OF THE HOLY JUSTIN, PHILOSOPHER AND MARTYR

 power, which is absurd for what is in time is corruptible. But if, being able long ago to prevent so great an evil, he did not prevent it, he would b

 form, but ignorance of God which has spoken the falsehood which is a third form of the greatest evil, resulting for them from the voluntary disobedie

 For, he says, ignorance is often given to men for their good at any rate we see in many cases that it often happens that things known are despised mo

 the religions of the earth differ from the religion that holds the true doctrine simply by falsehood, but from each other in the differences of falseh

 the creator and God ordained the day, on which he makes an abolition of all the evils in the world arising from unbelief and disobedience to God, acco

 to God, the creator of the world, they name the parts of the world, and without the act of creating, they attribute to God the name of creator, so tha

 and in actuality which is absurd. He who remains the same, therefore, has nothing temporal. He makes the world, therefore, always ordering it, and th

 become significant and affirmative of God that all the works of God are temporal with him, it is clear that he absurdly supposed that nothing temporal

 of each other? For 'He has not so much made as He makes' is not a negation of 'to have made', but rather an affirmation of 'He has made'. But clearly,

 the sun in its substance, or according to one act of creation He made its substance and according to another act of creation its motion, and having ma

 Is not God, in respect to the powers He has but according to which He does not act, corruptible according to the judgment of the one who answered? But

 or the denial to be true, how did the respondent posit both for the generation of the world, both the affirmation and the denial, saying it is both cr

 makes different things. Let us not consider God in human terms. For not as we, who previously are one way and later change into another, are said to m

 will. How then is the will the same as the essence, when that which is willed and the will are one thing and another, just as the sensible and sensati

 by essence. But if it is essence, he who wills does not exist, but if it is added to the essence, it is necessarily one thing and another for that wh

 makes of themselves, in the same way also God, being ungenerated, ungeneratedly makes all things, not becoming but co-existing, and by the infinity of

 can. But let us not consider God's creating in a human way. For not as we, who previously are one way, and later changing into another, are said to cr

 of milk, but nature in no way makes substance all at once. How then is the respondent not using an inappropriate example, the working of nature, to re

 For first the simple, but later the composite. Just as God is beyond reproach for the weakness of power, because he did not make more worlds, but havi

 having come to its manifestation, how is it not that in the work of God all the parts of time exist? Fourth Christian question to the Greeks. If it is

 of the known ones of the world he dogmatized its ungeneratedness, nor did he establish this through proof, but only according to his own authority did

 It is clear from this, that the world is not a relative term to the creator insofar as it is an image, nor to the paradigm insofar as it is a creation

 is, he ought also to say that the creation is uncreated, since its creator is uncreated for they necessarily follow one another, the uncreated with t

 kinds, of which it is a common feature for one to be spoken of sometimes in potentiality for what they are called, and sometimes in actuality, while o

 Fifth Christian question to the Hellenes. If heaven is uncreated and God is uncreated and God dwells in heaven, how is God not insulted dwelling in th

 and having made it and to say that the world, without interval, eternally co-exists with God, the world which received its existence from the Creat

 

