ARTICLE 12

In this article the question is: Whether the virtues are distinct from one another.

This question concerns the distinction of virtues. It would seem that they are not correctly distinguished.

             OBJECTIONS:

1. Moral entities are specified by the end, so that, if the virtues are to be distinguished according to species, this must be from the part of their end. But it cannot be from the part of their proximate end; for there would then be an infinite number of specifically distinct virtues. Hence it must be on the part of the ultimate end. But there is only one ultimate end for all the virtues, namely, God or beatitude. Therefore, there is only one virtue.

             2. Further, by one operation one end is attained. Now one operation proceeds from one form. Therefore, by one form man is ordered to one end. But the end of man is one, namely happiness. Therefore, virtue, which is the form whereby man is ordered to happiness, is also one.

             3. Further, forms and accidents are numerically distinguished by their matter or subject. Now the subject of virtue is the soul or one of its powers. Therefore, it would seem that there is only one virtue, because in each man there is only one soul; or at least that the virtues do not exceed in number the powers of the soul.

             4. Further, habits are distinguished by their objects, as powers are. Therefore, since virtues are habits, it would seem that we should distinguish the virtues on the same basis as we distinguish the powers of the soul. Thus the virtues do not exceed in number the powers of the soul.

             5. But it might be objected that habits are distinguished by their acts and not by their powers.--On the contrary, things which derive from principles (principiata) are distinguished according to their principles, and not vice versa; because things have both being and unity from the same source. But habits are the principles of acts. Therefore, acts are distinguished according to habits, rather than the other way around.

             6. Further, virtue is necessary that a man be inclined, as it were naturally, to what is of virtue; for as Cicero remarks, virtue is a habit formed in the reason, like a second nature. Hence man needs no virtue for that to which one of his powers is naturally inclined. Now man's will is naturally inclined to the ultimate end. Therefore, with regard to the ultimate end man does not need any virtuous habit, for which reason the Philosopher did not assign any virtues having beatitude, as their object. Consequently, neither should we admit any theological virtues, the object of which would be God, Who is the Ultimate End.

             7. Further, virtue is a disposition of a perfect thing to what is best. But faith and hope connote a certain imperfection: for faith is of things not seen and hope is of things not possessed, so that "when that which is perfect is come, that which is in part shall be done away," as we are told in 1 Cor. 13:10. Therefore, faith and hope should not be regarded as virtues.

             8. Further, a man cannot be ordered to God save by his intellect and will. But faith adequately orders man's intellect to God, while charity does the same for the will. Therefore, hope should not be included along with faith and charity as a theological virtue.

             9. Further, what is common to every virtue ought not be assigned as a special virtue. But charity seems to be common to every virtue, because virtue is no less than the order of love, as Augustine observes, in his book De Moribus Ecclesiae, while charity itself is said to be the form of all the virtues. Therefore, it should not be given a special place among the theological virtues.

             10. Further, in God there is not only Truth, with which faith is concerned, and the Divine bounty (sublimitas), which hope regards, and Goodness, to which charity looks; but there are many other Divine attributes, as wisdom, power, and others. It would seem, therefore, that there is either only one theological virtue, because all these attributes are one in God; or else there are as many theological virtues as there are Divine attributes.

             11. Further, a theological virtue is one whose act is immediately ordered to God. But there are many virtues of this nature: wisdom, which contemplates God, fear, which reverences Him, religion, which worships Him. Therefore, there are more than three theological virtues.

             12. Further, the end is the reason for everything in the means (finis est ratio eorum quae sunt ad finem). Therefore, when one has the theological virtues, whereby a man is rightly ordered to God, it would seem superfluous to look for any other virtues.

             13. Further, virtue is ordered to good; for it is defined as that which makes its possessor good and his action good. But goodness is only in the will and in the sensitive appetite. And so it seems that there are no intellectual virtues.

             14. Further, prudence is one of the intellectual virtues, and yet it is reckoned among the moral virtues. Therefore, it would seem that the moral virtues are not distinguished from the intellectual.

