OF SAINT JUSTIN PHILOSOPHER AND MARTYR, AN OVERTHROW OF CERTAIN ARISTOTELIAN DOGMAS.

 And concerning these things, all the prophets sent from God to all men continued to think the same things, and there was no disagreement among them b

 posited, must necessarily come to be by composition but if the mode of generation by composition fits every generation, it has been superfluously dis

 is another thing besides the destruction of all that is, but if matter has this, how is its being matter not also destroyed? Further, if when the form

 by its presence and absence, then the principles will be both generated and destroyed by each other, and not eternal for the eternal does not need th

 ·having been said concerning the philosophers among the Greeks, how they did not make their arguments concerning beings according to demonstrative sci

 animal, but in the generation of the animal simply the substrate was not seed, how is the animal coming to be from not-animal not contrary to nature?

 and matter is deprived of being the matter of something, but it is not deprived of being matter itself, therefore matter will be being and not-being,

 Saying If, when the form is present, then the privation does not remain, it is clear that when the form is not present, the privation remains. How th

 The eternally uncreated has this same [quality] with respect to something coming to be from it by nature and by art. How then was God able to make som

 and of change, but in another way the form and the shape according to reason. For just as art is said to be that which is according to art and the art

 he subjected to generation not only to the spontaneous one, but also to that through intellect and nature which is manifestly absurd, that the one wh

 sible, but it is among the impossible things for that which is going to be to be ungenerated, both without beginning and without end, both having and

 And that, if the infinite in no way exists, many impossibilities occur, is clear: for time will have a beginning and an end, and magnitudes will not b

 is in potentiality, but not in actuality but the amount taken always exceeds any definite quantity. But this number is not definite, nor does infinit

 second to providence but if place is ungeneratedly and without beginning what it is and has what it has, then place is ungenerated and first of all t

 Where is that which is in a place? And if not every being is in a place, how will some beings not be the same as non-being, if indeed not being in a p

 to have come into being. For those things to which belong the generable and having come into being, from these of necessity the eternal and the unorig

 38. From the same discourse. Whatever neither moves nor is at rest, is not in time for to be in time is to be measured by time, and time is the measu

 time to be, so also has the past been. But the future time, just as it has a future coming-into-being, so also it has a beginning and just as there i

 to be straight. The principles of things that always come to be according to nature cannot be eternal. For if they transmit the nature they have to th

 And this is the case for any single one of the things that come to be, but it is necessary for something else to be moved previously among the things

 according to which some things have come to be above nature, and others according to nature. If before and after is ungenerated, then there will b

 we say, of which there is no demonstration. But God and nature do nothing in vain. If there were contrary motions in the locomotion of bodies, either

 worlds to come into being from it, but having been used up for the genesis of one world, did it stop the unwilling god from making more worlds? 51. Fr

 and an enmattered principle in matter, through which 'for heaven to be' is different from 'for this particular heaven to be'? If heaven cannot do by w

 each other. But now this much is clear, for what reason there are more circular bodies: that it is necessary for there to be generation, and generatio

 and the outcome in things that happen by choice is secondary to the choice), how does it exist in eternal things that this particular thing is because

 chance can exist in eternal things, but the heaven is eternal and its circular motion, for what reason then does it move in one direction, and not in

 to suffer it. These things, therefore, are heated because they are carried through the air, which through the striking by the motion becomes fire but

 it was moved by nature the motion by which it is now moved, how was it not bound to the sphere in vain? But if it was not moved this way according to

 always? If to things that are always in motion the spherical shape was given as suitable, how is it that of the things having a spherical shape, one i

 and have what they have? If the stars ought not to move, why do they move at all by means of others? But if they ought to move, why do they not move b

 of an element besides the things here, but at other times from the same elements, how is he not speaking falsely in one of the two ways? 63. From the

 and the bricks. Therefore, since matter is not substance, who is it that has made from it the things that have come from it, since both nature and art

 change, but into the opposite in the same genus, for instance in quality a change does not occur from white to large but to black, in what way then do

