Chapter XIII.—Christ’s Human Nature.  The Flesh and the Soul Both Fully and Unconfusedly Contained in It.

The soul became flesh that the soul might become visible.185    Ostenderetur: or, “that it might prove itself soul.” Well, then, did the flesh likewise become soul that the flesh might be manifested?186    Or, “that it might show itself flesh.” If the soul is flesh, it is no longer soul, but flesh. If the flesh is soul, it is no longer flesh, but soul. Where, then, there is flesh, and where there is soul, it has become both one and the other.187    Alterutrum: “no matter which.” Now, if they are neither in particular, although they become both one and the other, it is, to say the least, very absurd, that we should understand the soul when we name the flesh, and when we indicate the soul, explain ourselves as meaning the flesh. All things will be in danger of being taken in a sense different from their own proper sense, and, whilst taken in that different sense, of losing their proper one, if they are called by a name which differs from their natural designation.  Fidelity in names secures the safe appreciation of properties. When these properties undergo a change, they are considered to possess such qualities as their names indicate. Baked clay, for instance, receives the name of brick.188    Testæ: a pitcher, perhaps. It retains not the name which designated its former state,189    Generis. because it has no longer a share in that state.  Therefore, also, the soul of Christ having become flesh,190    Tertullian quotes his opponent’s opinion here. cannot be anything else than that which it has become nor can it be any longer that which it once was, having become indeed191    Silicet: in reference to the alleged doctrine. something else. And since we have just had recourse to an illustration, we will put it to further use. Our pitcher, then, which was formed of the clay, is one body, and has one name indicative, of course, of that one body; nor can the pitcher be also called clay, because what it once was, it is no longer. Now that which is no longer (what it was) is also not an inseparable property.192    Non adhæret. And the soul is not an inseparable property. Since, therefore, it has become flesh, the soul is a uniform solid body; it is also a wholly incomplex being,193    Singularitas tota. and an indivisible substance. But in Christ we find the soul and the flesh expressed in simple unfigurative194    Nudis. terms; that is to say, the soul is called soul, and the flesh, flesh; nowhere is the soul termed flesh, or the flesh, soul; and yet they ought to have been thus (confusedly) named if such had been their condition. The fact, however, is that even by Christ Himself each substance has been separately mentioned by itself, conformably of course, to the distinction which exists between the properties of both, the soul by itself, and the flesh by itself.  “My soul,” says He, “is exceeding sorrowful, even unto death;”195    Matt. xxvi. 38. Tertullian’s quotation is put interrogatively. and “the bread that I will give is my flesh, (which I will give) for the life196    “The salvation” (salute) is Tertullian’s word. of the world.”197    John vi. 51. Now, if the soul had been flesh, there would have only been in Christ the soul composed of flesh, or else the flesh composed of soul.198    Above, beginning of chap. x. Since, however, He keeps the species distinct, the flesh and the soul, He shows them to be two. If two, then they are no longer one; if not one, then the soul is not composed of flesh, nor the flesh of soul. For the soul-flesh, or the flesh-soul, is but one; unless indeed He even had some other soul apart from that which was flesh, and bare about another flesh besides that which was soul. But since He had but one flesh and one soul,—that “soul which was sorrowful, even unto death,” and that flesh which was the “bread given for the life of the world,”—the number is unimpaired199    Salvus. of two substances distinct in kind, thus excluding the unique species of the flesh-comprised soul.

CAPUT XIII.

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Caro facta est anima, ut anima ostenderetur. Numquid ergo et caro anima facta est, ut caro manifestaretur? Si caro anima est, jam non anima est, sed caro. Si anima caro est, jam non caro est, sed anima. Ubi ergo caro, et ubi anima est, alterutrum facta est. Imo si neutrum sunt, dum alterutrum alterum fiunt, certe perversissimum, ut carnem nominantes, animam intelligamus, et animam significantes, carnem interpretemur. Omnia periclitabuntur aliter accipi quam sunt, et amittere quod sunt, dum aliter accipiuntur, si aliter quam sunt, cognominantur. Fides nominum, salus est proprietatum. Etiam cum demutantur qualitates, accipiunt vocabulorum possessiones. Verbi gratia, argilla excocta testae vocabulum 0776C suscipit; nec communicat cum vocabulo pristini generis, quia nec cum ipso genere. Proinde et anima Christi, caro facta, non potest non id esse quod facta est, et id non esse quod fuerit, aliud scilicet facta. Et quoniam proximum adhibuimus exemplum, plenius eo utemur. Certe enim testa ex argilla unum est corpus, unumque vocabulum, unius scilicet corporis. Nec potest dici et argilla; 0777A quia quod fuit, non est; quod autem non est, omnino non adhaeret. Ergo et anima caro facta, uniformis, solidata: scilicet singularitas tota est, et indiscreta substantia. In Christo vero invenimus animam et carnem simplicibus et nudis vocabulis editas, id est animam animam, et carnem carnem; nusquam animam carnem, aut carnem animam: quando ita nominari debuissent, si ita fuissent: sed etiam sibi quamque substantiam divise pronuntiatas ab ipso, utique pro duarum qualitatum distinctione, seorsum animam, et seorsum carnem. Quid anxia est, inquit (Matt. XXVI, 38), anima mea usque ad mortem? et (Joan. VI) : Panis quem ego dedero pro salute mundi, caro mea est. Porro, si anima caro fuisset, unum esset in 0777B Christo carnea anima, aut caro animalis. At cum dividit species, carnem et animam, duo ostendit: si duo, jam non unum; si non unum, jam nec anima carnalis, nec caro animalis; unum enim est anima caro, aut caro anima. Nisi et seorsum aliam gestabat animam, praeter eam quae caro erat, et aliam circumferebat carnem, praeter illam quae anima erat. Quod si una caro, et una anima; illa tristis usque ad mortem, et illa panis pro mundi salute; salvus est numerus duarum substantiarum, in suo genere distantium, excludens carneae animae unicam speciem.