itself, grown weary from the subtlety of the argument against the precision of the examination, often surrendering rather indifferently to false arguments and dogmas, which are themselves in error, and also lead astray those who hold them; and not only this, but even if another argument should wish to correct it, it no longer admits it nor is it persuaded, but is held by what is in it, as if some inexorable tyrant has taken hold of it.

14 For did not these things introduce both the dogmas that fight and are opposed to one another and the factions of philosophers, with some opposing the dogmas of others, and some holding to one thing, others to another, and some aligning with one group, others with another; and with all wishing and professing to philosophize, from the time they were first urged on, and saying that they are no less willing, now that they are engaged in the arguments, than when they began, or rather, that they now have an even greater love for philosophy, now that they have been able to taste of it (as one might say) and to spend time with its arguments, than when at first they were inexperienced and then were moved by some impulse to philosophize; while they say these things, do they no longer listen to any of the arguments of those who hold different opinions? Therefore, not one of the ancients persuaded any of the younger men or of the Peripatos to turn to him and to philosophize his philosophy, nor the other way around, and in general, no one persuaded anyone. For one would not easily be persuaded to change his mind and align with others, abandoning his own, and this, perhaps, to those very things which, if he had been persuaded by them before he came to philosophize, he would have loved in the first place; [he would have been easily persuaded] since his soul had not yet been preoccupied with arguments, he would have attended to and loved, similarly opposing these, on account of those things, which he now holds. In such a way have our good and most learned and most critical Hellenes philosophized, that whatever each one happened upon from the beginning, driven by some impulse, these things alone they say are true, and all the rest from the other philosophers is deceit and nonsense; strengthening his own positions with argument no more than each of the others defends his own, insisting that one must not change position or be persuaded by necessity or persuasion; having (if one must speak the truth) no other irrational impulse from philosophy toward these dogmas, and the criterion for what he thinks is true (may it not be paradoxical to say) is none other than uncritical chance; each one loving these things which he happened upon first, by which he is, as it were, bound, is no longer able to attend to others; whether he might have something to say with proof of the truth concerning all his own views, and that the views of his opponents are false, being helped also by reason, since he is also unhelped, having given and surrendered himself at random, like a windfall, to the arguments that first took hold of him; and these have led astray those who hold them in other matters, and indeed also in the greatest and most necessary of all matters, the knowledge of and piety toward the divine. And yet they remain in them, bound in a way, and no one could any longer rescue them easily, as if from a marsh in a very wide, impassable plain, which no longer allows those who have once fallen in to be saved by either turning back or crossing over, but holds them in it until the end; or as if from a deep and dense and high forest, into which some traveler entered, as if he would indeed perhaps emerge from it and establish himself again in a clear space outside its confines, but because of its length and density is not able, turning many times within it, and finding some continuous, winding paths within, he travels them, as if he would soon emerge through one of them; but they only lead deeper within, and in no way out, being only paths of the forest itself; finally the traveler, growing weary and giving up, as if everything had become forest and there was no longer any dwelling place on earth, wishes to remain there, having established his hearth, and making for himself as much open space as possible in the forest; and as if from some labyrinth, into which, since one entrance appeared, someone, suspecting nothing complex from the outside, having entered through the one visible door, then having proceeded to the innermost parts, and having seen a complex sight and

λεπτότητος τῆς τοῦ λόγου πρὸς τὴν ἀκρίβειαν τῆς ἐξετάσεως ἀποκαμοῦσαν ἑαυτὴν ἀπραγμονέστερον παραδι δόναι πολλάκις ψευδέσι λόγοις καὶ δόγμασι, πεπλανημέ νοις μὲν αὐτοῖς, πλανῶσι δὲ καὶ τοὺς ἐσχηκότας· καὶ οὐ τοῦτο μόνον, ἀλλὰ κἂν ἐπανορθοῦν ἕτερος ἐθέλοι λόγος, οὐκέτι προσιεμένη οὐδὲ μεταπειθομένη, τοῦ δὲ ἐν αὐτῇ περιεχομένη, ὥσπερ τινὸς τυράννου ἀπαραιτήτου αὐτῆς κεκρατηκότος.