             15. Further, moral science treats only of moral matters. Now this science does consider the intellectual virtues. Therefore, there is no difference between the moral and the intellectual virtues.

             16. Further, whatever is included in a thing's definition is not distinct from that thing. But prudence is placed in the definition of moral virtue; for the latter is defined as a habit of choice, consisting in a mean determined by right reason, as it says in the Ethics. Indeed, prudence is the right way of doing things, as it says later on. Therefore the moral virtues are not distinct from prudence.

             17. Further, both prudence and art pertain to practical knowledge. But besides art, there are no habits in the appetitive part ordered to the production of artifacts. By the same token, neither should there be any virtues besides prudence in the appetite, for directing one's actions. Therefore, it would seem that there are no moral virtues distinct from prudence.

             18. But it might be objected that there is no virtue in the appetite corresponding to art, because the appetite is concerned with singulars, whereas art is of universals.--On the contrary, Aristotle says in the Ethics that anger is always concerned with singulars; but hatred may also be of universals, for we hate every type of thief. Now hatred pertains to the appetite. Therefore, the appetite does regard universals.

             19. Further, every power naturally tends to its proper object. Now the object of the appetite naturally tends to the good from which it has been apprehended. Therefore, the appetite tends naturally to the good from which it was apprehended. But in apprehending the good we are sufficiently perfected by prudence. Therefore, we do not need any other moral virtue in the appetite, besides prudence, but a natural inclination suffices for the appetitive part.

             20. Further, knowledge and action suffice for virtue. But prudence guarantees both of these. Therefore, we need not assign any moral virtue besides prudence.

             21. Further, cognitive habits are distinguished according to their acts, the same as appetitive habits. But as far as all moral actions are concerned, there is only one cognitive habit involved; and this is either moral science, with respect to moral actions in general, or prudence (as regards individual acts, here and now.) Therefore, in the appetite as well there should be only one moral virtue.

             22. Further, things which agree in form and differ only in matter are specifically one. But all the moral virtues agree in form, since in all there is a mean determined by right reason--and this is formal (the formal element) in moral virtue; whereas they differ as regards their matter or objects. Therefore, virtues differ, not specifically, but only numerically.

             23. Further, things which differ in species are not predicated or denominated of each other. But the moral virtues mutually denominate each other; thus, as Augustine says in De Trinitate, justice must be brave and temperate, temperance must be just and courageous, and the same for the others. Therefore, the virtues are not distinct from one another.

             24. Further, the theological and the cardinal virtues are more excellent than the other moral virtues. But the intellectual virtues are called neither cardinal nor theological. Therefore, neither should the moral virtues be called cardinal, as though they were the principal virtues.

             25. Further, there are three parts assigned to the soul, namely, the rational, the irascible, and the concupiscible. Therefore, if there are any principal virtues, it would seem that they are only three in number.

             26. Further, some virtues seem to be more eminent than those which are (commonly) called cardinal. For example: magnanimity, which does great things in all the virtues (quae operatur magnum in omnibus virtutibus), and meekness, which is opposed to anger (ira), from which the irascible appetite takes its name. These seem to be more excellent than fortitude. Likewise, liberality and magnificence, which give of themselves, seem to be more outstanding than justice, which renders to another (only) what is due him. Therefore, the virtues which are commonly called cardinal are not really such, but rather others are so.

             27. Further, a part is not distinct from the whole. But Cicero, in his book De Inventione Rhetorica, /CS> lists certain virtues as parts of these four, prudence, justice, fortitude, and temperance. Therefore, these certain virtues, at least, are not distinct from the four cardinal virtues. Thus it would seem that the virtues are not correctly distinguished.

             ON THE CONTRARY:

In 1 Cor. 13:13: we read: "And now there remain faith, hope, and charity, these three;" and is Wisd. 8:7: "for she teacheth temperance and prudence and justice, and fortitude."

