OF SAINT JUSTIN PHILOSOPHER AND MARTYR, AN OVERTHROW OF CERTAIN ARISTOTELIAN DOGMAS.
And concerning these things, all the prophets sent from God to all men continued to think the same things, and there was no disagreement among them b
posited, must necessarily come to be by composition but if the mode of generation by composition fits every generation, it has been superfluously dis
is another thing besides the destruction of all that is, but if matter has this, how is its being matter not also destroyed? Further, if when the form
by its presence and absence, then the principles will be both generated and destroyed by each other, and not eternal for the eternal does not need th
·having been said concerning the philosophers among the Greeks, how they did not make their arguments concerning beings according to demonstrative sci
animal, but in the generation of the animal simply the substrate was not seed, how is the animal coming to be from not-animal not contrary to nature?
and matter is deprived of being the matter of something, but it is not deprived of being matter itself, therefore matter will be being and not-being,
Saying If, when the form is present, then the privation does not remain, it is clear that when the form is not present, the privation remains. How th
The eternally uncreated has this same [quality] with respect to something coming to be from it by nature and by art. How then was God able to make som
and of change, but in another way the form and the shape according to reason. For just as art is said to be that which is according to art and the art
he subjected to generation not only to the spontaneous one, but also to that through intellect and nature which is manifestly absurd, that the one wh
sible, but it is among the impossible things for that which is going to be to be ungenerated, both without beginning and without end, both having and
And that, if the infinite in no way exists, many impossibilities occur, is clear: for time will have a beginning and an end, and magnitudes will not b
is in potentiality, but not in actuality but the amount taken always exceeds any definite quantity. But this number is not definite, nor does infinit
second to providence but if place is ungeneratedly and without beginning what it is and has what it has, then place is ungenerated and first of all t
Where is that which is in a place? And if not every being is in a place, how will some beings not be the same as non-being, if indeed not being in a p
to have come into being. For those things to which belong the generable and having come into being, from these of necessity the eternal and the unorig
38. From the same discourse. Whatever neither moves nor is at rest, is not in time for to be in time is to be measured by time, and time is the measu
time to be, so also has the past been. But the future time, just as it has a future coming-into-being, so also it has a beginning and just as there i
to be straight. The principles of things that always come to be according to nature cannot be eternal. For if they transmit the nature they have to th
And this is the case for any single one of the things that come to be, but it is necessary for something else to be moved previously among the things
according to which some things have come to be above nature, and others according to nature. If before and after is ungenerated, then there will b
we say, of which there is no demonstration. But God and nature do nothing in vain. If there were contrary motions in the locomotion of bodies, either
