Opuscula psychologica, theologica, daemonologica
After the judgment of the thoughts, an exact discernment of how the thoughts happen to be, whether they are good or otherwise but imagination is the
to divide for us, by the established terms, the sesquitertian ratios into both the sesquioctave ratios and the leimmata, we would have stopped at thes
having split it, he bent each one into a circle, bringing them together middle to middle with each other like a chi, having joined 7 them both to them
left, or rather the one is an image of mind, the other of soul. And in the soul itself, the right is that which is turned toward the intelligible thin
regarding the explanation of the Platonic psychogony, this we now discharge for you as a kind of debt. For Plato's statement that the division of thes
and of exegesis. And there is a letter of mine placed among my books that has traced out and carefully examined the meaning in the sayings. But it is
a ruler drives a team of two then of the 14 horses, one of them is noble and good and of such stock, but the other is from opposite stock and is oppo
a body from one of the seeing things, such that it is able to be extended as far as the stars. But it was better, he says, than to say that the extern
through which it is not swept into material disorder, but is joined to the divine light, holds it in its own place and makes it unmixed with matter, l
of knowledge. For there is something intelligible, which you must understand with the flower of the intellect. And he says that the one in us is twofo
agrees, but among them the salty is more than the drinkable. They say, for example, that every soul is either divine or changing from intellect to min
to be deemed worthy of pardon in repenting. If the soul is a body according to some of the ancients, what is it that contains it? every body is three-
distinction. Two kinds of air according to Aristotle, the vaporous from the exhalation of water and the smoky from the extinguishing of fire. The latt
Plato. Pleasure is not a coming-to-be for coming-to-be is of things that are not, while pleasure is of things that are. And coming-to-be is swift and
is natural, while habit is acquired and taught. Providence is the care for existing things that comes from God. Epicurus says: the blessed and incorr
but such powers are simply and imperceptibly desired. What then? Do we have three souls? Solution: just as the soul, when united to the body, seems to
When this is dimmed they also are dimmed the soul flourishes when this 34 withers. Further, everything desires to preserve its own substrate. If the
actuality, as physicians, others in relation to something, others a double or one-and-a-half ratio. Potentiality is found in substance, as a man in th
concerning form, matter and cause, for example the matter of the celestial bodies is not the four elements, but a certain fifth, spherical one, as be
as knowledge (for knowledge is a transition from defined things to defined things for this reason it is also knowledge, as leading the mind to a stat
this, for indeed the flesh also moves downwards and is none of the elements. Aporia: but matter, that is the element, is not soul, but the form that c
definitions have as their beginning the most general things, as their end the most specific things. If, then, these are finite, so are the definitions
and it acts according to one part and another. It seems to act in these ways as being one. For if it is divided, it is necessary for the parts to be e
the rest, but this is about hot and soft, heavy and light, rare and dense, and many opposites. In humans, the cause of local motion is intellect, in i
is nourished {which} is twofold: either as Matter or as an instrument. And the instrument is twofold: either moving and being moved, like the innate h
is equal in distance to the zodiac signs. Light is not a body. for if it were a body, how would it be possible for it to have instantaneous movement,
we see the introduction of the forms of things seen entering the sight, but how do we see the interval of the air in between? Solution: It is not that
with a violent collision. In soft things no sound is produced, because the air is broken up in their pores and dispersed as in sponges. In things that
a buzzing which is conveyed back to the sense of hearing. Others say that the sound occurring in the ears after the blockage is of the external air th
For instance, fish, not having this, are cooled through their gills. Those that have a windpipe also have a lung. Fish have neither these nor a heart.
