XII. An examination of the question where the ruling principle is to be considered to reside; wherein also is a discussion of tears and laughter, and a physiological speculation as to the inter-relation of matter, nature, and mind.41    In the Latin version chap. xii. includes only §§1—8 (incl.), to which the Bodleian ms. gives the title:—“That the principle of man does not all reside in the brain, but in the whole body.”

1. Let there be an end, then, of all the vain and conjectural discussion of those who confine the intelligible energy to certain bodily organs; of whom some lay it down that the ruling principle is in the heart, while others say that the mind resides in the brain, strengthening such opinions by some plausible superficialities. For he who ascribes the principal authority to the heart makes its local position evidence of his argument (because it seems that it somehow occupies the middle position in the body42    This view of the position of the heart is perhaps shared by Gregory himself: see e.g. ch. xxx. §15.), on the ground that the motion of the will is easily distributed from the centre to the whole body, and so proceeds to operation; and he makes the troublesome and passionate disposition of man a testimony for his argument, because such affections seem to move this part sympathetically. Those, on the other hand, who consecrate the brain to reasoning, say that the head has been built by nature as a kind of citadel of the whole body, and that in it the mind dwells like a king, with a bodyguard of senses surrounding it like messengers and shield-bearers. And these find a sign of their opinion in the fact that the reasoning of those who have suffered some injury to the membrane of the brain is abnormally distorted, and that those whose heads are heavy with intoxication ignore what is seemly.

2. Each of those who uphold these views puts forward some reasons of a more physical character on behalf of his opinion concerning the ruling principle. One declares that the motion which proceeds from the understanding is in some way akin to the nature of fire, because fire and the understanding are alike in perpetual motion; and since heat is allowed to have its source in the region of the heart, he says on this ground that the motion of mind is compounded with the mobility of heat, and asserts that the heart, in which heat is enclosed, is the receptacle of the intelligent nature. The other declares that the cerebral membrane (for so they call the tissue that surrounds the brain) is as it were a foundation or root of all the senses, and hereby makes good his own argument, on the ground that the intellectual energy cannot have its seat save in that part where the ear, connected with it, comes into concussion with the sounds that fall upon it, and the sight (which naturally belongs to the hollow of the place where the eyes are situated) makes its internal representation by means of the images that fall upon the pupils, while the qualities of scents are discerned in it by being drawn in through the nose, and the sense of taste is tried by the test of the cerebral membrane, which sends down from itself, by the veterbræ of the neck, sensitive nerve-processes to the isthmoidal passage, and unites them with the muscles there.

3. I admit it to be true that the intellectual part of the soul is often disturbed by prevalence of passions; and that the reason is blunted by some bodily accident so as to hinder its natural operation; and that the heart is a sort of source of the fiery element in the body, and is moved in correspondence with the impulses of passion; and moreover, in addition to this, I do not reject (as I hear very much the same account from those who spend their time on anatomical researches) the statement that the cerebral membrane (according to the theory of those who take such a physiological view), enfolding in itself the brain, and steeped in the vapours that issue from it, forms a foundation for the senses; yet I do not hold this for a proof that the incorporeal nature is bounded by any limits of place.

4. Certainly we are aware that mental aberrations do not arise from heaviness of head alone, but skilled physicians declare that our intellect is also weakened by the membranes that underlie the sides being affected by disease, when they call the disease frenzy, since the name given to those membranes is φρένες. And the sensation resulting from sorrow is mistakenly supposed to arise at the heart; for while it is not the heart, but the entrance of the belly that is pained, people ignorantly refer the affection to the heart. Those, however, who have carefully studied the affections in question give some such account as follows:—by a compression and closing of the pores, which naturally takes place over the whole body in a condition of grief, everything that meets a hindrance in its passage is driven to the cavities in the interior of the body, and hence also (as the respiratory organs too are pressed by what surrounds them), the drawing of breath often becomes more violent under the influence of nature endeavouring to widen what has been contracted, so as to open out the compressed passages; and such breathing we consider a symptom of grief and call it a groan or a shriek. That, moreover, which appears to oppress the region of the heart is a painful affection, not of the heart, but of the entrance of the stomach, and occurs from the same cause (I mean, that of the compression of the pores), as the vessel that contains the bile, contracting, pours that bitter and pungent juice upon the entrance of the stomach; and a proof of this is that the complexion of those in grief becomes sallow and jaundiced, as the bile pours its own juice into the veins by reason of excessive pressure.

