ARTICLE 11

In this article the question is: Whether infused virtues may be increased.

It would seem that they may not.

OBJECTIONS:

             1. Nothing save quantity is increased. But virtue is not a quantity but a quality. Therefore, it is not increased.

             2. Further, virtue is an accidental form. But form is most simple and essentially invariable. Therefore, virtue does not vary essentially, nor can it be essentially increased.

             3. Further, what is increased undergoes a change, and what is essentially increased is changed essentially. Now what is changed in its essence is either corrupted or generated. But generation and corruption are changes in substance. Therefore, charity is not essentially increased, save when it is destroyed or first formed.

             4. Further, essentials are neither increased nor diminished. Now it is evident that the essence of virtue is essential to it. Therefore, virtue is not increased according to its essence.

             5. Moreover, increase and decrease are contraries, and so are by nature concerned with the same subject. Now infused virtue is not diminished, for it is diminished by neither a virtuous act, which rather strengthens it, nor by an act of venial sin, for then many venial sins would entirely destroy charity and the other infused virtues, which is impossible. For if it were possible, many venial sins would be equivalent to one mortal sin. Nor is infused virtue diminished by mortal sin, because mortal sin rather destroys completely charity and the other infused virtues. Therefore, infused virtue is not increased.

             6. Further, like is increased by like, as it says in De Anima. Therefore, if infused virtue be increased, it must be increased by the addition of virtue. But this cannot be, because virtue is simple, and something simple added to what is already simple does not enlarge it, e.g. a point added to a point does not make a greater line. Therefore, infused virtue cannot be increased.

             7. Further in De Generatione we learn that augmentation is an addition made to a pre-existing magnitude. Therefore, if virtue is increased, something must be added to it, and so it will be more composite and recede further from the Divine likeness, and be less excellent as a result. But all of this is most inappropriate. It remains then that virtue is not increased.

             8. Further, everything which is increased is changed. But whatever undergoes change is a body. Now virtue is not a body. Therefore, it is not increased.

             9. Further, that which has an unchanging cause is itself invariable. But the cause of infused virtue, which is God, is unchangeable. Therefore, infused virtue itself is immutable: it does not admit of a more or less; and so is not increased.

             10. Further, virtue is in the genus of habit, as science is. Hence, if virtue is increased, it must be in the way in which science is increased. Now science is increased by the multiplication of objects, so that it extends to more of them. But virtue is not increased in this way, as is evident in the case of charity: for the least degree of charity extends to all the objects which are capable of being loved. Therefore, virtue is in no way increased.

             11. Further, if infused virtue is increased, its increase must be reduced to some species of change (motus). But it can only be reduced to alteration, which is the change of a quality. Now there is alteration, according to the Philosopher, only in the sensitive part of the soul: wherein there is neither charity nor many of the other infused virtues. Therefore, not every infused virtue is increased.

             12. Further, if infused virtue is increased, it must be increased by God, Who is its cause; and if God does increase it this must be by some action of His. But there can be no new action unless there be a new infused virtue. Therefore, infused virtue cannot be increased, save by the addition of a new virtue. Now it cannot be increased in this manner, as was shown above. Therefore, infused virtue can in no way be increased.

             13. Further, habits are increased especially by acts. Since virtue is a habit, if it is increased, it is especially increased by its act. But it seems that this cannot be, for act proceeds from habit. Now nothing is increased by the fact that something goes out from it, but by the fact that something is received in it. Therefore, virtue is in no way increased.

             14. Further, all virtues have a common generic ratio. Therefore, if any virtue is increased by its own act, it may be increased by any act whatsoever; which experience seems to deny. For we do not experience that virtue grows with every act.

             15. Further, that which is the best in its kind cannot be increased: for there is nothing better than the best, nor anything whiter than the whitest. But the very nature of virtue consists in a maximum, for virtue is the ultimate term of a power (ultimum de potentia). Therefore, virtue cannot be increased.

             16. Further, whatever has an indivisible ratio lacks intenseness and remissness, e.g. substantial form, number and figure. But the ratio of virtue consists in something indivisible, for it is in a mean. Therefore, virtue is neither intensified nor slackened.