14 Ἦ γὰρ οὐχὶ ταῦτα δογμάτων τε τὰ μαχό μενα καὶ ἐναντιούμενα ἀλλήλοις φιλοσόφων τε τὰς στάσεις εἰσήγαγεν, ἄλλων τοῖς ἄλλων ἐνισταμένων δόγμασι, καὶ ἄλλων ἄλλα κρατούντων ἄλλων τε ἄλλοις προστιθεμένων· καὶ φιλοσοφεῖν μὲν ἁπάντων βουλομένων καὶ ἐπαγ γελλομένων, ἐξ οὗ γε προὐτράπησαν τὸ πρῶτον, καὶ φασκόντων ἐθέλειν οὐχ ἧττον ὅτε γεγόνασιν ἐν τοῖς λόγοις, ἢ ὡς αὐτοῦ ἤρχοντο, μᾶλλον δὲ καὶ πλείονα τὸν ἔρωτα νῦν ἔχειν τῆς φιλοσοφίας, ὅτε αὐτῆς καὶ γεύσασθαι (ὡς ἂν εἴποι τις) ὑπῆρξε καὶ προσδιατρῖψαι τοῖς λόγοις, ἤπερ ὅτε πρῶτον ἀπείρως ἔχοντες εἶθ' ὑπὸ ὁρμῆς τινος φιλοσοφεῖν ἐπήρθησαν· λεγόντων μὲν ταῦτα, οὐκέτι δ' ὑπακουσάντων λόγοις οὐδένεσι τῶν ἑτεροδόξων; Οὔτ' οὖν εἷς τις τῶν παλαιῶν προὐτρέψατό τινα τῶν νεωτέρων ἢ τῶν τοῦ Περιπάτου πρὸς αὐτὸν ἐπιστρέφειν καὶ τὴν αὐτοῦ φιλοσοφίαν φιλοσοφεῖν, οὔτε ἀνάπαλιν, καὶ ὅλως οὐδεὶς οὐδένα. Οὐ γὰρ ἂν ῥᾳδίως μεταπεισθείη τις προσθέσθαι, τῶν αὐτοῦ μετατιθέμενος, ἑτέροις, καὶ ταῦτα τούτοις ἴσως, οἷς εἴπερ ἐπείσθη πρὶν φιλοσοφήσει προσελθεῖν, τὸ πρῶτον ἂν καὶ ἠγάπα· [ἐπείσθη ῥᾳδίως] οἷα δὴ μὴ προκατειλημμένης τῆς ψυχῆς μηδέπω λόγοις προσανείχετο ἂν καὶ ἠγάπα, ὁμοίως ἐναντιούμενος δι' ἐκεῖνα τούτοις, ἃ νῦν ἔχει. Τοιαῦτα ἡμῶν οἱ καλοὶ καὶ λογιώτατοι καὶ ἐξε ταστικώτατοι Ἕλληνες πεφιλοσοφήκασιν, οἷς προσέτυχεν ἕκαστος ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐλαθεὶς ὑπό τινος ὁρμῆς, ταῦτα μόνα λέγων εἶναι ἀληθῆ, τὰ δὲ λοιπὰ πάντα τῶν ἄλλων φιλο σόφων ἀπάτην καὶ λῆρον· λόγῳ μὲν οὐδὲν μᾶλλον αὐτὸς τὰ αὐτοῦ κρατύνων, ἢ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστοι προΐστανται τῶν ἰδίων, τοῦ μὴ χρῆναι μετατίθεσθαι καὶ μεταβου λεύεσθαι ἀνάγκῃ ἢ πειθοῖ· οὐκ ἄλλην τινά (εἰ δεῖ τἀληθὲς εἰπεῖν) ἔχων ἢ τὴν πρὸς τῆς φιλοσοφίας ἐπὶ τάδε τὰ δόγματα