OF THE HOLY JUSTIN, PHILOSOPHER AND MARTYR

 power, which is absurd for what is in time is corruptible. But if, being able long ago to prevent so great an evil, he did not prevent it, he would b

 form, but ignorance of God which has spoken the falsehood which is a third form of the greatest evil, resulting for them from the voluntary disobedie

 For, he says, ignorance is often given to men for their good at any rate we see in many cases that it often happens that things known are despised mo

 the religions of the earth differ from the religion that holds the true doctrine simply by falsehood, but from each other in the differences of falseh

 the creator and God ordained the day, on which he makes an abolition of all the evils in the world arising from unbelief and disobedience to God, acco

 to God, the creator of the world, they name the parts of the world, and without the act of creating, they attribute to God the name of creator, so tha

 and in actuality which is absurd. He who remains the same, therefore, has nothing temporal. He makes the world, therefore, always ordering it, and th

 become significant and affirmative of God that all the works of God are temporal with him, it is clear that he absurdly supposed that nothing temporal

 of each other? For 'He has not so much made as He makes' is not a negation of 'to have made', but rather an affirmation of 'He has made'. But clearly,

 the sun in its substance, or according to one act of creation He made its substance and according to another act of creation its motion, and having ma

 Is not God, in respect to the powers He has but according to which He does not act, corruptible according to the judgment of the one who answered? But

 or the denial to be true, how did the respondent posit both for the generation of the world, both the affirmation and the denial, saying it is both cr

 makes different things. Let us not consider God in human terms. For not as we, who previously are one way and later change into another, are said to m

 will. How then is the will the same as the essence, when that which is willed and the will are one thing and another, just as the sensible and sensati

 by essence. But if it is essence, he who wills does not exist, but if it is added to the essence, it is necessarily one thing and another for that wh

 makes of themselves, in the same way also God, being ungenerated, ungeneratedly makes all things, not becoming but co-existing, and by the infinity of

 can. But let us not consider God's creating in a human way. For not as we, who previously are one way, and later changing into another, are said to cr

 of milk, but nature in no way makes substance all at once. How then is the respondent not using an inappropriate example, the working of nature, to re

 For first the simple, but later the composite. Just as God is beyond reproach for the weakness of power, because he did not make more worlds, but havi

 having come to its manifestation, how is it not that in the work of God all the parts of time exist? Fourth Christian question to the Greeks. If it is

 of the known ones of the world he dogmatized its ungeneratedness, nor did he establish this through proof, but only according to his own authority did

 It is clear from this, that the world is not a relative term to the creator insofar as it is an image, nor to the paradigm insofar as it is a creation

 is, he ought also to say that the creation is uncreated, since its creator is uncreated for they necessarily follow one another, the uncreated with t

 kinds, of which it is a common feature for one to be spoken of sometimes in potentiality for what they are called, and sometimes in actuality, while o

 Fifth Christian question to the Hellenes. If heaven is uncreated and God is uncreated and God dwells in heaven, how is God not insulted dwelling in th

 and having made it and to say that the world, without interval, eternally co-exists with God, the world which received its existence from the Creat

 