             I reply: A thing is distinguished in its species by what is formal to it. Now in each thing the formal element is what completes its definition. For it is the ultimate difference which constitutes the species as such, so that by this differentia a thing differs specifically from other things. Hence, if the difference be formally multiple (si ipsa sit multiplicabilis formaliter) by reason of diverse elements, the thing defined will be divided into various species, according to the diverse elements found in its difference.

             Now goodness is the formal element which ultimately completes the definition of virtue: for virtue is commonly defined as "that which makes both its possessor and its acts good," as is clear from the Ethics. Therefore, human virtue, of which we are speaking, will be specifically diversified according as the concept of good is diversified.

             Since man is human precisely because he is rational, human good ought to be in some sense (aliqualiter) a rational good or the good of reason. Now the rational or intellective part comprises both the cognitive and the appetitive powers. Further, not only does the appetite which is in the rational part, which follows the apprehension of the intellect and is called the will, pertain to the rational part; but also the appetite which is the sensitive part of man, and is divided into the irascible and concupiscible powers. For the sensitive appetite in man follows the apprehension of the intellect insofar as it obeys the command of reason; whence also it is said to participate to some extent in reason. Therefore, the good of man is the good of both his cognitive and his appetitive powers.

             However, good is not attributed to both these parts according to the same formality or ratio. For good is attributed formally to the appetitive part, since good itself is the object of the appetite. On the other hand, good is attributed to the intellect, not formally but only materially. Knowledge of the truth is the good for the cognitive part; although this good is not grasped as such by the cognitive part, but rather by the appetitive part, for the very knowledge of the truth is something desirable.

             Hence, the virtue which perfects the cognitive part in its knowledge of the truth will be of another nature (alterius rationis) than the virtue which perfects the appetitive part in its apprehension of the good. For this reason, the Philosopher, in his book of Ethics, distinguishes intellectual from moral virtue. He calls intellectual that virtue which perfects the intellective power in its knowledge of the truth, while moral virtue is that which perfects the appetite in its desire of the good.

             Because good pertains more properly to the appetitive than to the intellective part, the name "virtue" applies more properly and precisely to the virtues of the appetitive than to those of the intellective part; even though the intellectual virtues may be nobler as perfections than the moral virtues, as is proved in the Ethics.

             Moreover, knowledge of the truth is not specifically one as regards all things. For necessary truth is known with a different formality than contingent truth is known. Again, necessary truth is known differently according as it is known either per se, as the intellect knows first principles, or as it is known from something else, as conclusions are made known by science and wisdom concerning the highest truths; and in the knowledge of these lofty truths there is yet another formality, in that by it (wisdom) a man is directed to know other truths. In a similar way, as regards contingent actions, there is one mode of knowing those things in us which we must do, i.e. our actions, wherein error frequently occurs, on account of passion; and with these actions prudence is concerned. There is another and different mode of knowledge as regards those things which are outside of us and are to be made by us: in these matters we are directed by art, the correct judgment of which is not corrupted by the passions of the soul.

             Thus, as enumerated by the Philosopher in the Ethics, the intellectual virtues are: wisdom, science, understanding, prudence, and art.

             In a similar manner, the good of the appetitive part is not the same in all human matters. This good may be sought in three objects; namely: in the passions of the irascible and those of the concupiscible appetite, and in our operations, which are concerned with things we use, e.g. in buying and selling leasing and borrowing, and others such as these.

             Now the good for man, as far as his passions are concerned, is that he conduct himself so as not to swerve from the judgment of reason under their impetus. Hence, if there be any passions which by nature impede the good of reason by inciting man to perform acts contrary to or to seek other goods opposed to reason, then the virtuous good will consist especially in a certain bridling and restraining; as is evident in temperance, which represses and beats down the concupiscences. However, if there is a passion which is apt to impede the good of reason particularly by holding men back, as fear does, then the good of virtue in regard to this type of passion will be to give a man courage, which fortitude does.

