A Treatise on the Predestination of the Saints,
Chapter 3 [II.]—Even the Beginning of Faith is of God’s Gift.
Chapter 4.—Continuation of the Preceding.
Chapter 5.—To Believe is to Think with Assent.
Chapter 6.—Presumption and Arrogance to Be Avoided.
Chapter 7 [III.]—Augustin Confesses that He Had Formerly Been in Error Concerning the Grace of God.
Chapter 8 [IV.]—What Augustin Wrote to Simplicianus, the Successor of Ambrose, Bishop of Milan.
Chapter 9 [V.]—The Purpose of the Apostle in These Words.
Chapter 10.—It is God’s Grace Which Specially Distinguishes One Man from Another.
Chapter 11 [VI.]—That Some Men are Elected is of God’s Mercy.
Chapter 12 [VII.]—Why the Apostle Said that We are Justified by Faith and Not by Works.
Chapter 13 [VIII.]—The Effect of Divine Grace.
Chapter 14.—Why the Father Does Not Teach All that They May Come to Christ.
Chapter 15.—It is Believers that are Taught of God.
Chapter 16.—Why the Gift of Faith is Not Given to All.
Chapter 18.—The Preceding Argument Applied to the Present Time.
Chapter 19 [X]—In What Respects Predestination and Grace Differ.
Chapter 20.—Did God Promise the Good Works of the Nations and Not Their Faith, to Abraham?
Chapter 22.—God’s Promise is Sure.
Chapter 23 [XII.]—Remarkable Illustrations of Grace and Predestination in Infants, and in Christ.
Chapter 24.—That No One is Judged According to What He Would Have Done If He Had Lived Longer.
Chapter 26 [XIV]—Reference to Cyprian’s Treatise “On the Mortality.”
Chapter 27.—The Book of Wisdom Obtains in the Church the Authority of Canonical Scripture.
Chapter 28.—Cyprian’s Treatise “On the Mortality.”
Chapter 29.—God’s Dealing Does Not Depend Upon Any Contingent Merits of Men.
Chapter 30 [XV.]—The Most Illustrious Instance of Predestination is Christ Jesus.
Chapter 31.—Christ Predestinated to Be the Son of God.
Chapter 32 [XVI.]—The Twofold Calling.
Chapter 35 [XVIII.]—Election is for the Purpose of Holiness.
Chapter 39—The Beginning of Faith is God’s Gift.
Chapter 40 [XX.]—Apostolic Testimony to the Beginning of Faith Being God’s Gift.
Chapter 41.—Further Apostolic Testimonies.
Chapter 10.—It is God’s Grace Which Specially Distinguishes One Man from Another.
In this the apostle’s most evident intention, in which he speaks against human pride, so that none should glory in man but in God, it is too absurd, as I think, to suppose God’s natural gifts, whether man’s entire and perfected nature itself as it was bestowed on him in his first state, or the remains, whatever they may be, of his degraded nature. For is it by such gifts as these, which are common to all men, that men are distinguished from men? But here he first said, “For who maketh thee to differ?” and then added, “And what hast thou that thou hast not received?” Because a man, puffed up against another, might say, “My faith makes me to differ,” or “My righteousness,” or anything else of the kind. In reply to such notions, the good teacher says, “But what hast thou that thou hast not received?” And from whom but from Him who maketh thee to differ from another, on whom He bestowed not what He bestowed on thee? “Now if,” says he, “thou hast received it, why dost thou glory as if thou receivedst it not?” Is he concerned, I ask, about anything else save that he who glorieth should glory in the Lord? But nothing is so opposed to this feeling as for any one to glory concerning his own merits in such a way as if he himself had made them for himself, and not the grace of God,—a grace, however, which makes the good to differ from the wicked, and is not common to the good and the wicked. Let the grace, therefore, whereby we are living and reasonable creatures, and are distinguished from cattle, be attributed to nature; let that grace also by which, among men themselves, the handsome are made to differ from the ill-formed, or the intelligent from the stupid, or anything of that kind, be ascribed to nature. But he whom the apostle was rebuking did not puff himself up as contrasted with cattle, nor as contrasted with any other man, in respect of any natural endowment which might be found even in the worst of men. But he ascribed to himself, and not to God, some good gift which pertained to a holy life, and was puffed up therewith when he deserved to hear the rebuke, “Who hath made thee to differ? and what hast