5. Furthermore, the opposite affection, that, I mean, of mirth and laughter, contributes to establish the argument; for the pores of the body, in the case of those who are dissolved in mirth by hearing something pleasant, are also somehow dissolved and relaxed. Just as in the former case the slight and insensible exhalations of the pores are checked by grief, and, as they compress the internal arrangement of the higher viscera, drive up towards the head and the cerebral membrane the humid vapour which, being retained in excess by the cavities of the brain, is driven out by the pores at its base43    διὰ τῶν κατὰ τὴν βάσιν πόρων. The meaning of this is obscure. If we might read τῶν κατὰ τὴν ὀψιν πόρων, we should have a parallel to τοῦ κατὰ τὸ στόμα πόρου below. But there seems to be no variation in the mss., while the closing of the eyelids expels the moisture in the form of drops (and the drop is called a tear), so I would have you think that when the pores, as a result of the contrary condition, are unusually widened, some air is drawn in through them into the interior, and thence again expelled by nature through the passage of the mouth, while all the viscera (and especially, as they say, the liver) join in expelling this air by a certain agitation and throbbing motion; whence it comes that nature, contriving to give facility for the exit of the air, widens the passage of the mouth, extending the cheeks on either side round about the breath; and the result is called laughter.

6. We must not, then, on this account ascribe the ruling principle any more to the liver than we must think, because of the heated state of the blood about the heart in wrathful dispositions, that the seat of the mind is in the heart; but we must refer these matters to the character of our bodily organization, and consider that the mind is equally in contact with each of the parts according to a kind of combination which is indescribable.

7. Even if any should allege to us on this point the Scripture which claims the ruling principle for the heart, we shall not receive the statement without examination; for he who makes mention of the heart speaks also of the reins, when he says, “God trieth the hearts and reins”44    Ps. vii. 10.; so that they must either confine the intellectual principle to the two combined or to neither.

8. And although I am aware that the intellectual energies are blunted, or even made altogether ineffective in a certain condition of the body, I do not hold this a sufficient evidence for limiting the faculty of the mind by any particular place, so that it should be forced out of its proper amount of free space by any inflammations that may arise in the neighbouring parts of the body45    The inflammation causing swelling in the neighbouring parts, and so leaving no room for the mind. (for such an opinion is a corporeal one, that when the receptacle is already occupied by something placed in it, nothing else can find place there); for the intelligible nature neither dwells in the empty spaces of bodies, nor is extruded by encroachments of the flesh; but since the whole body is made like some musical instrument, just as it often happens in the case of those who know how to play, but are unable, because the unfitness of the instrument does not admit of their art, to show their skill (for that which is destroyed by time, or broken by a fall, or rendered useless by rust or decay, is mute and inefficient, even if it be breathed upon by one who may be an excellent artist in flute-playing); so too the mind, passing over the whole instrument, and touching each of the parts in a mode corresponding to its intellectual activities, according to its nature, produces its proper effect on those parts which are in a natural condition, but remains inoperative and ineffective upon those which are unable to admit the movement of its art; for the mind is somehow naturally adapted to be in close relation with that which is in a natural condition, but to be alien from that which is removed from nature.

9. 46    The Latin version (as well as several of the Greek mss.) makes this the beginning of chap. xiii. The Bodleian ms. gives as the title:—“That as the mind is governed by God, so is the material life of the body by the mind.”And here, I think there is a view of the matter more close to nature, by which we may learn something of the more refined doctrines. For since the most beautiful and supreme good of all is the Divinity Itself, to which incline all things that have a tendency towards what is beautiful and good47    καλὸν and τὸ καλὸν seem in the following passage to be used of goodness, alike moral and aesthetic: once or twice καλὸν seems to be used as equivalent to ἀγαθὸν or as opposed to κακὸν, in a sense capable of being rendered simply by “good”; it also seems to carry with it in other phrases the distinct idea of aesthetic goodness, or “beauty,” and the use of κάλλος and καλλωπίζειν, in other phrases still, makes it necessary to preserve this idea in translation. The phrases “beautiful and good,” or “beauty and goodness,” have therefore been here adopted to express the single adjective καλὸν., we therefore say that the mind, as being in the image of the most beautiful, itself also remains in beauty and goodness so long as it partakes as far as is possible in its likeness to the archetype; but if it were at all to depart from this it is deprived of that beauty in which it was. And as we said that the mind was adorned48    Omitting τοῦ, which Forbes inserts before κατακοσμεῖσθαι: it appears to be found in all the mss., but its insertion reduces the grammar of the passage to hopeless confusion. Perhaps the true reading is τοῦ πρωτοτύπου καλλιστοῦ by the likeness of the archetypal beauty, being formed as though it were a mirror to receive the figure of that which it expresses, we consider that the nature which is governed by it is attached to the mind in the same relation, and that it too is adorned by the beauty that the mind gives, being, so to say, a mirror of the mirror; and that by it is swayed and sustained the material element of that existence in which the nature is contemplated.

10. Thus so long as one keeps in touch with the other, the communication of the true beauty extends proportionally through the whole series, beautifying by the superior nature that which comes next to it; but when there is any interruption of this beneficent connection, or when, on the contrary, the superior comes to follow the inferior, then is displayed the misshapen character of matter, when it is isolated from nature (for in itself matter is a thing without form or structure), and by its shapelessness is also destroyed that beauty of nature with which49    Reading ᾧ, with several of Forbes’ mss., for the ἥof the Paris ed., and the ὅ of Forbes’ text. it is adorned through the mind; and so the transmission of the ugliness of matter reaches through the nature to the mind itself, so that the image of God is no longer seen in the figure expressed by that which was moulded according to it; for the mind, setting the idea of good like a mirror behind the back, turns off the incident rays of the effulgence of the good, and it receives into itself the impress of the shapelessness of matter.

