OF SAINT JUSTIN PHILOSOPHER AND MARTYR, AN OVERTHROW OF CERTAIN ARISTOTELIAN DOGMAS.

 And concerning these things, all the prophets sent from God to all men continued to think the same things, and there was no disagreement among them b

 posited, must necessarily come to be by composition but if the mode of generation by composition fits every generation, it has been superfluously dis

 is another thing besides the destruction of all that is, but if matter has this, how is its being matter not also destroyed? Further, if when the form

 by its presence and absence, then the principles will be both generated and destroyed by each other, and not eternal for the eternal does not need th

 ·having been said concerning the philosophers among the Greeks, how they did not make their arguments concerning beings according to demonstrative sci

 animal, but in the generation of the animal simply the substrate was not seed, how is the animal coming to be from not-animal not contrary to nature?

 and matter is deprived of being the matter of something, but it is not deprived of being matter itself, therefore matter will be being and not-being,

 Saying If, when the form is present, then the privation does not remain, it is clear that when the form is not present, the privation remains. How th

 The eternally uncreated has this same [quality] with respect to something coming to be from it by nature and by art. How then was God able to make som

 and of change, but in another way the form and the shape according to reason. For just as art is said to be that which is according to art and the art

 he subjected to generation not only to the spontaneous one, but also to that through intellect and nature which is manifestly absurd, that the one wh

 sible, but it is among the impossible things for that which is going to be to be ungenerated, both without beginning and without end, both having and

 And that, if the infinite in no way exists, many impossibilities occur, is clear: for time will have a beginning and an end, and magnitudes will not b

 is in potentiality, but not in actuality but the amount taken always exceeds any definite quantity. But this number is not definite, nor does infinit

 second to providence but if place is ungeneratedly and without beginning what it is and has what it has, then place is ungenerated and first of all t

 Where is that which is in a place? And if not every being is in a place, how will some beings not be the same as non-being, if indeed not being in a p

 to have come into being. For those things to which belong the generable and having come into being, from these of necessity the eternal and the unorig

 38. From the same discourse. Whatever neither moves nor is at rest, is not in time for to be in time is to be measured by time, and time is the measu

 time to be, so also has the past been. But the future time, just as it has a future coming-into-being, so also it has a beginning and just as there i

 to be straight. The principles of things that always come to be according to nature cannot be eternal. For if they transmit the nature they have to th

 And this is the case for any single one of the things that come to be, but it is necessary for something else to be moved previously among the things

 according to which some things have come to be above nature, and others according to nature. If before and after is ungenerated, then there will b

 we say, of which there is no demonstration. But God and nature do nothing in vain. If there were contrary motions in the locomotion of bodies, either

 worlds to come into being from it, but having been used up for the genesis of one world, did it stop the unwilling god from making more worlds? 51. Fr

 and an enmattered principle in matter, through which 'for heaven to be' is different from 'for this particular heaven to be'? If heaven cannot do by w

 each other. But now this much is clear, for what reason there are more circular bodies: that it is necessary for there to be generation, and generatio

 and the outcome in things that happen by choice is secondary to the choice), how does it exist in eternal things that this particular thing is because

 chance can exist in eternal things, but the heaven is eternal and its circular motion, for what reason then does it move in one direction, and not in

 to suffer it. These things, therefore, are heated because they are carried through the air, which through the striking by the motion becomes fire but

 it was moved by nature the motion by which it is now moved, how was it not bound to the sphere in vain? But if it was not moved this way according to

 always? If to things that are always in motion the spherical shape was given as suitable, how is it that of the things having a spherical shape, one i

 and have what they have? If the stars ought not to move, why do they move at all by means of others? But if they ought to move, why do they not move b

 of an element besides the things here, but at other times from the same elements, how is he not speaking falsely in one of the two ways? 63. From the

 and the bricks. Therefore, since matter is not substance, who is it that has made from it the things that have come from it, since both nature and art

 change, but into the opposite in the same genus, for instance in quality a change does not occur from white to large but to black, in what way then do

