he subjected to generation not only to the spontaneous one, but also to that through intellect and nature; which is manifestly absurd, that the one who received essential generation through intellect and nature, through the first causes, this one should again receive the same generation through the second causes. Moreover, how is it not among the most absurd things for the same at one time to remove it from spontaneous generation, and at another to subject it to it, and at one time to call it ungenerated, and at another generated by nature? I will make an exposition of these statements, in which he does these things, so that the falsehood contained in him may be known by comparison. 12. From the same discourse. There are some who blame spontaneity for this heaven and for all cosmic things; for they say that from spontaneity came the vortex and the motion that separated and established the universe into this order. And it is truly worthy of wonder that they say this very thing; for that animals and plants neither exist nor come to be by chance, but that either nature or intellect or some other such thing is the cause (for not just anything happens to come from each seed, but from one kind an olive tree, and from another a human), but that the most divine of visible things come to be from spontaneity, and that there is no such cause as there is for animals or plants. And yet if this is so, this very thing would be a cause for inquiry, and it would be well for something to be said about this very matter. For in addition to what is said being irrational in other ways, it is still more absurd to say these things while seeing that in the heaven nothing happens from spontaneity, but among things not from chance, many things happen by chance; and yet the opposite was likely. That the heaven has come to be from spontaneity and again not from spontaneity, the words declare, of which we have made an exposition from the second book of the *Physics* in the two chapters, the eleventh and the twelfth. And that he calls it ungenerated and again generated by nature, I will also make an exposition of these words, in which he has done this. 13. From the second book of Aristotle's *On the Heavens*. That the whole heaven, then, has not come to be, nor can it be destroyed, as some say, but is one and eternal, having no beginning or end of all time, but having and containing within itself infinite time, it will be possible to take the proof from what has been said. After Aristotle said these things about the ungenerated nature of the heaven, see what things he says again about its generation in the first book of *On the Heavens*. 14. From the first book of *On the Heavens*. And nature seems right to have removed what was to be ungenerated and indestructible from contraries; for in contraries are generation and destruction. If of impossible things, then, nothing either is or can be

