ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ λόγου. Ἐν μὲν οὖν τοῖς κατὰ τέχνην ἡμεῖς ποιοῦμεν τὴν ὕλην τοῦ ἔργου ἕνεκα, ἐν δὲ τοῖς φυσικοῖς ὑπάρχει οὖσα. Ἐπειδή ἐστιν ἔργον ἕτερον τὸ μήτε κατὰ φύσιν μήτε κατὰ τέχνην, ποῦ τούτου τοῦ ἔργου τὴν ὕλην θετέον; Γίνεται γὰρ ζῶον ἐκ ζώου· καὶ εἰ μὴ πρῶτον τὸ ζῶον, οὐδὲ ζῶον ἐκ ζώου. Καὶ κατὰ φύσιν μὲν γίνεται τὸ ἐκ ζώου ζῶον, οὐ κατὰ φύσιν δὲ τὸ ζῶον ἁπλῶς. Ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν ἐν τοῖς κατὰ τέχνην ἡ ὕλη ἔξωθεν, ἐν δὲ τοῖς κατὰ φύσιν ἡ ὕλη ἐν τοῖς φυσικοῖς, δῆλον ὅτι ἐν τοῖς μήτε κατὰ τέχνην μήτε κατὰ φύσιν ἔργοις ἡ ὕλη ἑτέρως ὑπάρχει· ἧς εἰ μὴ ποιήσειε τὸν διορισμὸν ὁ περὶ τῶν φυσικῶν τὴν πραγματείαν ἔχων, ἀσύστατα ποιεῖ καὶ τὰ ἤδη διορισθέντα. Eἰ γὰρ τότε οἰόμεθα εἰδέναι ἕκαστον, ὅταν τὰ αἴτια γνωρίζωμεν τὰ πρῶτα καὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς τὰς πρώτας, πῶς ἂν γνωρίσειεν ἄν τις τὸ ἐκ ζώου ζῶον, ὁ τὸ ζῶον ἀγνοῶν τὸ μὴ ἐκ ζώου; Ἐκεῖνο γὰρ τούτου ἀρχή τε καὶ αἴτιον. ια. Ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ λόγου. Ἐπειδή ἐστι τὸ αὐτόματον καὶ ἡ τύχη αἴτια ὧν ἂν νοῦς γένοιτο αἴτιος ἢ φύσις, ὅταν κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς αἴτιόν τι γένη ται τούτων αὐτῶν, οὐθὲν δὲ κατὰ συμβεβηκός ἐστι πρότερον τῶν καθ' αὑτό, δῆλον ὅτι οὐδὲ τὸ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς αἴτιον πρότερον τοῦ καθ' αὑτό. Ὕστερον ἄρα τὸ αὐτόματον καὶ ἡ τύχη νοῦ καὶ φύσεως· ὥστε εἰ ὅτι μάλιστα τοῦ οὐρανοῦ αἴτιον τὸ αὐτόματον, ἀνάγκη πρότερον νοῦν αἴτιον καὶ φύσιν εἶναι καὶ ἄλλων πολλῶν καὶ τοῦδε τοῦ παντός. Ἐν τούτοις οὐ μόνον τῶν πρώτων καὶ τῶν δευτέρων αἰ τίων ἣν οὐκ ἐφύλαξεν εἶπε τὴν τάξιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸν οὐρανόν, ὃν καὶ αὐτὸν ἐν τῷ δευτέρῳ λόγῳ τῆς Φυσικῆς ἀκροάσεως ἐν τοῖς ἀνωτέρω ὑπεξείλετο τῆς αὐτομάτου γενέσεως, ἐνταῦθα