Chapter I.—Defence of the Truth Should Precede Discussions Regarding It.
Chapter II.—A Resurrection is Not Impossible.
Chapter III.—He Who Could Create, Can Also Raise Up the Dead.
Chapter IV.—Objection from the Fact that Some Human Bodies Have Become Part of Others.
Chapter V.—Reference to the Processes of Digestion and Nutrition.
Chapter VI.—Everything that is Useless or Hurtful is Rejected.
Chapter VII.—The Resurrection-Body Different from the Present.
Chapter VIII.—Human Flesh Not the Proper or Natural Food of Men.
Chapter IX.—Absurdity of Arguing from Man’s Impotency.
Chapter X.—It Cannot Be Shown that God Does Not Will a Resurrection.
Chapter XII.—Argument for the Resurrection From the Purpose Contemplated in Man’s Creation.
Chapter XIII.—Continuation of the Argument.
Chapter XIV.—The Resurrection Does Not Rest Solely on the Fact of a Future Judgment.
Chapter XV.—Argument for the Resurrection from the Nature of Man.
Chapter XVI—Analogy of Death and Sleep, and Consequent Argument for the Resurrection.
Chapter XVII.—The Series of Changes We Can Now Trace in Man Renders a Resurrection Probable.
Chapter XIX.—Man Would Be More Unfavourably Situated Than the Beasts If There Were No Resurrection.
Chapter XXI.—Continuation of the Argument.
Chapter XXII.—Continuation of the Argument.
Chapter XXIII.—Continuation of the Argument.
Chapter XXIV.—Argument for the Resurrection from the Chief End of Man.
For that which is not accordant with His will is so either as being unjust or as unworthy of Him. And again, the injustice regards either him who is to rise again, or some other than he. But it is evident that no one of the beings exterior to him, and that are reckoned among the things that have existence, is injured. Spiritual natures (νοηταὶ φύσεις) cannot be injured by the resurrection of men, for the resurrection of men is no hindrance to their existing, nor is any loss or violence inflicted on them by it; nor, again, would the nature of irrational or inanimate beings sustain wrong, for they will have no existence after the resurrection, and no wrong can be done to that which is not. But even if any one should suppose them to exist for ever, they would not suffer wrong by the renewal of human bodies: for if now, in being subservient to the nature of men and their necessities while they require them, and subjected to the yoke and every kind of drudgery, they suffer no wrong, much more, when men have become immortal and free from want, and no longer need their service, and when they are themselves liberated from bondage, will they suffer no wrong. For if they had the gift of speech, they would not bring against the Creator the charge of making them, contrary to justice, inferior to men because they did not share in the same resurrection. For to creatures whose nature is not alike the Just Being does not assign a like end. And, besides, with creatures that have no notion of justice there can be no complaint of injustice. Nor can it be said either that there is any injustice done as regards the man to be raised, for he consists of soul and body, and he suffers no wrong as to either soul or body. No person in his senses will affirm that his soul suffers wrong, because, in speaking so, he would at the same time be unawares reflecting on the present life also; for if now, while dwelling in a body subject to corruption and suffering, it has had no wrong done to it, much less will it suffer wrong when living in conjunction with a body which is free from corruption and suffering. The body, again, suffers no wrong; for if no wrong is done to it now while united a corruptible thing with an incorruptible, manifestly will it not be wronged when united an incorruptible with an incorruptible. No; nor can any one say that it is a work unworthy of God to raise up and bring together again a body which has been dissolved: for if the worse was not unworthy of Him, namely, to make the body which is subject to corruption and suffering, much more is the better not unworthy, to make one not liable to corruption or suffering.
