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47 Therefore God made all things very good, each according to its own nature, as he willed; for he is not subject to law, but what he wills, this is good, not what we judge. For we are not judges of God, but, just as all light is illumined by the sun or fire, so every good is defined by the will of God. For if you say that God did well in this and badly in that and, why did he do this and why did he not do that, you are a judge of God and greater and wiser than he. He has authority, therefore, as God to do what he wills, and this is good, and he has authority to reveal to us the causes he wills of what he does, and to hide those he wills. But each of the rational goods that came into being either willingly remained in the good, as it was created, or willingly turned away and departed from the good and lost it. For good is the best order for each, preserving what is proper according to nature—this is also virtue—but evil is the dissolution of order, or disorder. All beings, insofar as they exist, are also good and from the good, but insofar as they are deprived of the good, they are neither good nor beings. For inanimate things, insofar as they have not received life from the good, are inanimate as being deprived of life, likewise also insensitive and irrational things, insofar as they have received, are good. 48 God knows evil as good, just as he knows fornication as desire and friendship and union. And with him the causes of evils are also powers that do good; often from fornication vessels of election have come to be. 49 If evil is wickedness, punishment which banishes it is good. For fornication is evil, not chastisement; for punishment is not evil, but making oneself worthy of punishment. 50 If evil is eternal and creates and has power and exists and acts, from where does it have these things? Either from the good or to the good from the evil or both from another cause, because evil also subsists alongside the good and because it makes good both evils and its own privation. For friendship, being good, makes fornication appear good, because in the good even that which is not somehow strives to be. For God is said not to be according to the transcendent abstraction from all things. 51 That nature itself puts forward one principle, number itself shows, not beginning from two, but from one. If, therefore, the principle of number is the unit, the principle of beings is also one. 52 If evil is not entirely without communion with the good, but the good is being, evil is non-being; for two beings have communion in being. If the good is substance, evil is unsubstantial; for two substances have communion in being substances. 53 If evil is unmoved from the beginning, motion is good and motionlessness evil. From where, then, did evil get motion? Life is good and motion and was always and is in the good, and the good is living and was. Death, as you say, is evil and motionlessness and corruption and deadness and no less non-existence. But evil was death, as you say. Therefore, just as the good is life and living, evil is death and deadness and having been put to death. From where, then, did it come back to life and was it moved? If from itself, life is from evil, which is impossible; for corruption does not give life. But if from the good, the good is not good, having become the cause of life and motion for evil. And why, foreknowing the evils that would come from it, did he give it life? 54 Evil, insofar as it is evil, is without communion with, contrary to, and an enemy of the good, but the desire for the good is good. How, then, did that which is supremely evil desire the good? 55 Evil is motionless and rather corruption and not generation. How then did evil, lifeless and senseless, put forth its own projections? How then does it perceive the good and

