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and why it perishes, and why 2.13 it is." Then after recounting many such things, he added: "I will tell you sufficient proof. For I, concerning things I formerly knew clearly, as it seemed at least to myself and to others, have been so completely blinded by this inquiry that I have unlearned even what I previously thought 2.14 I knew." And again, accusing the strife of the philosophers, Plato recounts the following in the Theaetetus: "But if you ask one of them, they draw out, as if from a quiver, enigmatic little sayings that cause pain, and if you seek to get an account of what they have said, you will be struck by another newly-coined phrase. And you will never accomplish anything with any of them, nor they with one another; but they take very good care to allow nothing to be stable, either in argument or in their own souls, believing, as it seems to me, that this very thing is a state of rest; and this they war against completely and, as far as they are able, from every direction. Perhaps, Theodorus, you have seen the men fighting, but you have not been with them when they are at peace; for they are not your companions. But I think they say these things at their leisure to their disciples, whom they wish to make like themselves. What disciples, you strange man? Among such men, one does not become the disciple of another, but they spring up of their own accord, each of them becoming inspired wherever he may happen to be, and one thinks the other knows nothing." And after a 2.15 few things, again: "I nearly forgot, Theodorus, that others have declared the opposite of these things, such as that 'unmoved is the name for the all,' and whatever Melissus and Parmenides, in opposition to all these, 2.16 maintain." And indeed in the Sophist he again makes these accusations against them, not an apostle nor a prophet, but the first of philosophers, whether one would wish to say Plato the son of Ariston, or Socrates the son of Sophroniscus. For the 2.17 thoughts are Socrates', but the writings are Plato's. Whether it was this one or that one, he says thus: "Each one of them seems to me to be telling a story to us as if we were children. One says that beings are three, and that some of them sometimes war with each other in some way, and at other times become friends and bring about marriages and births and nourishment for their offspring. Another, speaking of two—wet and dry, or hot and cold—makes them dwell together and gives them in marriage. And the Eleatic tribe among us, beginning from Xenophanes and even earlier, narrates its myths on the assumption that what are called all things are one. And indeed, some Sicilian Muses later realized that it is safer to combine both and to say that Being