LECTURE 10 (188 a 19-189 a 10)

THE OPINIONS OF THE ANCIENTS CONCERNING THE CONTRARIETY OF THE FIRST PRINCIPLES

             75. Having set forth the opinions of the ancient philosophers concerning the principles of nature, Aristotle here begins to seek the truth.

             He seeks it first by way of disputation, proceeding from probable opinions. Secondly, where he says, 'We will now give . . .' (189 b 30), he determines the truth demonstratively.

             Concerning the first part he makes two points. First he investigates the contrariety of the principles, secondly, where he says, 'The next question is . . .' (189 a 11), he inquires about their number.

             Concerning the first part he makes three points. First he sets forth the opinion of the ancients about the contrariety of the principles. Secondly, where he says, 'And with good reason . . .' (188 a 27), he gives an argument in favour of this position. Thirdly he shows how the philosophers are related to each other in saying that the principles are contraries. He does this where he says, 'Up to this point . . .' (188 b 27).

             76. He says, therefore, first that all of the ancient philosophers posited contrariety in the principles. And he makes this clear by citing three opinions of the philosophers.

             For some philosophers have said that the whole universe is one immobile being. Of these, Parmenides said that all things are one according to reason, but many according to sense. And to the extent that there are many, he posited in them contrary principles, e.g., the hot and the cold. He attributed the hot to fire and the cold to earth.

             Secondly there was the opinion of the natural philosophers who posited one material and mobile principle. They said that other things come to be from this principle according to rarity and density. Thus they held that the rare and the dense are principles.

             A third opinion was advanced by those who posited many principles. Among them, Democritus held that all things come to be from indivisible bodies which are joined together. And in this contact with each other they left a sort of void. Such voids he called pores, as is clear in De Generatione, I. Therefore he held that all bodies are composed of the fixed and the empty, that is, composed of the plenum and the void. Hence he said that the plenum and the void are principles of nature. But he associated the plenum with being and the void with non-being. And although all of these indivisible bodies are one in nature, he said that different things are composed of them according to a diversity of figure, position, and order. Thus he held that the principles are contraries in the genus of position, i.e., above and below, before and behind, and also contraries in the genus of figure, i.e., the straight, the angular, and the circular. The principles also are contraries in the genus of order, i.e., prior and posterior. (These last contraries are not mentioned in the text because they are obvious.) And thus Aristotle concludes, by a sort of induction, that all of the philosophers held that the principles are contraries in some way. He makes no mention of the opinion of Anaxagoras and Empedocles because he has already explained their position at length above. However, they also placed a certain contrariety in the principles when they said that all things come to be through joining and separating, which agree in genus with the rare and the dense.

             77. Next where he says, 'And with good reason' (188 a 27), he gives a probable argument to show that the first principles are contraries. The argument is as follows.

             Three things seem to belong to the very nature of principles. First, they are not from other things. Secondly, they are not from each other. Thirdly, all other things are from them. But these three notes are found in the primary contraries. Therefore the primary contraries are principles.

             Now in order to understand what he means when he speaks of primary contraries, we must realize that some contraries are caused by other contraries, e.g., the sweet and the bitter are caused by the wet and the dry and the hot and the cold. Since, however, it is impossible to proceed to infinity, but one must come to certain contraries which are not caused by other contraries, he calls these last contraries the primary contraries.

             Now the three conditions proper to principles mentioned above are found in these primary contraries. For things which are first are manifestly not from others. Moreover things which are contraries are manifestly not from each other. For even though the cold comes to be from the hot, insofar as that which was previously hot is later cold, nevertheless coldness itself never comes to be from heat, as will be pointed out later. The third point--precisely how all things come to be from the contraries--we must investigate more carefully.

             78. Now in order to clarify this latter point he states first that neither action nor passion can occur between things which are contingent in the sense of merely happening to be together, or between things which are contingent in the sense of being indeterminate. Nor does everything come to be from everything, as Anaxagoras said, except perhaps accidentally.

             This is first of all seen clearly in simple things. For white does not come to be from musical except accidentally insofar as white or black happen to be in the musical. But white comes to be per se from the non-white, and not from just any non-white, but from that non-white which is black or some mean colour. And in like manner, the musical comes to be from the non-musical, and again not from just any non-musical, but from its opposite, which is called the unmusical, i.e., from that which is disposed to be musical but is not, or from some mean between these two. And for the same reason, a thing is not corrupted primarily and per se into just any contingent thing (e.g., the white into the musical) except accidentally. Rather white is corrupted per se into the non-white, and not into just any non-white, but into black or some mean colour. And he says the same of the corruption of the musical and of other similar things. The reason for this is as follows. Whatever comes to be or is corrupted does not exist before it comes to be and does not exist after it is corrupted. Whence it is necessary that that which a thing comes to be per se and that into which a thing is corrupted per se be such that it includes in its nature [ratio] the non-being of that which comes to be or is corrupted.

