12 And indeed, he still intends to make us just and prudent and temperate or brave, because of our own sluggishness and sloth, even though he is very eager; for we neither possess nor have yet come near any human or divine virtue whatsoever, far from it; for these are very great and lofty, and neither is to be attained or chanced upon by anyone, unless God breathes power into him; and we confess that we are neither so suitably disposed by nature, nor yet worthy to attain them; not having done, out of laziness and weakness, all the things that are required of those who desire the best things and seek what is perfect. So then, we are still yet to be just or temperate or to possess any of the other virtues; but that we are lovers, loving with the most ardent love, a thing which perhaps belongs to him alone, this wonderful man, this friend and advocate of the virtues, has long ago established us, by instilling in us a love for his own virtue and for the beauty of justice, of which he has shown us its truly golden face, and of prudence, which is desired by all, and of the most lovely true wisdom, and of godlike temperance, which is stability of soul and peace for all who possess it, and of the most wonderful courage, of our endurance, and above all of piety, which they rightly say is the mother of the virtues. For this is the beginning and end of all the virtues; for starting from this, the other virtues would most easily come to us as well; if, desiring and hastening to acquire for ourselves this which every man ought, at least he who is not an atheist or a lover of pleasure—to become a friend and advocate of God—we should care for the other virtues; so that not unworthy and defiled, but with all virtue and wisdom as with some good guide and most wise priest, we may approach God. For the end of all things I think is nothing other than, having become like with a pure mind, to approach God and to abide in him.

13 Besides all his other diligence and zeal, how could I describe in words his teaching and reverence concerning theology, delving into the very disposition of the man, with what judgment and preparation he wished us to learn all the doctrines concerning the divine, taking care that we should not in any way be in peril concerning the most necessary of all things, the knowledge of the cause of all things. For he thought it right for us to philosophize by studying with all our might all the ancient writings of both philosophers and poets, rejecting nothing nor disapproving of anything (for we did not yet have the judgment to do so); except for the works of the atheists, as many as have rolled away from even human conceptions and say that there is no God or providence (for these it is not worthwhile to read, so that our soul, which is about to be pious, may not be polluted in the least by hearing arguments opposed to the worship of God; for not even those who approach temples of piety, they think, should touch anything at all of the profane); the