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He did not destroy him, but tolerates his foolishness, beneficently and generously providing him with being, which is His own. But for him to become good is not of God alone, but also of himself; for what comes about by force is not good, nor is it virtue. 33 But if you say, why did He allow him to make war on men, I say, that it is for their benefit; for many are crowned through him. But if you say, that many are also destroyed, I say, that just as the devil himself was able, without the assault of another, to become evil by his own will, which is for him a worse accusation, so also man was able to become evil of himself, even without having one to assail him, and his sin would have been worse for him; for one who sins from the instigation of another is worthy of more defense and pardon than one who sins of himself. For he who sins of himself is without excuse, just as he who pursues virtue of himself is praised more. Therefore the devil, having sinned of himself, remained unrepentant, but man, not having sinned of himself, but from the assault of the devil, came to repentance and was deemed worthy of renewal and the forgiveness of sins. To be, therefore, is good and a gift of God. 34 Manichaean: Why did God, foreknowing that the devil would be wicked, make him? Orthodox: He made him out of an excess of goodness. For He said: Since this one is going to be wicked and destroy all the good things given to him, shall I also deprive him completely of the good and make him non-existent? By no means. But even if he will be wicked, I will not deprive him of participation in me, but I will give him one good thing, participation in me through being, so that, even if he does not wish it, he may partake of my goodness through being. For there is no one who holds together and sustains existing things in being except God; for to be is good and a gift of God. 35 Manichaean: Being is for existing things from the good God; if therefore being is good for all existing things as having been given by the good God, for the devil too being is good. Orthodox: All existing things received being from God. All things given to each one by God, which are also good; for the things given from the Good are good. And evil is nothing other than the rejection of good things, that is, of those things given by God. Therefore those from God, even if they have only being, are in partial participation of the good as a final echo. It is good, therefore, for the devil to be and through being to partake of the good. Therefore to be is good, but to be well is better. For perfect existence is to be healthy, while to be sick and yet to be is a partial evil and corruption; for it is not a complete non-existence, but a partial existence and a partial non-existence. Not to be is a perfect evil; for complete corruption and non-existence is that which is completely non-existent. Therefore to be and to be well are good things and from God, but to become evil from good is of the will of the one who becomes so. God, therefore, through an excess of goodness has given good things even to the wicked, to be and to be well. 36 You accuse us, O Manichaeans, of why God, foreknowing the devil would be evil, made him, and we have demonstrated through many arguments, that according to the natural principle of justice He did well to make him; for it is better according to the natural principle even to exist and according to the principle of being to partake of the good. For from God, the only one who always is, comes being itself, who is good and the provider of good things; and that which is from the Good is in every way good. But if you say, that it would have been better for him not to have been created than to be created and be punished endlessly, we say, that that punishment is nothing other than a fire of desire for wickedness and sin and a fire of the failure of desire. For those who have become unchangeable in wickedness do not desire God, but wickedness, but there the activity of wickedness and sin will not exist. For neither do we eat nor do we drink nor

