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the body; but if from matter, that is from the essence of evil, if evil is without beginning, it is also certainly immortal and unchangeable—for that which has no beginning neither ceases nor changes; but if it changes and is corrupted, it is not without beginning—, but if evil is unchangeable, the body from its essence will also be incorruptible and unchangeable. Whose then was the corruption and the evil? For corruption certainly corrupts something or it is not corruption. If the good is passible, the good one is also passible, and how is he completely good? And the good one, being corrupted by it, will pass into non-existence. But if it corrupted itself, it was corrupted and perished and is no more. But if it corrupted a part of the good, it also corrupted a part of itself. And of whatever nature a part is corruptible, the whole is also corruptible; for it is impossible for the same nature to be both corruptible and incorruptible. For if we say the body of man is a corruptible part of man, and the soul incorruptible, yet they are not of one nature. For the soul, even if it dwells in a body, is not a body, but incorporeal; so that the soul is of one nature and the body of another, and it is not that one part of the same nature is corruptible and the other incorruptible, but that the one nature of man is corruptible, and the other incorruptible. And neither is the soul from an unoriginate substance—for it is changeable—nor the body; for it too is changeable and corruptible. But man is said to be of one nature, not because the soul and the body are of one nature, but because all men likewise each have a soul and a body and each has two natures. 43 Change is a transformation from an opposite to an opposite, from non-being to being or from being to non-being or from virtue to evil, which is from the natural states to their privation. Virtue is the fulfillment of the law of God, and the law of God is His will—for no one commands what he does not will—, and the will of God is good, unchangeable, always remaining the same. So that the good is being, likewise also virtue—for virtue is good—, but evil is not being, but a voluntary disobedience and negation of what is, that is of the law of God, subsisting incidentally in the doing and ceasing at the same time as the cessation of the action. 44 And this one must know, that God does not punish anyone in the future, but each one makes himself receptive of participation in God. And participation in God is delight, but non-participation in him is punishment; and here God does not bring on temptations to punish, but to discipline and to heal evil, so that we may know him and turn back and attain his holiness. “For the discipline of the Lord opens my ears.” 45 Manichaean: If he is good, why in the age to come does he punish the wicked one and not rather destroy him? Orthodox: God is good, but also just; as good, therefore, he made all that he made good. Therefore, just as it was just for those who were to be good by him and who were to not only guard the good given to them, but also to cultivate it, to come into being and be deemed worthy of the perfect good and of eternal delight, so also it was just for those who were to be good by him and who were not to guard the good given to them, but to willingly turn aside through the rejection of good things to evil and to come into being and be deprived of eternal delight. 46 The seraphim are more distant from God than the wicked one is from the seraphim. If therefore the devil had not come into being, the one before him would have appeared worse than all and evil in comparison to those before him, and we would say: Why did God, foreknowing that he would be such, create him? Likewise also concerning the one before that one, until we come even to the seraphim themselves. For often we behold a most pitiful thing and think there is nothing more pitiful than it, and after this we see another that is worse. For whatever we might reckon as the last evil of those things we have seen, we suppose there is nothing worse than it.