writings of these men, therefore, are not at all worthy even to be counted among men who have chosen to be pious; but to encounter and converse with all the rest, preferring no single school or philosophical argument, nor again rejecting one, neither Greek nor barbarian, but hearing all of them. This he did wisely and very skillfully; lest somehow some single argument of this or that school, heard by itself and honored, even if it happens not to be true, should enter our soul and deceive us as if it were the only true one, and having disposed us to itself should make us its own, no longer able to depart from it or to wash it out, just like wool that has been dyed with some fast color. For a terrible and versatile thing is human reason, varied in its sophisms, and sharp, rushing into the ears, to impress the mind and to set itself forth, and having persuaded those who are once seized to love it as true, and to remain within, even if it be false and deceitful, like some sorcerer holding sway, having the deceived person himself as its champion. And again, the soul of man is easily deceived by reason and quick to assent, and ready, before it distinguishes and examines in every way, on account of its own dullness and weakness, or on account of

12 Καὶ δῆτα δικαίους μὲν καὶ φρονίμους καὶ σώφρονας ἢ ἀνδρείους ἡμᾶς ὑπὸ ἡμετέρας βραδυτῆτος καὶ νωχελίας, καὶ ταῦτα πάνυ σπεύδων, ἔτι μέλλει κατα στήσεσθαι· οὔτε ἔχοντας οὔτε ἐγγύς πω γενομένους οὐδ' ἡστινοσοῦν ἀρετῆς ἀνθρώπων ἢ θείας, πολλοῦ γε δεῖ· αὗται γὰρ μέγισται καὶ ὑψηλαί, καὶ οὐδετέρα ληπτέα οὐδέ τῳ τυχεῖν, ὅτῳ μὴ θεός γε ἐμπνέοι δύναμιν· ἡμεῖς τε οὔτε πεφύκαμεν οὕτως ἐπιτηδείως, οὔτε καὶ ἄξιοι εἶναι ἐπιτυχεῖν οὐδέπω ὁμολογοῦμεν· οὐ ποιήσαντες ἀπὸ ῥᾳθυμίας καὶ ἀσθενείας πάντα, ἅπερ τοὺς τῶν ἀρίστων ἐφιεμένους καὶ τὰ τέλεια μνωμένους χρή. ∆ίκαιοι μὲν οὖν ἢ σώφρονες ἤ τινα τῶν ἄλλων ἔχειν ἀρετῶν ἔτι μέλλομεν· ἐραστὰς δὲ ἡμᾶς ὅτι δριμύτατον ἐρῶντας ἔρωτα, ὅπερ ἐπ' αὐτῷ μόνον ἴσως, καὶ πάλαι κατεστήσατο ὁ θαυμαστὸς οὗτος καὶ φίλος τῶν ἀρετῶν καὶ προήγορος, ἐμποιήσας ἔρωτα τῇ αὐτοῦ ἀρετῇ καὶ τοῦ κάλλους τῆς δικαιοσύνης, ᾗς τὸ χρύσεον ὄντως ἔδειξεν ἡμῖν πρόσω πον, καὶ φρονήσεως τῆς πᾶσιν ἐφεσίμου, καὶ τῆς ἐρασμιωτά της σοφίας τῆς ἀληθοῦς, καὶ σωφροσύνης τῆς θεοειδοῦς, ἥ ἐστι ψυχῆς εὐστάθεια καὶ εἰρήνη πᾶσι τοῖς κτησαμένοις αὐτήν, καὶ ἀνδρείας τῆς θαυμασιωτάτης, ὑπομονῆς ἡμῶν, καὶ ἐπὶ πᾶσιν εὐσεβείας, ἣν μητέρα φασὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν, ὀρθῶς λέγοντες. Αὕτη γάρ ἐστιν ἀρχὴ καὶ τελευτὴ πασῶν τῶν ἀρετῶν· ἀπὸ ταύτης τε γὰρ ὁρμωμένοις ῥᾷστα ἂν ἡμῖν ἐπιγένοιντο καὶ αἱ λοιπαὶ ἀρεταί· εἰ τοῦθ' ὃ δεῖ πάντα ἄνθρωπον, τόν γε μὴ ἄθεον ἢ φιλήδονον, τὸ φίλον γενέσθαι καὶ προήγορον θεῷ, κτήσασθαι ἑαυτοῖς ἐπιθυ μοῦντες καὶ σπεύδοντες, τῶν λοιπῶν ἀρετῶν ἐπιμελοίμεθα· ὅπως μὴ ἀνάξιοι καὶ ῥυπῶντες, μετὰ δὲ πάσης ἀρετῆς καὶ σοφίας ὥσπερ τινὸς ἀγαθοῦ πομποῦ καὶ ἱερέως σοφω τάτου προσίοιμεν τῷ θεῷ. Τό γε πάντων τέλος οὐχ ἕτερόν τι οἶμαι, ἢ καθαρῷ τῷ νῷ ἐξομοιωθέντα προσελθεῖν τῷ θεῷ καὶ μένειν ἐν αὐτῷ.

