Chapter XIV.—The Resurrection Does Not Rest Solely on the Fact of a Future Judgment.

The proof5    [This chapter of itself establishes the fact that Christians have a right to demand the evidence for what they are required to believe. It refutes the idea that what any single bishop or saint has said or thought is doctrine, for that reason only; but it leaves the fact that concurrent testimony is evidence, on certain conditions, in all its force.] of the several doctrines of which the truth consists, or of any matter whatsoever proposed for examination, if it is to produce an unwavering confidence in what is said, must begin, not from anything without, nor from what certain persons think or have thought,6    [Not strong enough for the force of the original: ουδ᾽ ἐκ τῶν τισί δοκοὐντων ῆ δεδογμένων.] but from the common and natural notion7    [From the natural common sense of the thing.] of the matter, or from the connection of secondary truths with primary ones. For the question relates either to primary beliefs, and then all that is necessary is reminiscence, so as to stir up the natural notion; or to things which naturally follow from the first and to their natural sequence. And in these things we must observe order, showing what strictly follows from the first truths, or from those which are placed first, so as neither to be unmindful of the truth, or of our certainty respecting it, nor to confound the things arranged by nature and distinguished from each other, or break up the natural order. Hence I think it behoves those who desire to handle the subject with fairness, and who wish to form an intelligent judgment whether there is a resurrection or not, first to consider attentively the force of the arguments contributing to the proof of this, and what place each of them holds—which is first, which second, which third, and which last. And in the arrangement of these they should place first the cause of the creation of men,—namely, the purpose of the Creator in making man; and then connect with this, as is suitable, the nature of the men so created; not as being second in order, but because we are unable to pass our judgment on both at the same time, although they have the closest natural connection with each other, and are of equal force in reference to the subject before us. But while from these proofs as the primary ones, and as being derived from the work of creation, the resurrection is clearly demonstrated, none the less can we gain conviction respecting it from the arguments taken from providence,—I mean from the reward or punishment due to each man in accordance with just judgment, and from the end of human existence. For many, in discussing the subject of the resurrection, have rested the whole cause on the third argument alone, deeming that the cause of the resurrection is the judgment. But the fallacy of this is very clearly shown, from the fact that, although all human beings who die rise again, yet not all who rise again are to be judged: for if only a just judgment were the cause of the resurrection, it would of course follow that those who had done neither evil nor good—namely, very young children8    [A beautiful and cogent argument for his proposition, and a precious testimony to the innocence of babes falling asleep in Christ. See Kaye, 190.]