will. How then is the will the same as the essence, when that which is willed and the will are one thing and another, just as the sensible and sensation? If God is without beginning and eternal, he is neither self-caused nor caused by another; for that which is simply self-caused is in no way eternal and without beginning. The one who answers with one voice denies the otherness of the essence of God and the will, but with another voice he posits it. For in denying the otherness of the essence of God and the will he said: "It must not be supposed that, just as in us being is one thing and willing another, so it is also in God." But in positing the otherness he says: "But it is absolutely the same." And again: "But being and willing are the same for God." For just as what is "other" is other than another, so also what is "the same" is absolutely the same as another; and likewise, what is "absolutely other" is absolutely other than another. But if the essence of God and the will are the same, they will be absolutely one and another; but if not, with the "one and another" being denied, the "sameness" of the essence of God and the will and the "absolutely" will of necessity be denied. Just as "to be moved" is the activity of motion, so also "to will" is the activity of the will; and whatever difference potentiality has in relation to activity, this the will has in relation to willing. But it is impossible for willing to have this difference with respect to the will, but not have it with respect to the one who wills. But if it is in no way possible for willing, the will, and the one who wills to be the same, it is clear that the one who rejects the "one and another" of God and willing rejects the difference between the one who acts and the activity; which is absurd. If the hypostatic is one thing, and the non-hypostatic another, and God is the former, but willing the latter, it is clear that the one who rejects the "one and another" of God and willing rejects either the hypostatic or the non-hypostatic. If, according to the argument of the opponent, whatever God is, he also wills, and what he wills, he is, it is clear that, if God should not will his own activity not to perish, when it ceases he perishes without his willing it. Therefore, God is not what he wills. If making belongs to the will of God, it is clear that just as making simply differs from making things of a certain kind and number and at a certain time, so being differs from willing. But indeed, it must not be supposed that God creates by his being in the same way that fire heats; for fire, although essentially, nevertheless has heat as an accident, but in God nothing is an accident, either essentially or accidentally. Since, therefore, nothing is an accident in him, and being and willing are the same for God, he is simple and of a single form, the uncreated creator of beings. As for how heat is an accident in fire, as the respondent wishes to say, let him say it. For the question now is not about how heat is an accident in it, but about the involuntary activity, according to which it acts by its being. Willing is either of the essence or is added to the