ὑπέβαλε τῇ γενέσει οὐ μόνῃ τῇ αὐτομάτῳ, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῇ διὰ νοῦ τε καὶ φύσεως· ὅπερ ἐστὶ προδήλως ἄτοπον, τὸ τὸν εἰ ληφότα διὰ νοῦ τε καὶ φύσεως τὴν κατ' οὐσίαν γένεσιν, διὰ τῶν πρώτων αἰτίων, τοῦτον πάλιν διὰ τῶν δευτέρων αἰτίων τὴν αὐτὴν λαβεῖν γένεσιν. Ἔτι δὲ πῶς οὐκ ἔστι τῶν ἀτοπω τάτων τὸ τὸν αὐτὸν ποτὲ μὲν ἐξελεῖν τῆς αὐτομάτου γενέ σεως, ποτὲ δὲ ὑποβάλλειν ταύτῃ, καὶ ποτὲ μὲν ἀγένητον ὀνομάζειν, ποτὲ δὲ γενητὸν ὑπὸ φύσεως; Ποιήσομαι δὲ τῶν φωνῶν τούτων τὴν ἔκθεσιν, ἐν αἷς ταῦτα ποιεῖ, ἵν' ἐκ πα ραλλήλου γνωσθῇ τὸ ἐν αὐτῷ περιεχόμενον ψεῦδος. ιβ. Ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ λόγου. Eἰσὶ δὲ οἳ καὶ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ τοῦδε καὶ τῶν κοσμικῶν πάντων αἰτιῶνται τὸ αὐτόματον· ἀπὸ ταὐτομάτου γάρ φασι γενέσθαι τὴν δίνην καὶ τὴν κίνησιν τὴν διακρίνασαν καὶ κατα στήσασαν εἰς ταύτην τὴν τάξιν τὸ πᾶν. Καὶ μάλα τοῦτό γε αὐτὸ θαυμάσαι ἄξιον λέγοντας· τὸ γὰρ τὰ μὲν ζῶα καὶ τὰ φυτὰ ἀπὸ τύχης μήτε εἶναι μήτε γίνεσθαι, ἀλλ' ἤτοι φύσιν ἢ νοῦν ἢ τοιοῦτον ἕτερον εἶναι τὸ αἴτιον (οὐ γὰρ ὅ τι ἔτυχεν ἐκ τοῦ σπέρματος ἑκάστου γίνεσθαι, ἀλλ' ἐκ μὲν τοιουδὶ ἐλαίαν, ἐκ δὲ τοιουδὶ ἄνθρωπον), τὰ δὲ θειότερα τῶν φανερῶν ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου γίνεσθαι, τοιαύτην δὲ αἰτίαν μηδεμίαν εἶναι οἵαν τῶν ζώων ἢ τῶν φυτῶν. Καίτοι εἰ οὕτως ἔχει, τοῦτό γ' αὐτὸ αἴτιον εἴη ἂν ζητήσεως, καὶ καλῶς ἔχει λεχθῆναί τι περὶ αὐτοῦ τούτου. Πρὸς γὰρ τῷ καὶ ἄλλως ἄλογον εἶναι τὸ λεγόμενον, ἔτι ἀτοπώτερον τὸ λέγειν ταῦτα ὁρῶντας ἐν μὲν τῷ οὐρανῷ οὐθὲν ἀπὸ ταὐτομάτου γιγνόμενον, ἐν δὲ τοῖς οὐκ ἀπὸ τύχης πολλὰ συμβαίνοντα ἀπὸ τύχης· καίτοι εἰκός γε ἦν τὸ ἐναντίον. Ὅτι μὲν ἀπὸ ταὐτομάτου γεγονέναι τὸν οὐρανὸν καὶ πάλιν μὴ ἀπὸ ταὐτομάτου, δηλοῦσιν αἱ λέξεις, ὧν τὴν ἔκθεσιν πεποιήκαμεν ἐκ τοῦ δευτέρου λόγου τῆς Φυσικῆς ἀκροάσεως ἐν τοῖς δυσὶ κεφαλαίοις, τῷ τε ἑνδεκάτῳ καὶ τῷ δωδεκάτῳ. Ὅτι δὲ ἀγένητον καὶ πάλιν γενητὸν ὑπὸ φύσεως λέγει αὐτόν, ποιήσομαι καὶ τούτων τῶν λέξεων τὴν ἔκθεσιν, ἐν αἷς τοῦτο πεποίηκεν. ιγ. Ἐκ τοῦ δευτέρου Περὶ οὐρανοῦ λόγου Ἀριστοτέλους. Ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὐ γέγονεν ὁ πᾶς οὐρανὸς οὔτε ἐνδέχεται φθαρῆναι, καθάπερ τινές φασιν, ἀλλ' ἔστιν εἷς καὶ ἀΐδιος, ἀρχὴν μὲν καὶ τελευτὴν οὐκ ἔχων τοῦ παντὸς αἰῶνος, ἔχων δὲ καὶ περιέχων ἐν ἑαυτῷ τὸν ἄπειρον χρόνον, ἔκ τε τῶν εἰρημέ νων ἐξέσται λαμβάνειν τὴν πίστιν. Ταῦτα περὶ τῆς ἀγενεσίας τοῦ οὐρανοῦ εἰπὼν Ἀριστο τέλης, ὅρα οἷα πάλιν περὶ τῆς γενέσεως αὐτοῦ λέγει ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ Περὶ οὐρανοῦ λόγῳ. ιδ. Ἐκ τοῦ πρώτου Περὶ οὐρανοῦ λόγου. Καὶ ὀρθῶς ἔοικεν ἡ φύσις τὸ μέλλον ἔσεσθαι ἀγένητον καὶ ἄφθαρτον ἐξελέσθαι ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων· ἐν τοῖς ἐναντίοις γὰρ ἡ γένεσις καὶ ἡ φθορά. Eἰ τῶν ἀδυνάτων μὲν οὐδὲν οὔτε ἐστὶν οὔτε ἔσεσθαι δυ