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preserving its good condition for it); so also with the soul's food, not everyone's desires incline toward the same thing. For some long for glory, or wealth, or some worldly eminence, for others, the appetite is busy about the table, others eagerly take up envy, as some poisonous food; but there are some for whom what is by nature good becomes an object of desire. And what is by nature good is always and for all that which is not chosen for the sake of something else, but is desirable for its own sake, always being the same, and never blunted by satiety. For this reason the Word blesses not those who are simply hungry, but those whose desire has its inclination toward true righteousness. What, then, is righteousness? For I think this must first be uncovered through reason, so that when its beauty is revealed, our appetite might thus be moved toward the loveliness of what has been revealed. For it is not possible to have desire for what is not seen, but our nature is somehow idle and unmoved toward the unknown, unless through hearing or sight it receives some notion of the desirable thing. Some of those who have examined such things say, therefore, that righteousness is a disposition that distributes what is equal, and to each what is according to worth. For instance, if someone were in charge of distributing money, the one who looks to what is equal and measures the gift to the need of the participants is called righteous; and if someone, having received the authority to judge, should not cast his vote according to some favor or enmity, but following the nature of the matters, should both punish the deserving and cast a saving vote for the blameless, and in the remaining disputes should make his judgment in truth, this person too is called righteous. And the one who sets taxes for his subjects, when he imposes a tax commensurate with their ability, and the master of a household, and the ruler of a city, 44.1236 and the king of nations, if each of these should lead his subjects fittingly, not moved by irrational impulses under authority, but judging his subjects with uprightness, and harmonizing his judgment with the choices of his subjects; all such things are attributed to the principle of righteousness by those who define the righteous by such a disposition. But I, looking to the height of the divine law, conjecture that something more than what has been said is to be understood in this righteousness. For if the saving word is common to all human nature, but it is not for every person to be in the positions mentioned (for it belongs to few to rule, to govern, to judge, to be in authority over money, or some other administration; while the multitude is among the subjects and those administered); how could one accept that true