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47 Ἐποίησεν οὖν ὁ θεὸς τὰ πάντα καλὰ λίαν ἕκαστον κατὰ τὴν ἰδίαν φύσιν, καθὼς ἠθέλησεν· οὐ γὰρ ὑπόκειται νόμῳ, ἀλλ', ὅπερ θέλει, τοῦτό ἐστιν ἀγαθόν, οὐχ ὅπερ ἡμεῖς κρίνομεν. Οὐ γάρ ἐσμεν ἡμεῖς κριταὶ τοῦ θεοῦ, ἀλλ', ὥσπερ ἐκ τοῦ ἡλίου ἤτοι τοῦ πυρὸς πᾶν φῶς φωτίζεται, οὕτως ἐκ τοῦ θελήματος τοῦ θεοῦ πᾶν ἀγαθὸν ὁρίζεται. Εἰ γὰρ λέγεις, ὅτι καλῶς ἐποίησεν ὁ θεὸς ἐν τούτῳ καὶ κακῶς ἐν τούτῳ καί, διὰ τί ἐποίησε τοῦτο καὶ διὰ τί οὐκ ἐποίησε τοῦτο, σὺ κριτὴς εἶ τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ μείζων αὐτοῦ καὶ σοφώτερος. Ἐξουσίαν οὖν ἔχει ὡς θεὸς ποιῆσαι, ὅπερ θέλει, καὶ τοῦτό ἐστιν ἀγαθόν, καὶ ἐξουσίαν ἔχει, ὧν ποιεῖ, ἃς θέλει, αἰτίας ἀποκαλύψαι ἡμῖν καί, ἃς θέλει, ἀποκρύψαι. Ἕκαστον δὲ τῶν γενομένων λογικῶν ἀγαθῶν ἑκουσίως ἢ ἐνέμεινεν τῷ ἀγαθῷ, ὡς ἐκτίσθη, ἢ ἑκουσίως ἐτράπη καὶ ἀπεφοίτησε τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ ἀπώλεσεν αὐτό. Ἀγαθὸν μὲν γάρ ἐστι τάξις ἀρίστη ἑκάστῳ τὸ κατὰ φύσιν οἰκεῖον διασῴζουσα-ταυτὸν δέ ἐστι καὶ ἀρετή-, κακία δὲ ἡ τῆς τάξεως λύσις εἴτουν ἀταξία. Τὰ ὄντα πάντα, καθόσον ἔστι, καὶ ἀγαθά ἐστι καὶ ἐκ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, καθόσον δὲ ἐστέρηται τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, οὔτε ἀγαθὰ οὔτε ὄντα ἐστί. Τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἄζωα, καθόσον οὐκ ἔσχεν ἐκ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ζωήν, ἄζωά ἐστιν ὡς ἐστερημένα ζωῆς, ὁμοίως καὶ τὰ ἀναίσθητα καὶ τὰ ἄλογα, καθόσον ἔσχεν, ἀγαθά ἐστιν. 48 Οἶδεν ὁ θεὸς τὸ κακὸν ὡς ἀγαθόν, ὥσπερ τὴν πορνείαν οἶδεν ὡς ἔφεσιν καὶ φιλίαν καὶ ἕνωσιν. Καὶ παρ' αὐτῷ καὶ αἱ αἰτίαι τῶν κακῶν δυνάμεις ἀγαθοποιοί· πολλάκις ἐκ πορνείας γεγένηνται σκεύη ἐκλογῆς. 49 Εἰ κακὸν ἡ κακία, καλὸν ἡ κόλασις τοῦτο ἐξορίζουσα. Κακὸν γὰρ ἡ πορνεία, οὐχ ὁ σωφρονισμός· οὐ γὰρ ἡ κόλασις κακή, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἄξιον ἑαυτὸν ποιῆσαι κολάσεως. 50 Εἰ τὸ κακὸν ἀίδιον καὶ δημιουργεῖ καὶ δύναται καὶ ἔστι καὶ δρᾷ, πόθεν αὐτῷ ταῦτα; Ἢ ἐκ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἢ τῷ ἀγαθῷ ἐκ τοῦ κακοῦ ἢ ἀμφοῖν ἐξ ἄλλης αἰτίας, ὅτι καὶ τὸ κακὸν ἐν τῷ ἀγαθῷ παρυφίσταται καὶ ὅτι ἀγαθύνει καὶ τὰ κακὰ καὶ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ στέρησιν. Ἡ γὰρ φιλία ἀγαθὴ οὖσα ἀγαθὸν ποιεῖ φανῆναι τὴν πορνείαν, ὅτι ἐν τῷ ἀγαθῷ φιλονεικεῖ πως καὶ τὸ μὴ ὂν εἶναι. Μὴ εἶναι γὰρ λέγεται ὁ θεὸς κατὰ τὴν πάντων ὑπεροχικὴν ἀφαίρεσιν. 51 Ὅτι δὲ ἡ φύσις αὐτὴ τὴν ἀρχὴν μίαν προβάλλεται, δηλοῖ αὐτὸς ὁ ἀριθμὸς οὐκ ἀπὸ δύο ἀρχόμενος, ἀλλ' ἀπὸ μιᾶς. Εἰ οὖν ἀρχὴ ἀριθμοῦ μονάς, καὶ ἀρχὴ τῶν ὄντων μία. 52 Εἰ μὴ πάντη ἀκοινώνητον τῷ ἀγαθῷ τὸ κακόν, τὸ δὲ ἀγαθὸν ὄν, τὸ κακὸν οὐκ ὄν· δύο γὰρ ὄντα κατὰ τὸ εἶναι κοινωνοῦσιν. Εἰ οὐσία τὸ ἀγαθόν, ἀνούσιον τὸ κακόν· δύο γὰρ οὐσίαι κατὰ τὸ εἶναι οὐσίας κοινωνοῦσιν. 53 Εἰ ἀκίνητον ἐξ ἀρχῆς τὸ κακόν, καλὸν ἡ κίνησις καὶ ἡ ἀκινησία κακόν. Πόθεν οὖν ἔσχε τὸ κακὸν τὴν κίνησιν; Ἡ ζωὴ ἀγαθὸν καὶ κίνησις καὶ ἦν ἀεὶ καὶ ἔστιν ἐν τῷ ἀγαθῷ, καὶ ζῶν ἐστι καὶ ἦν ὁ ἀγαθός. Ὁ θάνατος, ὥς φατε, κακὸν καὶ ἀκινησία καὶ φθορὰ καὶ νέκρωσις καὶ οὐδὲν ἧττον ἀνυπαρξία. Θάνατος δὲ ἦν ἡ κακία, ὡς ὑμεῖς λέγετε. Ὥσπερ οὖν ζωὴ καὶ ζῶν ὁ ἀγαθός, θάνατος καὶ νέκρωσις καὶ νενεκρωμένον τὸ κακόν. Πόθεν οὖν ἀνέζησε καὶ ἐκινήθη; Εἰ μὲν ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ, ἐκ τοῦ κακοῦ ζωή, ὅπερ ἀμήχανον· ἡ φθορὰ γὰρ οὐ ζωοποιεῖ. Εἰ δὲ ἐκ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, οὐκ ἀγαθὸν τὸ ἀγαθὸν τῷ κακῷ ζωῆς καὶ κινήσεως γεγονὸς αἴτιον. Καὶ διὰ τί προειδὼς τὰ ἐξ αὐτοῦ ἐσόμενα κακὰ ἐζωοποίησεν αὐτόν; 54 Τὸ κακόν, καθό ἐστι κακόν, τῷ ἀγαθῷ καὶ ἀκοινώνητον καὶ ἐναντίον καὶ ἐχθρόν, ἡ δὲ ἐπιθυμία τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἀγαθόν. Πῶς οὖν τὸ ἄκρως κακὸν ἐπεθύμησε τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ; 55 Ἡ κακία ἀκίνητος καὶ φθορὰ μᾶλλον καὶ οὐ γένεσις. Πῶς οὖν προεβάλετο τὰ ἑαυτῆς προβλήματα ἡ κακία ἄζωος καὶ ἀναίσθητος; Πῶς οὖν αἰσθάνεται τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