             17. Further, what is infinite cannot be increased, because outside the infinite there is nothing. But infused virtue is infinite, since by it man merits an infinite good, namely, God. Therefore, virtue cannot be increased.

             18. Further, nothing extends beyond its own perfection, because perfection is the term of a thing. But virtue is the perfection of its possessor, for according to the Physics virtue is the disposition of a perfect thing for its best. Therefore, virtue can not be increased.

             ON THE CONTRARY:

1. We read in Peter 2:2: "As newborn babes, desire the rational milk without guile, that thereby you may grow unto salvation." Now a man does not grow unto salvation, except by an increase in virtue, by which he is ordered to salvation. Therefore, virtue is increased.

             2. Further, in his Commentary on John, Augustine states that charity is increased so that, being increased, it may merit to be brought to perfection.

             I reply: Many have erred concerning forms because they considered them in the way substances are to be considered. It seems that they were led to do this because, in the abstract, forms are given substantive names; we speak, for example, of virtue or whiteness and the like. As a result, some, deceived by this mode of expression, treat of forms as though they were substances.

             From this have arisen the errors both of those who held for the latent pre-existence of forms, as well as of those who claimed that all forms were immediately created. For these men reason that it is proper to forms to be produced in the same manner as are substances. Since they were unable to discover any source whence forms were educed, they taught either that they were (immediately) created or else that they pre-existed in matter. In this they failed to remember that existence does not belong to the form but to the (composite) subject through the form, so that becoming (fieri), which terminates in being, is not a process of movement of the form but of the complete subject. For just as form is termed being, not because it is itself a being, if we want to speak properly, but because by it something is; so form is said to become, not because it itself becomes, but because by it something becomes, when a subject is reduced from potency to act.

             Such is the case as regards the increase of qualities. Of this increase some speak as though qualities and forms were substances. Now substance is said to be increased insofar as it is the subject of a change whereby it acquires greater quantity; and this change is called augmentation.

             Because increase in substance may be affected by the addition of substance to substance, some have thought that this is the way in which charity or any other infused virtue is increased, namely, by the addition of charity to charity, or virtue to virtue, or whiteness to whiteness: which is certainly not the case.

             There can be no addition of one thing to another unless two things be pre-supposed. But there can be no duality of forms unless there be a distinction of subjects, because specifically identical forms are not numerically distinguished except by reason of their subjects. Consequently, if quality is added to quality, it must be in one of two ways: either that subject is added to subject, e.g. when one white thing is added to another; or that something in a subject, which was not previously white, becomes white--as some have held with regard to corporeal qualities, and which the Philosopher disproves in the Physics. For when something becomes more curved, nothing is curved which was not curved before, but the whole being becomes more curved. However, not even this can possibly apply to spiritual qualities, the subject of which is the soul or a part of the soul.

             Hence certain others have said that charity and the other infused virtues are not essentially increased; but that they are said to be increased, either insofar as they are more firmly rooted in their subject, or in the sense that they operate more fervently and intensely. Now this opinion would indeed have reasonable grounds to it, if charity were a substance of some sort, existing by itself without a subject of inherence. In fact, the Master of the Sentences (Peter Lombard), in I Sent. D. 17, considering charity to be a substance, namely, the Holy Spirit Himself, seems to have held, not unreasonably, for this manner of increase. But others of this opinion, who do admit that charity is a quality of some kind, have maintained this position most unreasonably.

             For a quality to be increased means nothing other than that a subject participate more of the quality; indeed, a quality has no being save what it has in a subject. From its partaking more of the quality, the subject operates more forcefully; for everything operates to the extent that it is in act, so that what has been reduced to greater act, acts more perfectly. Therefore, to state that a quality is not increased in its essence, but may be increased according to its radication in a subject, or according to the intensity of its act, is a contradiction.

             It remains then to consider how certain qualities and forms are said to be increased, and which of them can be increased.

