Chapter 11 [X.]—Grace Subtly Acknowledged by Pelagius.

He then starts an objection to his own position, as if, indeed, another person had raised it, and says: “‘A man,’ you will say, ‘may possibly be [without sin]; but it is by the grace of God.’” He then at once subjoins the following, as if in answer to his own suggestion: “I thank you for your kindness, because you are not merely content to withdraw your opposition to my statement, which you just now opposed, or barely to acknowledge it; but you actually go so far as to approve it. For to say, ‘A man may possibly, but by this or by that,’ is in fact nothing else than not only to assent to its possibility, but also to show the mode and condition of its possibility. Nobody, therefore, gives a better assent to the possibility of anything than the man who allows the condition thereof; because, without the thing itself, it is not possible for a condition to be.” After this he raises another objection against. himself: “But, you will say, ‘you here seem to reject the grace of God, inasmuch as you do not even mention it;’” and he then answers the objection: “Now, is it I that reject grace, who by acknowledging the thing must needs also confess the means by which it may be effected, or you, who by denying the thing do undoubtedly also deny whatever may be the means through which the thing is accomplished?” He forgot that he was now answering one who does not deny the thing, and whose objection he had just before set forth in these words: “A man may possibly be [without sin]; but it is by the grace of God.” How then does that man deny the possibility, in defence of which his opponent earnestly contends, when he makes the admission to that opponent that “the thing is possible, but only by the grace of God?” That, however, after he is dismissed who already acknowledges the essential thing, he still has a question against those who maintain the impossibility of a man’s being without sin, what is it to us? Let him ply his questions against any opponents he pleases, provided he only confesses this, which cannot be denied without the most criminal impiety, that without the grace of God a man cannot be without sin. He says, indeed: “Whether he confesses it to be by grace, or by aid, or by mercy, whatever that be by which a man can be without sin,—every one acknowledges the thing itself.”

CAPUT X.

11. Versute gratiam confitetur Pelagius. Sed objicit sibi quasi ab alio dictum, et ait: Potest quidem esse, sed per gratiam Dei, inquies. Deinde velut respondendo subjungit: Ago Humanitati tuae gratias, quod assertionem meam, quam dudum oppugnabas, non modo non oppugnare, aut confiteri solum contentus non es , verum etiam non refugis comprobare. Nam dicere, Potest quidem, sed per illud aut illud: quid aliud est, quam non solum consentire quod possit esse, verum etiam quomodo vel qualiter possit, ostendere? Nullus itaque magis alicujus rei possibilitatem probat, quam qui ejus etiam qualitatem fatetur; quia neque absque re esse qualitas potest. His dictis iterum sibi objicit: Sed tu, inquies, hoc in loco Dei gratiam, quandoquidem eam non commemoras, videris abnuere. Deinde respondet: Egone abnuo, qui rem confitendo, confitear necesse est et per quod res effici potest; an tu, qui rem negando, et quidquid illud est per quod res efficitur procul dubio negas? Oblitus est, jam se illi respondere, qui rem non negat, cujus objectionem paulo ante proposuerat dicentis, Potest quidem esse, sed per gratiam Dei. Quomodo ergo illam, pro qua iste multum laborat, possibilitatem negat, qui ei jam dicit, Potest esse, sed per Dei gratiam? Verumtamen quia isto dimisso qui rem jam confitetur, agit adhuc adversus eos qui negant esse possibile hominem esse sine peccato, quid ad nos? Contra quos vult agat, dum tamen hoc confiteatur, quod impietate sceleratissima negatur, sine gratia Dei hominem sine peccato esse non posse. Dicit ergo: Sive per gratiam, sive per adjutorium, sive per misericordiam, et quidquid illud est per quod esse homo absque peccato peccat, confitetur, quisquis rem ipsam fatetur.