OF THE HOLY JUSTIN, PHILOSOPHER AND MARTYR

 power, which is absurd for what is in time is corruptible. But if, being able long ago to prevent so great an evil, he did not prevent it, he would b

 form, but ignorance of God which has spoken the falsehood which is a third form of the greatest evil, resulting for them from the voluntary disobedie

 For, he says, ignorance is often given to men for their good at any rate we see in many cases that it often happens that things known are despised mo

 the religions of the earth differ from the religion that holds the true doctrine simply by falsehood, but from each other in the differences of falseh

 the creator and God ordained the day, on which he makes an abolition of all the evils in the world arising from unbelief and disobedience to God, acco

 to God, the creator of the world, they name the parts of the world, and without the act of creating, they attribute to God the name of creator, so tha

 and in actuality which is absurd. He who remains the same, therefore, has nothing temporal. He makes the world, therefore, always ordering it, and th

 become significant and affirmative of God that all the works of God are temporal with him, it is clear that he absurdly supposed that nothing temporal

 of each other? For 'He has not so much made as He makes' is not a negation of 'to have made', but rather an affirmation of 'He has made'. But clearly,

 the sun in its substance, or according to one act of creation He made its substance and according to another act of creation its motion, and having ma

 Is not God, in respect to the powers He has but according to which He does not act, corruptible according to the judgment of the one who answered? But

 or the denial to be true, how did the respondent posit both for the generation of the world, both the affirmation and the denial, saying it is both cr

 makes different things. Let us not consider God in human terms. For not as we, who previously are one way and later change into another, are said to m

 will. How then is the will the same as the essence, when that which is willed and the will are one thing and another, just as the sensible and sensati

 by essence. But if it is essence, he who wills does not exist, but if it is added to the essence, it is necessarily one thing and another for that wh

 makes of themselves, in the same way also God, being ungenerated, ungeneratedly makes all things, not becoming but co-existing, and by the infinity of

 can. But let us not consider God's creating in a human way. For not as we, who previously are one way, and later changing into another, are said to cr

 of milk, but nature in no way makes substance all at once. How then is the respondent not using an inappropriate example, the working of nature, to re

 For first the simple, but later the composite. Just as God is beyond reproach for the weakness of power, because he did not make more worlds, but havi

 having come to its manifestation, how is it not that in the work of God all the parts of time exist? Fourth Christian question to the Greeks. If it is

 of the known ones of the world he dogmatized its ungeneratedness, nor did he establish this through proof, but only according to his own authority did

 It is clear from this, that the world is not a relative term to the creator insofar as it is an image, nor to the paradigm insofar as it is a creation

 is, he ought also to say that the creation is uncreated, since its creator is uncreated for they necessarily follow one another, the uncreated with t

 kinds, of which it is a common feature for one to be spoken of sometimes in potentiality for what they are called, and sometimes in actuality, while o

 Fifth Christian question to the Hellenes. If heaven is uncreated and God is uncreated and God dwells in heaven, how is God not insulted dwelling in th

 and having made it and to say that the world, without interval, eternally co-exists with God, the world which received its existence from the Creat

 