sible, but it is among the impossible things for that which is going to be to be ungenerated, both without beginning and without end, both having and containing in itself infinite time, therefore he who says these things will be ignorant of the difference between a possible and an impossible thing. 15. From the first book of Aristotle's On the Heavens, at the end of the book. For nothing that comes from chance can be either incorruptible or ungenerated. How then could anyone believe him who says both things about the heaven? For in the eleventh chapter he says that chance is the cause of the heaven, but in the thirteenth he says that the heaven is without beginning and ungenerated. 10. From the second book of the Physics. There are two principles that move naturally, one of which is not natural; for it does not have the principle of motion in itself. Such a thing is whatever moves without being moved, so that it is both completely unmoved and the first of all things. How then could the principle move naturally, being neither natural nor moving according to nature? For it is consistent only for the natural principle that moves according to nature to move naturally. If the principle which is not natural does not have in itself a principle of motion, it is clear that the natural principle does have in itself a principle of motion; but the principle that has a principle is not a principle. If among eternally ungenerated things nothing can be before or after anything else, how is the unmoved principle, which is not moved, but moves, the first of all things or a principle at all? 17. From the third book of the same treatise. And they derive their belief in the infinite from time; for this is infinite; and further, because only in this way would generation and destruction not fail, if there were an infinite source from which that which is coming to be is taken. If time always has its being in coming to be, and that which is coming to be did not exist before it came to be, how is time infinite, whose existence is always preceded by non-existence? For that which is not yet is about to be present, and that which is future is about to pass away, and that which has passed was about to come to be. If, because generation and destruction do not fail, it is necessary for generation and destruction to be infinite, then generation and destruction will also be without beginning, just like that which is ungenerated and incorruptible; but if this is impossible, then generation and destruction are not infinite. 18. From the same book. But indeed, number is not infinite in the sense of being separate; for number is that which can be numbered or that which has number. If, therefore, it is possible to number that which is numerable, it would also be possible to traverse the infinite. If the number of that which can be numbered and of that which has number is not infinite, and past time is numerable, then past time would be finite. 19. From the same book.