by essence. But if it is essence, he who wills does not exist, but if it is added to the essence, it is necessarily one thing and another; for that which is and that which is added are not the same. If God wills many things, but many things do not exist, then in God's case to be is not the same as to will. If God is able to make whatever he wills to make, but does not will to make whatever he is able to make, then for him to be is not the same as to will. If God is one and simple and of a single form, but wills many things and does not will many things, for example he wills that beings be many in their variety, but does not will them to be infinite in number, then for him to be is not the same as to will. If God does not make what he is, but makes what he wills, and he wills to make the world, then for him to be is not the same as to will. If uncreated things do not come to be in an uncreated way, then neither does God make uncreated things in an uncreated way; for it is impossible for a made thing to be uncreated. Just as teaching is an activity of the teacher in the one who is learning, so making is an activity of the maker in the thing being made; therefore he who denies generation from the thing being made also denies the activity from the making of the maker. God's activity of making is in vain, if that which comes to be does not exist. If God does not make without making, then neither does he make uncreatedly. "God makes" is an affirmation of making, but "makes without making" is in effect a denial of the affirmation. The terms "uncreated" and "made" are contradictory. If that which is through making is uncreated, then that which is not through making is not uncreated. To say, "The one who made has made, but the thing being made has not come to be," is no different from saying, "God makes uncreated things." If it is reasonable to say, "God makes uncreated things in an uncreated way," then it is also reasonable to say, "Uncreated things come to be in an uncreated way." For "it comes to be" follows "he makes" by a natural necessity. But if the second is absurd, then the first is also absurd. If "to come to be" is temporal, "to be made" is also temporal; for they are equivalent. For it is impossible that while the maker is making, the thing being made is not coming to be. If nothing comes to be in an uncreated way, then neither is anything made in an uncreated way; for "to come to be" and "to be made" are not the same in word, but are the same in deed. If God makes by being, he makes what he makes by necessity; but if he makes by willing, he makes with authority; and making with authority, he makes as many things as he wills, and of such a kind as he wills, and when he wills. If God makes by being, his willing is useful for nothing, which he is in no way able to use. The respondent posits two incompatible things concerning God: he calls him the maker of beings, and attributes to him making uncreatedly. For if he himself makes uncreatedly, but the thing being made does not come to be in any way, neither createdly nor uncreatedly, neither by making nor without making, then just as the thing being made does not come to be, so also the maker does not make. Just as, he says, we see that begotten things, for example a man who has come to be by begetting and is himself a begetter, makes begotten things, and in general begotten things that have come to be by begetting begotten things and those from