And that, if the infinite in no way exists, many impossibilities occur, is clear: for time will have a beginning and an end, and magnitudes will not be divisible into magnitude, and number will not be infinite. If of the infinite one part is in actuality, and the other in potentiality, and it is impossible for that which is now actually part of the infinite not to have been previously in potentiality, it is impossible, therefore, for the infinite always to be partly in actuality and partly in potentiality, but if it was first in potentiality, and later in actuality. If, just as time is endless with respect to the future, so too it is without beginning with respect to the past, then time will be ungenerated with respect to the future just as it is with respect to the past. But if it is impossible for time to be ungenerated with respect to the future, in which it has not yet come to be, while it has come to be with respect to the past, then time is not without beginning. For that which is without beginning has no generation, but time does. If nothing can be actually infinite, then neither the dichotomies of magnitude already taken are infinite, nor the number already taken; for both are in actuality. And if they are not infinite, they are then finite; and if they are finite, then they have a beginning, the one of being dichotomized, the other of being numbered. 20. From the same argument. The infinite exists by addition, and it exists by subtraction. That magnitude is not actually infinite has been said, but it is so by division. It remains, therefore, that the infinite is potential. But one must not take what is potential as if, for example, it is possible for this to be a statue, it will also be a statue, so also something infinite, which will be in actuality; but since being in potentiality has many senses, just as a day and a contest exist by one thing after another always coming to be, so too does the infinite. For in these cases it exists both potentially and actually. For in general the infinite exists in this way, by one thing after another always being taken, and what is taken is always finite, but always another and another. If nothing is actually infinite, it is clear that everything that exists in actuality is always finite; and being finite, it necessarily has a beginning, and having a beginning, it is necessarily generated, and being generated, there was then a time when it was not. This applies to every infinite spoken of by addition and subtraction, by potentiality and by division. 21. From the same argument. Nor if something is outside, is this infinite; but that which receives what is from outside becomes greater than what it was before receiving what was from outside. And that which becomes greater than itself by the addition of what is from outside is always finite. If the infinite is always in addition and subtraction, then the infinite is always in generation. How then is that which always has its being in becoming without beginning? For that which is generated is not without beginning. 22. From the same argument. The dichotomies of magnitude are infinite. So that in potentiality