νατόν, ἐστὶ δὲ τῶν ἀδυνάτων τὸ μέλλον ἔσεσθαι ἀγένητον εἶναι, ἄναρχόν τε καὶ ἀτελεύτητον, ἔχον τε καὶ περιέχον ἐν ἑαυτῷ τὸν ἄπειρον χρόνον, ἔσται ἄρα ὁ ταῦτα λέγων δυνατοῦ τε καὶ ἀδυνάτου πράγματος ἀγνοῶν τὴν διαφοράν. ιε. Ἐκ τοῦ πρώτου Περὶ οὐρανοῦ λόγου Ἀριστοτέλους, ἐν τῷ τέλει τοῦ λόγου. Oὐθὲν γὰρ ἀπὸ ταὐτομάτου οὔτε ἄφθαρτον οὔτε ἀγένη τον οἷόν τε εἶναι. Πῶς οὖν ἄν τις πιστεύσειε τῷ ἀμφότερα λέγοντι περὶ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ; Ἐν μὲν τῷ ἑνδεκάτῳ κεφαλαίῳ τὸ αὐτόματον αἴτιον εἶναι λέγει τοῦ οὐρανοῦ, ἐν δὲ τῷ τρισκαιδεκάτῳ ἄναρ χόν τε καὶ ἀγένητον τὸν οὐρανὸν εἶναι λέγει. ι. Ἐκ τοῦ δευτέρου λόγου τῆς Φυσικῆς ἀκροάσεως. ∆ιτταὶ δὲ ἀρχαὶ αἱ κινοῦσαι φυσικῶς, ὧν ἡ ἑτέρα οὐ φυσική· οὐ γὰρ ἔχει κινήσεως ἀρχὴν ἐν ἑαυτῇ. Τοιοῦτον δέ ἐστιν εἴ τι κινεῖ μὴ κινούμενον, ὥστε τό τε παντελῶς ἀκίνη τον καὶ τὸ πάντων πρῶτον. Πῶς ἂν οὖν κινήσειε φυσικῶς ἡ ἀρχή, ἡ μήτε φυσικὴ οὖσα μήτε κατὰ φύσιν κινοῦσα; Τῇ γὰρ μόνῃ φυσικῇ ἀρχῇ τῇ κατὰ φύσιν κινούσῃ ἀκόλουθόν ἐστι τὸ φυσικῶς κινεῖν. Eἰ ἀρχὴ ἡ μὴ οὖσα φυσικὴ οὐκ ἔχει ἐν ἑαυτῇ ἀρχὴν κινήσεως, δῆλον ὅτι ἡ φυσικὴ ἀρχὴ ἔχει ἐν ἑαυτῇ ἀρχὴν κινήσεως· ἀλλ' ἡ ἀρχὴ ἡ ἀρχὴν ἔχουσα οὐκ ἔστιν ἀρχή. Eἰ ἐν τοῖς ἀϊδίως ἀγενήτοις οὐδὲν οὐδενὸς πρότερον ἢ ὕστερον εἶναι δύναται, πῶς ἡ ἀρχὴ ἀκίνητος, ἡ μὴ κινουμένη, κινοῦσα, πάντων πρῶτόν ἐστιν ἢ ὅλως ἀρχή; ιζ. Ἐκ τοῦ τρίτου λόγου τῆς αὐτῆς πραγματείας. Τοῦ δὲ εἶναι ἄπειρον τὴν πίστιν λαμβάνουσιν ἔκ τε τοῦ χρόνου· οὗτος γὰρ ἄπειρος· ἔτι τῷ οὕτως ἂν μόνως μὴ ὑπο λείπειν γένεσιν καὶ φθοράν, εἰ ἄπειρον εἴη ὅθεν ἀφαιρεῖται τὸ γινόμενον. Eἰ ὁ χρόνος ἀεὶ ἐν τῷ γίνεσθαι τὸ εἶναι ἔχει, τὸ δὲ γιγνόμενον πρὸ τοῦ γίνεσθαι οὐκ ἦν, πῶς ἄπειρος ὁ χρόνος, οὗ ἀεὶ τῆς ὑπάρξεως προηγεῖται ἡ ἀνυπαρξία; Καὶ γὰρ τὸ μήπω ὂν μέλλει παρεῖναι, καὶ τὸ μέλλον μέλλει παρελθεῖν, καὶ τὸ παρελθὸν ἔμελλε γίνεσθαι. Eἰ τῷ μὴ ὑπολείπεσθαι τὴν γένεσιν καὶ τὴν φθορὰν ἀνάγκη ἄπειρον εἶναι τὴν γένεσιν καὶ τὴν φθοράν, ἔσται ἄρα καὶ ἡ γένεσις καὶ ἡ φθορὰ ἄναρ χος, ὥσπερ τὸ ἀγένητον καὶ τὸ ἄφθαρτον· εἰ δὲ τοῦτο ἀδύνα τον, οὐκ ἄρα ἄπειρος ἡ γένεσις καὶ ἡ φθορά. ιη. Ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ λόγου. Ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ ἀριθμὸς οὕτως ὡς κεχωρισμένος καὶ ἄπειρος· ἀριθμητὸν γὰρ ὁ ἀριθμὸς ἢ τὸ ἔχον ἀριθμόν. Eἰ οὖν τὸ ἀριθμητὸν ἐνδέχεται ἀριθμῆσαι, καὶ τὸ διεξελθεῖν ἂν εἴη δυνατὸν τὸ ἄπειρον. Eἰ τοῦ ἀριθμητοῦ καὶ τοῦ ἔχοντος ἀριθμὸν οὐκ ἔστιν ἄπει ρος ὁ ἀριθμός, ἀριθμητὸς δὲ ὁ γεγονὼς χρόνος, πεπερασμένος ἄρα ἂν εἴη γεγονὼς χρόνος. ιθ. Ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ λόγου.