—would not rise again; but seeing that all are to rise again, those who have died in infancy as well as others, they too justify our conclusion that the resurrection takes place not for the sake of the judgment as the primary reason, but in consequence of the purpose of God in forming men, and the nature of the beings so formed.

Ἡ τῶν τῆς ἀληθείας δογμάτων ἢ τῶν ὁπωσοῦν εἰς ἐξέτασιν προβαλλομένων ἀπόδειξις τὴν ἀπλανῆ τοῖς λεγομένοις ἐπιφέρουσα πίστιν οὐκ ἔξωθέν ποθεν ἔχει τὴν ἀρχὴν οὐδ' ἐκ τῶν τισι δοκούντων ἢ δεδογμένων, ἀλλ' ἐκ τῆς κοινῆς καὶ φυσικῆς ἐννοίας ἢ τῆς πρὸς τὰ πρῶτα τῶν δευτέρων ἀκολουθίας. ἢ γὰρ περὶ τῶν πρώτων ἐστὶ δογμάτων καὶ δεῖ μόνης ὑπομνήσεως τῆς τὴν φυσικὴν ἀνακινούσης ἔννοιαν ἢ περὶ τῶν κατὰ φύσιν ἑπομένων τοῖς πρώτοις καὶ τῆς φυσικῆς ἀκολουθίας καὶ δεῖ τῆς ἐπὶ τούτοις τάξεως, δεικνύντας τί τοῖς πρώτοις ἢ τοῖς προτεταγμένοις ἀκολουθεῖ κατ' ἀλήθειαν, ἐπὶ τῷ μήτε τῆς ἀληθείας ἢ τῆς κατ' αὐτὴν ἀσφαλείας ἀμελεῖν μήτε τὰ τῇ φύσει τεταγμένα καὶ διωρισμένα συγχεῖν ἢ τὸν φυσικὸν εἱρμὸν διασπᾶν. ὅθεν, οἶμαι, [χρῆν] δίκαιον περὶ τῶν προκειμένων ἐσπουδακότας καὶ κρίνειν ἐμφρόνως θέλοντας εἴτε γίνεται τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων σωμάτων ἀνάστασις εἴτε μή, πρῶτον μὲν ἐπισκοπεῖν καλῶς τῶν πρὸς τὴν τοῦδε δεῖξιν συντελούντων τὴν δύναμιν καὶ ποίαν ἕκαστον εἴληχεν χώραν καὶ τί μὲν τούτων πρῶτον τί δὲ δεύτερον ἢ τρίτον τί δ' ἐπὶ τούτοις ὕστατον· ταῦτα δὲ διαταξαμένους χρὴ πρώτην μὲν τάξαι τὴν αἰτίαν τῆς τῶν ἀνθρώπων γενέσεως, τοῦτ' ἔστιν τὴν τοῦ δημιουργήσαντος γνώμην καθ' ἣν ἐποίησεν ἄνθρωπον, ταύτῃ δὲ προσφυῶς ἐπισυνάψαι τὴν τῶν γενομένων ἀνθρώπων φύσιν, οὐχ ὡς τῇ τάξει δευτερεύουσαν, διὰ δὲ τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι κατὰ ταὐτὸν ἀμφοτέρων γενέσθαι τὴν κρίσιν, κἂν ὅτι μάλιστα συνυπάρχωσιν ἀλλήλαις καὶ πρὸς τὸ προκείμενον τὴν ἴσην παρέχωνται δύναμιν. διὰ δὲ τούτων, ὡς πρώτων καὶ τὴν ἐκ δημιουργίας ἐχόντων ἀρχήν, ἐναργῶς δεικνυμένης τῆς ἀναστάσεως, οὐδὲν ἧττον καὶ διὰ τῶν τῆς προνοίας λόγων ἔστι λαβεῖν τὴν περὶ ταύτης πίστιν, λέγω δὲ διὰ τῆς ἑκάστῳ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ὀφειλομένης κατὰ δικαίαν κρίσιν τιμῆς ἢ δίκης καὶ τοῦ κατὰ τὸν ἀνθρώπινον βίον τέλους. πολλοὶ γὰρ τὸν τῆς ἀναστάσεως λόγον διαλαμβάνοντες τῷ τρίτῳ μόνῳ τὴν πᾶσαν ἐπήρεισαν αἰτίαν, νομίσαντες τὴν ἀνάστασιν γίνεσθαι διὰ τὴν κρίσιν. τοῦτο δὲ περιφανῶς δείκνυται ψεῦδος ἐκ τοῦ πάντας μὲν ἀνίστασθαι τοὺς ἀποθνῄσκοντας ἀνθρώπους, μὴ πάντας δὲ κρίνεσθαι τοὺς ἀναστάντας· εἰ γὰρ μόνον τὸ κατὰ τὴν κρίσιν δίκαιον τῆς ἀναστάσεως ἦν αἴτιον, ἐχρῆν δήπου τοὺς μηδὲν ἡμαρτηκότας ἢ κατορθώσαντας μηδ' ἀνίστασθαι, τοῦτ' ἔστι τοὺς κομιδῇ νέους παῖδας· ἐξ ὧν δὲ πάντας ἀνίστασθαι τούς τε ἄλλους καὶ δὴ καὶ τοὺς κατὰ τὴν πρώτην ἡλικίαν τελευτήσαντας καὶ αὐτοὶ δικαιοῦσιν, οὐ διὰ τὴν κρίσιν ἡ ἀνάστασις γίνεται κατὰ πρῶτον λόγον, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὴν τοῦ δημιουργήσαντος γνώμην καὶ τὴν τῶν δημιουργηθέντων φύσιν.