second to providence; but if place is ungeneratedly and without beginning what it is and has what it has, then place is ungenerated and first of all things in place, in which are the heaven and the things that appear in heaven. For that without which none of the other things exist, that indeed must be first of the others. 27. From the same argument. For just as, if something is altered, there is this thing which is now white but formerly black (for which reason we say matter is something), so also place seems to exist through some such appearance, except that the former is because what was air is now water, but place is because where the air was, there water is now. If place has the same relation to the things in it that matter has to the things in it through a similar appearance, but place and matter are incomprehensible, then matter is none of the things that are altered and come to be in it, and it is not substance. How then was matter posited to be the substance of things that simply come to be? 28. From the same argument. Every body that is moved either by locomotion or by growth is somewhere in itself, but the heaven, as has been said, is not somewhere at all nor is it in any place, if indeed no body contains it. If what is moved by locomotion is somewhere in itself, and the heaven is moved by locomotion, then it is necessary for the heaven to be somewhere in itself. But if not the second, then not the first; for they are inseparable from each other, and upon the elimination of the one follows the elimination of the other. If the heaven is not in place in itself, how, being moved in circular locomotion, do its upper parts become lower, and its lower parts become upper? And being up and down with respect to its own parts, how is it not false to say that the heaven is not in place? 29. From the same argument. There is no place of a point. Therefore the point is not somewhere, just like what is not; but if this is false, then the point is a being and somewhere. And if somewhere, it must of necessity also have a place. 30. From the same argument. And place is also somewhere, but not as in a place, but as the limit is in the limited. For not every being is in a place, but a movable body. If everything that is in a place is somewhere, and not everything that is somewhere is in a place, then 'somewhere' is more extensive than 'in a place'. How then is it said that 'somewhere' and 'in a place' are of one category, things differing so much from each other, that even place is said to be somewhere, but not in a place? And if the limit of the limited is the place of one limited thing and the limit of another, how is it not necessary for place to always be both place and limit? And if place is before the things in place, how is the necessity not dissolved for place to always be the place of one thing, and the limit of another? And if that which in no way is is not in a place (for it would be somewhere, as he said), how is it not the same thing

