Chapter IV.—Hermogenes Gives Divine Attributes to Matter, and So Makes Two Gods.
Chapter VIII.—On His Own Principles, Hermogenes Makes Matter, on the Whole, Superior to God.
Chapter IX.—Sundry Inevitable But Intolerable Conclusions from the Principles of Hermogenes.
Chapter XIII.—Another Ground of Hermogenes that Matter Has Some Good in It. Its Absurdity.
Chapter XIV.—Tertullian Pushes His Opponent into a Dilemma.
Chapter XVIII.—An Eulogy on the Wisdom and Word of God, by Which God Made All Things of Nothing.
Chapter XXIV.—Earth Does Not Mean Matter as Hermogenes Would Have It.
Chapter XXVII.—Some Hair-Splitting Use of Words in Which His Opponent Had Indulged.
Chapter XXXV.—Contradictory Propositions Advanced by Hermogenes Respecting Matter and Its Qualities.
Chapter XIII.—Another Ground of Hermogenes that Matter Has Some Good in It. Its Absurdity.
Here the question will arise How creatures were made good out of it,129 Matter. which were formed without any change at all?130 i.e. in their nature, Matter being evil, and they good, on the hypothesis. How occurs the seed of what is good, nay, very good, in that which is evil, nay, very evil? Surely a good tree does not produce evil fruit,131 Matt. vii. 18. since there is no God who is not good; nor does an evil tree yield good fruit, since there is not Matter except what is very evil. Or if we were to grant him that there is some germ of good in it, then there will be no longer a uniform nature (pervading it), that is to say, one which is evil throughout; but instead thereof (we now encounter) a double nature, partly good and partly evil; and again the question will arise, whether, in a subject which is good and evil, there could possibly have been found a harmony for light and darkness, for sweet and bitter? So again, if qualities so utterly diverse as good and evil have been able to unite together,132 Concurrisse. and have imparted to Matter a double nature, productive of both kinds of fruit, then no longer will absolutely133 Ipsa. good things be imputable to God, just as evil things are not ascribed to Him, but both qualities will appertain to Matter, since they are derived from the property of Matter. At this rate, we shall owe to God neither gratitude for good things, nor grudge134 Invidiam. for evil ones, because He has produced no work of His own proper character.135 Ingenio. From which circumstance will arise the clear proof that He has been subservient to Matter.
CAPUT XIII.
Et quaeretur: Quomodo ex ea bona facta sint, quae ex demutatione nullo modo facta sunt? Unde in mala ac pessima boni atque optimi semen? Certe nec bona arbor fructus malos edit, quia nec Deus nisi bonus: nec mala arbor, bonos, quia nec materia est nisi pessima. Aut si dabimus illi aliquid etiam boni germinis, jam non erit uniformis naturae, id est malae 0209B in totum, sed et tantum duplex, id est bonae et malae naturae. Et quaeretur iterum, an in bono et malo poterit convenire luci et tenebris, dulci et amaro. Aut si potuit utriusque diversitas boni et mali concurrisse, et duplex natura fuisse materiae, amborum ferax fructuum, jam nec bona ipsa Deo deputabuntur, ut nec mala illi imputentur: sed utraque species de materiae proprietate sumpta, ad materiam pertinebit. Quo pacto, neque gratiam bonorum Deo debebimus, nec invidiam malorum, quia nihil de suo operatus ingenio.