             Since terms are the signs of concepts, as it says in De Interpretatione, it is evident that, just as we know the less known from the more known, so we also name the less known from the more known. Therefore, because local motion is the most known of all the types of movement or change, we extend the term 'distance' from meaning contrariety of place to all contraries between which there can be movement, as we learn from the Metaphysics. Likewise, because change of substance according to quantity (i.e. augmentation or increase) is more sensible than change by way of alteration (i.e.: change of quality), it has come about that the terms proper to quantitative change have been carried over to denote change of alteration. Thus, just as a body which is changed so as to acquire its perfect quantity, is said to be increased, and as the perfect quantity itself is said to be great in relation to imperfect quantity; so also, whatever is changed from imperfect to perfect quality is said to be increased with respect to quality, and perfect quality itself is called great as compared to imperfect quality. Since the perfections of each thing is its goodness, Augustine says that in things which are not of very large size, to be greater in size is the same thing as to be better.

             To change from imperfect to perfect form is nothing other than for the subject to be more fully reduced to actuality, for form is act. Hence a subject has greater possession of a form when it is more perfectly actualized by that form. Just as something is reduced by an agent from pure potency to the actuality of a form, so also it is reduced by the agent's action from imperfect to perfect act.

             But this is not the case in all forms, for two reasons.

             First, from the very nature of form, for what has the ratio of form perfectly is something indivisible, for example, number. In numbers an added unit constitutes a new species, so that numbers, such as three or four, allow of no more or less. Consequently, more or less are not found either in quantities designated by numbers, e.g. two cubits or three cubits, or in figures, e.g. triangle, quadrangle, or in proportions, e.g. double or triple.

             Secondly, from the relation of form to subject; because form inheres in its subject in an indivisible mode. For this reason, substantial form is not subject to any intensification or remissness, because it gives substantial being, which is only one in each substance: where there is another substantial being (esse), there is another thing (res). Hence the Philosopher likens definitions to numbers, in the Metaphysics. Hence also, nothing which is substantially predicated of another thing, even if it be in the class of accidents, is predicated according to more or less: thus whiteness is not said to be more or less of a color. For this reason, too, qualities expressed in abstract terms, because they are expressed as substance is, are neither intensified nor diminished; for we do not speak of more or less whiteness, but of a more or less white thing.

             However, neither of the above reasons explains why charity or the other infused virtues cannot be intensified or slackened, because the ratio of these virtues is not something indivisible, as is the concept of number; nor do they give substantial being to a subject, as do substantial forms. Therefore, to the extent that a subject is more or less perfectly actualized by these virtues, as a result of the agent causing them, they are, in fact, intensified or slackened. Just as the acquired virtues are increased by the acts which cause them, so the infused virtues are increased by the action of God, by Whom they are caused.

             Our acts are as dispositions for the increase of charity and of the infused virtues, just as they dispose for the reception of these virtues in the first place (or: from their source). For a man who does what lies in his power prepares himself to receive charity from God. Even further, our acts can be meritorious of an increase of charity, because they presuppose charity, which is the principle of merit. But no one can merit to obtain the first infusion of charity, because there can be no merit at all without charity itself. In conclusion then we say that charity is increased by being made more intense.

             REPLY TO OBJECTIONS:

1. Just as in charity and in other qualities increase is spoken of through a similitude, so also in quantity, as is clear from what has been said in the body of the article.

             2. Form is invariable insofar as it is not the subject of variation; however, it can be said to vary insofar as a subject, varied in its regard, participates in it more or less.

             3. Essential change in anything can be understood in two ways. First, as regards what is proper to the thing, namely, its essential being or non-being. In this sense, essential change is nothing other than change according to being and not-being, which is generation and corruption. Secondly, essential change can be understood where there is change of anything at all which is connected with the essence. In this sense, we say that a body is essentially changed when it is moved locally, because the subject of change is transferred from place to place; and also that a quality is essentially changed in the mode proper to it when it varies according to perfect or imperfect, or rather that the subject is thus changed in respect of quality, as is evident from what was said in the body of the Art.

             4. What is predicated essentially of charity, is not predicated of it according to more or less, for we do not speak of anything as more or less a virtue. Greater charity is said to be "more a virtue" (magis virtus) rather by a mode of signifying, expressing it in terms of a substance. But because charity itself is not predicated essentially of its subject, the subject may be said to enjoy it more or less: thus we speak of a man's having more or less charity, and we say that one who has more charity is more virtuous.

             5. Charity suffers no diminution, because there is nothing to cause its decrease, as Ambrose proves. However, it does have a cause of its increase, namely God.

             6. Increase by addition is increase in a quantified substance. But charity is not increased in this way, as was said in the body of the Art.