             The good of reason as regards external things consists in their being duly proportioned according to the share which men have of them in daily life. To effect this good there is justice, whose office it is to direct and to insure equity in these matters.

             The good of both the intellective and the appetitive part is two-fold: first, there is the good which is the ultimate end, and secondly, the good which is a means to the end. Therefore, besides all the virtues mentioned above, by which a man attains good in those things which are means to the end, other virtues must be assigned, which will dispose one rightly towards the ultimate end, which is God. Consequently, these virtues are called theological, because they have God, not only as their end, but also as their object.

             That we may be rightly moved toward our end, this end must be both known and loved. Now desire of the end requires two things: namely, confidence that we will attain the end, for no wise man is moved to what he cannot attain; and love of the end, for only what is loved is desired. And so there are three theological virtues, as follows: faith, by which we know God; hope, by which we trust we will one day possess Him; and charity, by which we love Him. From all that has been said, we conclude that there are three classes of virtue: theological, intellectual, and moral; and each general class has many specific types under it.

             REPLY TO OBJECTIONS:

1. Moral entities take their species from their proximate ends.

             However, these ends are not infinite in number, if in them only the formal difference be considered. For the proximate end of each virtue is the good which it effects, which differs specifically from the goods of the rest of the virtues, as was shown in the body of the Article.

             2. This objection is valid with respect to those agents which act by a necessity of their nature, because they attain their end by one act and one form; whereas man has reason, because he is meant to attain his end by many and various acts. Therefore, many virtues are necessary for him.

             3. Accidents are not multiplied in a single subject numerically but only specifically; hence we need not consider the unity or multiplicity of virtues according to their subject, which is the soul or its powers, save where a diversity of powers demands a diverse type of good; for the virtues are distinguished by the various types of good which they effect, as has been said.

             4. A thing is not the object of a power in the same way as it is the object of a habit. For a power is that whereby we are simply capable of something, for example, of becoming angry or of being trustful; whereas a habit is that whereby we enjoy the capability of acting well or badly, as explained in the Ethics. And so, where there are different kinds of good there will be but one kind of object with respect to a habit, but not as regards a power; so that in one power there may be many habits.

             5. Nothing prevents one thing from being the efficient cause of another, which other is at the same time the final cause of the first thing; as medicine is the efficient cause of health, which is the end of medicine, as the Philosopher says in the Ethics. Thus, habits are efficient causes of acts, while acts are the final causes of habits; and so habits are formally distinguished by their acts.

             6. A mutual inclination is sufficient for a man, that he be well disposed with respect to an end which is proportionate to human nature. And so the philosopher enumerated certain virtues, the object of which was to be the happiness of which they themselves had treated. But the end for which we hope, namely God, exceeds the proportion of our nature. Therefore, over and above any natural inclination, we need the virtues whereby we may be elevated to our ultimate end.

             7. To attain God in some manner, even imperfectly, is a greater perfection than to attain other things perfectly. Whence the Philosopher remarks, in De Proprietatibus Animalium, "What we perceive of the more sublime things is more excellent than the great deal which we may know about other things." Consequently, nothing prevents faith and hope from being virtues, even though by them we attain God only imperfectly.

             8. Our will is ordered to God, both by hope, whereby we trust in God, and by charity, whereby we love Him.

             9. Love is the principle and the root of all affections: for we rejoice in the presence of a good only insofar as the good is loved; and the same is true of all the other affections. Hence every virtue which orders a passion is also directive of love. Nor does it follow that charity, which is love, is not a special virtue; rather, it must in a certain sense be the principle of all the virtues, insofar as it moves them all to their end.

             10. We need not assign theological virtues to correspond to all of the Divine attributes, but only for those attributes which move our appetite as an end. Now in this capacity there are the three theological virtues which were mentioned in Article 10 of this Question.