οὐσίᾳ. Ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν οὐσία ἐστίν, οὐκ ἔστιν ὁ βουλόμενος, εἰ δὲ πρόσεστι τῇ οὐσίᾳ, ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἄλλο καὶ ἄλλο ἐστίν· οὐκ ἔστι γὰρ τὸ ὂν καὶ τὸ προσὸν ταὐτόν. Eἰ πολλὰ μὲν βούλεται ὁ θεός, πολλὰ δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν, οὐκ ἄρα ταὐτὸν παρὰ τῷ θεῷ τὸ εἶναι τῷ βούλεσθαι. Ὁ θεὸς εἰ ὅσα μὲν βούλεται ποιεῖν δύ ναται ποιεῖν, οὐχ ὅσα δὲ δύναται ποιεῖν βούλεται ποιεῖν, οὐ ταὐτὸν ἄρα παρ' αὐτῷ τὸ εἶναι τῷ βούλεσθαι. Ὁ θεὸς εἰ ἓν μέν ἐστι καὶ ἁπλοῦν καὶ μονοειδές, πολλὰ δὲ βούλεται καὶ πολλὰ οὐ βούλεται, οἷον βούλεται μὲν τῇ ποικιλίᾳ πολλὰ εἶναι τὰ ὄντα, ἄπειρα δὲ αὐτὰ εἶναι τῷ πλήθει οὐ βούλεται, οὐκ ἄρα ταὐτὸν παρ' αὐτῷ τὸ εἶναι τῷ βούλεσθαι. Ὁ θεὸς εἰ ὃ ὑπάρχει οὐ ποιεῖ, ποιεῖ δὲ ὃ βούλεται, βούλεται δὲ ποιεῖν τὸν κόσμον, οὐκ ἄρα ταὐτὸν παρ' αὐτῷ τῷ εἶναι τὸ βούλεσθαι. Eἰ ἀγενήτως ἀγένητα οὐ γίνεται, οὐδ' ἄρα ἀγενήτως ἀγένητα ποιεῖ ὁ θεός· ἀδύνατον γὰρ εἶναι ποιητὸν ἀγένητον. Ὥσπερ ἡ διδασκαλία ἐνέργειά ἐστι τοῦ διδάσκοντος ἐν τῷ μανθά νοντι, οὕτως ἡ ποίησις ἐνέργειά ἐστι τοῦ ποιοῦντος ἐν τῷ ποιουμένῳ· ὁ ἄρα ἀναιρῶν τὴν γένεσιν ἀπὸ τοῦ ποιουμένου ἀναιρεῖ καὶ τὴν ἐνέργειαν ἀπὸ τῆς ποιήσεως τοῦ ποιοῦντος. Μάτην ἐνεργεῖ θεὸς τὴν ποίησιν, οὐκ ὄντος τοῦ γινομένου. Eἰ ἀποιήτως οὐ ποιεῖ ὁ θεός, οὐδ' ἄρα ἀγενήτως ποιεῖ. Τὸ ποιεῖ ὁ θεὸς φάσις ἐστὶ ποιήσεως, τὸ δὲ ἀποιήτως ποιεῖ δυνάμει ἀπόφασίς ἐστι τῆς φάσεως. Μαχόμενα ὀνόματα τὸ ἀγένητον καὶ τὸ ποιητόν. Eἰ τὸ διὰ ποιήσεως ἀγένητον, οὐκ ἄρα ἀγένητον τὸ μὴ διὰ ποιήσεως. Oὐδὲν διαφέρει τὸ λέγειν· Ὁ μὲν ποιήσας ἐποίησε, τὸ δὲ ποιούμενον οὐκ ἐγένετο, τοῦ λέγειν· Ποιεῖ ὁ θεὸς τὰ ἀγένητα. Eἰ εὔλογον τὸ λέγειν· Ὁ θεὸς ἀγενήτως ἀγένητα ποιεῖ, εὔλογον ἄρα καὶ τὸ λέγειν· Ἀγενήτως τὰ ἀγένητα γίνεται. Ἀκολουθεῖ γὰρ τῷ ποιεῖ τὸ γίνεται φυσικῇ ἀνάγκῃ. Eἰ δὲ ἄτοπον τὸ δεύτερον, ἄτοπον ἄρα καὶ τὸ πρῶτον. Eἰ ἔγχρονον τὸ γίνεσθαι, ἔγχρονον καὶ τὸ ποιεῖσθαι· ἰσοδύναμα γάρ. Ἀδύνατον γὰρ ἐν τῷ ποιεῖν τὸν ποιοῦντα μὴ γίνεσθαι τὸ ποιούμενον. Eἰ ἀγενήτως οὐδὲν γίνεται, οὐδ' ἄρα ἀγενήτως ποιεῖταί τι· τὸ γὰρ γίνε σθαι καὶ τὸ ποιεῖσθαι λέξει μὲν οὐ ταὐτόν, ἔργῳ δὲ ταὐτόν. Ὁ θεός, εἰ τῷ εἶναι ποιεῖ, ἀναγκαστικῶς ποιεῖ ἃ ποιεῖ, εἰ δὲ τῷ βούλεσθαι ποιεῖ, αὐθεντικῶς ποιεῖ· αὐθεντικῶς δὲ ποιῶν ὅσα βούλεται καὶ οἷα βούλεται καὶ ὅτε βούλεται ποιεῖ. Ὁ θεὸς εἰ τῷ εἶναι ποιεῖ, εἰς οὐδὲν αὐτοῦ χρησιμεύει τὸ βού λεσθαι, ᾧ οὐδαμῶς δύναται κεχρῆσθαι. ∆ύο ἀσύμβατα τί θησιν ἐπὶ τοῦ θεοῦ ὁ ἀποκρινάμενος· ποιητικὸν αὐτὸν ὀνο μάζει τῶν ὄντων, καὶ προσάπτει αὐτῷ τὸ ἀγενήτως ποιεῖν. Eἰ γὰρ αὐτὸς μὲν ἀγενήτως ποιεῖ, τὸ δὲ ποιούμενον οὐδαμῶς γίνεται, οὔτε γενητῶς οὔτε ἀγενήτως, οὔτε ποιητῶς οὔτε ἀποιήτως, ὥσπερ ἄρα οὐ γίνεται τὸ ποιούμενον, οὕτως οὐδὲ ποιεῖ ὁ ποιῶν. Ὥσπερ, φησίν, ὁρῶμεν ὅτι τὰ γεννητά, οἷον ἄνθρωπος γεννητῶς γενόμενος γεννητικός τε ὤν, γεννητὰ ποιεῖ, καὶ καθόλου τὰ γεννητὰ γεννητῶς γενόμενα γεννητὰ καὶ τὰ ἐξ