ARTICLE 13

In this article the question is: Whether virtue is in the mean.

It would seem that it is not.

             OBJECTIONS:

1. Virtue is the limit of power, as stated in De Caelo. But the limit is not a mean, but rather an extreme. Therefore, virtue is not in the mean but in the extreme.

             2. Further, virtue has the nature of good; for it is a good quality, as Augustine says. Now goodness has the nature of end, which is something ultimate, and so an extreme. Therefore, virtue is in the extreme rather than in the mean.

             3. Further, good is the contrary of evil. But between these two contraries there is no mean, which would be neither good nor bad, as we read in the Postpredicaments. Hence, the good is of the nature of an extreme; and also virtue, which makes its possessor and his action good, according to the Ethics, is not in the mean, but in the extreme.

             4. Further, virtue is the good of reason; for that is virtuous which is according to right reason. Now in man reason is not a mean or something mean, but is supreme. Therefore, the notion of mean does not apply to virtue.

             5. Further, every virtue is either theological, intellectual, or moral, as is evident from the preceding Articles (6 to 10 of this Question).

             But theological virtue is not in the mean; for Bernard says, in his book On the Love of God, that the measure of charity is to love without measure. Now charity is the foremost of the theological virtues and their root.

             It would seem, likewise that the mean is not observed in the intellectual virtues: because a mean is something between contraries, whereas things as they are in the intellect are not contraries; nor is the intellect damaged by any eminently intelligible object, as we read in De Anima.

             Similarly, neither do the moral virtues seem to be in the mean: for some of these virtues consist in the maximum. Thus fortitude concerns the gravest dangers, namely, those of death; magnanimity regards exalted honors; magnificence is concerned with large expenditure; piety, with the greatest reverence due to parents, whom we can never adequately repay; religion, likewise, in that it strives for the most perfect carrying out of Divine worship, in order to honor God, Whom we cannot serve adequately.

             Therefore, virtue is not in the mean.

             6. Further, if the perfection of virtue consists in the mean, it must be that the more perfect virtues adhere more closely to the mean. But virginity and poverty are among the more perfect virtues, since they fall under counsel, which is concerned with the better things. Hence virginity and poverty would be in the mean: which is manifestly false, because, as regards sexual pleasures, virginity abstains from every one of them, and so consists in an extreme position. Similarly, as regards possessions, poverty renounces them all. Therefore, it does not seem that the notion of virtue is to consist in the mean.

             7. Further, in Arithmetica, Boethius distinguishes three types of mean, namely: arithmetical, as six is between four and eight, because six is equally distant in numbers from both extremes; geometrical, as six is between nine and four, because six is equally distant from both extremes, not in numbers, but by the same proportion, namely, by one-half of the first extreme and one-half of the mean; lastly, a harmonic or musical mean, as three is the mean between six and two, because the proportion of one extreme to the other, i.e. of six to two, is the same proportion as that of three, which is the difference between six and three, to one, which is the difference between three and two. Now none of these means may be applied to virtue; for the virtuous mean need not be equally related to extremes, either in number (arithmetical mean), or in proportion either of terms (geometrical) or of differences (hamonic). Therefore, virtue is not in the mean.

             8. But it might be objected that virtue consists in the mean of reason and not that of things, whereas Boethius is speaking of the latter.--On the contrary, according to Augustine, in De Libero Arbitrio, virtue is counted among the greatest goods, of which no one can make a bad use. Now if virtuous good consists in the mean, the virtuous mean must be the most perfect mean of all. Therefore, the virtuous mean is a mean of things rather than a mean of reason.

             9. Further, moral virtue has to do with the passions and actions of the soul, which are indivisible. Now in the indivisible there are neither mean nor extremes. Therefore, virtue does not consist in the mean.

             10. Further, the Philosopher says, in his book, the Topica, that in pleasures present activity is better than past and present enjoyment better than past (melius est facere quam fecisse, vel fieri quam factum esse). But there is a certain virtue which regards pleasures, and that is temperance. Therefore, since virtue always seeks what is better, temperance always seeks present pleasures to moderate, which is to hold to the extreme, and not the mean. Therefore, moral virtue does not consist in the mean.