worlds to come into being from it, but having been used up for the genesis of one world, did it stop the unwilling god from making more worlds? 51. Fr
and an enmattered principle in matter, through which 'for heaven to be' is different from 'for this particular heaven to be'? If heaven cannot do by w
each other. But now this much is clear, for what reason there are more circular bodies: that it is necessary for there to be generation, and generatio
and the outcome in things that happen by choice is secondary to the choice), how does it exist in eternal things that this particular thing is because
chance can exist in eternal things, but the heaven is eternal and its circular motion, for what reason then does it move in one direction, and not in
to suffer it. These things, therefore, are heated because they are carried through the air, which through the striking by the motion becomes fire but
it was moved by nature the motion by which it is now moved, how was it not bound to the sphere in vain? But if it was not moved this way according to
always? If to things that are always in motion the spherical shape was given as suitable, how is it that of the things having a spherical shape, one i
and have what they have? If the stars ought not to move, why do they move at all by means of others? But if they ought to move, why do they not move b
of an element besides the things here, but at other times from the same elements, how is he not speaking falsely in one of the two ways? 63. From the
and the bricks. Therefore, since matter is not substance, who is it that has made from it the things that have come from it, since both nature and art
change, but into the opposite in the same genus, for instance in quality a change does not occur from white to large but to black, in what way then do
is in potentiality, but not in actuality; but the amount taken always exceeds any definite quantity. But this number is not definite, nor does infinity remain but it comes to be, just as time and the number of time. If infinity does not remain but it comes to be, just as time and the number of time, then nothing infinite is ungenerated. And if everything infinite is generated, then all other things in which the infinite is said to be are also generated. If what happens to the infinite of necessity happens to those things in which infinity exists, and it happens to the infinite to come to be and to be begun, then time is generated and has a beginning; and likewise also motion, of which time is the number. 23. From the fourth book of the same treatise. For that which is not is nowhere. How then is matter, being nothing, being neither substance nor a being nor a 'this something'? 24. From the same book. And Hesiod would seem to speak correctly, having made Chaos first. For he says, "Verily at the first Chaos came to be, but next wide-bosomed Earth," as if it were necessary for a place to exist first for beings, because of the belief, like that of the many, that all things are somewhere and in a place. And if it is such, the power of place would be something marvelous and prior to all things; for that without which nothing else exists, must of necessity be first of all other things. If, therefore, place is first and the things in place are later by natural necessity, as Hesiod said and Aristotle testified to the correctness of the argument, how is it not among the impossibilities to say that the heaven, which is in place, is ungenerated? For this is equivalent to saying that the generated is before the ungenerated. 