11. And in this way is brought about the genesis of evil, arising through the withdrawal of that which is beautiful and good. Now all is beautiful and good that is closely related to the First Good; but that which departs from its relation and likeness to this is certainly devoid of beauty and goodness. If, then, according to the statement we have been considering, that which is truly good is one, and the mind itself also has its power of being beautiful and good, in so far as it is in the image of the good and beautiful, and the nature, which is sustained by the mind, has the like power, in so far as it is an image of the image, it is hereby shown that our material part holds together, and is upheld when it is controlled by nature; and on the other hand is dissolved and disorganized when it is separated from that which upholds and sustains it, and is dissevered from its conjunction with beauty and goodness.

12. Now such a condition as this does not arise except when there takes place an overturning of nature to the opposite state, in which the desire has no inclination for beauty and goodness, but for that which is in need of the adorning element; for it must needs be that that which is made like to matter, destitute as matter is of form of its own, should be assimilated to it in respect of the absence alike of form and of beauty.

13. We have, however, discussed these points in passing, as following on our argument, since they were introduced by our speculation on the point before us; for the subject of enquiry was, whether the intellectual faculty has its seat in any of the parts of us, or extends equally over them all; for as for those who shut up the mind locally in parts of the body, and who advance for the establishment of this opinion of theirs the fact that the reason has not free course in the case of those whose cerebral membranes are in an unnatural condition, our argument showed that in respect of every part of the compound nature of man, whereby every man has some natural operation, the power of the soul remains equally ineffective if the part does not continue in its natural condition. And thus there came into our argument, following out this line of thought, the view we have just stated, by which we learn that in the compound nature of man the mind is governed by God, and that by it is governed our material life, provided the latter remains in its natural state, but if it is perverted from nature it is alienated also from that operation which is carried on by the mind.

14. Let us return however once more to the point from which we started—that in those who are not perverted from their natural condition by some affection, the mind exercises its own power, and is established firmly in those who are in sound health, but on the contrary is powerless in those who do not admit its operation; for we may confirm our opinion on these matters by yet other arguments: and if it is not tedious for those to hear who are already wearied with our discourse, we shall discuss these matters also, so far as we are able, in a few words.

ΚΕΦΑΛΑΙΟΝ ΙΒʹ. Ἐξέτασις, ἐν τίνι τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν νομιστέον, ἐν ᾧ καὶ περὶ δακρύων καὶ περὶ γέλωτος φυσιολογία, καὶ θεώρημά τι φυσικὸν περὶ τῆς κατὰ τὴν ὕλην, καὶ τὴν φύσιν, καὶ τὸν νοῦν κοινωνίας.

