XIV. That the mind is not in a part of the body; wherein also is a distinction of the movements of the body and of the soul56    This is chapter xv. in the Latin version and some Greek mss. The Bodleian ms. of the Latin gives the title:—“That the mind is sometimes in servitude to the body, and of its three differences, vital, spiritual, and rational.”.

1. But we have wandered far from our subject, for the purpose of our argument was to show that the mind is not restricted to any part of the body, but is equally in touch with the whole, producing its motion according to the nature of the part which is under its influence. There are cases, however, in which the mind even follows the bodily impulses, and becomes, as it were, their servant; for often the bodily nature takes the lead by introducing either the sense of that which gives pain or the desire for that which gives pleasure, so that it may be said to furnish the first beginnings, by producing in us the desire for food, or, generally, the impulse towards some pleasant thing; while the mind, receiving such an impulse, furnishes the body by its own intelligence with the proper means towards the desired object. Such a condition, indeed, does not occur in all, save in those of a somewhat slavish disposition, who bring the reason into bondage to the impulses of their nature and pay servile homage to the pleasures of sense by allowing them the alliance of their mind; but in the case of more perfect men this does not happen; for the mind takes the lead, and chooses the expedient course by reason and not by passion, while their nature follows in the tracks of its leader.

2. But since our argument discovered in our vital faculty three different varieties—one which receives nourishment without perception, another which at once receives nourishment and is capable of perception, but is without the reasoning activity, and a third rational, perfect, and co-extensive with the whole faculty—so that among these varieties the advantage belongs to the intellectual,—let no one suppose on this account that in the compound nature of man there are three souls welded together, contemplated each in its own limits, so that one should think man’s nature to be a sort of conglomeration of several souls. The true and perfect soul is naturally one, the intellectual and immaterial, which mingles with our material nature by the agency of the senses; but all that is of material nature, being subject to mutation and alteration, will, if it should partake of the animating power, move by way of growth: if, on the contrary, it should fall away from the vital energy, it will reduce its motion to destruction.

3. Thus, neither is there perception without material substance, nor does the act of perception take place without the intellectual faculty.

ΚΕΦΑΛΑΙΟΝ ΙΔʹ. Ὅτι οὐκ ἐν μέρει τοῦ σώματος ὁ νοῦς. Ἐν ᾧ καὶ διάκρισις τῶν τε σωματικῶν καὶ ψυχικῶν κινημάτων.

Ἀλλὰ πολὺ τῶν προκειμένων ἀπεπλανήθημεν. Δεῖξαι γὰρ ἡμῖν ὁ λόγος προέθετο τὸ, μὴ μέρει τινὶ τοῦ σώματος ἐνδεδέσθαι τὸν νοῦν: ἀλλὰ παντὸς κατὰ τὸ ἴσον ἐφάπτεσθαι, καταλλήλως τῇ φύσει τοῦ ὑποκειμένου μέρους ἐνεργοῦντα τὴν κίνησιν. Ἔστι δὲ ὅπου καὶ ἐπακολουθεῖ ταῖς φυσικαῖς ὁρμαῖς ὁ νοῦς, οἷον ὑπηρέτης γενόμενος. Καθηγεῖται γὰρ πολλάκις ἡ τοῦ σώματος φύσις, καὶ τοῦ λυποῦντος αἴσθησιν ἐντιθεῖσα, καὶ τοῦ εὐφραίνοντος ἐπιθυμίαν, ὥστε ταύτην μὲν τὰς πρώτας παρέχειν ἀρχὰς, ἢ βρώσεως ὄρεξιν, ἤ τινος ὅλως τῶν καθ' ἡδονὴν τὴν ὁρμὴν ἐμποιοῦσαν, τὸν δὲ νοῦν ἐκδεχόμενον τὰς τοιαύτας ὁρμὰς, ταῖς οἰκείαις περινοίαις τὰς πρὸς τὸ ποθούμενον ἀφορμὰς συνεκπορίζειν τῷ σώματι. Τὸ δὲ τοιοῦτον οὐκ ἐπὶ πάντων ἐστὶν, ἀλλὰ μόνων τῶν ἀνδραποδωδέστερον διακειμένων, οἳ δουλώσαντες τὸν λόγον ταῖς ὁρμαῖς τῆς φύσεως, διὰ τῆς τοῦ νοῦ συμμαχίας τὸ κατὰ τὰς αἰσθήσεις ἡδὺ δουλοπρεπῶς κολακεύουσιν. Ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν τελειοτέρων οὐχ οὕτως γίνεται. Καθηγεῖται γὰρ ὁ νοῦς, λόγῳ καὶ οὐχὶ πάθει τὸ λυσιτελὲς προαιρούμενος: ἡ δὲ φύσις κατ' ἴχνος ἕπεται τῷ προκαθηγουμένῳ. Ἐπειδὴ δὲ τρεῖς κατὰ τὴν ζωτικὴν δύναμιν διαφορὰς ὁ λόγος εὗρε, τὴν μὲν τρεφομένην χωρὶς αἰσθήσεως, τὴν δὲ τρεφομένην μὲν καὶ αὐξανομένην, ἀμοιροῦσαν δὲ τῆς λογικῆς ἐνεργείας, τὴν δὲ λογικὴν καὶ τελείαν δι' ἁπάσης διήκουσαν τῆς δυνάμεως, ὡς καὶ ἐν ἐκείναις εἶναι καὶ τῆς νοερᾶς τὸ πλέον ἔχειν: μηδεὶς διὰ τούτων ὑπονοείτω τρεῖς συγκεκροτῆσθαι ψυχὰς ἐν τῷ ἀνθρωπίνῳ συγκρίματι, ἐν ἰδίαις περιγραφαῖς θεωρουμένας, ὥστε συγκρότημά τι πολλῶν ψυχῶν τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην φύσιν εἶναι νομίζειν. Ἀλλ' ἡ μὲν ἀληθής τε καὶ τελεία ψυχὴ, μία τῇ φύσει ἐστὶν, ἡ νοερά τε καὶ ἄϋλος, ἡ διὰ τῶν αἰσθήσεων τῇ ὑλικῇ καταμιγνυμένη φύσει. Τὸ δὲ ὑλῶδες ἅπαν ἐν τροπῇ τε καὶ ἀλλοιώσει κείμενον, εἰ μὲν μετέχοι τῆς ψυχούσης δυνάμεως, κατὰ αὔξησιν κινηθήσεται: εἰ δὲ ἀποπέσοι τῆς ζωτικῆς ἐνεργείας, εἰς φθορὰν ἀναλύσει τὴν κίνησιν. Οὔτε οὖν αἴσθησις χωρὶς ὑλικῆς οὐσίας, οὔτε τῆς νοερᾶς δυνάμεως χωρὶς, αἰσθήσεως ἐνέργεια γίνεται.