ἄλογον ὁρμήν, καὶ κρίσιν ὧν οἴεται ἀληθῶν (μὴ παράδοξον εἰπεῖν ᾖ) οὐκ ἄλλην ἢ τὴν ἄκριτον τύχην· ταῦθ' ἕκαστος φιλῶν, οἷς προσέτυχε τὸ πρῶτον, ὑφ' ὧν οἱονεὶ δεδεμένος, οὐκέθ' οἷός τε προσέχειν ἑτέροις· εἰ μέν τι καὶ λέγειν ἔχοι σὺν ἀποδείξει ἀληθείας τῶν αὐτοῦ περὶ πάντων, καὶ ὡς ψευδῆ εἴη τὰ τῶν ἐναντίων, βεβοηθημένος καὶ τῷ λόγῳ, ἐπεὶ καὶ ἀβοήθητος, ἑαυτὸν χαρισάμενος καὶ ἐκδεχόμενος εἰκῇ ὥσπερ ἕρμαιον τοῖς προκαταλαβοῦσιν αὐτὸν λόγοις· οἳ δ' ἔν τε τοῖς ἄλλοις ἔσφηλαν τοὺς ἔχοντας, καὶ δὴ καὶ τοῦ πάντων μεγίστου καὶ ἀναγκαιοτάτου, τῆς περὶ τὸ θεῖον γνώσεως καὶ εὐσεβείας. Καὶ μένουσιν ὅμως ἐν αὐτοῖς δεδεμένοι τρόπον τινά, καὶ οὐκέτ' ἂν αὐτοὺς οὐδεὶς ῥύσαιτο ῥᾳδίως, ὥσπερ ἐκ τενάγους ἐν πεδίῳ πλατυτάτῳ δυσδιαβάτῳ, οὐκέτι ἐῶντος τοὺς ἐμπεσόντας ἅπαξ οὔτε παλινδρομήσαντας οὔτε καὶ περαιωσαμένους διασώζεσθαι, ἐν αὐτῷ δὲ αὐτοὺς κατέχοντας μέχρι τελευτῆς· ἢ ὥσπερ ἐξ ὕλης βαθείας καὶ δασείας καὶ ὑψηλῆς, εἰς ἣν εἰσῆλθε μέν τις ὁδοιπόρος, ὡς δὴ καὶ ἐξορμήσων ἴσως καὶ ἐν καθαρῷ πάλιν αὑτὸν καταστήσων τῷ ἕρκει, ὑπὸ δὲ μήκους καὶ δασύτητος οὐχ οἷός τε γίνεται, πάμπολλα στρεφόμενος ἐν αὐτῷ, ὁδούς τέ τινας ἔνδον εὑρίσκων συνεχεῖς ποικίλα ὁδοιπορεῖ, ὡς δὴ διά τινος αὐτῶν ἐξορμήσων τάχα· αἱ δ' ἐπὶ τὰ ἔνδον ἄγουσι μόνον, ἔξοδον δὲ οὐδαμῶς, αὐτῆς τε τῆς ὕλης μόνης ὁδοί τινες οὖσαι· τέλος δὲ ὁ ὁδοιπόρος ἀποκαμὼν καὶ ἀπαγορεύσας, ὡς δὴ πάντων ὕλης γενομένων καὶ οὐκέτι οὐδενὸς ὄντος ἐπὶ γῆς οἰκητηρίου, ἐκεῖ μένειν ἐθέλει τὴν ἑστίαν καταστησάμενος, καὶ εὐρυχωρίαν αὑτῷ ὡς οἷόν τε ἐν τῇ ὕλῃ ἐκποριζόμενος· καὶ ὥσπερ ἔκ τινος λαβυρίνθου, εἰς ὃν εἰσόδου φαινομένης μιᾶς οὐδὲν ποικίλον ἐκ τῶν ἔξωθεν ὑποτοπήσας τις εἰσελθὼν διὰ τῆς φαινομένης θύρας μιᾶς, εἶτα προχωρήσας ἄχρι τῶν ἐνδοτάτω, ποικίλον τε ἰδὼν θέαμα καὶ