Σιγάτω τοίνυν πᾶσα στοχαστικὴ ματαιολογία τῶν μορίοις τισὶ σωματικοῖς τὴν νοητὴν ἐναποκλειόντων ἐνέργειαν, ὧν οἱ μὲν ἐν καρδίᾳ τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν εἶναι τίθενται, οἱ δὲ τῷ ἐγκεφάλῳ τὸν νοῦν ἐνδιαιτᾶσθαί φασιν, ἐπιπολαίοις τισὶ πιθανότησι τὰς τοιαύτας ἐπινοίας κρατοῦντες. Ὁ μὲν γὰρ τῇ καρδίᾳ προστιθεὶς τὴν ἡγεμονίαν, τὴν κατὰ τόπον αὐτῆς θέσιν ποιεῖται τοῦ λόγου τεκμήριον, διὰ τὸ δοκεῖν πως τὴν μέσην τοῦ παντὸς σώματος ἐπέχειν χώραν αὐτὴν, ὡς τῆς προαιρετικῆς κινήσεως εὐκόλως ἐκ τοῦ μέσου πρὸς ἅπαν μεριζομένης σῶμα, καὶ οὕτως εἰς ἐνέργειαν προϊούσης. Καὶ μαρτύριον ποιεῖται τοῦ λόγου τὴν λυπηράν τε καὶ θυμώδη τοῦ ἀνθρώπου διάθεσιν, ὅτι δοκεῖ πως τὰ τοιαῦτα πάθη συγκινεῖν τὸ μέρος τοῦτο πρὸς τὴν συμπάθειαν. Οἱ δὲ τὸν ἐγκέφαλον ἀφιεροῦντες τῷ λογισμῷ, ὥσπερ ἀκρόπολίν τινα τοῦ παντὸς σώματος τὴν κεφαλὴν δεδομῆσθαι παρὰ τῆς φύσεως λέγουσιν: ἐνοικεῖν δὲ ταύτῃ καθάπερ τινὰ βασιλέα τὸν νοῦν, οἷόν τισιν ἀγγελιαφόροις ἢ ὑπασπισταῖ, τοῖς αἰσθητηρίοις ἐν κύκλῳ δορυφορούμενον. Σημεῖον δὲ καὶ οὗτοι τῆς τοιαύτης ὑπονοίας ποιοῦνται, τὸ παράγεσθαι τοῦ καθεστῶτος τὸν λογισμὸν τῶν κεκακωμένων τὰς μήνιγγας, καὶ τὸ ἐν ἀγνοίᾳ τοῦ πρέποντος γίνεσθαι τοὺς ἐν μέθῃ καρηβαρήσαντας. Προστιθέασι δὲ καί τινας φυσικωτέρας αἰτίας τῆς τοιαύτης περὶ τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν ὑπονοίας ἑκάτερος τῶν ταύταις ταῖς δόξαις παρισταμένων. Ὁ μὲν γὰρ πρὸς τὸ πυρῶδες συγγενῶς ἔχειν τὴν ἐκ τῆς διανοίας κίνησιν λέγει, διὰ τὸ ἀεικίνητον εἶναι καὶ τὸ πῦρ καὶ τὴν διάνοιαν. Καὶ ἐπειδὴ πηγάζειν ἐν τῷ μορίῳ τῆς καρδίας ἡ θερμότης ὁμολογεῖται: διὰ τοῦτο τῷ εὐκινήτῳ τῆς θερμότητος τὴν τοῦ νοῦ κίνησιν ἀνακεκρᾶσθαι λέγων, δοχεῖον τῆς νοερᾶς φύσεως τὴν καρδίαν εἶναί φησιν, ἐν ᾗ τὸ θερμὸν περιείληπται. Ὁ δὲ ἕτερος πᾶσι τοῖς αἰσθητηρίοις οἷον ὑποβάθραν τινὰ καὶ ῥίζαν εἶναι λέγει τὴν μήνιγγα (οὕτω γὰρ ὀνομάζουσι τὸν περιεκτικὸν τοῦ ἐγκεφάλου ὑμένα): καὶ τούτῳ πιστοῦνται τὸν ἴδιον λόγον, ὡς οὐχ ἑτέρωθι τῆς νοητικῆς ἐνεργείας καθιδρυμένης, εἰ μὴ κατ' ἐκεῖνο τὸ μέρος, ᾧ καὶ τὸ οὖς ἐφηρμοσμένον τὰς ἐμπιπτούσας αὐτῷ φωνὰς προσαράσσει. Καὶ ἡ ὄψις κατὰ τὸν πυθμένα τῆς τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν ἕδρας συμπεφυκυῖα, διὰ τῶν ἐμπιπτόντων ταῖς κόραις εἰδώλων πρὸς τὸ ἔσω ποιεῖται τὴν τύπωσιν. Καὶ τῶν ἀτμῶν αἱ ποιότητες διὰ τῆς τῶν ὀσφρήσεων ὁλκῆς ἐν αὐτῷ διακρίνονται. Καὶ ἡ κατὰ τὴν γεῦσιν αἴσθησις τῇ ἐπικρίσει τῆς μήνιγγος δοκιμάζεται, ἐκ τοῦ σύνεγγυς ἐκφύσεις τινὰς νευρώδεις ἀφ' ἑαυτῆς αἰσθητικὰς διὰ τῶν αὐχενίων σπονδύλων ἐπὶ τὸν ἠθμοειδῆ πόρον κατὰ τοὺς αὐτόθι μύας ἐγκαταμιξάσης. Ἐγὼ δὲ τὸ μὲν ἐπιταράσσεσθαι πολλάκις πρὸς τὰς τῶν παθημάτων ἐπικρατήσεις τὸ διανοητικὸν τῆς ψυχῆς, καὶ ἀμβλύνεσθαι τῆς κατὰ φύσιν ἐνεργείας τὸν λογισμὸν ἔκ τινος σωματικῆς περιστάσεως, ἀληθὲς εἶναί φημι: καὶ πηγήν τινα τοῦ κατὰ τὸ σῶμα πυρώδους τὴν καρδίαν εἶναι, πρὸς τὰς θυμώδεις ὁρμὰς συγκινουμένην. Καὶ ἔτι πρὸς τούτοις, τὸ ὑποβεβλῆσθαι τοῖς αἰσθητηρίοις τὴν μήνιγγα, κατὰ τὸν λόγον τῶν τὰ τοιαῦτα φυσιολογούντων, περιπτυσσομένην ἐν ἑαυτῇ τὸν ἐγκέφαλον, καὶ τοῖς ἐκεῖθεν ἀτμοῖς ὑπαλειφομένην, τῶν ταῖς ἀνατομικαῖς θεωρίαις ἐσχολακότων τὸ τοιοῦτον ἀκούων, οὐκ ἀθετῶ τὸ λεγόμενον.