the sense organs of touch, it is clear for every sense organ is both separated and known. Aristotle speaks of the senses both as one each and as many
Aristotle in On the Soul : if sensation ceased, the sense-organ would also cease. But if the second is not, neither is the first. Sensation and sense-
Some add also a sixth, the attentive [faculty], as when a man says, I perceived, I thought, I opined. To this part they also add the activities of t
We can say ten, but not indeed opine it, so that opinion is not up to us. But neither do we imagine what we wish for we see at night what we do not w
in the case of children, the one according to state, and the one in act, as the one governing all things or the one entering from without. Plato says
theoretical versus the practical. The theoretical corresponds to a vision discerning of forms, while the practical corresponds to a vision not only kn
organs. Moreover, at night the nutritive faculty is more active, but the locomotive faculty is not at all. A difficulty: the vegetative faculty produc
simpler, or rather the things inherent in the matter, into which the matter is also divided, which are also prop[erly] called its elements. I say then
he hints that it is not completed from both of the things mixed, but is produced in the union of the soul and the body, not by the soul itself giving
closing the senses, so as to know unknowingly the transcendent substance of that which is. For according to their own opinions, the philosopher who ha
he himself will also pardon his own student for the apparent 78 opposition to him and others will come here again to bear witness for us, the philoso
it grows and is naturally constituted to decay, must in every way grow along with and decay along with the other in a connate manner for that by whic
a demonstration, so also the soul in an infant's body and a more imperfect one, if it were in another, perfect body, would immediately have shown its
I shall use the argument. In what do you say virtue is inherent? or again, is it superimposed on the formless and incorporeal and uncompounded nature,
Porphyry has philosophized in harmony with this. For in discussing the soul, he says: “Just as insomniacs, by the very act of wanting to sleep and wat
have they cast off? Perhaps those who hold the contrary opinion will vex us with these things. But their objection is like a spider's web, which will
to have received watchwords from the first father, nor that they possess the fullness of many bosoms, nor would I accept that they stand before the bo
both the Sibylline and the Orphic ones, and those according to which the Berytian Bulls came to be and Amous the Egyptian, and Socrates and Plato (for
of the bonds by which they were bound, and after this, turning their minds upward, they will approach God. And if the account told about the Sibyl wer
has the front part? What then do you think? a mind scattered in so great a size is from this cause for him both slack and weak, and the soul is simply
would remember any of the things here. But as many of the souls as were allotted to more humble portions and their whole mind has not been snatched aw
Let us not altogether reject the analogy of the eye in the case of the soul, let it be and be called a more precise substance of the soul but if some
The manner of the entry of souls, and likewise of their release or separation from hence, both are most difficult or hard to explain for of the first
but by such powers the soul is led like some kind of thing moved by another, being drawn towards whatever the leaders happen to lead it, but then rath
For that which is according to reason, knowledge is readily at hand, but that which is contrary to reason, is so because it has received such a nature
of beasts, but perhaps the matter which reason has shown not to exist. Therefore our bodies will be resurrected, and there will be nothing to prevent
fitting and gluing it to that by means of a suitable analogy, not placing the rational and intellectual substance into any of the animals for this is
are generated from these powers alone, for this reason, having abandoned the others, they divided the substance of the soul into these alone. But if y
it is in fourths, when one might contemplate these both in the third order of the intellectual virtues and in the fourth of the paradigmatic virtues,
and so interpreting the Platonic opinion, but they do not seem to me to have grasped the precise meaning of his doctrine. But if I shall clarify for y
and with nothing separating them, it is necessary for the one to be ordered, and the other to order and the one which is ordered has its form divided
what is hard and resistant in them has been smoothed out by me. But what follows from this must be attributed to them alone for, proposing to speak a
proceeds from it and returns to it.” Then indeed he works out the point by division. For if it only remained, it would in no way differ from its cause
in our sacred writings, neither a whole soul nor any whole nature, apart from the partial ones, has been dogmatically established1. I for my part reje
by the energy, then also the substance is perfected according to it, and these things stand in each other according to one energy. For he who does not
having a life activated according to intellect and reason the psychic is defined according to reason 124 and takes care of divisible souls the physi
tormenting them. But there are, they say, both on earth divine daimons and in the air, guardians of the animals there, and <in> the water, extending t
make it superior to the confusion of life, but, if possible, may you not even leave behind in the terrestrial world the very body which you have put o
cast under your mind: for there is no plant of truth on earth» that is: do not busy your mind with the great measures of the earth, as the geographer
Gregory by reason and contemplation leads the soul up to the more divine things by reason that is according to us, the more intellectual and better,
such a lion-bearing fount of heaven and the stars, but the ruling part of its own existence conceals the vision of them. Chaldaean Oracle. From all si
often appearing, they feign the semblance of some goodness towards the one being initiated. Chaldean Oracle. The soul of mortals will draw God into it
they can. Whence everything they say and show is false and insubstantial for they know existing things through forms but that which knows future thi
and fear is the holding back of his goodness towards us for the sake of the economy. Chaldean Oracle. The Father snatched himself away, not even enclo
they are possessed by passions. Therefore, it is necessary for these also to receive their part of the whole judgment and, having been filled up with
for it is higher than being venerated, than being uttered, and than being conceived. A Chaldean Oracle. The Iynges, being conceived by the Father, the
an unknown password, spoken and unspoken. And they often bring the soul down 148 into the world for many reasons, either through the shedding of its w
of truth and of love. After which are the demiurgic fountains, such as that of the ideas, according to which the cosmos and the things in it have shap
enclosing the triad towards itself and they call these also intelligible. After these, another order of the intelligible and at the same time intelle
to the setting [sun], and the pit to the one just at mid-heaven. And thus, gently separating the membrane of the liver, [which is placed] upon the org
parts of philosophy is necessary. For according to moral philosophy it is necessary to assume that not all things are and come to be by necessity, but
knowledge and sees not only the essences themselves, but also their powers and their activities, both those according to nature and those contrary to
he acquired. For even before the birth of both, God knew that the one would be good, and the other would turn out bad and this knowledge is an unchan
from the one who knows, and it revolves around the thing known and is made like the one who knows. I mean something like this: the knowledge of the so
they fabricate. For I too had a certain little man, ignoble in soul, but by no means the least of storytellers to him, at any rate, such phantoms pre
of knowledge. For there is something intelligible, which you must understand with the flower of the intellect. And he says that the one in us is twofold; on the one hand, like a flower of our primary powers, and on the other, the center of our whole essence and of the various powers around it; for we are not only intellect, but also attention and choice and discursive thought and opinion, and before these powers, one essence that is also many, divisible and indivisible. And the intelligible intellect is being, while the intelligible is existence. And that, he says, the soul contains the fullness of many bosoms, that is, life-giving powers that fill many recipients capable of being made alive by it. And that it is constituted from the intellectual principles and the divine symbols. and just as it is the fullness of all the forms, but subsists according to a single idea, so also it partakes <μὲν> of all the tokens through which it is joined to God, but its existence is defined in one. And that every soul is distinct from every other in form. for if the being of the soul is a simple principle and form, then one soul will either not differ at all in essence from another soul, or it would differ in form. And in each are all things according to one, both the intellectual principles and the tokens; for the subsistence of many individuals of the same form according to one form has to do with <τε> matter and the composite beings, with the underlying nature partaking variously of the same form. On the Intellect You read the letter I wrote with great pleasure, but you wish not to have the things concerning intellect and soul in the same letter, but that in one the entire intellectual property be made known to you, and in another <δὲ> the whole psychic one. 21 This letter, therefore, taking up the intellect alone, summarizes concisely the things concerning it from those