thou that thou receivedst not?” For though the capacity to have faith is of nature, is it also of nature to have it? “For all men have not faith,”44 2 Thess. iii. 2. although all men have the capacity to have faith. But the apostle does not say, “And what hast thou capacity to have, the capacity to have which thou receivedst not?” but he says, “And what hast thou which thou receivedst not?” Accordingly, the capacity to have faith,45 Thence says Bernard, in his treatise On Grace and Free Will, ch. i.: “God is the author of salvation. Free will is only capable of it.” Comp. On the Calling of the Gentiles, Book ii. ch. 2, and Fulgentius, On the Incarnation and Grace of our Lord Jesus Christ, chs. 22, 23, and 24. as the capacity to have love, belongs to men’s nature; but to have faith, even as to have love, belongs to the grace of believers. That nature, therefore, in which is given to us the capacity of having faith, does not distinguish man from man, but faith itself makes the believer to differ from the unbeliever. And thus, when it is said, “For who maketh thee to differ? and what hast thou that thou receivedst not?” if any one dare to say, “I have faith of myself, I did not, therefore, receive it,” he directly contradicts this most manifest truth,—not because it is not in the choice of man’s will to believe or not to believe, but because in the elect the will is prepared by the Lord. Thus, moreover, the passage, “For who maketh thee to differ? and what hast thou that thou receivedst not?” refers to that very faith which is in the will of man.
10. In hac Apostoli evidentissima intentione, qua contra humanam superbiam loquitur, ne quisquam in homine, sed in Domino glorietur, dona Dei naturalia suspicari, sive ipsam totam perfectamque naturam, qualis in prima conditione donata est, sive vitiatae 0968 naturae qualescumque reliquias, nimis, quantum existimo, absurdum est. Numquid enim per haec dona quae omnibus communia sunt hominibus, discernuntur homines ab hominibus? Hic autem prius dixit, Quis enim te discernit? et deinde addidit, Quid autem habes quod non accepisti? Posset quippe dicere homo inflatus adversus alterum, Discernit me fides mea, justitia mea, vel si quid aliud. Talibus occurrens cogitationibus bonus doctor, Quid autem habes, inquit, quod non accepisti? A quo, nisi ab illo qui te discernit ab alio, cui non donavit quod donavit tibi? Si autem et accepisti, ait, quid gloriaris quasi non acceperis? Num, quaeso, agit aliud, nisi ut qui gloriatur, in Domino glorietur? Nihil autem huic sensui tam contrarium est, quam de suis meritis sic quemquam gloriari, tanquam ipse sibi ea fecerit, non gratia Dei: sed gratia quae bonos discernit a malis, non quae communis est bonis et malis. Sit ergo gratia naturae attributa, qua sumus animantia rationalia, discernimurque a pecoribus; sit etiam gratia naturae attributa, qua in ipsis hominibus a deformibus pulchri, vel ingeniosi discernuntur a tardis, ac si quid ejusmodi est: sed non se ille, quem coercebat Apostolus, adversus pecus inflabat, nec adversus hominem alterum de aliquo naturali munere quod inesse posset et pessimo; sed aliquod bonum quod pertineret ad vitam bonam, sibi non Deo tribuens inflabatur, quando audire meruit, Quis enim te discernit? Quid autem habes quod non accepisti? Ut enim sit naturae, fidem posse habere; numquid et habere? Non enim omnium est fides (II Thess. III, 2); cum fidem posse habere sit omnium. Non autem ait Apostolus, Quid autem potes habere, quod non acccepisti ut posses habere; sed ait, Quid autem habes quod non accepisti? Proinde posse habere fidem, sicut posse habere charitatem, naturae est hominum: habere autem fidem quemadmodum habere charitatem, gratiae est fidelium . Illa itaque natura, in qua nobis data est possibilitas habendi fidem, non discernit ab homine hominem: ipsa vero fides discernit ab infideli fidelem. Ac per hoc, ubi dicitur, Quis enim te discernit? Quid autem habes quod non accepisti? quisquis audet dicere, Habeo ex me ipso fidem, non ergo accepi; profecto contradicit huic apertissimae veritati: non quia credere vel non credere non est in arbitrio voluntatis humanae, sed in electis praeparatur voluntas a Domino (Prov. VIII, sec. LXX). Ideo ad ipsam quoque fidem, quae in voluntate est, pertinet, Quis enim te discernit? Quid autem habes quod non accepisti?