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ἀνεῖλεν, ἀλλ' ἀνέχεται τῆς ἀφροσύνης αὐτοῦ εὐεργετικῶς καὶ ἀφθόνως τὸ εἶναι παρέχων αὐτῷ, ὅπερ ἐστὶν αὐτοῦ. Τὸ δὲ καλὸν γενέσθαι αὐτὸν οὐ τοῦ θεοῦ μόνου, ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτοῦ· τὸ γὰρ βίᾳ γινόμενον οὐ καλὸν οὐδὲ ἀρετή. 33 Εἰ δὲ λέγεις ὅτι, διὰ τί εἴασεν αὐτὸν πολεμεῖν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, φημί, ὅτι πρὸς τὸ συμφέρον· πολλοὶ γὰρ δι' αὐτοῦ στεφανοῦνται. Εἰ δὲ λέγεις, ὅτι καὶ πολλοὶ ἀπόλλυνται, φημί, ὅτι, ὥσπερ ἠδυνήθη αὐτὸς ὁ διάβολος ἐκτὸς προσβολῆς ἄλλου γενέσθαι κακὸς ἐξ οἰκείας γνώμης, ὅπερ καὶ χεῖρον αὐτῷ ἐστιν ἔγκλημα, οὕτως ἠδύνατο καὶ ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ καὶ μὴ ἔχων τὸν προσβάλλοντα γενέσθαι κακός, καὶ ἐγίνετο ἂν αὐτῷ ἡ ἁμαρτία χείρων· πλείονος γὰρ ἀπολογίας καὶ συγγνώμης ἀξιοῦται ὁ ἐξ ὑποβολῆς ἄλλου ἁμαρτάνων ἤπερ ὁ ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ. Ὁ γὰρ ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ ἁμαρτάνων ἀναπολόγητός ἐστιν, ὥσπερ καὶ ὁ ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ μετερχόμενος τὴν ἀρετὴν πλέον ἐπαινεῖται. ∆ιὸ ὁ διάβολος μὲν ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ ἁμαρτήσας ἀμετανόητος ἔμεινεν, ὁ δὲ ἄνθρωπος οὐκ ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ ἁμαρτήσας, ἀλλ' ἐκ τῆς τοῦ διαβόλου προσβολῆς ἐν μετανοίᾳ γέγονε καὶ ἠξιώθη τῆς ἀνακαινίσεως καὶ ἀφέσεως τῶν ἁμαρτιῶν. Τὸ οὖν εἶναι ἀγαθόν ἐστι καὶ δῶρον θεοῦ. 34 Μανιχαῖος· ∆ιὰ τί προγνοὺς ὁ θεὸς πονηρὸν ἐσόμενον τὸν διάβολον ἐποίησεν αὐτόν; Ὀρθόδοξος· ∆ι' ὑπερβολὴν ἀγαθότητος ἐποίησεν αὐτόν. Ἔφη γάρ· Ἐπειδὴ οὗτος πονηρὸς μέλλει ἔσεσθαι καὶ ἀπολλύειν πάντα τὰ διδόμενα αὐτῷ ἀγαθά, στερήσω αὐτὸν κἀγὼ τελείως τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ ἀνύπαρκτον αὐτὸν ποιήσω; Οὐδαμῶς. Ἀλλ' εἰ καὶ αὐτὸς πονηρὸς ἔσται, ἐγὼ τῆς μετουσίας μου μὴ στερήσω αὐτόν, ἀλλὰ δώσω αὐτῷ ἓν ἀγαθόν, τὴν διὰ τοῦ εἶναι μετουσίαν μου, ἵνα, κἂν μὴ θέλῃ, μετέχῃ μου τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ διὰ τοῦ εἶναι. Οὐδεὶς γάρ ἐστιν ὁ συγκρατῶν καὶ συνέχων τὰ ὄντα ἐν τῷ εἶναι εἰ μὴ ὁ θεός· τὸ γὰρ εἶναι ἀγαθόν ἐστι καὶ δῶρον θεοῦ. 35 Μανιχαῖος· Τὸ εἶναι τοῖς οὖσιν ἐκ θεοῦ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ· εἰ οὖν πᾶσι τοῖς οὖσιν ἀγαθὸν τὸ εἶναι ὡς ἐκ θεοῦ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ δεδομένον, καὶ τῷ διαβόλῳ ἀγαθὸν τὸ εἶναι. Ὀρθόδοξος· Πάντα τὰ ὄντα ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ ἔσχε τὸ εἶναι. Πάντα τὰ δοθέντα ἑκάστῳ ὑπὸ θεοῦ, ἃ καὶ ἀγαθά ἐστι· τὰ γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ διδόμενα ἀγαθά. Κακὸν δὲ οὐδὲν ἕτερόν ἐστιν εἰ μὴ ἡ τῶν ἀγαθῶν, τουτέστι τῶν ὑπὸ θεοῦ δοθέντων, ἀποβολή. Οἱ οὖν ἐκ θεοῦ κἂν τὸ εἶναι ἔχοντες ἐν μετουσίᾳ μερικῇ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ εἰσι κατ' ἔσχατον ἀπήχημα. Καλὸν οὖν ἐστιν εἶναι τὸν διάβολον καὶ διὰ τοῦ εἶναι μετέχειν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ. Τὸ οὖν εἶναι καλόν, τὸ δὲ εὖ εἶναι κάλλιον. Τελεία γὰρ ὕπαρξις τὸ ὑγιαίνειν, τὸ νοσεῖν καὶ εἶναι μερικὸν κακὸν καὶ φθορά· οὐ γὰρ τελεία ἀνυπαρξία, ἀλλὰ μερικὴ ὕπαρξις καὶ μερικὴ ἀνυπαρξία. Τὸ μὴ εἶναι τέλειον κακόν· τελεία γὰρ φθορὰ καὶ ἀνυπαρξία τὸ τελείως μὴ ὄν. Τὸ οὖν εἶναι καὶ τὸ εὖ εἶναι καλὰ καὶ παρὰ θεοῦ, τὸ δὲ κακὸν ἐξ ἀγαθοῦ γενέσθαι τῆς τοῦ γινομένου γνώμης. Ὁ οὖν θεὸς δι' ὑπερβολὴν ἀγαθότητος καὶ τῷ πονηρῷ τὰ ἀγαθὰ δέδωκε, τὸ εἶναι καὶ τὸ εὖ εἶναι. 36 Ἐγκαλεῖτε ἡμῖν, ὦ Μανιχαῖοι, διὰ τί προγινώσκων ὁ θεὸς τὸν διάβολον κακὸν ἐσόμενον ἐποίησεν αὐτόν, καὶ ἀπεδείξαμεν διὰ πλειόνων, ὅτι κατὰ τὸν φυσικὸν τοῦ δικαίου λόγον καλῶς ἐποίησεν αὐτόν· κρεῖσσον γὰρ κατὰ τὸν φυσικὸν λόγον κἂν εἶναι καὶ κατὰ τὸν τοῦ εἶναι λόγον μετέχειν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ. Ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ γὰρ τοῦ μόνου ἀεὶ ὄντος αὐτὸ τὸ εἶναι, ἀγαθοῦ καὶ ἀγαθῶν παρεκτικοῦ· τὸ δὲ ἐκ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἀγαθὸν πάντως ἐστίν. Εἰ δὲ λέγετε, ὅτι συνέφερεν αὐτῷ μὴ γενέσθαι ἤπερ γενέσθαι καὶ κολασθῆναι ἀτελευτήτως, φαμέν, ὅτι ἡ κόλασις ἐκείνη οὐδὲν ἕτερόν ἐστιν εἰ μὴ πῦρ ἐπιθυμίας τῆς κακίας καὶ ἁμαρτίας καὶ πῦρ ἀστοχίας τῆς ἐπιθυμίας. Οὐ γὰρ ἐπιθυμοῦσι θεοῦ οἱ ἐν τῇ κακίᾳ τὸ ἄτρεπτον ἐσχηκότες, ἀλλὰ τῆς κακίας, ἐκεῖ δὲ ἐνέργεια κακίας καὶ ἁμαρτίας οὐκ ἔσται. Οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐσθίομεν οὐδὲ πίνομεν οὐδὲ