Οὐ μὴν ἀπόδειξιν ποιοῦμαι ταύτην τοῦ τοπικαῖς τισι περιγραφαῖς ἐμπεριειλῆφθαι τὴν ἀσώματον φύσιν. Τάς τε γὰρ παραφορὰς οὐκ ἐκ μόνης καρηβαρείας γίνεσθαι μεμαθήκαμεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν τὰς πλευρὰς ὑπεζωκότων ὑμένων ἐμπαθῶς διατεθέντων, ὁμοίως ἀῤῥωστεῖν τὸ διανοητικὸν διορίζονται οἱ τῆς ἰατρικῆς ἐπιστήμονες, φρενῖτιν τὸ πάθος καλοῦντες, ἐπειδὴ φρένες τοῖς ὑμέσι τούτοις ἐστὶ τὸ ὄνομα. Καὶ ἡ ἀπὸ τῆς λύπης ἐπὶ τὴν καρδίαν γινομένη συναίσθησις ἐσφαλμένως ὑπονοεῖται. Οὐ γὰρ τῆς καρδίας, ἀλλὰ τοῦ στόματος τῆς κοιλίας δριμυσσομένου, εἰς τὴν καρδίαν τὸ πάθος ὑπ' ἀπειρίας ἀνάγουσι. Τοιοῦτον δέ τί φασιν οἱ ἐπεσκεμμένοι δι' ἀκριβείας τὰ πάθη, ὅτι συμπτώσεως τῶν πόρων καὶ μύσεως ἐν ταῖς λυπηραῖς διαθέσεσι φυσικῶς περὶ ἅπαν γινομένης τὸ σῶμα, πρὸς τὰς ἐν τῷ βάθει κοιλότητας συνωθεῖται πᾶν τὸ πρὸς τὴν διαπνοὴν κωλυόμενον: ὅθεν καὶ τῶν ἀναπνευστικῶν σπλάγχνων στενοχωρουμένων τῷ περιέχοντι, βιαιοτέρα πολλάκις ἡ ὁλκὴ τοῦ πνεύματος ὑπὸ τῆς φύσεως γίνεται, πρὸς τὴν τῶν συμπεπτωκότων διαστολὴν τὸ στενωθὲν εὐρυνούσης. Τὸ δὲ τοιοῦτον ἆσθμα σύμπτωμα λύπης ποιούμεθα, στεναγμὸν αὐτὸ καὶ ἀναποτνιασμὸν ὀνομάζοντες. Ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ δοκοῦν ὑποθλίβειν τὸ περικάρδιον μέρος, οὐ τῆς καρδίας, ἀλλὰ τοῦ στόματός ἐστι τῆς γαστρὸς ἀηδία, διὰ τῆς αὐτῆς αἰτίας, λέγω δὴ τῆς κατὰ τὴν σύμπτωσιν τῶν πόρων, τοῦ χοληδόχου ἀγγείου τὸν δριμὺν ἐκεῖνον καὶ δακνώδη χυμὸν ὑπὸ στενοχωρίας ἐπὶ τὸ στόμα τῆς γαστρὸς παρεγχέοντος. Ἀπόδειξις δὲ τούτου τὸ ὕπωχρον γίνεσθαι καὶ ἰκτερώδη τοῖς λυπουμένοις τὴν ἐπιφάνειαν, ἀπὸ τῆς ἄγαν συνοχῆς ἐπὶ τὰς φλέβας τὸν ἴδιον χυμὸν τῆς χολῆς ἐπισπειρούσης: ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ ἐξ ἐναντίου γινόμενον πάθος, τὸ κατὰ τὴν εὐφροσύνην φημὶ καὶ τὸν γέλωτα, μᾶλλον τὸν λόγον συνίστησι. Διαχέονται γάρ πως καὶ διαλύονται δι' ἡδονῆς οἱ τοῦ σώματος πόροι τῶν ἔκ τινος ἀκοῆς ἡδείας διαχεθέντων.