             This also answers the seventh objection.

             8. Charity is said to be increased or changed, not because it is itself the subject of change, but insofar as its subject is changed and increased with regard to it.

             9. Although God is immutable, yet He changes things while remaining Himself unvarying; for it is not necessary that every mover be moved, as is proved in the book of the Physics. And this is especially true of God, because He does not act from any necessity in His nature, but of His own free will.

             10. All qualities and forms share in common the notion of magnitude insofar as this represents their perfection in a subject. Some qualities, besides this magnitude or quantity which they have per se, have another magnitude or quality, which pertains to them accidentally and this in two ways.

             First, by reason of their subject, as whiteness is said to be quantitative accidentally because its subject has quantity; so that, when the subject is increased, the whiteness is also increased accidentally. Now by this increase we do not say that a thing is whiter but that there is more whiteness there, just as we would say that there is a larger white thing. In no other sense do we predicate those things which pertain to increase of whiteness and of the subject by reason of which the whiteness is said to be accidentally increased. But this quantitative change and increase is not found in the qualities of the soul, namely, the sciences and virtues.

             Secondly, quantity and increase are attributed to a quality accidentally, by reason of the object which the quality affects (ex parte obiecti in quod agit). We call this the quantity or amount of power (virtutis), which is said to be more according to the extent and perfection of the object. Thus a man is said to have great strength (magnae virtutis) who can lift a heavy weight or perform any sort of good-sized task, one which is larger either dimensively or by reason of its perfection or according to discrete quantity. In this sense we attribute great power to a man who can do many things.

             However, as regards science and virtue there is this to note: that it is not of the nature of a science to extend actually to all possible objects, for it is not necessary that one who has science know all things knowable. But it is of the essence of virtue that the virtuous man act virtuously in all things. Hence science can be increased both in the number of known objects and by reason of its intensity in a subject; whereas virtue can only be increased in the latter way.

             But we must observe that a quality is both great in itself and has great potentiality for the same reason, as was made clear above. Wherefore, greatness of perfection can also be called greatness of power.

             11. In charity, change in quantity or increase may be reduced to change in quality or alteration; not in the sense in which alteration is a change between contraries, which occurs only in sensible subjects and in the sensitive part of the soul; but insofar as alteration and passion bespeak reception and perfection. Thus, to have sense and intellectual knowledge is to be passive and to undergo alteration. In this way the Philosopher distinguishes alteration and passion, in De Anima.

             12. God increases charity, not by infusing new charity, but by perfecting that which already exists.

             13. Just as an agent's act can cause acquired virtue by reason of the impression of active or passive powers, as was remarked above (in the body of the Article); so it can also increase this virtue.

             14. Charity and the other infused virtues are not actively increased by our acts, but only dispositively and meritoriously, as we have said (ibid). Nor indeed is it absolutely necessary that every perfect act correspond to the amount of one's virtue: for one who has charity need not always act with all the charity of which he is capable; for the use of habits is subject to the will.

             15. The ratio of virtue does not consist in a maximum in itself (quantum ad se), but only as regards its object; because by virtue a man is ordered to the limit of his power, which is to act well. Thus the Philosopher says, in the Physics, that virtue is the disposition of a perfect thing for its best. Now one can be more or less disposed for what is his best; and according to this disposition virtue can allow of more or less. Or it might be said that here it is not a question of the absolute ultimate, but of a specific ultimate: as fire is the subtlest element among bodies, and man is the noblest of creatures (on earth)--and yet one man is worthier than another.

             16. The concept of virtue is not something indivisible in itself, but is so by reason of its subject, insofar as it seeks a mean for the subject. A man may be variously disposed, for better or worse, for seeking this mean. Yet even the mean itself is not altogether indivisible, for it admits of a certain latitude. It is sufficient for virtue that it approach the mean, as is stated in the Ethics. It is in this very respect that one act is said to be more virtuous than another.

             17. The virtue of charity is infinite on the part of its end, which is God; but charity itself is finitely disposed towards this infinite end. Hence it can admit of more or less.

             18. Not everything perfect is most perfect, but only what is in complete and ultimate actuality. Therefore, nothing prevents what is perfect in virtue from being perfected yet further.