makes different things. Let us not consider God in human terms. For not as we, who previously are one way and later change into another, are said to make, does God make; but, through an ineffable and surpassing power making all things timelessly, he perfects all things, and at the same time that he is, he also makes the things that are, not having need, as we do, to come into being first and be perfected, and thus to make what is later, because there is in him nothing former and later. We see, then, that nature also creates by its very being and always works its change all at once, just as in the case of the curdling of milk we see the curdling happen to the milk all at once. Much more, therefore, must we think that God makes all things at once and timelessly, He Himself being one, but by the infinitude of his power producing different things, and these being completely produced immediately. Refutation of the response that was not correctly made. One must not think, he says, that just as in us to be is one thing, and to will is another, so it is also in God; but on the contrary, to be and to will are the very same thing in God. For what he is, he also wills, and what he wills, he is; and there is no division in God, because God is self-subsistent. Therefore, the division of being from willing in God must be rejected. Since God has substance for existence, and will for creation, he who rejects the difference between substance and will also rejects the existence of God and his creation, his own existence, and the creation of things that are not. But that the substance of God is one thing and his will another is shown also from the argument of the one who responded, who said: For what he is, he also wills, and what he wills, he is. He converted the will with the substance, and the substance with the will. But conversion can in no way happen if the things being converted are not different from each other either in concept or in number. For that which is one in number is not at all prevented from being different in concept; for example, a straight line is one in number in its hypostasis, but in the concept of straightness and of line it is different things. In this way, is not the nature of God divided in the concept of substance and of will? If to exist is one thing and to in-exist is another, and the substance of God exists, while the will in-exists in the substance, then the substance of God is one thing and the will another. If the will of God is from the substance, but the substance is not from the will, then the substance of God is one thing and the will another. The substance of God does not admit of not being substance, but the will of God admits of not willing; for example, God willed to make one sun, he did not will to make a second sun, because, just as it was advantageous for beings that there be one sun, so it was not advantageous for beings that a second sun come to be; and he willed what was advantageous, but he did not will what was not advantageous. But if this is so, then the substance of God is one thing and the will another. If what God is, this he also wills, it is clear that he is an object of will and not