who philosophized among the Greeks. Every intellect, then, according to the Greek opinions, is either unparticipated or participated. for the unparticipated leads the whole multitude of intellects, having the primary existence. And of those that are participated, some illuminate the supercosmic and unparticipated soul, and others the encosmic. and the first knows only itself, but each of those after it knows both itself and the things before it. and in activity, as intellect, it knows itself, being no other than the things being known. and the unparticipated knows all things simply, while each of those after it knows all things according to one. and every intellect has its essence and its power and its activity in eternity. and it is an indivisible essence, and without magnitude, and bodiless, and motionless. and some things exist according to cause, as many as are after it, and some according to participation, as many as are before it, and it has obtained an intellectual essence according to its own existence. and it defines all things, both those which are according to cause and those which are according to participation. and it is the immediate hypostatizer of eternal and unchangeable things. and by knowing it gives subsistence to the things after it, and the making is in the knowing and the knowing is in the making. and it is participated in primarily by those things that are intellectual in essence and at the same time in activity. and all the intellectual forms are both in one another and each by itself. and every intellect, being a fullness of forms, is comprehensive, one of more universal forms, another of more particular ones. and every intellectual form is productive of eternal things. and every intellect is a whole, as having subsisted from parts. and every participated intellect is either divine, as being attached to gods, or intellectual only. and the divine intellect is participated in by divine souls. and the participated intellect is participated in by souls that are neither divine nor become intellectual and unintellectual in turn, but by those that are always intellectual in essence <καὶ> in activity. and the entire intellectual number is limited. and every intellect is a whole, as having subsisted from parts; for each is both united with the others and distinguished from them. But the unparticipated intellect is simply a whole, as also having all the parts universally in itself, while each of the particular intellects has the whole in a partial way, and thus all things are partially; for all things are according to one, and "according to one" is nothing other than "partially." These are the things philosophized about the intellect by the philosopher Proclus in his Theological Elements. 22 On the Soul Behold, I also set before you the Greek doctrines concerning the soul, some of which are also for our oracles
γνώσεως. Ἔστιν γάρ τι νοητόν, ὃ χρή σε νοεῖν νόου ἄνθει. διττὸν δέ φησι τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν ἕν· τὸ μὲν τῆς πρωτίστης ἡμῶν τῶν δυνάμεων
οἷον ἄνθος, τὸ δὲ τῆς ὅλης οὐσίας κέντρον καὶ τῶν περὶ αὐτὴν παντοίων δυνάμεων· οὐ γάρ ἐσμεν νοῦς μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ προσοχὴ
καὶ προαίρεσις καὶ διάνοια καὶ δόξα καὶ πρὸ τῶν δυνάμεων τούτων οὐσία μία καὶ πολλὴ καὶ μεριστὴ καὶ ἀμερής. Καὶ ὂν μέν ἐστιν
ὁ νοητὸς νοῦς, ὕπαρξις δὲ τὸ νοητόν. Καὶ ὅτι, φησίν, ἡ ψυχὴ περιέχει πολλῶν κόλπων πληρώματα, τουτέστι ζωοποιοὺς δυνάμεις
ἀποπληρωτικὰς πολλῶν ὑποδοχῶν τῶν δυναμένων ζωοποιεῖσθαι παρ' αὐτῆς. Καὶ ὅτι συνέστηκεν αὕτη ἀπὸ τῶν νοερῶν λόγων καὶ τῶν
θείων συμβόλων. καὶ ὥσπερ πάντων ἐστὶ πλήρωμα τῶν εἰδῶν, κατὰ μίαν δὲ ἰδέαν ὑφέστηκεν, οὕτω καὶ πάντων <μὲν> μετέχει τῶν συνθημάτων
δι' ὧν συνάπτεται τῷ θεῷ, ἀφώρισται δὲ ἡ ὕπαρξις αὐτῆς ἐν ἑνί. Καὶ ὅτι πᾶσα ψυχὴ πάσης κατ' εἶδος διέστηκεν. εἰ γὰρ τὸ εἶναι
τῆς ψυχῆς λόγος ἐστὶ καὶ εἶδος ἁπλοῦν, ἢ οὐδὲν διοίσει κατ' οὐσίαν ψυχή τις ἄλλης ψυχῆς ἢ κατ' εἶδος ἂν διαφέρῃ. Καὶ ἔστιν
ἐν ἑκάστῃ πάντα καθ' ἕν, οἵ τε νοεροὶ λόγοι καὶ τὰ συνθήματα· τὸ γὰρ καθ' ἓν εἶδος πολλῶν εἶναι ἀτόμων ὑπόστασιν ὁμοειδῶν
περί <τε> τὴν ὕλην ἐστὶ καὶ τὰ σύνθετα τῶν ὄντων, τῆς ὑποκειμένης φύσεως ποικίλως τοῦ αὐτοῦ μετεχούσης εἴδους. Περὶ νοῦ Ἀνέγνως
μὲν ἥδιστα ὡς ἔγραψα τὴν ἐπιστολήν, βούλει δὲ μὴ ἐν ταὐτῷ γράμματι τὰ περὶ νοῦ καὶ ψυχῆς ἔχειν, ἀλλ' ἐν ἑτέρῳ μὲν τὴν πᾶσαν
νοερὰν ἰδιότητα γνωρισθῆναι σοι, ἐν ἑτέρῳ <δὲ> σύμπασαν τὴν ψυχικήν. 21 αὕτη τοιγαροῦν ἡ ἐπιστολὴ τὸν νοῦν μόνον ἀπολαβοῦσα
τὰ περὶ αὐτοῦ ἐκ τῶν παρ' Ἕλλησι φιλοσοφησάντων ἐπιτετμημένως κεφαλαιοῖ. Πᾶς τοίνυν νοῦς κατὰ τὰς Ἑλληνικὰς δόξας ἢ ἀμέθεκτός
ἐστιν ἢ μεθεκτός. παντὸς γὰρ τοῦ πλήθους τῶν νόων ὁ ἀμέθεκτος ἡγεῖται, πρωτίστην ἔχων ὕπαρξιν. τῶν δὲ μετεχομένων οἱ μὲν τὴν
ὑπερκόσμιον καὶ ἀμέθεκτον ἐλλάμπουσι ψυχήν, οἱ δὲ τὴν ἐγκόσμιον. καὶ ὁ μὲν πρῶτος ἑαυτὸν μόνον νοεῖ, ἕκαστος δὲ τῶν ἐφεξῆς
ἑαυτὸν ἅμα καὶ τὰ πρὸ αὐτοῦ. κατ' ἐνέργειαν δὲ ὡς νοῦς ἑαυτὸν νοεῖ οὐκ ἄλλον ὄντα παρὰ τὰ νοούμενα. καὶ ὁ μὲν ἀμέθεκτος ἁπλῶς
πάντα νοεῖ, τῶν δὲ μετ' ἐκεῖνον ἕκαστος καθ' ἓν πάντα. καὶ πᾶς νοῦς ἐν αἰῶνι τὴν οὐσίαν ἔχει καὶ τὴν δύναμιν καὶ τὴν ἐνέργειαν.