βουλή. Πῶς οὖν ταὐτόν ἐστι τῇ οὐσίᾳ ἡ βουλή, τοῦ βουλητοῦ καὶ τῆς βουλῆς ἄλλου καὶ ἄλλου ὄντος, καθάπερ τὸ αἰσθητὸν καὶ ἡ αἴσθησις; Eἰ ἄναρχος καὶ ἀΐδιός ἐστι θεός, οὔτε αὐτο πάρακτός ἐστιν οὔτε ἑτεροπάρακτος· ὁ γὰρ ἁπλῶς αὐτοπά ρακτος οὐδενὶ λόγῳ ἐστὶν ἀΐδιος καὶ ἄναρχος. Ὁ ἀποκρινά μενος δι' ἑτέρας φωνῆς ἀναιρεῖ τῆς οὐσίας τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ τῆς βουλῆς τὸ ἕτερον, δι' ἑτέρας δὲ φωνῆς τοῦτο τίθησιν. Ἀναι ρῶν μὲν τῆς οὐσίας τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ τῆς βουλῆς τὸ ἕτερον ἔλεγεν· Oὐκ οἰητέον, ὥσπερ ἐν ἡμῖν ἄλλο μέν ἐστι τὸ εἶναι, ἄλλο δὲ τὸ βούλεσθαι, οὕτω καὶ ἐν τῷ θεῷ. Τιθέμενος δὲ τὸ ἕτερόν φησιν· Ἀλλὰ τὸ αὐτὸ ἄντικρυς ὑπάρχει. Καὶ πάλιν· Τὸ δὲ εἶναι καὶ τὸ βούλεσθαι ταὐτὸν ὑπάρχει τῷ θεῷ. Ὥσπερ γὰρ τὸ ἕτερον ἄλλο ἄλλῳ ἐστὶν ἕτερον, οὕτως καὶ τὸ ταὐτὸν ἄλλο ἄλλῳ ἐστὶν ἄντικρυς ταὐτόν· ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ τὸ ἄντι κρυς ἄλλο ἄλλῳ ἐστὶν ἄντικρυς. Ἀλλ' εἰ ταὐτόν ἐστιν ἡ οὐσία τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ ἡ βουλή, ἄντικρυς ἔσται ἄλλο καὶ ἄλλο· εἰ δὲ μή γε, ἀναιρουμένου τοῦ ἄλλου καὶ ἄλλου, ἀναιρεθήσεται ἐξ ἀνάγκης τὸ ταὐτὸν τῆς οὐσίας τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ τῆς βουλῆς καὶ τὸ ἄντικρυς. Ὥσπερ τὸ κινεῖσθαι ἐνέργειά ἐστι κινήσεως, οὕτως καὶ τὸ βούλεσθαι βουλῆς ἐστιν ἐνέργεια· καὶ ἣν ἔχει διαφορὰν ἡ δύναμις πρὸς τὴν ἐνέργειαν, ταύτην ἔχει ἡ βουλὴ πρὸς τὸ βούλεσθαι. Ἀδύνατον δὲ τὸ βούλεσθαι πρὸς μὲν τὴν βουλὴν ἔχειν τὴν διαφοράν, πρὸς δὲ τὸν βουλόμενον μὴ ἔχειν. Eἰ δὲ οὐδενὶ λόγῳ δυνατὸν ταὐτὸν εἶναι τὸ βούλεσθαι καὶ τὴν βουλὴν καὶ τὸν βουλόμενον, δῆλον ὅτι ὁ ἀποῤῥίπτων τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ τοῦ βούλεσθαι τὸ ἄλλο καὶ ἄλλο τοῦ ἐνεργοῦντος καὶ τῆς ἐνεργείας ἀποῤῥίπτει τὴν διαφοράν· ὅπερ ἄτοπον. Eἰ ἄλλο τὸ ἐνυπόστατον, καὶ ἄλλο τὸ ἀνυπόστατον, καὶ θεὸς μὲν ἐκεῖνο, τὸ βούλεσθαι δὲ τοῦτο, δῆλον ὅτι ὁ τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ τοῦ βούλεσθαι ἀποῤῥίπτων τὸ ἄλλο καὶ ἄλλο ἢ τὸ ἐνυπόστατον ἀποῤῥίπτει ἢ τὸ ἀνυπόστατον. Eἰ κατὰ τὸν λόγον τοῦ ἀντι κειμένου ὅπερ ἔστι θεὸς καὶ βούλεται, καὶ ὃ βούλεται ἔστι, δῆλον ὅτι, εἰ μὴ βουληθείη θεὸς τὸ μὴ φθείρεσθαι τὴν ἐνέρ γειαν αὑτοῦ, παυσαμένης αὐτῆς φθείρεται οὐ βουληθέντος αὐτοῦ. Oὐκ ἄρα ἔστιν ὁ θεὸς ὃ βούλεται. Eἰ τὸ ποιεῖν ἐστι τῆς τοῦ θεοῦ βουλῆς, δῆλον ὅτι, ὥσπερ διαφέρει τὸ ποι εῖν ἁπλῶς τοῦ ποῖα καὶ πόσα καὶ πότε ποιεῖν, οὕτω διαφέρει τὸ εἶναι τοῦ βούλεσθαι. Ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ' οὕτως τὸν θεὸν τῷ εἶναι ποιεῖν ὑπο θετέον ὡς τὸ πῦρ θερμαίνει· τὸ γὰρ πῦρ, εἰ καὶ οὐσιωδῶς, ἀλλ' ὅμως συμβεβηκυῖαν ἔχει τὴν θερμότητα, παρὰ δὲ τῷ θεῷ οὐδὲν οὔτε οὐσιωδῶς συμβέβηκεν οὔτε συμβεβηκότως. Ἐπεὶ οὖν συμβέβηκε μὲν αὐτῷ οὐδέν, τὸ δὲ εἶναι καὶ τὸ βούλεσθαι ταὐτὸν ὑπάρχει τῷ θεῷ, ἁπλοῦν τέ ἐστι καὶ μονοειδές, ποιη τικὸν ἀγενήτως τῶν ὄντων. Τὸ μὲν πῶς συμβέβηκε τῷ πυρὶ ἡ θερμότης, ὡς βούλεται λέγειν ὁ ἀποκρινάμενος, λεγέτω. Oὐ γὰρ περὶ τοῦ πῶς αὐτῷ συμβέβηκεν ἡ θερμότης νῦν ἐστι τὸ ζητούμενον, ἀλλὰ περὶ τῆς ἀβουλήτου ἐνεργείας, καθ' ἣν τῷ εἶναι ἐνεργεῖ. Τὸ βούλεσθαι ἢ οὐσίας ἐστὶν ἢ πρόσεστι τῇ