13 Ἐπὶ τῇ ἄλλῃ πάσῃ φιλοπονίᾳ καὶ σπουδῇ τὴν περὶ θεολογίας διδασκαλίαν καὶ εὐλάβειαν πῶς ἂν ἐξέλθοιμι τῷ λόγῳ, εἰς αὐτὴν τὴν διάθεσιν εἰσδὺς τοῦ ἀνδρός, σὺν οἵᾳ γνώμῃ καὶ παρασκευῇ τοὺς περὶ τοῦ θείου πάντας ἐκμανθάνειν ἡμᾶς ἤθελε λόγους, φυλαττό μενος, μή πη κινδυνεύσαιμεν περὶ τὸ ἀναγκαιότατον ἁπάντων, τὴν τοῦ πάντων αἰτίου γνῶσιν. Φιλοσοφεῖν μὲν γὰρ ἠξίου ἀναλεγομένους τῶν ἀρχαίων πάντα ὅσα καὶ φιλοσόφων καὶ ὑμνῳδῶν ἐστι γράμματα πάσῃ δυνάμει, μηδὲν ἐκποιουμένους μηδ' ἀποδοκιμάζοντας (οὐδέπω γὰρ οὐδὲ τὴν κρίσιν ἔχειν)· πλὴν ὅσα τῶν ἀθέων εἴη, ὅσοι ἐκκυλισθέντες ὁμοῦ καὶ τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων ἐννοιῶν οὐκ εἶναι θεὸν ἢ πρόνοιαν λέγουσι (ταῦτα γὰρ οὔτ' ἀναγινώσ κειν ἄξιον, ἵνα μηδ' ἐν τῷ τυχόντι μολύνοιθ' ἡμῖν ἡ ψυχή, εὐσεβεῖν μέλλουσα λόγων δὲ ἀκούουσα ὑπεναντίων τῇ τοῦ θεοῦ θεραπείᾳ· οὐδὲ γὰρ τοὺς τοῖς ναοῖς προσιόντας εὐσεβείας, ἧς οἴονται, ἐφάπτεσθαί τινος ὅλως τῶν βεβήλων)· τὰ τούτων τοίνυν οὐδ' ὅλως οὐδὲ ἀριθμεῖσθαι ἄξιον παρ' ἀνδράσιν εὐσεβεῖν ἐπανελομένοις· τοῖς δὲ λοιποῖς πᾶσιν ἐντυγχάνειν καὶ προσομιλεῖν, γένος μὲν οὐδὲ ἓν οὐδὲ λόγον φιλόσοφον προτιμήσαντας οὔτε αὖ ἀποδοκι μάσαντας, οὔτε Ἑλληνικὸν οὔτε βάρβαρον, πάντων δὲ ἀκούοντας. Σοφῶς τοῦτο καὶ μάλα ἐντέχνως· μή πη εἷς τις καὶ καθ' ἑαυτὸν τῶνδέ τινων ἢ τῶνδε λόγος αὐτὸς μόνος ἀκουσθεὶς καὶ τιμηθείς, κἂν μὴ ἀληθινὸς ὢν τύχῃ, ὡς μόνος ἀληθὴς ὤν, εἰσδὺς εἰς τὴν ψυχὴν ἡμῶν ἐξαπατήσῃ καὶ καθ' ἑαυτὸν διαθεὶς ἰδίους ἡμᾶς ποιήσηται, οὐκέτ' ἀποστῆναι δυναμένους οὐδὲ ἀποπλύνασθαι, ὥσπερ τὰ δευσοποιόν τινα βαφὴν βαφέντα τῶν ἐρίων. ∆εινόν τε γὰρ χρῆμα καὶ εὔστροφον λόγος ὁ ἀνθρώπων, ποικίλος τε τοῖς σοφίσμασι, καὶ ὀξύς, εἰσδραμὼν εἰς τὰς ἀκοάς, τυπῶσαί τε τὸν νοῦν καὶ προθέσθαι, καὶ ἀναπείσας τοὺς ἅπαξ ἁρπασθέντας ὡς ἀληθὴς ἀγαπᾶσθαι, καὶ μένειν ἔνδον, κἂν ψευδὴς καὶ ἀπατηλὸς ἦ, ὥσπερ τις γόης κρατῶν, ὑπέρμαχον ἔχων αὐτὸν τὸν ἠπατημένον. Εὐεξαπάτητόν τε πάλιν ὑπὸ λόγου καὶ εὔκολον πρὸς συγκατάθεσιν ψυχὴ ἀνθρώπου, ἑτοίμη τε, πρὶν διακρίνῃ καὶ ἐξετάσῃ πάντα τρόπον, ὑπὸ ἀμβλύτητος καὶ ἀσθενείας τῆς ἰδίας, ἢ ὑπὸ