καὶ ἀμέριστός ἐστιν οὐσία καὶ ἀμεγέθης καὶ ἀσώματος καὶ ἀκίνητος. καὶ τὰ μέν ἐστι κατ' αἰτίαν, ὅσα μετ' αὐτόν, τὰ δὲ κατὰ
μέθεξιν, ὅσα πρὸ αὐτοῦ, νοερὰν δὲ ἔλαχεν οὐσίαν κατὰ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ ὕπαρξιν. καὶ ἀφορίζει πάντα καὶ ἃ κατ' αἰτίαν ἐστὶ καὶ ἃ κατὰ
μέθεξιν. ἀιδίων τέ ἐστι προσεχῶς καὶ ἀμεταβλήτων ὑποστάτης. καὶ τῷ νοεῖν ὑφίστησι τὰ μετ' αὐτόν, καὶ ἡ ποίησις ἐν τῷ νοεῖν
καὶ ἡ νόησις ἐν τῷ ποιεῖν. καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν κατ' οὐσίαν ἅμα καὶ ἐνέργειαν νοερῶν μετέχεται πρώτως. καὶ πάντα τὰ νοερὰ εἴδη καὶ
ἐν ἀλλήλοις εἰσὶ καὶ καθ' αὑτὸ ἕκαστον. καὶ πᾶς νοῦς πλήρωμα ὢν εἰδῶν, ὁ μὲν ὁλικωτέρων, ὁ δὲ μερικωτέρων ἐστὶ περιεκτικός.
καὶ πᾶν νοερὸν εἶδος ἀιδίων ἐστὶν ὑποστατικόν. καὶ πᾶς νοῦς ὅλος ἐστὶν ὡς ἐκ μερῶν ὑποστάς. καὶ πᾶς ὁ μετεχόμενος νοῦς ἢ θεῖός
ἐστιν ὡς θεῶν ἐξημμένος ἢ νοερὸς μόνον. καὶ ὁ θεῖος νοῦς ὑπὸ ψυχῶν μετέχεται θείων. καὶ ὁ μετεχόμενος νοῦς μετέχεται ὑπὸ ψυχῶν
οὔτε θείων οὔτε νοῦ καὶ ἀνοίας ἐν μεταβολῇ γινομένων, ἀλλ' ὑπὸ τῶν κατ' οὐσίαν ἀεὶ <καὶ> κατ' ἐνέργειαν νοερῶν. καὶ πᾶς ὁ
νοερὸς ἀριθμὸς πεπέρασται. καὶ πᾶς νοῦς ὅλος ἐστὶν ὡς ἐκ μερῶν ὑποστάς· ἕκαστος γὰρ καὶ ἥνωται τοῖς ἄλλοις καὶ διακέκριται
ἀπ' αὐτῶν. ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν ἀμέθεκτος νοῦς ἁπλῶς ὅλος ὡς καὶ τὰ μέρη πάντα ὁλικῶς ἔχων ἐν ἑαυτῷ, τῶν δὲ μερικῶν ἕκαστος ἐν μέρει
τὸ ὅλον ἔχει καὶ οὕτως πάντα ἐστὶ μερικῶς· καθ' ἓν γὰρ πάντα, τὸ δὲ καθ' ἓν οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἐστὶν ἢ μερικῶς. Ταῦτά ἐστι τὰ τῷ φιλοσόφῳ
Πρόκλῳ πεφιλοσοφημένα περὶ νοῦ ἐν τῇ θεολογικῇ αὐτοῦ στοιχειώσει. 22 Περὶ ψυχῆσ Ἰδού σοι καὶ τὰ περὶ ψυχῆς παρατίθημι Ἑλληνικὰ
δόγματα, ὧν ἔνια καὶ τοῖς ἡμετέροις λογίοις