Ὡς γὰρ ἐκεῖ διὰ τῆς λύπης μύουσιν αἱ λεπταί τε καὶ ἄδηλοι τῶν πόρων διαπνοαὶ, καὶ διασφίγξασαι τὴν ἔνδοθεν τῶν σπλάγχνων διάθεσιν, ἐπὶ τὴν κεφαλὴν καὶ τὰς μήνιγγας τὸν νοτερὸν ἀτμὸν ἀναθλίβουσιν, ὃς πολὺς ἐναποληφθεὶς ταῖς τοῦ ἐγκεφάλου κοιλότησι, διὰ τῶν κατὰ τὴν βάσιν πόρων ἐπὶ τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς ἐξωθεῖται, τῆς τῶν ὀφρύων συμπτώσεως ἐξελκομένης διὰ σταγόνων τὴν ὑγρασίαν (ἡ δὲ σταγὼν δάκρυον λέγεται): οὕτω μοι νόησον, ἐκ τῆς ἐναντίας διαθέσεως πλέον τοῦ συνήθους εὐρυνομένων τῶν πόρων, εἰσέλκεσθαί τι πνεῦμα δι' αὐτῶν ἐπὶ τὸ βάθος, κἀκεῖθεν πάλιν ἐξωθεῖσθαι παρὰ τῆς φύσεως διὰ τοῦ κατὰ τὸ στόμα πόρου, πάντων τῶν σπλάγχνων, καὶ μάλιστά γε τοῦ ἥπατος, ὤς φασι, διά τινος κλόνου καὶ βρασμώδους κινήσεως τὸ τοιοῦτον πνεῦμα συνεξωθούντων. Ὅθεν εὐκολίαν τινὰ τῇ διεξόδῳ τοῦ πνεύματος μηχανωμένη ἡ φύσις, ἀνευρύνει τὸν περὶ τὸ στόμα πόρον, ἑκατέρωθεν περὶ τὸ ἆσθμα τὰς παρειὰς διαστέλλουσα. Ὄνομα δὲ τῷ γινομένῳ γέλως ἐστίν. Οὔτε οὖν διὰ τοῦτο τῷ ἥπατι τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν λογιστέον, οὔτε διὰ τὴν περικάρδιον ζέσιν τοῦ αἵματος ἐν ταῖς θυμικαῖς διαθέσεσιν, ἐν καρδίᾳ νομιστέον εἶναι τοῦ νοῦ τὴν καθίδρυσιν; ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν εἰς τὰς ποιὰς τῶν σωμάτων κατασκευὰς ἀνακτέον. Τὸν δὲ νοῦν ὁμοτίμως ἑκάστῳ τῶν μορίων, κατὰ τὸν ἄφραστον τῆς ἀνακράσεως λόγον ἐφάπτεσθαι νομιστέον. Κἂν τὴν Γραφήν τινες ἡμῖν πρὸς τοῦτο προτείνωνται, τῇ καρδίᾳ τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν μαρτυροῦσαν, οὐκ ἀνεξετάστως τὸν λόγον δεξόμεθα. Ὁ γὰρ καρδίαν μνησθεὶς, καὶ νεφρῶν ἐμνημόνευσεν, εἰπών: «Ἐτάζων καρδίας καὶ νεφροὺς ὁ Θεός:» ὥστε ἢ ἀμφοτέροις, ἢ οὐδετέρῳ τὸ νοερὸν κατακλείουσιν. Ἀμβλύνεσθαι δὲ τὰς νοητικὰς ἐνεργείας, ἢ καὶ παντάπασιν ἀπρακτεῖν ἐν τῇ ποιᾷ διαθέσει τοῦ σώματος διδαχθεὶς, οὐχ ἱκανὸν ποιοῦμαι τοῦτο τεκμήριον, τοῦ τόπῳ τινὶ τὴν δύναμιν τοῦ νοῦ περιείργεσθαι, ὡς ταῖς ἐπιγινομέναις τοῖς μέρεσι φλεγμοναῖς τῆς οἰκείας εὐρυχωρίας ἐξειργομένης. Σωματικὴ γὰρ ἡ τοιαύτη δόξα, τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι προκατειλημμένου τοῦ ἀγγείου διά τινος τῶν ἐμβεβλημένων, ἕτερόν τι ἐν αὐτῷ χώραν εὑρεῖν. Ἡ γὰρ νοητὴ φύσις οὔτε ταῖς κενώσεσιν ἐμφιλοχωρεῖ τῶν σωμάτων, οὔτε τῷ πλεονάζοντι τῆς σαρκὸς ἐξωθεῖται. Ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ καθάπερ τι μουσικὸν ὄργανον ἅπαν τὸ σῶμα δεδημιούργηται, ὥσπερ συμβαίνει πολλάκις ἐπὶ τῶν μελῳδεῖν μὲν ἐπισταμένων, ἀδυνατούντων δὲ δεῖξαι τὴν ἐπιστήμην, τῆς τῶν ὀργάνων ἀχρηστίας οὐ παραδεχομένης τὴν τέχνην (τὸ γὰρ ἢ χρόνῳ φθαρὲν, ἢ παρεῤῥηγμένον ἐκ καταπτώσεως, ἢ ὑπό τινος ἰοῦ καὶ εὐρῶτος ἠχρειωμένον, ἄφθογγον μένει καὶ ἀνενέργητον, κἂν ὑπὸ τοῦ προέχειν δοκοῦντος κατὰ τὴν αὐλητικὴν τέχνην ἐμπνέηται): οὕτω καὶ ὁ νοῦς δι' ὅλου τοῦ ὀργάνου διήκων, καὶ καταλλήλως ταῖς νοητικαῖς ἐνεργείαις, καθὸ πέφυκεν, ἑκάστῳ τῶν μερῶν προσαπτόμενος, ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν κατὰ φύσιν διακειμένων τὸ οἰκεῖον ἐνήργησεν, ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ἀσθενούντων δέξασθαι τὴν τεχνικὴν αὐτοῦ κίνησιν, ἄπρακτός τε καὶ ἀνενέργητος ἔμεινε. Πέφυκε γάρ πως ὁ νοῦς πρὸς μὲν τὸ κατὰ φύσιν διακείμενον οἰκείως ἔχειν, πρὸς δὲ τὸ παρενεχθὲν ἀπὸ ταύτης, ἀλλοτριοῦσθαι.