or the denial to be true, how did the respondent posit both for the generation of the world, both the affirmation and the denial, saying it is both created and uncreated? Furthermore, if, as he said in the third response, God, being uncreated, makes all things in an uncreated way, not coming into being but co-subsisting, but since everything that co-subsists is saved by the salvation of that with which it co-subsists, needing no other protection than the salvation of that one (for when that one is saved, it too is saved), for this reason, if there is need of protection for salvation, that one needs protection with whose substance the co-subsistent things co-subsist, not the co-subsistent things. But if these things are so, then the world which co-subsists with God does not need protection, but God himself with whom the world co-subsists. But if this is absurd, then it is also absurd to say that the world co-subsists with God. One must therefore say that the world subsists by the will of God, and by the will of God it remains the same, even if not forever. Likewise, things that co-subsist with the substance of something remain through its permanence, not their own; for example, with the composition of lines, the angles co-subsist, and while the composition remains, the angles also remain, and when the composition is undone, the angles are also undone; and if it is necessary for the angles to remain, it is necessary to give protection to the composition of the lines, not to the angles in themselves, but accidentally to the angles, and essentially to the composition of the lines. In this way one must understand the world, if it co-subsists with God in an uncreated way, as the respondent says. Third Christian question to the Greeks. If God creates by being and not by willing, just as fire heats by being, how is it that He himself is one and simple and uniform, yet is the maker of different substances? Greek response to the Christians. One must not suppose that, just as in us to be is one thing and to will another, so it is also in God; but on the contrary to be and to will in God are the very same. For what He is, He also wills, and what He wills, He is; and there is no division in God, because God is self-sufficient. Therefore the division of being from willing in God must be rejected. But indeed, not even so must one suppose that God creates by being in the way that fire heats; for fire, even if not essentially, nevertheless has heat as an accident, but in God nothing is an accident, neither essentially nor accidentally. Since, therefore, nothing is an accident to Him, and to be and to will are the same for God, and He is simple and uniform, He is the maker of beings in an uncreated way. For just as we see that generated things, for example, a certain man, having come into being in a generated way and being generative, makes generated things, and in general generated things, having come into being in a generated way, make generated things and make them out of themselves, in the same way God also, being uncreated, makes all things in an uncreated way, not coming into being but co-subsisting, and on the one hand by the infin- of power