is both many and one, and is held together by strife and friendship." And after saying some such things in succession, 2.18 he adds: "And indeed there seems to be a sort of battle of giants among them because of their dispute with one another concerning being. How so? Some of them drag everything down from heaven and the unseen to earth, literally grasping rocks and oak trees with their hands. For, grasping all such things, they strongly maintain that only that which offers some impact and contact exists, defining body and being as the same thing." 2.19 These things were not alleged against your philosophers by our Peter or Paul, but by Plato, the most eloquent, and Socrates, who according to the Pythian oracle was the wisest of all men; and they said that they maintained that only that which offers some impact and contact exists, and that body and being are defined as the same thing, 2. and to imagine nothing beyond what is seen. How then could anyone use these as guides to the truth, who have endured so great and such an error, and have given birth to contrary opinions, and have fanned a fierce war against one another? and Timon of Phlius, the companion of Pyrrho, satirized them in his Silloi; and I will mention a few things out of very many: wretched men, vile reproaches, mere bellies, you are filled with such strifes and conjectures, men, wineskins full of empty conceit. 2.21 So it is not only we who have said that the affliction of conceit is added to you; for long ago and very long ago Timon made this accusation against your philosophers. For it is one thing to know, and another to think one knows, while knowing nothing. For by far
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καὶ διὰ τί ἀπόλλυται, καὶ διὰ τί 2.13 ἔστιν." Εἶτα πολλὰ τοιαῦτα διεξελθών, ἐπήγαγεν· "Τεκμήριον δέ σοι ἐρῶ ἱκανόν. Ἐγὼ γάρ, ἃ καὶ πρότερον σαφῶς ἠπιστάμην ὥς γε ἐμαυτῷ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐδόκουν, ὑπὸ ταύτης τῆς σκέψεως οὕτω σφόδρα διετυφλώθην, ὥστ' ἀπέμαθον καὶ ἃ πρὸ τοῦ ᾤμην 2.14 εἰδέναι." Καὶ αὖθις δέ, τῆς τῶν φιλοσόφων κατηγορῶν ἔριδος, τοιάδε ὁ Πλάτων ἐν τῷ Θεαιτήτῳ διέξεισιν· "Ἀλλ' ἄν τινα ἔρῃ, ὥσπερ ἐκ φαρέτρας ῥηματίσκια αἰνιγμάτων ἀνασπῶντες πονοῦσι, καὶ ἂν τούτου ζητῇς λόγον λαβεῖν τί εἰρήκασιν, ἑτέρῳ πεπλήξῃ καινῶς μετωνομασμένῳ. Περανεῖς δὲ οὐδέποτε οὐδὲν πρὸς οὐδένα αὐτῶν· οὐδέ γε ἐκεῖνοι πρὸς ἀλλήλους, ἀλλ' εὖ πάνυ φυλάξουσι τὸ μηδὲν βέβαιον ἐᾶν εἶναι, μήτε ἐν λόγῳ μήτε ἐν ταῖς αὑτῶν ψυχαῖς, ἡγούμενοι, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, αὐτὸ στάσι μον εἶναι· τούτῳ δὲ πάνυ πολεμοῦσι καὶ καθόσον ἂν δύνωνται πανταχόθεν· Ἴσως, ὦ Θεόδωρε, τοὺς ἄνδρας μαχομένους ἑώρα κας, εἰρηνεύουσι δὲ οὐ ξυγγέγονας· οὐ γάρ σοι ἑταῖροί εἰσιν· ἀλλ' οἶμαι ταῦτα τοῖς μαθηταῖς ἐπὶ σχολῆς φράζουσιν, οὓς ἂν βούλωνται