Καί μοι δοκεῖ φυσικώτερον εἶναί τι κατὰ τὸ μέρος τοῦτο θεώρημα, δι' οὗ μαθεῖν ἔστι τι τῶν ἀστειοτέρων δογμάτων. Ἐπειδὴ γὰρ τὸ κάλλιστον πάντων καὶ ἐξοχώτατον ἀγαθὸν αὐτὸ τὸ Θεῖόν ἐστι, πρὸς ὃ πάντα νένευκεν, ὅσα τοῦ καλοῦ τὴν ἔφεσιν ἔχει, διὰ τοῦτό φαμεν καὶ τὸν νοῦν, ἅτε κατ' εἰκόνα τοῦ καλλίστου γενόμενον, ἕως ἂν μετέχῃ τῆς πρὸς τὸ ἀρχέτυπον ὁμοιότητος, καθόσον ἐνδέχεται, καὶ αὐτὸν ἐν τῷ καλῷ διαμένειν, εἰ δέ πως ἔξω γένοιτο τούτου, γυμνοῦσθαι τοῦ κάλλους ἐν ᾧ ἦν. Ὥσπερ δὲ ἔφαμεν τῇ ὁμοιώσει τοῦ πρωτοτύπου κάλλους κατακοσμεῖσθαι τὸν νοῦν, οἷόν τι κάτοπτρον τῷ χαρακτῆρι τοῦ ἐμφαινομένου μορφούμενον: κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν ἀναλογίαν, καὶ τὴν οἰκονομουμένην ὑπ' αὐτοῦ φύσιν ἔχεσθαι τοῦ νοῦ λογιζόμεθα, καὶ τῷ παρακειμένῳ κάλλει καὶ αὐτὴν κοσμεῖσθαι οἷόν τι κατόπτρου κάτοπτρον γινομένην: κρατεῖσθαι δὲ ὑπὸ ταύτης καὶ συνέχεσθαι τὸ ὑλικὸν τῆς ὑποστάσεως, περὶ ἢν θεωρεῖται ἡ φύσις. Ἕως ἂν οὖν ἔχηται τοῦ ἑτέρου τὸ ἕτερον, διὰ πάντων ἀναλόγως ἡ τοῦ ὄντως κάλλους κοινωνία διέξεισι, διὰ τοῦ ὑπερκειμένου τὸ προσεχὲς καλλωπίζουσα. Ἐπειδὰν δέ τις γένηται τῆς ἀγαθῆς ταύτης συμφυΐας διασπασμὸς, ἢ καὶ πρὸς τὸ ἔμπαλιν, ἀντακολουθῇ τῷ ὑποβεβηκότι τὸ ὑπερέχον: τότε αὐτῆς τε τῆς ὕλης, ὅταν μονωθῇ τῆς φύσεως, διηνέχθη τὸ ἄσχημον (ἄμορφον γάρ τι καθ' ἑαυτὴν ἡ ὕλη καὶ ἀκατάσκευον) καὶ τῇ ἀμορφίᾳ ταύτης συνδιεφθάρη τὸ κάλλος τῆς φύσεως, ἢ διὰ τοῦ νοῦ καλλωπίζεται. Καὶ οὕτως ἐπ' αὐτὸν τὸν νοῦν τοῦ κατὰ τὴν ὕλην αἴσχους διὰ τῆς φύσεως ἡ διάδοσις γίνεται, ὡς μηκέτι τοῦ Θεοῦ τὴν εἰκόνα ἐν τῷ χαρακτῆρι καθορᾶσθαι τοῦ πλάσματος. Οἷον γάρ τι κάτοπτρον κατὰ νώτου τὴν τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἰδέαν ὁ νοῦς ποιησάμενος, ἐκβάλλει μὲν τῆς ἐκλάμψεως τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ τὰς ἐμφάσεις, τῆς δὲ ὕλης τὴν ἀμορφίαν εἰς ἑαυτὸν ἀναμάσσεται: Καὶ τούτῳ γίνεται τῷ τρόπῳ τοῦ κακοῦ ἡ γένεσις, διὰ τῆς ὑπεξαιρέσεως τοῦ καλοῦ παρυφισταμένη: Καλὸν δὲ πᾶν, ὅπερ ἂν τύχῃ πρὸς τὸ πρῶτον ἀγαθὸν οἰκείως ἔχον: ὅ τι δ' ἂν ἔξω γένηται τῆς πρὸς τοῦτο σχέσεώς τε καὶ ὁμοιώσεως, ἄμοιρον τοῦ καλοῦ πάντως ἐστίν. Εἰ οὖν ἓν μὲν κατὰ τὸν θεωρηθέντα λόγον τὸ ὄντως ἀγαθόν: ὁ δὲ νοῦς τῷ κατ' εἰκόνα τοῦ καλοῦ γεγενῆσθαι, καὶ αὐτὸς ἔχει τὸ καλὸς εἶναι: ἡ δὲ φύσις ἡ ὑπὸ τοῦ νοῦ συνεχομένη, καθάπερ τις εἰκὼν εἰκόνος ἐστί: δείκνυται διὰ τούτων, ὅτι τὸ ὑλικὸν ἡμῶν συνέστηκε μὲν καὶ περικρατεῖται, ὅταν οἰκονομῆται ὑπὸ τῆς φύσεως: λύεται δὲ, καὶ διαπίπτει πάλιν, ὅταν χωρισθῇ τοῦ, περικρατοῦντός τε καὶ συνέχοντος, καὶ διασπασθῇ τῆς πρὸς τὸ καλὸν συμφυΐας. Τὸ δὲ τοιοῦτον οὐκ ἄλλως γίνεται, ἢ ὅταν τῆς φύσεως πρὸς τὸ ἔμπαλιν γένηται ἡ ἐπιστροφὴ, μὴ πρὸς τὸ καλὸν τῆς ἐπιθυμίας νευούσης, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸ χρῇζον τοῦ καλλωπίζοντος. Ἀνάγκη γὰρ πᾶσα τῇ πτωχευούσῃ τῆς ἰδίας μορφῆς ὕλῃ κατὰ τὸ ἄσχημόν τε καὶ ἀκαλλὲς συμμεταμορφοῦσθαι τὸ ὁμοιούμενον, ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν ἡμῖν ἐξ ἀκολουθίας τινὸς παρεξητάσθη, διὰ τῆς εἰς τὸ προκείμενον θεωρίας ἐπεισελθόντα. Τὸ γὰρ ζητούμενον ἦν, εἰ ἐν μέρει τινὶ τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν ἡ νοερὰ καθίδρυται δύναμις, ἢ διὰ πάντων κατὰ τὸ ἴσον διήκει. Τῶν γὰρ τοπικοῖς μέρεσι περιειργόντων τὸν νοῦν, καὶ εἰς σύστασιν τῆς τοιαύτης αὐτῶν ὑπολήψεως προφερόντων, τὸ μὴ εὐοδοῦσθαι τὴν διάνοιαν ἐπὶ τῶν παρὰ φύσιν διακειμένων τὰς μήνιγγας: ἀπέδειξεν ὁ λόγος, ὅτι κατὰ πᾶν μέρος τοῦ ἀνθρωπίνου συγκρίματος, καθ' ὃ πέφυκεν ἕκαστος ἐνεργεῖν, ἴσως ἡ τῆς ψυχῆς δύναμις ἀνενέργητος μένει, μὴ διαμένοντος ἐν τῇ φύσει τοῦ μέρους. Καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἐξ ἀκολουθίας τὸ προτεθὲν παρενέπεσε τῷ λόγῳ θεώρημα, δι' οὗ μανθάνομεν, ἐν τῷ ἀνθρωπίνῳ συγκρίματι ὑπὸ Θεοῦ μὲν διοικεῖσθαι τὸν νοῦν, ὑπ' ἐκείνου δὲ τὴν ὑλικὴν ἡμῶν ζωὴν, ὅταν ἐν τῇ φύσει μένῃ, εἰ δὲ παρατραπείη τῆς φύσεως, καὶ τῆς κατὰ τὸν νοῦν ἐνεργείας ἀλλοτριοῦσθαι. Ἀλλ' ἐπανέλθωμεν πάλιν ὅθεν ἐξέβημεν, ὅτι ἐπὶ τῶν μὴ παρατραπέντων ἐκ πάθους τινὸς τῆς φυσικῆς καταστάσεως τὴν οἰκείαν δύναμιν ὁ νοῦς ἐνεργεῖ, καὶ ἔῤῥωται μὲν ἐπὶ τῶν συνεστώτων, ἀδυνατεῖ δὲ πάλιν ἐπὶ τῶν μὴ χωρούντων αὐτοῦ τὴν ἐνέργειαν. Ἔστι γὰρ καὶ δι' ἑτέρων τὸ περὶ τούτων δόγμα πιστώσασθαι: καὶ εἰ μὴ βαρὺ τῇ ἀκοῇ τῶν προκεκμηκότων ἤδη τῷ λόγῳ, καὶ περὶ τούτων, ὡς ἂν οἷοί τε ὦμεν, δι' ὀλίγων διαληψώμεθα.