righteousness is that which is not set before all equally by nature? For if the goal for the righteous person according to secular reasoning is equality, but pre-eminence involves inequality, it is not possible to consider the given definition of righteousness to be true, since it is immediately refuted by the inequality in life. What then is the righteousness that reaches all? The desire for which is set forth as common to everyone who looks to the evangelical table; whether one be rich or poor, whether a slave or a master, whether of noble birth or bought with silver, with no circumstance either increasing or diminishing the principle of righteousness. For if such a thing were found only in one who is prominent by some authority and pre-eminence; how is Lazarus righteous, who was cast down at the rich man's gate, having no material for such righteousness, no office, no authority, no house, no table, no other provision for life, by which it is possible to work that righteousness? For if being righteous consists in ruling, or distributing, or administering anything at all, he who is not in those positions is entirely outside of righteousness. How then is he deemed worthy of rest who had none of those things by which righteousness is characterized according to the common definition? Therefore we must seek that righteousness, the one who desires which has its enjoyment in the promise. For "Blessed," it says, "are those who hunger for righteousness, for they shall be satisfied." With many and various things set forth for

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αὐτῷ συντηρούσης τὴν εὐεξίαν)· οὕτως καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ψυχῆς τροφῆς οὐ πάντων πρὸς τὸ αὐτὸ ῥέπουσιν αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι. Οἱ μὲν γὰρ δό ξης, ἢ πλούτου, ἤ τινος κοσμικῆς περιφανείας ὀρέ γονται, ἄλλοις περὶ τὴν τράπεζαν ἄσχολός ἐστιν ἡ ὄρεξις, ἕτεροι τὸν φθόνον, ὥς τινα δηλητηριώδη τρο φὴν προθύμως ἀναλαμβάνουσιν· εἰσὶν δέ τινες οἷς τὸ τῇ φύσει καλὸν ἐν ὀρέξει γίνεται. Φύσει δὲ καλὸν ἀεὶ καὶ πᾶσι τοῦτό ἐστιν, ὃ μὴ ἄλλου τινὸς ἕνεκέν ἐστιν αἱρετὸν, ἀλλ' αὐτὸ δι' ἑαυτὸ ἐπιθυμητὸν, ἀεὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχον, καὶ οὐδέποτε ἀμβλυνόμενον κόρῳ. ∆ιὰ τοῦτο μακαρίζει ὁ Λόγος οὐ τοὺς ἁπλῶς πεινῶντας, ἀλλ' οἷς πρὸς τὴν ἀληθῆ δικαιοσύνην ἡ ἐπιθυμία τὴν ῥοπὴν ἔχει. Τίς οὖν ἡ δικαιοσύνη; τοῦτο γὰρ οἶμαι δεῖν πρό τερον ἀνακαλυφθῆναι διὰ τοῦ λόγου, ὡς ἂν τοῦ κατ' αὐτὴν κάλλους φανερωθέντος, οὕτως ἐν ἡμῖν κινηθείη πρὸς τὴν ὥραν τοῦ φανέντος ἡ ὄρεξις. Οὐδὲ γάρ ἐστι δυνατὸν πρὸς τὸ μὴ φαινόμενον ἐπιθυμητικῶς ἔχειν, ἀλλ' ἀργή πως ἐπὶ τὸ ἄγνωστόν ἐστιν ἡ φύσις ἡμῶν καὶ ἀκίνητος, εἰ μὴ δι' ἀκοῆς ἢ ὄψεως ἔννοιάν τινα τοῦ ἐπιθυμητοῦ λάβοι. Φασὶ τοίνυν τῶν ἐξητακότων τὰ τοιαῦτά τινες, δικαιοσύνην εἶναι ἕξιν ἀπονεμητι κὴν τοῦ ἴσου, καὶ τοῦ κατ' ἀξίαν ἑκάστῳ. Οἷον εἴ τις χρημάτων διανομῆς γένοιτο κύριος, ὁ πρὸς τὸ ἴσον βλέπων, καὶ συμμετρῶν τῇ χρείᾳ τῶν μετεχόντων τὴν δόσιν, δίκαιος λέγεται· καὶ εἴ τις τοῦ κρίνειν τὴν ἐξουσίαν λαβὼν, μὴ πρὸς χάριν τινὰ καὶ ἀπέχθειαν τὴν ψῆφον φέροι, ἀλλὰ τῇ φύσει τῶν πραγμάτων ἑπόμενος, τιμωροῖτό τε τοὺς ἀξίους, καὶ τὴν σώζου σαν ψῆφον πρὸς τοὺς ἀνευθύνους φέροι, καὶ τῶν λοι πῶν ἀμφισβητημάτων ἐν ἀληθείᾳ ποιοῖτο τὴν κρίσιν, καὶ οὗτος δίκαιος λέγεται. Καὶ ὁ τοὺς φόρους τοῖς ὑποχειρίοις τάσσων, ὅταν σύμμετρον ἐπιβάλῃ τῇ δυ νάμει τὸν φόρον, καὶ οἰκείας δεσπότης, καὶ πόλεως 44.1236 ἄρχων, καὶ ἐθνῶν βασιλεὺς, εἰ καταλλήλως ἡγοῖτο τῶν ὑποτεταγμένων ἕκαστος τούτων, μὴ ὁρμαῖς ἀλό γοις ὑπ' ἐξουσίας κινούμενος, ἀλλ' εὐθύτητι τὸ ὑπ ήκοον κρίνων, καὶ πρὸς τὰς προαιρέσεις τῶν ὑποχει ρίων τῇ γνώμῃ συναρμοζόμενος· πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα τῷ λόγῳ τῆς δικαιοσύνης ἀνατιθέασιν, οἱ τῇ τοιαύτῃ ἕξει τὸ δίκαιον ὁριζόμενοι. Ἐγὼ δὲ πρὸς τὸ ὕψος βλέπων τῆς θείας νομοθεσίας, πλέον τι τῶν εἰρημένων ἐν τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ ταύτῃ νοεῖσθαι στοχάζομαι. Εἰ γὰρ κοινὸς μὲν πρὸς πᾶσαν τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην φύσιν ὁ σωτήριος λόγος, οὐ παντὸς δέ ἐστιν ἀνθρώπου τὸ ἐν τοῖς εἰρη μένοις εἶναι (ὀλίγων γὰρ τὸ βασιλεύειν, τὸ ἄρχειν, τὸ δικάζειν, τὸ ἐν ἐξουσία χρημάτων, ἤ τινος ἄλλης οἰκονομίας γενέσθαι· τὸ δὲ πλῆθος ἐν τοῖς ὑποχειρίοις τε καὶ οἰκονομουμένοις ἐστίν)· πῶς ἄν τις δέξαιτο τὴν ἀληθῆ δικαιοσύνην ἐκείνην εἶναι, ἣ μὴ πᾶσι πρόκειται ὁμοτίμως τῇ φύσει; Εἰ γὰρ ὁ σκοπὸς τῷ δικαίῳ κατὰ τοὺς ἔξωθεν λόγους τὸ ἴσον ἐστίν· ἡ δὲ ὑπεροχὴ τὸ ἄνισον ἔχει· οὐκ ἔστι τὸν ἀποδεδομένον τῆς δικαιοσύνης λόγον ἀληθῆ νομίσαι, εὐθὺς τῷ κατὰ τὸν βίον ἀνίσῳ διελεγχόμενον. Τίς οὖν ἡ δικαιοσύνη ἡ εἰς πάντας φθάνουσα; Ἧς ἡ ἐπιθυμία κοινὴ πρό κειται παντὶ τῷ κατὰ τὴν εὐαγγελικὴν τράπεζαν βλέποντι· κἂν πλούσιός τις ᾖ, κἂν πένης, κἂν δου λεύῃ, κἂν κυριεύῃ, κἂν εὐπατρίδης, κἂν ἀργυρώνη τος, οὐδεμιᾶς περιστάσεως, οὔτε πλεοναζούσης, οὔτε ὑποστελλούσης τοῦ δικαίου τὸν λόγον. Εἰ γὰρ ἐν μόνῳ τῷ προήκοντι κατ' ἐξουσίαν τινὰ καὶ ὑπεροχὴν τὸ τοιοῦτον εὑρίσκοιτο· πῶς δίκαιος ὁ τῷ πυλῶνι τοῦ πλουσίου παρεῤῥιμμένος Λάζαρος, ὁ μηδεμίαν ὕλην πρὸς τὴν τοιαύτην δικαιοσύνην ἔχων, οὐκ ἀρχὴν, οὐκ ἐξουσίαν, οὐκ οἶκον, οὐ τράπεζαν, οὐκ ἄλλην τινὰ πρὸς τὸν βίον παρασκευὴν, δι' ἧς ἔστι τὴν δικαιοσύ νην ἐκείνην ἐργάζεσθαι; Εἰ γὰρ ἐν τῷ ἄρχειν, ἢ δια νέμειν, ἤ τι ὅλως οἰκονομεῖν τὸ δίκαιόν ἐστιν εἶναι, ὁ μὴ ὣν ἐν ἐκείνοις, ἔξω τοῦ δικαίου πάντως ἐστίν. Πῶς οὖν ἀξιοῦται τῆς ἀναπαύσεως ὁ μηδὲν ἐσχηκὼς τούτων, δι' ὧν ἡ δικαιοσύνη κατὰ τὸν τῶν πολλῶν λόγον χαρακτηρίζεται. Οὐκοῦν ζητητέα ἡμῖν ἡ δικαιο σύνη ἐκείνη, ἧς ὁ ἐπιθυμήσας ἐν ἐπαγγελίᾳ τὴν ἀπόλαυσιν ἔχει. Μακάριοι γὰρ, φησὶν, οἱ πεινῶντες τὴν δικαιοσύνην· ὅτι αὐτοὶ χορτασθήσονται. Πολλῶν καὶ παντοδαπῶν προκειμένων εἰς