             11. Further, where degrees of more and less are to be found, there is a mean to be found as well. But we can discern more and less in vices: for a man may be more or less lustful or gluttonous. Therefore, in gluttony, in lust, and in the other vices, there is a mean. Consequently, if the nature of virtue is to be in the mean, it would seem that where there is vice, virtue may also be found.

             12. Further, if virtue consists in the mean, it is only in the mean between two vices. But this is not the case with every moral virtue, for justice is not a mean between two vices, but has only one vice opposed to it, since to take more than what is one's own is vicious, but there is no vice in one who suffers the loss of what is his own. Therefore, it is not the nature of moral virtue to consist in the mean.

             13. Further, a mean is equally distant from two extremes. But virtue is not equally distant from two extremes; for the courageous man is closer to audacity than to timidity; and the liberal man is nearer to prodigality than to close-fistedness; and the like is true of the other virtues. Therefore, moral virtue does not consist in the mean.

             14. Further, there is no going from one extreme to another, save by passing through the mean. But if virtue be in the mean, there will be no passing from one vice to its opposite vice, save through virtue: which is patently false.

             15. Further, mean and extremes are in the same genus. But fortitude, timidity and daring are not in the same genus: for fortitude is a virtue, whereas fear and daring are in the class of vice. Therefore, fortitude is not the mean between the other two. And the same objection may be raised concerning the other virtues.

             16. Further, in quantities just as extremes are indivisible, so is the mean; for the point is both the mean and the term of a line. If, then, virtue consists in the mean, the latter is something indivisible. This is clear also from what the Philosopher says, in the Ethics, namely, that it is difficult to be virtuous, just as it is difficult to hit the center of a target or to find the center of a circle. Therefore, if virtue consists in an indivisible, it would seem that virtue is neither increased nor diminished, which is obviously false.

             17. Further, there is no room for diversity in what is indivisible. Hence, if virtue is in the mean as in something indivisible, it would seem that there is no diversity in virtue, so that whatever is virtuous for one man will be virtuous for another. But this is certainly false, for what may be praised as a virtue in one man will be condemned in another.

             18. Further, what is separated even a short distance from something indivisible, for example, from the center of a circle, is outside that indivisible thing, outside the center. Hence, if virtue is in the mean as in something indivisible, it would seem that whatever deviates ever so slightly from what ought to be done is outside the pale of virtue, so that man rarely acts according to virtue. Therefore, virtue is not in the mean.

             ON THE CONTRARY:

Virtues are either moral, intellectual, or theological. Now moral virtue is in the mean; for moral virtue, according to the Philosopher is a habit of choosing the mean. Intellectual virtue seems also to be in the mean, from what the Apostle says, in Rom. 12:3. "For I say . . . not to be more wise than it behoveth to be wise, but to be wise unto sobriety." Likewise, theological virtue seems to be in the mean, for faith holds the mean between two heresies, as Boethius says, in his book De Duabus Naturis; hope also is the mean between presumption and despair. Therefore, all virtue is in the mean.

             I reply: Moral and intellectual virtues are in the mean, although each in its own manner, but theological virtues are not in the mean, except accidentally.

             In confirmation, it must be observed that the good of one having a rule and measure consists in its adequating the rule or measure. Thus we call good a thing which has neither more nor less than what it should have.

             Now it must be noted that the matter or object of the moral virtues are human passions and actions, just as the object of art are artefacts. Just as the good of those things which are fashioned by art consists in their conforming to the measure demanded by art, which is their rule; so the good of man's passions and actions is that the mean of reason be observed, which mean is the measure and rule of all human passions and actions. For since man is human because he has reason, the good for man must be according to reason.

             It is bad for a man to go beyond or to swerve from the measure which reason imposes on his passions and actions. Since human virtue is the good of man, it follows that moral virtue consists in the mean between excess and defect: excess, defect, and mean being taken as they are measured by the rule of reason.

             Of the intellectual virtues, which reside in reason itself, some are practical, e.g. prudence and art; and some are speculative, as wisdom, science, and understanding. The matter of the practical virtues are the human passions and actions, or artefacts made by man. The matter of the speculative virtues are necessary things (or truths).

             Reason orders each type of intellectual virtue differently.