Ὅτι δέ, εἰ μή ἐστιν ἄπειρον οὐδαμῶς, πολλὰ ἀδύνατα συμβαίνει, δῆλον· τοῦ τε γὰρ χρόνου ἔσται τις ἀρχὴ καὶ τε λευτή, καὶ τὰ μεγέθη οὐ διαιρετὰ εἰς μέγεθος, καὶ ἀριθμὸς οὐκ ἔσται ἄπειρος. Eἰ τοῦ ἀπείρου τὸ μέν ἐστιν ἐνεργείᾳ, τὸ δὲ δυνάμει, ἀδύνατον δὲ τὸ νῦν ἐνεργείᾳ ὂν τοῦ ἀπείρου μὴ πρότερον εἶναι δυνάμει, ἀδύνατον ἄρα τὸ ἄπειρον ἀεὶ τὸ μὲν εἶναι ἐνεργείᾳ, τὸ δὲ δυνάμει, ἀλλὰ εἰ πρότερον μὲν δυνάμει, ὕστερον δὲ ἐνεργείᾳ. Eἰ, ὥσπερ κατὰ τὸ μέλλον ἀτελεύτητος ὁ χρόνος, οὕτως καὶ κατὰ τὸ παρεληλυθὸς ἄναρχος, ἔσται ἄρα ὁ χρόνος ὥσπερ ἀγένητος κατὰ τὸ μέλλον οὕτως καὶ κατὰ τὸ παρελη λυθός. Eἰ δὲ τοῦτο ἀδύνατον ἀγένητον εἶναι τὸν χρόνον κατὰ τὸ μέλλον, καθ' ὃ οὔπω ἦν γεγονώς, γεγονὼς δὲ κατὰ τὸ παρεληλυθός, οὐκ ἄρα ἄναρχος ὁ χρόνος. Τοῦ μὲν γὰρ ἀνάρ χου οὐκ ἔστι γένεσις, τοῦ δὲ χρόνου ἐστίν. Eἰ οὐδὲν δύναται ἐνεργείᾳ εἶναι ἄπειρον, οὐκ ἄρα αἱ ἤδη ληφθεῖσαι διχοτομίαι τοῦ μεγέθους ἄπειροί εἰσιν, οὔτε ὁ ἤδη ληφθεὶς ἀριθμός· ἀμφότεροι γὰρ ἐνεργείᾳ εἰσίν. Eἰ δὲ οὐκ εἰσὶν ἄπειροι, πε περασμένοι ἄρα· εἰ δὲ πεπερασμένοι, καὶ ἀρχὴν ἄρα ἔχουσι, τὸ μὲν τοῦ διχοτομεῖσθαι, ὁ δὲ τοῦ ἀριθμεῖσθαι. κ. Ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ λόγου. Τὸ ἄπειρον ἔστι μὲν προσθέσει, ἔστι δὲ ἀφαιρέσει. Τὸ δὲ μέγεθος ὅτι μὲν κατ' ἐνέργειαν οὐκ ἔστιν ἄπειρον, εἴρηται, διαιρέσει δέ ἐστι. Λείπεται οὖν δυνάμει εἶναι τὸ ἄπειρον. Oὐ δεῖ δὲ τὸ δυνάμει ὂν λαμβάνειν, ὥσπερ, εἰ δυνατὸν τουτὶ ἀνδριάντα εἶναι, ὡς καὶ ἔσται τουτὶ ἀνδριάς, οὕτω τι καὶ ἄπειρον, ὃ ἔσται ἐνεργείᾳ· ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ πολλαχῶς τὸ δυνάμει εἶναι, ὥσπερ ἡμέρα ἐστὶ καὶ ὁ ἀγών, τῷ ἀεὶ ἄλλο καὶ ἄλλο γίνεσθαι, οὕτω καὶ τὸ ἄπειρον. Καὶ γὰρ ἐπὶ τούτων ἐστὶ καὶ δυνάμει καὶ ἐνεργείᾳ. Ὅλως μὲν γὰρ οὕτως ἐστὶ τὸ ἄπειρον, τῷ ἀεὶ ἄλλο καὶ ἄλλο λαμβάνεσθαι, καὶ τὸ λαμ βανόμενον ἀεὶ πεπερασμένον εἶναι, ἀλλ' ἀεὶ ἕτερον καὶ ἕτερον. Eἰ κατ' ἐνέργειαν οὐκ ἔστι τι ἄπειρον, δῆλον ὅτι πᾶν τὸ ἐνεργείᾳ ὂν ἀεὶ πεπερασμένον ἐστί· πεπερασμένον δὲ ὂν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἀρχὴν ἔχει, ἀρχὴν δὲ ἔχον ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἐστὶ γενητόν, γενητὸν δὲ ὂν ἦν ἄρα ποτὲ ὅτε οὐκ ἦν. Τοῦτο ἐπὶ παντὸς ἀπείρου προσθέσει τε καὶ ἀφαιρέσει, δυνάμει τε καὶ διαιρέσει λεγομένου. κα. Ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ λόγου. Oὐδ' εἴ τι ἔξω ἐστί, τοῦτο ἄπειρόν ἐστιν· ἀλλὰ τὸ δε χόμενον τὸ ἔξωθεν μεῖζον γίνεται οὗ ἦν πρὸ τοῦ δέξασθαι τὸ ἔξωθεν. Τὸ δὲ τῇ προσθήκῃ τοῦ ἔξωθεν μεῖζον ἑαυτοῦ γιγνό μενον ἀεὶ πεπερασμένον ἐστίν. Eἰ τὸ ἄπειρον ἀεὶ ἐν προσθήκῃ καὶ ἀφαιρέσει, ἀεὶ ἄρα ἐν γενέσει τὸ ἄπειρον. Πῶς οὖν ἄναρχον τὸ ἀεὶ ἐν τῷ γί νεσθαι τὸ εἶναι ἔχον; Γενητὸν γὰρ ἄναρχον οὐκ ἔστιν. κβ. Ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ λόγου. Ἄπειροι αἱ διχοτομίαι τοῦ μεγέθους. Ὥστε δυνάμει