25. From the same book. First, then, one must understand that place would not be sought, if there were not motion with respect to place; for it is for this reason that we think heaven especially is in place, because it is always in motion. If it is impossible for the ungenerated to need the movable both for its being and for its being moved, then it is impossible for the heaven to be ungenerated; for it needs place both for its being and for its being moved. 20. From the same book. For place has magnitude, but no body. If place has finite intervals and magnitude, then place is generated; but if infinite, then either in potentiality or in actuality. But if in potentiality, then place is generated, just as time and the number of time; but if in actuality, then the argument is false that says that nothing can be actually infinite. If it is by some providence that place is what it is and has what it has, then place is generated and of the
μέν ἐστιν, ἐνεργείᾳ δὲ οὔ· ἀλλ' ἀεὶ ὑπερβάλλει τὸ λαμβα νόμενον παντὸς ὡρισμένου πλήθους. Ἀλλ' οὐχ ὁριστὸς οὗτος ὁ ἀριθμός,
οὐδὲ μένει ἡ ἀπειρία ἀλλὰ γίνεται, ὥσπερ καὶ ὁ χρόνος καὶ ὁ ἀριθμὸς τοῦ χρόνου. Eἰ οὐ μένει ἡ ἀπειρία ἀλλὰ γίνεται, ὥσπερ
καὶ ὁ χρόνος καὶ ὁ ἀριθμὸς τοῦ χρόνου, οὐδὲν ἄρα ἄπειρον ἀγένητον. Eἰ δὲ πᾶν ἄπειρον γενητόν, γενητὰ ἄρα καὶ τὰ ἄλλα πάντα
ἐν οἷς λέγεται εἶναι τὸ ἄπειρον. Eἰ τὸ συμβαῖνον τῷ ἀπείρῳ ἐξ ἀνάγκης συμβαίνει κκείνοις ἐν οἷς ἐστιν ἡ ἀπειρία, συμ βαίνει
δὲ τῷ ἀπείρῳ τὸ γενέσθαι καὶ τὸ εἶναι ἠργμένον, γε νητὸς ἄρα ὁ χρόνος καὶ ἠργμένος· ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἡ κίνησις, ἧς ὁ χρόνος
ἐστὶν ἀριθμός. κγ. Ἐκ τοῦ τετάρτου λόγου τῆς αὐτῆς πραγματείας. Τὸ γὰρ μὴ ὂν οὐδαμοῦ εἶναι. Πῶς οὖν ἡ ὕλη μηδὲν οὖσα, μήτε
οὖσα μήτε ὂν μήτε τόδε τι; κδ. Ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ λόγου. ∆όξειε δ' ἂν καὶ Ἡσίοδος ὀρθῶς λέγειν, ποιήσας πρῶ τον τὸ χάος. Λέγει γοῦν
Πάντων μὲν πρώτιστα χάος γέ νετ', αὐτὰρ ἔπειτα γαῖ' εὐρύστερνος", ὡς δέον πρῶτον ὑπάρ ξαι χώραν τοῖς οὖσι, διὰ τὸ νομίζειν,
ὥσπερ οἱ πολλοί, πάντα εἶναί που καὶ ἐν τόπῳ. Eἰ δέ ἐστι τοιοῦτον, θαυ μαστή τις ἂν εἴη ἡ τοῦ τόπου δύναμις καὶ προτέρα πάν
των· οὗ γὰρ ἄνευ τῶν ἄλλων οὐδέν ἐστιν, ἐκεῖνο τῶν ἄλλων ἀνάγκη πρῶτον εἶναι. Eἰ τοίνυν πρῶτος ὁ τόπος καὶ ὕστερα τὰ ἐν τῷ
τόπῳ φυσικῇ ἀνάγκῃ, καθὼς εἶπεν ὁ Ἡσίοδος καὶ ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης προσεμαρτύρησε τῇ τοῦ λόγου ὀρθότητι, πῶς οὐκ ἔστι τῶν ἀδυνάτων
τὸ τὸν ὄντα ἐν τῷ τόπῳ οὐρανὸν λέγειν ἀγένητον; Τοῦτο γὰρ ἴσον ἐστὶ τῷ λέγειν πρὸ τοῦ ἀγενήτου εἶναι τὸ γενητόν. κε. Ἐκ τοῦ
αὐτοῦ λόγου. Πρῶτον μὲν οὖν δεῖ κατανοῆσαι ὅτι οὐκ ἂν ἐζητεῖτο ὁ τόπος, εἰ μὴ ἡ κίνησις ἦν ἡ κατὰ τὸν τόπον· διὰ γὰρ τοῦτο
καὶ τὸν οὐρανὸν οἰόμεθα μάλιστα ἐν τῷ τόπῳ, ὅτι ἀεὶ ἐν κινήσει. Eἰ ἀδύνατόν ἐστι τὸ ἀγένητον πρὸς τὸ εἶναί τε καὶ πρὸς τὸ
κινηθῆναι δεῖσθαι τοῦ κινητοῦ, ἀδύνατον ἄρα τὸν οὐρανὸν εἶναι ἀγένητον· ἐπιδέεται γὰρ τοῦ τόπου πρὸς τὸ εἶναί τε καὶ πρὸς
τὸ κινηθῆναι. κ. Ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ λόγου. Μέγεθος μὲν γὰρ ἔχει ὁ τόπος, σῶμα δὲ οὐθέν. Eἰ μὲν πεπερασμένα ἔχει ὁ τόπος τὰ διαστήματα
καὶ τὸ μέγεθος, γενητὸς ἄρα ὁ τόπος· εἰ δὲ ἄπειρα, ἢ ἄρα δυ νάμει ἢ ἐνεργείᾳ. Ἀλλὰ εἰ μὲν δυνάμει, ἔστι γενητὸς ἄρα ὁ τόπος,
ὥσπερ ὁ χρόνος καὶ ὁ τοῦ χρόνου ἀριθμός· εἰ δὲ ἐνεργείᾳ, ψευδὴς ἄρα ὁ λόγος ὁ λέγων μηδὲν ἐνεργείᾳ δύνα σθαι εἶναι ἄπειρον.
Eἰ κατὰ μὲν πρόνοιάν τινός ἐστιν ὁ τόπος ὅ ἐστι καὶ ἔχει ὃ ἔχει, γενητὸς ἄρα ὁ τόπος καὶ τῆς