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τὸ σῶμα· εἰ δὲ ἐκ τῆς ὕλης, τουτέστιν ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας τῆς κακίας, εἰ μὲν ἄναρχος ἡ κακία, καὶ ἀθάνατος πάντως καὶ ἄτρεπτος-τὸ γὰρ μὴ ἀρξάμενον οὐ παύεται οὐδὲ τρέπεται· εἰ δὲ τρέπεται καὶ φθείρεται, οὐκ ἄναρχος-, εἰ δὲ ἡ κακία ἄτρεπτος, καὶ τὸ ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας αὐτῆς σῶμα ἄφθαρτον ἔσται καὶ ἄτρεπτον. Τίνος οὖν ἦν ἡ φθορὰ καὶ ἡ κακία; Ἡ γὰρ φθορὰ πάντως φθείρει τι ἢ οὐκ ἔστι φθορά. Εἰ μὲν τὸ ἀγαθὸν παθητόν, παθητὸς καὶ ὁ ἀγαθός, καὶ πῶς τελέως ἀγαθός; Φθειρόμενος δὲ ὁ ἀγαθὸς ὑπὸ αὐτῆς εἰς ἀνυπαρξίαν χωρήσει. Εἰ δὲ ἑαυτὴν ἔφθειρεν, ἐφθάρη καὶ ἀπώλετο καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν. Εἰ δὲ μέρος τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, καὶ μέρος ἑαυτῆς ἔφθειρεν. Ἧς δὲ φύσεως τὸ μέρος φθαρτόν, καὶ πᾶσα φθαρτή· ἀδύνατον γὰρ τὴν αὐτὴν φύσιν καὶ φθαρτὴν εἶναι καὶ ἄφθαρτον. Εἰ γὰρ λέγομεν τὸ σῶμα τοῦ ἀνθρώπου φθαρτὸν μέρος ὂν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, τὴν δὲ ψυχὴν ἄφθαρτον, ἀλλ' οὔκ εἰσι μιᾶς φύσεως. Ἡ γὰρ ψυχή, εἰ καὶ ἐν σώματι πολιτεύεται, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἔστι σῶμα, ἀλλ' ἀσώματος· ὥστε ἄλλης φύσεώς ἐστιν ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ ἄλλης τὸ σῶμα, καὶ οὐ τὸ μὲν μέρος τῆς αὐτῆς φύσεως φθαρτόν, τὸ δὲ ἄφθαρτον, ἀλλ' ἡ μὲν μία φύσις τοῦ ἀνθρώπου φθαρτή, ἡ δὲ ἄφθαρτος. Καὶ οὔτε ἡ ψυχὴ ἐξ ἀνάρχου οὐσίας-τρεπτὴ γάρ-οὔτε τὸ σῶμα· καὶ αὐτὸ γὰρ τρεπτὸν καὶ φθαρτόν. Μιᾶς δὲ φύσεως λέγεται ὁ ἄνθρωπος, οὐχ ὅτι ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ τὸ σῶμα μιᾶς ἐστι φύσεως, ἀλλ' ὅτι πάντες οἱ ἄνθρωποι ὁμοίως ἕκαστος ψυχὴν ἔχει καὶ σῶμα καὶ ἕκαστος δύο φύσεις ἔχει. 43 Ἡ τροπὴ ἐκ τοῦ ἐναντίου εἰς τὸ ἐναντίον μεταβολή, ἐκ μὴ ὄντος εἰς τὸ εἶναι ἢ ἐξ ὄντων εἰς τὸ μὴ εἶναι ἢ ἐξ ἀρετῆς εἰς κακίαν, ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἐκ τῶν φυσικῶν ἕξεων εἰς τὴν τούτων στέρησιν. Ἡ ἀρετὴ πλήρωσίς ἐστι τοῦ νόμου τοῦ θεοῦ, ὁ δὲ νόμος τοῦ θεοῦ θέλημα αὐτοῦ ἐστιν-οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἐντέλλεται, ὃ οὐ θέλει-, τὸ δὲ θέλημα τοῦ θεοῦ ἀγαθόν ἐστιν, ἄτρεπτον, ἀεὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχον. Ὥστε τὸ ἀγαθὸν ὄν ἐστιν, ὁμοίως καὶ ἡ ἀρετή- ἀγαθὸν γὰρ ἡ ἀρετή-, ἡ δὲ κακία οὐκ ὄν, ἀλλὰ τοῦ ὄντος, τουτέστι τοῦ νόμου τοῦ θεοῦ, ἑκούσιος παρακοὴ καὶ ἀναίρεσις κατὰ σύμβασιν ἐν τῷ πράττεσθαι παρυφισταμένη καὶ ἅμα τῷ παύσασθαι τῆς πράξεως παυομένη. 44 Καὶ τοῦτο δὲ εἰδέναι δεῖ, ὅτι ὁ θεὸς οὐ κολάζει τινὰ ἐν τῷ μέλλοντι, ἀλλ' ἕκαστος ἑαυτὸν δεκτικὸν ποιεῖ τῆς μετοχῆς τοῦ θεοῦ, Ἔστι δὲ ἡ μὲν μετοχὴ τοῦ θεοῦ τρυφή, ἡ δὲ ἀμεθεξία αὐτοῦ κόλασις· ἐνταῦθα δὲ οὐ κολάζων ἐπιφέρει τοὺς πειρασμοὺς ὁ θεός, ἀλλὰ παιδεύων καὶ ἰώμενος τὴν κακίαν, ἵνα ἐπιγνῶμεν αὐτὸν καὶ ἐπιστρέφωμεν καὶ τύχωμεν τῆς ἁγιότητος αὐτοῦ. «Ἡ γὰρ παιδεία κυρίου ἀνοίγει μου τὰ ὦτα.» 45 Μανιχαῖος· Εἰ ἀγαθός, διὰ τί ἐν τῷ μέλλοντι αἰῶνι κολάζει τὸν πονηρὸν καὶ οὐ μᾶλλον ἀναιρεῖ αὐτόν; Ὀρθόδοξος· Ὁ θεὸς ἀγαθός ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ δίκαιος· ὡς ἀγαθὸς οὖν ἐποίησεν, ὅσα ἐποίησεν, ἀγαθά. Ὥσπερ οὖν δίκαιον ἦν, τοὺς ὑπ' αὐτοῦ ἐσομένους ἀγαθοὺς καὶ μέλλοντας οὐ μόνον φυλάττειν τὸ δοθὲν αὐτοῖς ἀγαθόν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐπεργάζεσθαι αὐτό, γενέσθαι καὶ ἀξιωθῆναι τοῦ τελείου ἀγαθοῦ καὶ τῆς αἰωνίου τρυφῆς, οὕτως καὶ δίκαιον ἦν, τοὺς ὑπ' αὐτοῦ ἐσομένους ἀγαθοὺς καὶ μέλλοντας οὐ φυλάττειν τὸ δοθὲν αὐτοῖς ἀγαθόν, ἀλλ' ἑκουσίως ἐκκλίνειν διὰ τῆς ἀποβολῆς τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἐπὶ τὴν κακίαν καὶ γενέσθαι καὶ στερηθῆναι τῆς ἀιδίου τρυφῆς. 46 Πλέον ἀπέχει τὰ σεραφὶμ ἀπὸ θεοῦ ἤπερ ὁ πονηρὸς ἀπὸ τῶν σεραφίμ. Εἰ οὖν μὴ ἐγένετο ὁ διάβολος, ὁ πρὸ αὐτοῦ ἀνεφαίνετο χείρων πάντων καὶ κακὸν ἐν συγκρίσει τῇ πρὸς τοὺς πρὸ αὐτοῦ καὶ ἐλέγομεν· ∆ιὰ τί προειδὼς ὁ θεός, ὅτι τοιοῦτος μέλλει ἔσεσθαι, ἐποίησεν αὐτόν; Ὁμοίως καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ πρὸ ἐκείνου, ἕως ἂν ἔλθωμεν καὶ εἰς αὐτὰ τὰ σεραφίμ. Καὶ γὰρ πολλάκις θεωροῦμεν πρᾶγμα ἐλεεινότατον καὶ δοκοῦμεν μὴ εἶναι ἐλεεινότερον αὐτοῦ ἕτερον καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα ὁρῶμεν ἕτερον χεῖρον. Ὅπερ γὰρ ἂν ἔσχατον κακόν, ὧν εἴδομεν, λογισώμεθα, ὑπονοοῦμεν μὴ εἶναι αὐτοῦ χεῖρον.