προνοίας δεύτερος· εἰ δὲ ἀγενήτως τε καὶ ἀνάρχως ἐστὶν ὁ τόπος ὅ ἐστι καὶ ἔχει ὃ ἔχει, ἀγένητος ἄρα ὁ τόπος καὶ πρῶτος τῶν ἐν τόπῳ πάντων, ἐν οἷς ἐστιν ὁ οὐρανὸς καὶ τὰ ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ φαινόμενα· οὗ γὰρ ἄνευ τῶν ἄλλων οὐδέν ἐστιν, ἐκεῖνο δὴ τῶν ἄλλων ἀνάγκη πρῶτον εἶναι. κζ. Ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ λόγου. Ὡς γάρ, εἰ ἀλλοιοῦται, ἔστι τοῦτο ὃ νῦν μὲν λευκὸν πάλαι δὲ μέλαν (διό φαμεν εἶναί τι τὴν ὕλην), οὕτως καὶ ὁ τόπος διὰ τῆς τοιαύτης τινὸς δοκεῖ εἶναι φαντασίας, πλὴν ἐκεῖνο μὲν διότι ὃ ἦν ἀὴρ τοῦτο νῦν ὕδωρ, ὁ δὲ τόπος ὅτι οὗ ἦν ὁ ἀὴρ ἐνταῦθά ἐστι νῦν ὕδωρ. Eἰ ὃν ἔχει λόγον ὁ τόπος πρὸς τὰ ἐν αὐτῷ, τοῦτον ἔχει ἡ ὕλη πρὸς τὰ ἐν αὐτῇ διὰ τῆς ὁμοίας φαντασίας, ἄληπτος δ' ὁ τόπος καὶ ἡ ὕλη, οὐδὲν ἄρα ἐστὶν ἡ ὕλη τῶν ἐν αὐτῇ ἀλλοιουμένων τε καὶ γιγνομένων καὶ οὐκ οὐσία. Πῶς οὖν ἐτέθη ἡ ὕλη οὐσία εἶναι τῶν ἁπλῶς γιγνομένων; κη. Ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ λόγου. Πᾶν σῶμα ἢ κατὰ φορὰν ἢ κατ' αὔξησιν κινητὸν καθ' αὑτό που, ὁ δὲ οὐρανός, ὥσπερ εἴρηται, οὔ που ὅλως οὐδὲ ἔν τινι τόπῳ ἐστίν, εἴ γε μηδὲν αὐτὸν περιέχει σῶμα. Eἰ τὸ κατὰ φορὰν κινητὸν καθ' αὑτό που, κατὰ φορὰν δὲ κινητὸς ὁ οὐρανός, καὶ καθ' αὑτὸ ἄρα ἀνάγκη εἶναί που τὸν οὐρανόν. Eἰ δὲ μὴ τὸ δεύτερον, οὐδ' ἄρα τὸ πρῶτον· ἀχώριστα γὰρ ἀλλήλων, καὶ τῇ ἀναιρέσει τοῦ θατέρου ἀκο λουθεῖ ἡ τοῦ δευτέρου ἀναίρεσις. Eἰ οὐκ ἔστιν ὁ οὐρανὸς ἐν τόπῳ καθ' αὑτό, πῶς κυκλικὴν φορὰν φερόμενος τῶν μερῶν αὐτοῦ τὰ μὲν ἄνω γίνεται κάτω, τὰ δὲ κάτω γίνεται ἄνω; Ἄνω δὲ καὶ κάτω ὢν τοῖς ἑαυτοῦ μέρεσι, πῶς οὐκ ἔστι ψευδὲς τὸ λέγειν τὸν οὐρανὸν μὴ εἶναι ἐν τόπῳ; κθ. Ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ λόγου. Στιγμῆς οὐκ ἔστιν ὁ τόπος. Oὐκοῦν οὐκ ἔστι ποῦ ἡ στιγμή, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ μὴ ὄν· εἰ δὲ ψευδὲς τοῦτο, ὂν ἄρα ἐστὶν ἡ στιγμὴ καὶ ποῦ. Eἰ δὲ ποῦ, καὶ τόπον αὐτῆς εἶναι ἐξ ἀνάγκης. λ. Ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ λόγου. Καὶ ἔστιν ὁ τόπος καὶ ποῦ, οὐχ ὡς ἐν τόπῳ δέ, ἀλλ' ὡς τὸ πέρας ἐν τῷ πεπερασμένῳ. Oὐ γὰρ ἐν τόπῳ τὸ ὄν, ἀλλὰ τὸ κινητὸν σῶμα. Eἰ πᾶν τὸ ἐν τόπῳ ποῦ ἐστι, καὶ οὐ πᾶν τὸ ποῦ ἐν τόπῳ ἐστί, πλέον ἄρα τὸ ποῦ τοῦ ἐν τόπῳ. Πῶς οὖν μιᾶς κατηγορίας εἶναι λέγεται τὸ ποῦ καὶ τὸ ἐν τόπῳ, τὰ τοσοῦ τον ἀλλήλων διαφέροντα, ὥστε καὶ τὸν τόπον λέγειν εἶναι μὲν ποῦ, οὐκ ἐν τόπῳ δέ; Καὶ εἰ τὸ πέρας τοῦ πεπερασμέ νου, ἑτέρου μὲν πεπερασμένου ἐστὶ τόπος, ἑτέρου δὲ πέρας, πῶς οὐκ ἔστιν ἀνάγκη ἀεὶ τὸν τόπον εἶναι καὶ τόπον καὶ πέρας; Καὶ εἰ πρὸ τῶν ἐν τόπῳ ὁ τόπος ἐστί, πῶς οὐ λέλυται ἡ ἀνάγκη τοῦ ἀεὶ τὸν τόπον εἶναι τόπον μὲν ἄλλου, πέρας δὲ ἄλλου; Καὶ εἰ τὸ μηδαμῶς ὂν οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν τόπῳ (εἴη γὰρ ἄν που, καθὼς εἶπε), πῶς οὐκ ἔστι ταὐτὸν τὸ