             As regards those things on which reason works effectively, reason acts as a measure and rule, as has already been said. But as regards speculations, reason itself is the thing measured and regulated by the measure and rule of reality: for the good of the intellect is truth, which our intellect attains when it adequates reality.

             Moreover, just as the moral virtues consist in the mean determined by reason (medium rationis); so this same mean belongs to prudence, the practical intellectual virtue which directs moral actions and passions in man. This is evident from the very definition of moral virtue given in the Ethics, where it is said to be a habit of choosing the mean which the man of practical wisdom would determine. Therefore, the mean of prudence and of moral virtue are the same; but it belongs to prudence as to the virtue which determines it, and to moral virtue as to the subject on which it is impressed, just as the canons (rectitudo) of art, as the habit which imposes, are the same as those of artefacts, which are determined by this habit.

             In the speculative intellectual virtues, the mean will be truth itself, or rather the true thing (verum), and this mean will be determined according as the true thing attains its measure. Now this is not a mean between two contraries on the part of things (between two contrary things), for the contraries between which the virtuous mean are found are not on the part of the measure but on the part of what is measured. This is clear from what has been said about the moral virtues. Therefore, we must look to the intellect itself for the contraries between which the mean in the intellectual virtues is to be found.

             The contraries of the intellect are opposites by affirmation and negation, as we read in Perihermeneias. Between affirmations, then, and their opposite negations, we find the mean in the speculative intellectual virtues. This mean is truth. As an example, it is true to say that what is is, and that what is not is not, but it is false by excess to say that what is not is, and by defect to say that what is is not.

             Therefore, if there were not in the intellect its own proper contrariety, over and above the contrariety found in things, there would be no mean or extremes in the intellectual virtues. There is evidently no contrariety in the will as proper to it, but only by an ordination to contrary willed objects. The reason is that whereas the intellect knows things as they are within it (in esse intentionali), the will is moved to things as they are in themselves. Hence, if there is in the will any virtue which is measured and regulated by the will, such virtue will not consist in the mean: for we find no extremes on the part of the measure, but only on the part of the thing measured, as it exceeds or falls short of its measure.

             The theological virtues are ordered to their object, which is God, by means of the will. This is evident in the case of charity and of hope, and may be said also of faith; for, although faith is in the intellect, still it is there inasmuch as it is commanded by the will, for no one believes unless he wills to do so. Since God is the rule and measure of the human will, it is clear that the theological virtues are not in the mean, strictly (per se) speaking; although one of them may be in the mean by accident, as we shall explain later.

             REPLY TO OBJECTIONS:

1. The limit of a power is the farthest point of its extension, or the thing which is most difficult for it: for it is most difficult to find the mean, whereas it is easy to miss it. For this reason, virtue is the limit of a power, and this limit is in the mean.

             2. The good is as the end in relation to the movement of an appetite, but not as regards the object in which the good may be found. The good is the mean in this matter or object, whereby it neither exceeds nor falls short of the due rule and measure.

             3. As to the form which it takes from its measure, virtue has the nature of an extreme; thus it is opposed to evil as the formed to the unformed, the commensurate to the incommensurate. But as regards the matter on which the measure is imposed, virtue is in the mean.

             4. This objection considers the supreme (extreme) and the mean according to the order of the soul's powers, and not in relation to the matter on which the measure of virtue is imposed as a mean.

             5. In the theological virtues there is no mean, as has been said; but in the intellectual virtues there is a mean, not between contrary things, as they are in the intellect, but between the contrariety of affirmation and negation, as has also been said.

             Now in all the moral virtues it is commonly found that they are in the mean. The fact that some attain the maximum pertains to them as their mean, inasmuch as they attain the maximum according to the rule of reason. Thus, the courageous man faces the gravest dangers reasonably, i.e. when, as, and for the reason that he ought to face them.

             On the other hand, excess and defect are considered, not in relation to the quantity of things, but according to the rule of reason; so that it would be excessive if, for example, one should put himself in danger when he ought not to do so, or for the wrong motive; and it would be a defect if he should fail to face danger when and as he ought.

