LESSON VI

[iii. 7. 1279a23-8. 1280a7]

             391 After having distinguished just regimes from unjust ones, the Philosopher here seeks to distinguish both groups among themselves. In this connection he does two things. First, he states his aim. Secondly, he carries out his proposal. He says then, first of all, that, now that these things have been determined, we must next treat of the number and nature of the regimes in the following order: first, we shall consider the just regimes and, secondly, the unjust regimes.

             392 Then he distinguishes the regimes, and in this connection he does three things. First, he shows on what basis the distinction of the regimes is to be made. Secondly, he distinguishes the regimes. Thirdly, he raises an objection against what has been said.

             He says then, first of all, that a regime is nothing other than the order of the rulers in the city; and indeed regimes must be distinguished according to the difference of rulers. In a city, either one, or a few, or the many rule; and any one of these three cases can come about in two ways: one, when they rule for the common benefit, and in this case we shall have just regimes; the other, when they rule for the private benefit of those who are in power, whether that be one man, or a few, or many, and in this case we have perversions of regimes; for we have to say either that the subjects are not citizens or that in some things they share in the benefit of the city.

             393 Then he distinguishes both groups of regimes by their proper names. First, he distinguishes the just regimes and, secondly, the corrupt regimes.

             He says then, first of all, that if there is a rule of one man, it is usually called kingly rule if it seeks the common benefit. The regime in which only a few, but more than one, rule for the sake of the common good is called the state of the best, either because the best, that is to say, the virtuous, rule or because such a regime is ordered to the greatest good of the city and all the citizens. And when the multitude rules and seeks the common benefit, the regime is called a commonwealth (respublica), which is a name common to all the regimes. And it is not without reason that this regime should chance to be called by this name; for it easily happens that in a city one or a few men are found who greatly surpass the others in virtue, but it is extremely difficult to find many who arrive at the perfection of virtue. This rather happens above all with reference to military virtue, namely, that many should excel in it. Hence in this regime, military men and men who possess arms are the ones who rule.

             394 Then he distinguishes the corruptions of these regimes by name. He says that the perversions of the aforesaid regimes are the following: tyranny is a perversion of kingship, the rule of the few a perversion of the rule of the best, and the popular state a perversion of the commonwealth. From this he concludes that tyranny is the rule of one man seeking his own benefit; the rule of the few, that which seeks the benefit of the rich; and a popular state, that which seeks the benefit of the poor. None of these seeks the common benefit.

             395 Then he raises an objection to what has been said; and in this connection he does three things. First, he states his aim and repeats what has been said. Secondly, he raises a difficulty. Thirdly, he proposes the solution.

             He says then, first of all, that we must stand at a slightly greater distance and discuss what each one of the previously mentioned regimes is, since it presents certain difficulties. He who philosophizes in any art and considers the truth, as it were, not only looks to what is useful for action; he should not look down on or pass over anything but rather set out the truth in each instance. Now we said that a tyranny is a certain monarchy that exercises its domination over the political community because it makes use of citizens as slaves. A rule of the few exists when the regime is dominated by those who abound in riches. And a popular state exists when the regime is dominated, not by those who have an abundance of riches, but rather by the poor.

             396 Then he raises the difficulty. First, he states the difficulty. Secondly, he eliminates a certain answer.

             He says then, first of all, that the first difficulty concerns the definition of popular rule and of the rule of the few. Let us suppose, then, that in a certain city the rich outnumber the poor and that the rich are the masters of the city. It seems, according to this, that there exists here a rule of the many. Likewise, if it should happen, on the other hand, that the poor are fewer but better and stronger and dominate the city, it will follow, according to this, that there exists here a rule of the few. It does not seem, therefore, that we defined the regimes properly when [140] we said that the state of the many consists in the domination of the poor and the state of the few in the domination of the rich.

             397 Then he eliminates an answer. Someone could indeed say that, in the definition of the rule of the few, fewness should be added to riches, and, in the definition of the rule of the many, multitude should be added to poverty, in such a way that the rule of the few is that in which a few rich men govern, and the rule of the many that in which many poor men govern. But this, in turn, poses another problem. For, if the regimes have been adequately divided, so that there is no other regime besides the ones mentioned, it will be impossible to say under which regime the two aforesaid regimes, the ones in which either many rich men or a few poor men rule, are comprised.

             398 Then from what has been premised he infers the solution of the difficulty. He says that the nature of the difficulty just mentioned seems to indicate that the fact that there are many rulers is related only incidentally to the rule of the few, since everywhere one finds that the poor outnumber the rich; and, accordingly, these things are named as they are found to exist for the most part. But that which is incidental does not constitute a specific difference and, hence, the rules of the few are not distinguished, essentially speaking, from the rule of the many on the basis of large and small numbers. Rather, that by which they differ essentially is poverty and riches. For the nature of the rule that is ordered to opulence is other than that of the rule that is ordered to freedom, which constitutes the end of the rule of the many. And hence, wherever some rule for the sake of riches, whether they be more numerous or less numerous, there we necessarily have a state of the few; and wherever the poor rule, there we necessarily have a rule of the many. It is incidental, however, that the latter be numerous and the former few. For those who abound in riches are few, but all share in freedom; and for this reason these two elements fight with each other. The few wish to be set over the others on account of their excess of riches, and the many wish to prevail over the few, being as it were their equals on account of freedom.

[Here ends Aquinas' commentary on the Politics of Aristotle.]

Notes