On “Not Three Gods.” To Ablabius.

 Ye that are strong with all might in the inner man ought by rights to carry on the struggle against the enemies of the truth, and not to shrink from t

 In truth, the question you propound to us is no small one, nor such that but small harm will follow if it meets with insufficient treatment. For by th

 The argument which you state is something like this:—Peter, James, and John, being in one human nature, are called three men: and there is no absurdit

 What, then, is the reason that when we count one by one those who are exhibited to us in one nature, we ordinarily name them in the plural and speak o

 We say, then, to begin with, that the practice of calling those who are not divided in nature by the very name of their common nature in the plural, a

 Most men think that the word “Godhead” is used in a peculiar degree in respect of nature: and just as the heaven, or the sun, or any other of the cons

 But some one will say that the proof of our argument does not yet regard the question. For even if it were granted that the name of “Godhead” is a com

 As we have to a certain extent shown by our statement that the word “Godhead” is not significant of nature but of operation, perhaps one might reasona

 Since, then, the character of the superintending and beholding power is one, in Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, as has been said in our previous argumen

 If, then, every good thing and every good name, depending on that power and purpose which is without beginning, is brought to perfection in the power

 It does not seem to me absolutely necessary, with a view to the present proof of our argument, to contend against those who oppose us with the asserti

 But if it pleases our adversaries to say that the significance of the term is not operation, but nature, we shall fall back upon our original argument

 As, then, the golden staters are many, but the gold is one, so too those who are exhibited to us severally in the nature of man, as Peter, James, and

 Indeed, it would be a lengthy task to set out in detail from the Scriptures those constructions which are inexactly expressed, in order to prove the s

 If, however, any one cavils at our argument, on the ground that by not admitting the difference of nature it leads to a mixture and confusion of the P

 But in speaking of “cause,” and “of the cause,” we do not by these words denote nature (for no one would give the same definition of “cause” and of “n

 Thus, since on the one hand the idea of cause differentiates the Persons of the Holy Trinity, declaring that one exists without a Cause, and another i

It does not seem to me absolutely necessary, with a view to the present proof of our argument, to contend against those who oppose us with the assertion that we are not to conceive “Godhead” as an operation. For we, believing the Divine nature to be unlimited and incomprehensible, conceive no comprehension of it, but declare that the nature is to be conceived in all respects as infinite: and that which is absolutely infinite is not limited in one respect while it is left unlimited in another, but infinity is free from limitation altogether. That therefore which is without limit is surely not limited even by name. In order then to mark the constancy of our conception of infinity in the case of the Divine nature, we say that the Deity is above every name: and “Godhead” is a name. Now it cannot be that the same thing should at once be a name and be accounted as above every name.

μάχεσθαι δὲ πρὸς τοὺς ἀντιλέγοντας μὴ δεῖν ἐνέργειαν νοεῖν τὴν θεότητα οὐ πάνυ τι τῶν ἀναγκαίων μοι δοκεῖ, ὡς πρὸς τὴν παροῦσαν τοῦ λόγου κατασκευήν. ἡμεῖς μὲν γὰρ ἀόριστον καὶ ἀπερίληπτον τὴν θείαν φύσιν εἶναι πιστεύοντες οὐδεμίαν αὐτῆς ἐπινοοῦμεν περίληψιν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ πάντα τρόπον ἐν ἀπειρίᾳ νοεῖσθαι τὴν φύσιν διοριζόμεθα. τὸ δὲ καθόλου ἄπειρον οὐ τινὶ μὲν ὁρίζεται, τινὶ δὲ οὐχί: ἀλλὰ κατὰ πάντα λόγον ἐκφεύγει τὸν ὅρον ἡ ἀπειρία. οὐκοῦν τὸ ἐκτὸς ὅρου οὐδὲ ὀνόματι πάντως ὁρίζεται. ὡς ἂν οὖν διαμένοι ἐπὶ τῆς θείας φύσεως τοῦ ἀορίστου ἡ ἔννοια, ὑπὲρ πᾶν ὄνομά φαμεν εἶναι τὸ θεῖον, ἡ δὲ θεότης ἓν τῶν ὀνομάτων ἐστίν. οὐκοῦν οὐ δύναται τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ὄνομα εἶναι καὶ ὑπὲρ πᾶν ὄνομα εἶναι νομίζεσθαι.