the sun in its substance, or according to one act of creation He made its substance and according to another act of creation its motion, and having made first its substance, afterwards gave it motion. But if He is always making it to be moved, but is not always making its substance, it is clear that after the creation of its substance He provides it its unceasing motion, and the end of the creation of its substance is the beginning of its motion. But if these things are so, it is clear that nothing with God is without time; for a creation succeeding a creation is not without time. So that He has made nothing, nor will He make anything. But the Same always makes the same, having no beginning of creation, in order that there be no end either. It having been shown that the creation of the sun's substance is one thing, and that through motion another, which the respondent called unceasing, and that the creation of its substance precedes the creation through motion, how is it not absurd to say that the creation of the sun through motion is without beginning, when the sun, before the unceasing creation through motion, has had the creation of its substance which has ceased? Either, therefore, God is not the maker of the sun's substance, or the creation of the sun through motion is not without beginning. But if the first, if God is not the maker of the sun's substance, then neither is He its maker through motion; for from whom it has its substance, from him it must also have its motion. But if the second, God will be corruptible in His activity, if indeed according to the respondent, when the activity of God has ceased, God is corrupted in His activity. But if God is the maker of the sun's substance and does not always make it, it is clear that He has made it before it was moved and no created thing is without time with God. So that, if His activities have a beginning and an end, God will be corruptible in His activity; which is absurd. And His power will also be changeable, at different times putting forth different activities. But if the power is changeable, using different activities at different times, the substance also will be shaken, at different times begetting different powers and not remaining in the same ones. So that, if these things are so in all respects, it is clear that God will be changeable in substance, power, and activity; which is absurd. Just as God Himself has no beginning and end, so neither has His activity nor His works; for His activities are in His works. Therefore, just as He Himself does not need a maker, so neither do His so-called works; it will be a falsehood also to call God the maker of the things that are according to Him, since they are without beginning and without end. But if everywhere the maker is distinguished from the thing made by the difference of pre-existence and subsequent existence, it is clear that he who removes this difference from God and His works deprives both, God and the things made, the one of the title of maker, the others of that of things made. And if God's power is indeed infinite, as it is, but His works are finite, how