             And he shows that the same is true of composite things. He says that the situation is the same with composite things as with simple things, but is more hidden in composite things because the opposites of composite things have no names, as do the opposites of simple things. For the opposite of house has no name, although we give a name to the opposite of white. Hence if the composite is reduced to something with a name, it will be clear. For every composite consists of a certain harmony. Now the harmonious comes to be from the inharmonious, and the inharmonious from the harmonious. And in like manner, the harmonious is corrupted into the inharmonious (not any inharmonious, but the opposite). However, we can speak of the harmonious according to order alone, or according to composition. For some wholes consist of a harmony of order, e.g., an army; and other wholes consist of a harmony of composition, e.g., a house. And the nature [ratio] of each of these is the same. It is also clear that all composites come to be from the non-composed, for example, a house comes to be from non-composed things, and the figured from the non-figured. And in all such things nothing is involved except order and composition.

             Thus it is clear by induction, as it were, that everything which comes to be or is corrupted comes to be from contraries or from some intermediate between them, or is corrupted into them. Moreover, intermediates between contraries come to be from the contraries, as the intermediate colours come to be from black and white. Hence he concludes that whatever comes to be according to nature is either a contrary, such as white and black, or comes to be from the contraries, such as the intermediates between the contraries.

             This, then, is the principal conclusion which he intended to draw, namely, that all things come to be from contraries, which was the third characteristic of principles.

             79. Next where he says, 'Up to this point . . .' (188 b 27), Aristotle shows how the philosophers are related in holding that the principles are contraries. First he shows how they are related with reference to being moved toward this position. Secondly, where he says, 'They differ, however . . .' (188 b 30), he shows how they are related in respect to the position itself.

             He says, therefore, as was pointed out above, that many of the philosophers followed the truth to the point where they held that the principles are contraries. Although they indeed held this position, they did not hold it as though moved by reason, but rather as forced to it by the truth itself. For truth is the good of the intellect, toward which the intellect is naturally ordered. Hence as things which lack knowledge are moved to their ends without reason [ratio], so, at times, the intellect of man, by a sort of natural inclination, tends toward the truth, though it does not perceive the reason [ratio] for the truth.

             80. Next where he says, 'They differ, however, . . .' (188 b 30), he shows how the aforesaid philosophers are related in respect to the position itself.

             Concerning this he makes two points. First he shows how they differ in holding that the principles are contraries. Secondly, where he says, 'Hence their principles . . .' (188 b 37), he shows how they both differ and agree.

             He says, therefore, first that the philosophers who held that the principles are contraries differed in two ways. First, those who argued reasonably held that the principles are the primary contraries. Others, however, considering the matter less well, held that the principles are posterior [derived] contraries.

             And of those who appealed to the primary contraries, some considered those contraries which were better known to reason, others those contraries which were better known to sense.

             Or it could be said that this second difference explains the first. For those things which are better known to reason are prior simply, whereas those things which are better known to sense are posterior simply, and are prior relative to us. However, it is clear that the principles must be prior. Thus, those who judged 'prior' according to what is better known to reason held that the principles are those contraries which are prior simply. On the other hand, those who judged 'prior' according to what is better known to sense held that the principles are those contraries which are posterior simply. Hence some held that the hot and the cold are first principles; others, the wet and the dry. And both of these are better known to sense. However the hot and the cold, which are active qualities, are prior to the wet and the dry, which are passive qualities, because the active is naturally prior to the passive.

             Others, however, held principles which are better known to reason.

             Among these, some held that the equal and the unequal are the principles. For example, the Pythagoreans, thinking that the substance of all things is numbers, held that all things are composed of the equal and the unequal as of form and matter. For they attributed infinity and otherness to the equal because of its divisibility. Whereas to the unequal they attributed finiteness and identity because of its indivisibility.

             Others, however, held that the cause of generation and corruption is strife and friendship, that is, the cycles of Empedocles, which are also better known to reason. Whence it is clear that the diversity mentioned above appears in these positions.

             81. Next where he says, 'Hence their principles . . .' (188 b 37), he shows how there is also a certain agreement within the differences of the aforementioned positions. He concludes from what he has said above that the ancient philosophers in a way called the same things principles and in a way called different things principles. For they differed insofar as different philosophers assumed different contraries (as was said above ; yet they are the same insofar as their principles were alike according to analogy, i.e., proportion. For the principles taken by all of them have the same proportion.

             And this is true in three respects. First, all the principles which they assumed are related as contraries. And thus Aristotle says that they all took their principles from the same columns, i.e., columns of contraries. For they all took contraries as their principles, even though the contraries differed. Nor is it remarkable that they took different principles from the columns of contraries. For among the contraries, some are containers, as the prior and more common; and others are contained, as the posterior and less common. Hence one way in which they spoke alike is that all of them took their principles from the order of contraries.

             Another way in which they agree according to analogy is as follows. No matter what principles they accepted, one of these principles is better, and the other is worse. For example, friendship, or the plenum, or the hot, are better; but strife, or the void, or the cold, are worse. And the same thing is true of the other pairs of contraries. This is so because one of the contraries always has privation joined to it. For the source of contrariety is the opposition of privation and habit, as is said in Metaphysics, X.

             Thirdly they agree according to analogy by reason of the fact that they all took principles which are better known. But some took principles which are better known to reason, others those which are better known to sense. Since reason treats the universal and sense treats the particular, universals (such as the great and the small) are better known to reason, whereas singulars (such as the rare and the dense, which are less common) are better known to sense.

             Then as a final summary, he concludes with that which he had uppermost in mind, namely, the principles are contraries.