             11. Religion has God for its end, but not for its object. The object of the virtue of religion is those things which it offers to God in Divine worship. Therefore, religion is not a theological virtue. Likewise, wisdom, whereby we contemplate God, does not immediately regard God Himself, but the effects from which we are led to contemplate Him in the present life. Fear too has for its object something other than God, namely, either punishments or one's own meanness, from the consideration of which a man is moved to subject himself reverently to God.

             12. Just as in speculative matters there are principles and conclusions, so in actions there are ends and means. Just as for perfect and clear knowledge it is not enough that a man have a good grasp of the principles, which is obtained by understanding, but there is further required science, for conclusions; so also in actions, besides the theological virtues, whereby we are well-disposed for the ultimate end, other virtues are necessary, whereby we may be well-ordered to those things which are for the end.

             13. Although good as such is the object of an appetitive and not of an intellective power; nevertheless, the good can also be found in an intellectual virtue. For to know the truth is a good; and so a habit which perfects the intellect in its knowledge of the truth has the nature of a virtue.

             14. Prudence is essentially an intellectual virtue, but its matter or object is moral. Hence it is sometimes numbered with the moral virtues, as a sort of mean between the intellectual and the moral.

             15. Although the intellectual virtues are distinct from the moral, still they pertain to moral science insofar as their acts are subject to the will. For we make use of science and the other intellectual virtues when we have a will to do so. Now when something is in some way related to the will, it is called moral.

             16. The right reason of prudence is not included in the definition of moral virtue as part of the latter's essence, but as, in a certain sense, its efficient cause; or else it is put there by participation. For moral virtue is nothing other than a certain participation of the appetitive part in right reason, as was said above.

             17. The matter with which art deals is exterior things which are to be made, while the matter of prudence is the things which we are to do. Just as art requires a right disposition in the exterior things which it will fashion according to some form; so prudence requires a right disposition in our passions and affections. For this disposition prudence presupposes moral virtues in the appetitive part, which art does not require.

             18. We concede the objection. The intellective appetite, which is the will, can have as its object the universal good which the intellect can apprehend. But the sensitive appetite cannot have this universal good as its object, because sense cannot grasp the universal.

             19. The appetite is naturally moved by an apprehended good; yet, that it be easily inclined towards a good which reason determines with perfect prudence, a virtuous habit is required in the appetitive power. Man especially needs right reason freely to determine and to point out a good, towards the opposite of which the appetite may by nature be absolutely drawn: as the concupiscible appetite is naturally moved to sense pleasure, and the irascible power to vengeance, which reason at times forbids by its deliberation. Similarly, the will also naturally desires for the needs of life whatever may come to a man's use; but the deliberation of reason may sometimes command that these goods be shared with another. Therefore, we must assign virtuous habits to the appetitive part, whereby it may easily obey reason.

             20. Knowledge pertains immediately to prudence, but actions pertain to prudence through the medium of the appetitive powers. Therefore, there should be certain habits in the appetitive part also, and these are called the moral virtues.

             21. In all moral matters truth is of one kind: it is the contingent truth of actions which must be performed. However, in these actions there is more than one kind of good, which is the object of virtue. Therefore, with respect to all moral actions there is but one cognitive habit, but not merely one moral virtue.

             22. There are various means for diverse subject-matters. Hence diversity of matter is the basis for the formal diversity whereby the moral virtues differ specifically from one another.

             23. Certain moral virtues, which are concerned with special matter, appropriate to themselves what is common to every virtue, and by this they are denominated. Moreover, what is common to all the virtues is particularly difficult and deserving of praise in certain special matters or objects.

             Thus, for every virtue it is clearly required that its act be modified to fit the proper circumstances by which it is constituted in the mean; and that it be directed to the end or to some other exterior object, and further, that it have a certain firmness.

             For to act with firmness is one of the conditions of virtue, as we learn from the Ethics; and to persevere unflinchingly in the face of death is especially praiseworthy and difficult. And so the virtue which is concerned with effecting this courage appropriates to itself the name of fortitude (fortitudo = courage).

             Again, to be continent in the pleasures of touch is especially difficult and praiseworthy; hence the virtue which regulates this matter is called temperance (temperantia = moderation).

