On the Soul and the Resurrection.
What then, I asked, is the doctrine here?
What then, I asked, are we to say to those whose hearts fail at these calamities ?
But, said she, which of these points has been left unnoticed in what has been said?
Why, the actual doctrine of the Resurrection, I replied.
And yet, she answered, much in our long and detailed discussion pointed to that.
Would not the defenders of the opposite belief say this: that the body, being composite, must necessarily be resolved into that of which it is composed? And when the coalition of elements in the body ceases, each of those elements naturally gravitates towards its kindred element with the irresistible bias of like to like; the heat in us will thus unite with heat, the earthy with the solid, and each of the other elements also will pass towards its like. Where, then, will the soul be after that? If one affirm that it is in those elements, one will be obliged to admit that it is identical with them, for this fusion could not possibly take place between two things of different natures. But this being granted, the soul must necessarily be viewed as a complex thing, fused as it is with qualities so opposite. But the complex is not simple, but must be classed with the composite, and the composite is necessarily dissoluble; and dissolution means the destruction of the compound; and the destructible is not immortal, else the flesh itself, resolvable as it is into its constituent elements, might so be called immortal. If, on the other hand, the soul is something other than these elements, where can our reason suggest a place for it to be, when it is thus, by virtue of its alien nature, not to be discovered in those elements, and there is no other place in the world, either, where it may continue, in harmony with its own peculiar character, to exist? But, if a thing can be found nowhere, plainly it has no existence.
_Γ. Ἐπειδὴ τοῦτο ἐκέλευσε, παραιτησάμενος αὐτὴν μὴ κατὰ ἀλήθειαν οἰηθῆναι τὰ παρ' ἡμῶν ἀντιλέγεσθαι, ἀλλ' ὑπὲρ τοῦ βεβαίως κατασκευασθῆναι τὸ περὶ ψυχῆς δόγμα, τῶν ἀντιπιπτόντων πρὸς τὸν σκοπὸν τοῦτον ὑπεκλυθέντων:
Ἦ που, ἔφην, ταῦτα ἂν εἴποιεν οἱ τῷ ἐναντίῳ παριστάμενοι λόγῳ, ὅτι τὸ σῶμα σύνθετον ὂν, πάντως εἰς τὰ, ἐξ ὧν συνέστηκε, διαλύεται; Λυθείσης δὲ τῶν στοιχείων τῆς ἐν τῷ σώματι συμφυΐας, ἐπὶ τὸ οἰκεῖον ἐν ἑκάστῳ γίνεται κατὰ τὸ εἰκὸς ἡ ῥοπὴ αὐτῆς φύσεως τῶν στοιχείων, δι' ὁλκῆς τινος ἀναγκαίας τῇ ὁμογενεῖ τὸ οἰκεῖον ἀποδιδούσης. Τῷ τε γὰρ θερμῷ πάλιν τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν ἑνωθήσεται, καὶ τῷ στεῤῥῷ τὸ γεῶδες, καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν ἑκάστῳ πρὸς τὸ συγγενὲς ἡ μεταχώρησις γίνεται. Ἡ οὖν ψυχὴ μετὰ τοῦτο ποῦ ἔσται; Εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἐν τοῖς στοιχείοις εἶναί τις λέγοι, τὴν αὐτὴν εἶναι τούτοις κατ' ἀνάγκην συνθήσεται. Οὐ γὰρ ἂν γένοιτό τις τοῦ ἑτεροφυοῦς πρὸς τὸ ἀλλότριον μίξις, καὶ, εἰ ταῦτα εἴη, ποικίλη τις πάντως ἀναφανήσεται ἡ πρὸς τὰς ἐναντίας μεμιγμένη ποιότητας, τὸ δὲ ποικίλον ἁπλοῦν οὐκ ἔστιν, ἀλλ' ἐν συνθέσει θεωρεῖται πάντως. Πᾶν δὲ τὸ σύνθετον καὶ διαλυτὸν ἐξ ἀνάγκης: ἡ δὲ διάλυσις φθορὰ τοῦ συνεστῶτός ἐστι. Τὸ δὲ φθειρόμενον οὐκ ἀθάνατον: ἢ οὕτως γε ἂν καὶ ἡ σὰρξ ἀθάνατος λέγοιτο, εἰς τὰ, ἐξ ὧν συνέστηκε, λυομένη. Εἰ δὲ ἄλλο τί που παρὰ ταῦτά ἐστι, ποῦ λόγος αὐτὴν εἶναι ὑποτίθεται, ἐν μὲν τοῖς στοιχείοις διὰ τοῦ ἑτεροφυῶς αὐτὴν ἔχειν οὐχ εὑρισκομένην; ἄλλου δὲ οὐδενὸς ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ ὄντος, ἐν ᾧ γένοιτ' ἂν ἡ ψυχὴ καταλλήλως τῇ ἰδίᾳ φύσει ἐμβιοτεύουσα; Ὃ δὲ μηδαμῆ ἐστιν, οὐδέ ἐστι πάντως.