Τὸ γὰρ ἀβούλητον ἢ ὡς ἄδικον αὐτῷ ἐστιν ἀβούλητον ἢ ὡς ἀνάξιον. καὶ πάλιν τὸ ἄδικον ἢ περὶ αὐτὸν θεωρεῖται τὸν ἀναστησόμενον ἢ περὶ ἄλλον τινὰ παρ' αὐτόν. ἀλλ' ὅτι μὲν οὐδεὶς ἀδικεῖται τῶν ἔξωθεν καὶ τῶν ἐν τοῖς οὖσιν ἀριθμουμένων, πρόδηλον. οὔτε γὰρ αἱ νοηταὶ φύσεις ἐκ τῆς τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἀναστάσεως ἀδικηθεῖεν ἄν· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐμπόδιόν τι ταύταις πρὸς τὸ εἶναι, οὐ βλάβος, οὐχ ὕβρις ἡ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἀνάστασις· οὐ μὴν οὐδὲ τῶν ἀλόγων ἡ φύσις οὐδὲ τῶν ἀψύχων· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἔσται μετὰ τὴν ἀνάστασιν, περὶ δὲ τὸ μὴ ὂν οὐδὲν ἄδικον. εἰ δὲ καὶ εἶναί τις ὑποθοῖτο διὰ παντός, οὐκ ἂν ἀδικηθείη ταῦτα τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων σωμάτων ἀνανεωθέντων· εἰ γὰρ νῦν ὑπείκοντα τῇ φύσει τῶν ἀνθρώπων [καὶ] τῆς τούτων χρείας ὄντων ἐνδεῶν ὑπό τε ζυγὸν ἠγμένα καὶ δουλείαν παντοίαν οὐδὲν ἀδικεῖται, πολὺ μᾶλλον, ἀφθάρτων καὶ ἀνενδεῶν γενομένων καὶ μηκέτι δεομένων τῆς τούτων χρείας, ἐλευθερωθέντα δὲ πάσης δουλείας, οὐκ ἀδικηθήσεται. οὐδὲ γὰρ, εἰ φωνῆς μετεῖχεν, ᾐτιάσατο ἂν τὸν δημιουργὸν ὡς παρὰ τὸ δίκαιον ἐλαττούμενα τῶν ἀνθρώπων, ὅτι μὴ τῆς αὐτῆς τούτοις τετύχηκεν ἀναστάσεως. ὧν γὰρ ἡ φύσις οὐκ ἴση, τούτοις οὐδὲ τὸ τέλος ἴσον ὁ δίκαιος ἐπιμετρεῖ. χωρὶς δὲ τούτων, παρ' οἷς οὐδεμία τοῦ δικαίου κρίσις, οὐδὲ μέμψις ἀδικίας. οὐ μὴν οὐδ' ἐκεῖνο φῆσαι δυνατὸν ὡς περὶ αὐτὸν θεωρεῖταί τις ἀδικία τὸν ἀνιστάμενον ἄνθρωπον. ἔστι μὲν γὰρ οὗτος ἐκ ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος, οὔτε δὲ εἰς ψυχὴν οὔτε εἰς σῶμα δέχεται τὴν ἀδικίαν. οὔτε γὰρ τὴν ψυχὴν ἀδικεῖσθαι φήσει τις σωφρονῶν· λήσεται γὰρ ταύτῃ συνεκβάλλων καὶ τὴν παροῦσαν ζωήν· εἰ γὰρ νῦν ἐν φθαρτῷ καὶ παθητῷ κατοικοῦσα σώματι μηδὲν ἠδίκηται, πολὺ μᾶλλον ἀφθάρτῳ καὶ ἀπαθεῖ συζῶσα οὐκ ἀδικηθήσεται. ἀλλ' οὐδὲ τὸ σῶμα ἀδικεῖταί τι· εἰ γὰρ νῦν φθαρτὸν ἀφθάρτῳ συνὸν [ἀδικηθή]σεται. οὐ μὴν οὐδ' ἐκεῖνο φαίη τις ἂν ὡς ἀνάξιον ἔργον τοῦ θεοῦ τὸ διαλυθὲν ἀναστῆσαι σῶμα καὶ συναγαγεῖν· εἰ γὰρ τὸ χεῖρον οὐκ ἀνάξιον, τοῦτ' ἔστι τὸ φθαρτὸν ποιῆσαι σῶμα καὶ παθητόν, πολὺ μᾶλλον τὸ κρεῖττον οὐκ ἀνάξιον, ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἄφθαρτον καὶ ἀπαθές.