ὁμοίους αὐτοῖς ποιῆσαι. Ποίοις μαθηταῖς, ὦ δαι μόνιε; οὐδὲ γίνεται τῶν τοιούτων ἕτερος ἑτέρου μαθητής, ἀλλ' αὐτόματοι ἀναφύονται ὁπόθεν ἂν τύχῃ ἕκαστος αὐτῶν ἐνθουσιά σας, καὶ τὸν ἕτερον ὁ ἕτερος οὐδὲν ἡγεῖται εἰδέναι." Καὶ μετ' 2.15 ὀλίγα πάλιν· "Ὀλίγου δ' ἐπελαθόμην, ὦ Θεόδωρε, ὅτι ἄλλοι αὖ τἀναντία τούτοις ἀπεφήναντο, οἷον ἀκίνητον τελέθει τῷ παντὶ ὄνομ' εἶναι, καὶ ὅσα Μέλισσοί τε καὶ Παρμενίδαι ἐναντιούμενοι πᾶσι τού 2.16 τοις διϊσχυρίζονται." Καὶ μέντοι κἀν τῷ Σοφιστῇ τὰ τοιαῦτα πάλιν αὐτῶν κατηγορεῖ, οὐκ ἀπόστολος οὐδέ γε προφήτης, ἀλλὰ τῶν φιλοσόφων ὁ πρῶτος, εἴτε Πλάτωνα τὸν Ἀρίστωνος ἐθέλοι τις λέγειν, εἴτε Σωκράτην τὸν Σωφρονίσκου· Σωκράτους μὲν 2.17 γὰρ τὰ ἐνθυμήματα, Πλάτωνος δὲ τὰ ξυγγράμματα. Εἴτε δὲ οὗτος, εἴτε ἐκεῖνος, οὕτω φησίν· "Μῦθόν τινα ἕκαστος φαίνεταί μοι διηγεῖσθαι παισὶν ὡς οὖσιν ἡμῖν· ὁ μέν, ὡς τρία τὰ ὄντα· πολεμεῖ δὲ ἀλλήλοις ἐνίοτε αὐτῶν ἄττα πῃ, τοτὲ δὲ καὶ φίλα γινόμενα, γάμους τε καὶ τόκους καὶ τροφὴν ἐκγόνων παρέχεται· δύο δὲ ἕτερος εἰπών, ὑγρὸν καὶ ξηρόν, ἢ θερμὸν καὶ ψυχρόν, ξυνοικίζει τε αὐτὰ καὶ ἐκδίδωσιν. Τὸ δὲ παρ' ἡμῖν Ἐλεατικὸν ἔθνος ἀπὸ Ξενοφάνους τε καὶ ἔτι πρόσθεν ἄρχεται, ὡς ἑνὸς ὄντος τῶν ἁπάντων καλουμένων διεξέρχεται τοὺς μύθους. Ἤδη δὲ καὶ Σικελικαί τινες Μοῦσαι ξυνενόησαν ὅτι ξυμπλέκειν ἀσφαλέ στερον ἀμφότερα καὶ λέγειν ὡς τὸ ὂν πολλά τε καὶ ἕν ἐστιν, ἔχθρᾳ δὲ καὶ φιλίᾳ ξυνέχεται." Καὶ τοιαῦτα ἄττα ἐφεξῆς εἰπών, 2.18 ἐπάγει· "Καὶ μὴν ἔοικέ γε ἐν αὐτοῖς οἷον γιγαντομαχία τις εἶναι διὰ τὴν ἀμφισβήτησιν περὶ τῆς οὐσίας πρὸς ἀλλήλους. Πῶς; Οἱ μὲν εἰς γῆν ἐξ οὐρανοῦ καὶ περὶ τοῦ ἀοράτου πάντα ἕλκουσι, ταῖς χερσὶν ἀτεχνῶς πέτρας καὶ δρῦς λαβόντες. Τῶν γὰρ τοιούτων ἐφαπτόμενοι πάντων, σφόδρα διϊσχυρίζονται τοῦτο εἶναι μόνον, ὅπερ ἔχει προσβολὴν καὶ ἐπαφήν τινα, ταὐτὸν σῶμα καὶ οὐσίαν ὁριζόμενοι." 2.19 Ταῦτα οὐ Πέτρος ὁ ἡμέτερος οὐδὲ Παῦλος τῶν ὑμετέρων κατηγόρησε φιλοσόφων, ἀλλὰ Πλάτων ὁ εὐγλωττότατος καὶ Σωκράτης ὁ κατὰ τὴν Πυθίαν ἀνδρῶν ἁπάντων σοφώτατος· καὶ ἔφασαν αὐτοὺς διϊσχυρίζεσθαι, τοῦτο εἶναι μόνον, ὅπερ ἔχει προσ βολὴν καὶ ἐπαφήν τινα, καὶ ταὐτὸν σῶμα καὶ οὐσίαν ὁρίζεσθαι 2. καὶ μηδὲν περαιτέρω τῶν ὁρωμένων φαντάζεσθαι. Πῶς οὖν ἄν τις τούτοις χρήσαιτο ποδηγοῖς τῆς ἀληθείας, τοσοῦτον δὴ καὶ τοιοῦ τον ὑπομείνασι πλάνον καὶ ἐναντίας γε ὠδίνασι δόξας καὶ σφοδρὸν κατ' ἀλλήλων ἀναρριπίσασι πόλεμον; καὶ Τίμων δὲ αὐτοὺς ὁ Φλιάσιος, ὁ Πύρρωνος ἑταῖρος, ἐν τοῖς σίλλοις ἐτραγῴδησεν· ἐγὼ δὲ ἐκ μάλα πολλῶν ὀλίγων μνησθήσομαι· σχέτλιοι ἄνθρωποι, κάκ' ἐλέγχεα, γαστέρες οἶον, τοίων ἔκ τ' ἐρίδων ἔκ τε στοχασμῶν πέπλησθε, ἄνθρωποι, κενεῆς οἰήσιος ἔμπλεοι ἀσκοί. 2.21 Οὐ μόνον ἄρα ἡμεῖς τὸ τῆς οἰήσεως ἐπιπροσθεῖν ὑμῖν εἰρήκα μεν πάθος· πάλαι γὰρ καὶ πρόπαλαι ταύτην ὁ Τίμων τῶν ὑμε τέρων φιλοσόφων τὴν κατηγορίαν πεποίηται. Ἄλλο δέ ἐστιν εἰδέναι, καὶ ἄλλο τὸ οἴεσθαι εἰδέναι, μηδὲν ἐπιστάμενον. Πολλῷ γάρ τινι