ρίᾳ διάφορα ποιεῖ. Μὴ προσέχωμεν δὲ τὸν θεὸν ἀνθρωπί νως. Oὐ γὰρ ὥσπερ ἡμεῖς, τὸ πρότερον ἄλλως ἔχοντες, ὕστε ρον εἰς ἄλλο μεταβάλλοντες, λεγόμεθα ποιεῖν, οὕτως καὶ ὁ θεὸς ποιεῖ· ἀλλά, δι' ἄῤῥητον ὑπερβάλλουσάν τε δύναμιν ἀχρόνως ποιῶν πάντα, τελειοῖ πάντα, καὶ ἅμα τῷ αὐτὸν εἶναι καὶ τὰ ὄντα ποιεῖ, οὐ χρείαν ἔχων ὥσπερ ἡμεῖς τὸ πρότερον γενέσθαι καὶ τελειωθῆναι, καὶ οὕτως ποιῆσαι τὸ ὕστερον, διὰ τὸ μηδὲν εἶναι ἐν αὐτῷ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον. Ὁρῶμεν οὖν καὶ τὴν φύσιν αὐτῷ τῷ εἶναι ποιοῦσαν καὶ ἀθρόον ἀεὶ τὴν μεταβολὴν ἐργαζομένην, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς πήξεως τοῦ γά λακτος ἀθρόως τὴν πῆξιν θεώμεθα παραγινομένην τῷ γάλακτι. Πολλῷ τοίνυν τὸν θεὸν μᾶλλον οἰητέον ἀθρόως καὶ ἀχρόνως πάντα ποιεῖν, αὐτὸν μὲν ὄντα ἕν, τῇ δὲ ἀπειρίᾳ τῆς δυνά μεως τὰ διάφορα παράγοντα, καὶ αὐτὰ παντελῶς αὐτοπάρακτα τυγχάνοντα. Ἔλεγχος τῆς ἀποκρίσεως οὐκ ὀρθῶς γεγενημένης. Oὐκ οἰητέον, φησίν, ὥσπερ ἐν ἡμῖν ἄλλο μέν ἐστι τὸ εἶναι, ἄλλο δέ ἐστι τὸ βούλεσθαι, οὕτως καὶ ἐν τῷ θεῷ· ἀλλὰ τὸ αὐτὸ ἄντικρυς ὑπάρχει τὸ εἶναι καὶ τὸ βούλεσθαι ἐν τῷ θεῷ. Ὃ γὰρ ἔστι καὶ βούλεται, καὶ ὃ βούλεται ἔστι· καὶ οὐδεμία διαίρεσις ἐπὶ τοῦ θεοῦ, διὰ τὸ αὐτοπάρακτον εἶναι τὸν θεόν. Ὥστε τὴν διαίρεσιν τὴν τοῦ εἶναι πρὸς τὸ βούλε σθαι ἐπὶ τοῦ θεοῦ ἀποῤῥιπτέον. Τοῦ θεοῦ ἔχοντος οὐσίαν μὲν πρὸς ὕπαρξιν, βούλησιν δὲ πρὸς ποίησιν, ὁ ἀποῤῥίπτων οὐσίας τε καὶ βουλῆς τὴν διαφορὰν καὶ τὴν ὕπαρξιν ἀποῤῥί πτει τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ τὴν ποίησιν, ὕπαρξιν μὲν τὴν αὐτοῦ, ποίη σιν δὲ τῶν οὐκ ὄντων. Ὅτι δὲ ἄλλη ἐστὶν ἡ οὐσία τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ ἄλλη ἡ βουλή, δείκνυται καὶ ἐκ τοῦ λόγου τοῦ ἀποκρινα μένου, τοῦ εἰπόντος· Ὃ γὰρ ἔστι καὶ βούλεται, καὶ ὃ βούλεται ἔστιν. Ἀντέστρεψε τῇ οὐσίᾳ τὴν βουλήν, καὶ τῇ βουλῇ τὴν οὐσίαν. Ἀντιστροφὴ δὲ οὐδαμῶς ἐνδέχεται γενέσθαι τῶν ἀντι στρεφομένων οὐκ ὄντων ἄλλο καὶ ἄλλο ἢ λόγῳ ἢ ἀριθμῷ. Τὸ τῷ ἀριθμῷ ἓν ὂν οὐδὲν κωλύει τῷ λόγῳ ἄλλο καὶ ἄλλο εἶναι· οἷον ἡ εὐθεῖα γραμμὴ τῇ μὲν ὑποστάσει ἀριθμῷ μία ἐστί, τῷ δὲ λόγῳ τῆς εὐθείας καὶ τῆς γραμμῆς ἄλλο καὶ ἄλλο. Κατὰ τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον οὐ διαιρεῖται τοῦ θεοῦ ἡ φύσις τῷ λόγῳ τῆς οὐσίας καὶ τῆς βουλῆς; Eἰ ἄλλο τὸ ὑπάρχειν καὶ ἄλλο τὸ ἐνυπάρχειν, καὶ ὑπάρχει μὲν τοῦ θεοῦ ἡ οὐσία, ἐνυπάρχει δὲ τῇ οὐσίᾳ ἡ βουλή, ἄλλη ἄρα ἡ οὐσία τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ ἄλλη ἡ βουλή. Eἰ ἡ μὲν βουλὴ τοῦ θεοῦ ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας, ἡ δὲ οὐσία οὐκ ἐκ τῆς βουλῆς, ἄλλη ἄρα ἡ οὐσία τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ ἄλλη ἡ βουλή. Ἡ οὐσία τοῦ θεοῦ τὸ μὴ εἶναι οὐσία οὐ δέχεται, ἡ δὲ βουλὴ τοῦ θεοῦ δέχεται τὸ μὴ βούλεσθαι· οἷον ἐβούλετο ὁ θεὸς ποιῆσαι ἕνα ἥλιον, δεύτερον ἥλιον οὐκ ἐβούλετο ποιῆσαι, ὅτι, ὥσπερ ἐλυσιτέλει τοῖς οὖσι τὸ ἕνα εἶναι τὸν ἥλιον, οὕτως οὐκ ἐλυσι τέλει τοῖς οὖσι τὸ γενέσθαι δεύτερον ἥλιον· καὶ ἐβούλετο μὲν τὸ λυσιτελές, τὸ δὲ μὴ λυσιτελὲς οὐκ ἐβούλετο. Ἀλλ' εἰ τοῦτο, ἄλλη ἄρα ἡ οὐσία τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ ἄλλη ἡ βουλή. Eἰ ὃ ἔστιν ὁ θεὸς τοῦτο καὶ βούλεται, δῆλον ὅτι βουλητόν ἐστι καὶ οὐ