             Further, in the use of exterior things, rectitude is above all required and to be commended, because it is in these goods that men communicate with each other. Therefore, in these things the good of virtue is that a man maintain in their regard a certain equality towards others. From this function the virtue of justice (ius = right) is named.

             Sometimes, then, when speaking of the virtues, men use the terms fortitude, temperance, and justice, not according as these are special virtues, having a definite, determined object, but in reference to the general conditions from which they derive their names. It is in this sense that we say that temperance should be courageous, i.e. firm, and that fortitude should be temperate, i.e. observe moderation, and the same for the other virtues.

             Now concerning prudence, it is clear that in a certain sense it is general, to the extent that it has for its object all the moral virtues (i.e. all moral matters), and inasmuch as all the moral virtues in some way participate in it, as was shown in this article, in reply to the sixteenth objection. For this reason we say that every moral virtue ought to be prudent.

             24. A virtue is called cardinal, meaning principal, because the other virtues are based on it much as a door swings on its hinges (cardine).

             Inasmuch as it is through a door that one enters a house, the ratio of cardinal virtue is not found in the theological virtues, which are concerned with the ultimate end, from which there is no entrance or passing on to anything beyond. Indeed, it is proper to the theological virtues that on them the other virtues are established as on an immovable foundation. Thus faith is called the foundation, 1 Cor. 3:11: "For other foundation no man can lay, but that which is laid;" hope is called an anchor, Heb. 6:19: "which we have as an anchor of the soul, sure and firm;" and charity is called the root, Ephes. 3:17: "being rooted and founded in charity."

             Similarly, the intellectual virtues are not given the name of cardinal because some of them, namely, wisdom, science, and understanding, perfect one in the contemplative life: now the contemplative life is an end; therefore, it does not partake of the notion of a door. But the active life, in which the moral virtues are practiced, is a doorway to the contemplative life.

             Lastly, art has no virtues connected with it by which it might possibly be called cardinal. But prudence, which directs us in the active life, is counted among the cardinal virtues.

             25. In the rational part there are two powers, namely, the appetitive, called the will, and the cognitive, called the reason. Therefore, in the rational part there are two cardinal virtues: prudence, which is in the reason, and justice, which is in the will. In the concupiscible appetite there is temperance, and in the irascible appetite, fortitude.

             26. There is a cardinal virtue concerned with what is outstanding in every object of the virtues. The virtues which regard other things pertaining to the object are called secondary or connected.

             For example, in the passions of the concupiscible appetite, the elements of chief concern are the concupiscences and pleasures of touch, which are the object of temperance. And so, in this matter the cardinal virtue is temperance; whereas eutrapelia, which has to do with pleasure found in games, may be assigned as a secondary or connected virtue.

             Likewise, among the passions of the irascible appetite, the principal element is what pertains to fear and daring in the face of death, which is the object of fortitude. Hence fortitude is assigned as the cardinal virtue for the irascible appetite; and not meekness, which has to do with anger, even though the irascible appetite is denominated from anger (ira), because anger is the greatest of the passions of this power. Nor do we count magnanimity or humility, which are concerned in some way with hope or confidence in something great, as the cardinal virtues of the irascible power; for anger and hope do not move men as does fear of death.

             In actions which regard the external goods meant to be used in daily life, the first and foremost requirement is that each man be given what is due him: and this justice insures. For apart from justice neither liberality nor magnificence have any place. Therefore, justice is the cardinal virtue, and the others are connected with it.

             Furthermore, in the acts of reason, the principal act is command or choice, which prudence regulates: for to this act both ebulia, which directs counsel, and synesis, which directs judgment, are ordered.

             27. The connected or secondary virtues are considered as parts of the cardinal virtues, not integral or subjective parts, since they have their own determined matter and proper act; but as potential parts, inasmuch as they participate in a partial and imperfect way in the mean which belongs principally and in a more perfect manner to the cardinal virtues.