ὁ ἥλιος τῇ οὐσίᾳ, ἢ κατὰ ἄλλην ποίησιν ἐποίησεν αὐτοῦ τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ κατὰ ἄλλην ποίησιν τὴν κίνησιν, καὶ ποιήσας μὲν πρῶτον αὐτοῦ τὴν οὐσίαν, ὕστερον δὲ παρασχὼν αὐτῷ τὴν κί νησιν. Ἀλλ' εἰ τὸ κινεῖσθαι αὐτὸν ἀεὶ ποιεῖ, τὴν δὲ οὐσίαν αὐτοῦ οὐκ ἀεὶ ποιεῖ, δῆλον ὅτι μετὰ τὴν ποίησιν τῆς οὐσίας αὐτοῦ παρέχει αὐτῷ τὴν ἄπαυστον κίνησιν, καὶ ἔστι τὸ τέλος τῆς οὐσίας τῆς ποιήσεως αὐτοῦ ἀρχὴ τῆς κινήσεως αὐτοῦ. Eἰ δὲ ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχει, δῆλον ὅτι οὐδὲν ἄχρονον παρὰ τῷ θεῷ· ἡ γὰρ ποίησις ποίησιν διαδεχομένη ἄχρονος οὐκ ἔστιν. Ὥστε πεποίηκε μὲν οὐδὲν οὔτε ποιήσει. Ποιεῖ δὲ ἀεὶ ὁ αὐτὸς τὸ αὐτό, μὴ ἔχων ἀρχὴν τῆς ποιήσεως, ἵνα μὴ καὶ τέλος. ∆ειχθέντος τοῦ ἄλλην εἶναι τοῦ ἡλίου τὴν ποίησιν τῆς οὐσίας, καὶ ἄλλην τὴν διὰ κινήσεως, ἣν ἄπαυστον ὠνόμασεν ὁ ἀποκρινάμενος, καὶ ὅτι προηγεῖται ἡ ποίησις τῆς οὐσίας αὐτοῦ τῆς διὰ κινήσεως ποιήσεως, πῶς οὐκ ἔστιν ἄτοπον τὸ ἄναρ χον λέγειν τοῦ ἡλίου τὴν ποίησιν τὴν διὰ τῆς κινήσεως, τοῦ ἡλίου πρὸ τῆς ἀπαύστου διὰ κινήσεως ποιήσεως τὴν τῆς οὐ σίας παυσαμένην ποίησιν ἐσχηκότος; Ἢ τοίνυν οὐκ ἔστι ποιη τὴς τῆς τοῦ ἡλίου οὐσίας ὁ θεός, ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν ἄναρχος ἡ διὰ τῆς κινήσεως ποίησις τοῦ ἡλίου. Ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν τὸ πρῶτον, εἰ οὐκ ἔστι ποιητὴς τῆς τοῦ ἡλίου οὐσίας ὁ θεός, οὐδ' ἄρα διὰ τῆς κινήσεώς ἐστιν αὐτοῦ ποιητής· παρ' οὗ γὰρ ἔχει τὴν οὐ σίαν, παρὰ τούτου ἀνάγκη ἔχειν καὶ τὴν κίνησιν. Eἰ δὲ τὸ δεύτερον, φθαρτὸς ἔσται ὁ θεὸς τὴν ἐνέργειαν, εἴγε κατὰ τὸν ἀποκρινάμενον παυσαμένης τῆς ἐνεργείας τοῦ θεοῦ φθείρεται ὁ θεὸς τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ. Eἰ δὲ ποιητὴς τῆς τοῦ ἡλίου οὐσίας ἐστὶν ὁ θεὸς καὶ ταύτην ἀεὶ οὐ ποιεῖ, δῆλον ὅτι πεποίηκε ταύτην πρὸ τοῦ κινεῖσθαι αὐτὸν καὶ οὐδὲν ποίημα ἄχρονον παρὰ τῷ θεῷ. Ὡς, εἴγε ἀρχὴν ἔχουσι καὶ τελευτὴν αἱ ἐνέργειαι αὐτοῦ, φθαρτὸς ἔσται ὁ θεὸς τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ· ὅπερ ἄτοπον. Ἔσται δὲ καὶ ἡ δύναμις αὐτοῦ μεταβλητή, ἄλλοτε ἄλλας ἐνεργείας προέχουσα. Eἰ δὲ ἡ δύναμις μεταβλητή, ἄλλοτε ἄλλαις κε χρημένη ἐνεργείαις, καὶ ἡ οὐσία σαλευθήσεται, ἄλλοτε ἄλλας γεννῶσα δυνάμεις καὶ μὴ μένουσα ἐν ταῖς αὐταῖς. Ὥστε, εἰ ταῦτα διὰ πάντων, δῆλον ὅτι ὁ θεὸς ἔσται μεταβλητὸς οὐ σίᾳ, δυνάμει, ἐνεργείᾳ· ὅπερ ἄτοπον. Ὥσπερ αὐτὸς ὁ θεὸς οὐκ ἔχει ἀρχὴν καὶ τελευτήν, οὕτως οὐδὲ ἡ ἐνέργεια αὐτοῦ οὐδὲ τὰ ἔργα αὐτοῦ· αἱ γὰρ ἐνέργειαι αὐτοῦ ἐν τοῖς ἔργοις αὐ τοῦ εἰσιν. Ἔσται ἄρα ὥσπερ μὴ χρῄζων αὐτὸς τοῦ ποιοῦντος, οὕτως οὐδὲ τὰ λεγόμενα αὐτοῦ ἔργα· ἔσται ψεῦδος καὶ τὸ λέγειν τὸν θεὸν ποιητὴν τῶν κατ' αὐτόν, ἀνάρχων τε ὄντων καὶ ἀτελευτήτων. Eἰ δὲ πανταχοῦ κατὰ διαφορὰν προϋ πάρξεώς τε καὶ μεθυπάρξεως διέστηκεν ὁ ποιητὴς τοῦ ποιή ματος, δῆλον ὅτι ὁ ἀναιρῶν ἀπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ τῶν ἔργων αὐτοῦ τὴν διαφορὰν ταύτην ἀμφότερα ἀποστερεῖ, τὸν θεὸν καὶ τὰ ποιήματα, τὸν μὲν τῆς τοῦ ποιητοῦ προσηγορίας, τὰ δὲ τῆς τῶν ποιημάτων. Καὶ εἰ ἔστι μὲν ἡ τοῦ θεοῦ δύναμις ἄπει ρος, ὥσπερ οὖν καὶ ἔστι, πεπερασμένα δὲ τὰ ἔργα αὐτοῦ, πῶς