             6. Although virginity and poverty are in the extreme with regard to things, nevertheless, they are in the mean with regard to reason. A virgin abstains from all sexual pleasures because and as he should, namely, for the love of God and with joy. But if he were to abstain for the wrong reason, for instance, if it were odious to him by its very nature either to generate sons or to have a wife, this would be the vice of insensibility. But to abstain entirely from sexual pleasures for a proper end is virtuous: Thus even those who so abstain that they may go to war for the good of their country are praised as having political or civic virtue.

             7. The means which Boethius mentions are means of things (media rei); and so they do not apply to the mean of virtue, which is according to reason (medium rationis): except perhaps in the case of justice, in which there is at the same time the mean of things and the mean of reason. To this virtue we may apply the arithmetic mean of reason in commutative justice (in commutationibus) and the geometric mean in distributive justice (in distributionibus), as is clear from the Ethics.

             8. The concept of mean applies to virtue, not just as mean, but insofar as it is a mean of reason; for virtue is the good of man, which is to be according to reason. Hence, what partakes more of the nature of mean does not necessarily pertain more to virtue, but what has more of the mean of reason.

             9. The passions and actions of the soul are indivisible per se but divisible per accidens, to the extent that they are found to be greater or less according to diverse circumstances. And so in these passions and actions virtue holds to the mean.

             10. In pleasures it is better to enjoy them here and now than to have already enjoyed them, in that "better" signifies, not the performance of a virtuous good, which pertains to virtue, but of delectable good, which pertains to pleasure: for pleasure consists in actual or present enjoyment. Now those things whose being consists in becoming, once they have become, are no longer; hence the good of pleasure consists in becoming more than in having become.

             11. Not any mean at all applies to virtue, but the mean of reason; which mean, indeed, is not found in vices, because according to its proper nature it is not possible that in vice there be virtue.

             12. Justice does not attain the mean in exterior things when a man takes more for himself because of an inordinate will. Hence this is vicious. But it does not impair a man's own goodness when something he owns is taken away from him. Therefore, this does not imply any deordination in him. But the passions of the soul with which other virtues are concerned are within us; and so excess or defect in their regard is chargeable to man's viciousness. Consequently, other virtues are a mean between two vices; but justice is not. Nevertheless, justice observes the mean in its own proper matter, and this is what pertains per se to virtue.

             13. The mean of virtue is a mean of reason and not of things; and so it is not necessary that the virtuous man be equally distant from two extremes, but he must act as reason demands. Hence in those things wherein the good of reason consists principally in restraining the passions, virtue is nearer to defect than to excess; as is evident in temperance and meekness. But in things wherein the good is to lead one on to what passion urges, virtue is more like to excess, as is evident in the virtue of fortitude.

             14. As the Philosopher says, in the Physics, the mean is that into which a thing continuously changing first changes, and in which it finally rests. Hence, only in continuous movement must one pass from extreme to extreme through the mean. Now the movement from one vice to its opposite is not a continuous movement, nor is the movement of the will or of the intellect in considering diverse objects. Therefore, one need not pass from vice to vice through virtue.

             15. Although virtue is a mean as regards the matter in which it finds a mean, yet, according to its proper nature, inasmuch as it is in the class of goods, it is an extreme, as the Philosopher says, in the Ethics.

             16. Although the mean in which virtue consists is something indivisible, still, virtue can be intensified or slackened, according as a man is more or less disposed for attaining that indivisible mean, as an archer comes more or less close to hitting the indivisible center of a target.

             17. The mean of virtue is not a mean of things but of reason, as has been said. This mean consists in the due proportion or measure of things to man. Now this proportion is diversified in different men; for what is much for one man is little for another. And so virtue is not determined for all men in one and the same manner.

             18. Since the mean of virtue is a mean of reason, the indivisibility of this mean must be determined by reason. Reason determines as indivisible that which maintains an imperceptible distance, and which does not err. Thus, the earth as a whole is to be taken as an indivisible point in comparison with the rest of the heavens. Consequently, the mean of virtue allows of a certain latitude.

             The objection on the contrary may be conceded both as regards moral and as regards intellectual virtue, but not as regards theological virtue. For faith is a mean between two heresies, but this does not pertain to it per se, precisely as it is a virtue. The same is to be said of hope, which is a mean between two extremes, not in relation to its object, but according to the disposition of the subject towards hoping for heavenly things.