ἢ τὴν ἀπόφασιν εἶναι ἀληθῆ, πῶς ὁ ἀποκρινάμενος ἀμφότερα ἔθηκεν ἐπὶ τῆς τοῦ κόσμου γενέσεως, καὶ τὴν φάσιν καὶ τὴν ἀπόφασιν, λέγων αὐτὸν εἶναι γενητὸν καὶ ἀγένητον; Ἔτι δὲ εἰ, καθὰ εἶπεν ἐν τῇ τρίτῃ ἀποκρίσει, ἀγένητος ὢν ὁ θεὸς ἀγε νήτως ποιεῖ πάντα, οὐ γινόμενα ἀλλὰ συνυφιστάμενα, ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ πᾶν συνυφιστάμενον τῇ τοῦ ᾧ συνυφίσταται σωτηρίᾳ σώζεται, μὴ χρῇζον ἑτέρας φρουρᾶς πλὴν τῆς ἐκείνου σωτη ρίας (σωζομένου γὰρ ἐκείνου σέσωσται καὶ αὐτό), διὰ τοῦτο, εἰ χρεία ἐστὶ φρουρᾶς πρὸς σωτηρίαν, ἐκεῖνο χρῄζει φρουρᾶς οὗ ὑφισταμένου συνυφίσταται τὰ συνυφιστάμενα, οὐχὶ τὰ συν υφιστάμενα. Ἀλλ' εἰ ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχει, οὐκ ἄρα ὁ κόσμος χρῄζει φρουρᾶς ὁ συνυφιστάμενος τῷ θεῷ, ἀλλ' αὐτὸς ὁ θεὸς ᾧ συνυφίσταται ὁ κόσμος. Eἰ δὲ τοῦτο ἄτοπον, ἄτοπον ἄρα καὶ τὸ τὸν κόσμον λέγειν συνυφιστάμενον τῷ θεῷ. Χρὴ οὖν λέγειν βουλήσει τοῦ θεοῦ ὑφίστασθαι τὸν κόσμον, καὶ βουλήσει τοῦ θεοῦ διαμένει ὁ αὐτός, εἰ καὶ μὴ ἀεί. Ὡσαύτως τὰ τῇ ὑποστάσει τινὸς συνυφιστάμενα τῇ ἐκείνου διαμονῇ διαμένει, οὐχὶ ἑαυτῶν· οἷον τῇ συνθέσει τῶν γραμμῶν συνυφίστανται αἱ γωνίαι, καὶ μενούσης τῆς συνθέσεως μένουσι καὶ αἱ γω νίαι, καὶ ἀναιρουμένης τῆς συνθέσεως ἀναιροῦνται καὶ αἱ γω νίαι· καὶ εἰ χρεία ἐστὶ τοῦ διαμένειν τὰς γωνίας, ἀνάγκη δοῦναι φρουρὰν τῇ συνθέσει τῶν γραμμῶν, οὐχὶ ταῖς γω νίαις καθ' ἑαυτάς, ἀλλὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς μὲν ταῖς γωνίαις, καθ' ἑαυτὸ δὲ τῇ συνθέσει τῶν γραμμῶν. Κατὰ ταῦτα χρὴ νοεῖν τὸν κόσμον, εἰ ἀγενήτως συνυφίσταται τῷ θεῷ, καθά φησιν ὁ ἀποκρινάμενος. Τρίτη ἐρώτησις χριστιανικὴ πρὸς τοὺς Ἕλληνας. Eἰ τῷ εἶναι καὶ οὐ τῷ βούλεσθαι ποιεῖ ὁ θεός, οἷον θερ μαίνει τὸ πῦρ τῷ εἶναι, πῶς αὐτὸς μὲν ἕν ἐστί τε καὶ ἁπλοῦν καὶ μονοειδές, διαφόρων δὲ οὐσιῶν ἐστι ποιητής; Ἀπόκρισις ἑλληνικὴ πρὸς τοὺς Χριστιανούς. Oὐκ οἰητέον, ὥσπερ ἐν ἡμῖν ἄλλο μὲν ἔστι τὸ εἶναι, ἄλλο δὲ τὸ βούλεσθαι, οὕτω καὶ ἐν τῷ θεῷ· ἀλλὰ τὸ αὐτὸ ἄντικρυς ὑπάρχει τὸ εἶναι καὶ τὸ βούλεσθαι ἐν τῷ θεῷ. Ὃ γὰρ ἔστι καὶ βούλεται, καὶ ὃ βούλεται ἔστι· καὶ οὐδεμία διαίρεσις ἐπὶ τοῦ θεοῦ, διὰ τὸ αὐτοπάρακτον εἶναι τὸν θεόν. Ὥστε καὶ τὴν διαίρεσιν τοῦ εἶναι πρὸς τὸ βούλεσθαι ἐπὶ τοῦ θεοῦ ἀποῤῥιπτέον. Ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ' οὕτως τὸν θεὸν τῷ εἶναι ποι εῖν ὑποθετέον ὡς τὸ πῦρ θερμαίνει· τὸ γὰρ πῦρ, εἰ καὶ οὐ σιωδῶς, ἀλλ' ὅμως συμβεβηκυῖαν ἔχει τὴν θερμότητα, παρὰ δὲ τῷ θεῷ οὐδὲν οὔτε οὐσιωδῶς συμβέβηκεν οὔτε συμβεβηκό τως. Ἐπεὶ οὖν συμβέβηκε μὲν αὐτῷ οὐδέν, τὸ δὲ εἶναι καὶ τὸ βούλεσθαι ταὐτὸν ὑπάρχει τῷ θεῷ, ἁπλοῦν τέ ἐστι καὶ μονο ειδές, ποιητικὸν ἀγενήτως τῶν ὄντων. Ὥσπερ γὰρ ὁρῶμεν ὅτι τὰ γεννητά, οἷον ἄνθρωπος ὁ δεῖνα γεννητῶς γενόμενος γεννητικός τε ὤν, γεννητὰ ποιεῖ, καὶ καθόλου τὰ γεννητὰ γεν νητῶς γενόμενα γεννητὰ ποιεῖ καὶ ἐξ αὑτῶν ποιεῖ, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον καὶ ὁ θεός, ἀγένητος ὤν, ἀγενήτως ποιεῖ πάντα, οὐ γινόμενα ἀλλὰ συνυφιστάμενα, καὶ τῇ μὲν τῆς δυνάμεως ἀπει