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In infants, when they are young, only irrational movement is present, but we say that they have a rational soul, since as they grow they display rational activity; but the irrational animal, showing no rationality at any age, would have a rational soul superfluously, since its rational power would be completely useless. For it is unanimously agreed by all that nothing superfluous has been created by God; and if this is so, a rational soul would have been cast into cattle and beasts superfluously, being never able to display its own work; and it would be an accusation against the giver for placing an unfitting soul in the body; for it is the work neither of an artisan nor of one who knows order or harmony. But if someone should say that animals are moved rationally according to disposition, but that their physical form is incapable of skilled action, confirming the argument from the case of humans—for if only the fingers of the hands are removed, most skills are lost—this does not solve the problem. For the same absurdity still remains, that God fitted a soul to the body that was not suitable, but superfluous and useless and inactive, hindered through their whole life from its proper activities, in addition to the fact that they construct their argument from things unclear and not agreed upon. For whence comes it that animals are moved rationally according to disposition? It is better, then, to hold that a soul suitable to each body has been fitted to it, and that animals have nothing more in their disposition than the natural simplicity that appears in their works. For each species of irrational animal is moved according to its own impulse, for which use and activity it was made from the beginning; and for these purposes it also received a suitable physical form. Nevertheless, the Creator has not left them completely helpless, but in each he has instilled a natural, not rational, intelligence; and in some he has even placed cunning, like a rational image and shadow of skill, for these two reasons: for avoiding present plots and for guarding against future ones, and for joining all creation to itself, as has already been said. And that they do not do these things rationally is clear from the fact that each animal according to its species does the same things in the same way, and their activities do not differ among the multitude, except in degree, but the whole species is moved by one impulse. For every hare employs craft in the same way, and every wolf acts cunningly in the same way, and every ape imitates in the same way, which is not the case with man. For countless are the ways of human actions. For the rational is something free and self-determining; whence not one and the same work is for all men, as it is for each species of irrational animals. For these are moved by nature alone; and things by nature are the same in all cases. But rational actions are different in different people and are not necessarily the same in all. But if they should say that for punishment the soul of those who have sinned before in human life is sent down into such bodies, they make their proof from later things. For why were rational souls cast into the first bodies of animals that came into being? For surely they did not sin in human bodies before they had even come into a human body. And Galen, the wonderful physician, seems to hold this opinion and to believe that for each species of animal there is a different species of soul. For he says right at the beginning of the first book of his treatise On the Use of the Parts thus: and if this is so, there will be many parts of animals, some larger, some smaller, some completely indivisible into another form; and there is a need for all of them for the soul; for the body is its instrument, and for this reason the parts of animals differ greatly from each other, because their souls do also. And again, proceeding in the same book, he adds this concerning the ape: And yet, O most wise accuser, nature might say to you, for a ridiculous animal a ridiculous physical constitution had to be given for its soul. Thus he knows that different souls exist in bodies that are different in species. And so much for these matters. But if we have shown that the soul is neither a body nor a harmony nor a mixture nor any other quality, it is clear from this that the soul is some incorporeal substance. For that it exists is agreed by all; if

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νέοις οὖσι τοῖς βρέφεσιν ἡ ἄλογος μόνη κίνησις πρόσεστιν, ἀλλὰ ψυχὴν λογικὴν ἔχειν φαμὲν αὐτά, ἐπειδήπερ αὐξανόμενα τὴν λογικὴν ἀναδείκνυσιν ἐνέργειαν· τὸ δὲ ἄλογον, κατ' οὐδεμίαν ἡλικίαν ἐμφαῖνον τὸ λογικόν, περιττῶς ἂν ἔσχε λογικὴν ψυχήν, ἀχρήστου παντελῶς μελλούσης ἔσεσθαι τῆς λογικῆς δυνάμεως. καὶ γὰρ οὐδὲν περιττὸν παρὰ τοῦ Θεοῦ γεγενῆσθαι συμφώνως πᾶσιν συνωμολόγηται· εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, περιττῶς ἂν ἡ λογικὴ ψυχὴ τοῖς κτήνεσιν καὶ τοῖς θηρίοις ἐγκατεβάλλετο, μηδέποτε δυναμένη τὸ ἑαυτῆς ἔργον ἐπιδείξασθαι· καὶ ἦν ἂν ἔγκλημα τοῦ δόντος ἀνάρμοστον ψυχὴν τῷ σώματι· οὔτε γὰρ τεχνίτου τὸ ἔργον οὔτε τάξιν ἢ ἁρμονίαν εἰδότος· εἰ δέ τις λέγοι κινεῖσθαι μὲν κατὰ διάθεσιν λογικῶς τὰ ζῷα, τὴν δὲ διάπλασιν αὐτῶν ἀνεπίδεκτον εἶναι τεχνικῆς πράξεως, πιστούμενος τὸν λόγον ἀπὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων· περιαιρεθέντων γὰρ μόνων τῶν δακτύλων τῶν χειρῶν, τὰς πλείστας τέχνας παραπόλλυσθαι· οὐ λύει τὸ ζητούμενον· μένει γὰρ ἔτι τὸ αὐτὸ ἄτοπον, ὡς τοῦ Θεοῦ μὴ πρόσφορον ψυχὴν ἐναρμόσαντος τῷ σώματι, ἀλλὰ περιττὴν καὶ ἀνόνητον καὶ ἀνενέργητον, ἐμποδιζομένην διὰ πάσης τῆς ἡλικίας αὐτῶν εἰς τὰς οἰκείας ἐνεργείας, πρὸς τῷ καὶ τὸν λόγον αὐτοὺς κατασκευάζειν ἐξ ἀδήλων καὶ οὐχ ὁμολογουμένων. πόθεν γὰρ ὅτι κατὰ διάθεσιν λογικῶς κινεῖται τὰ ζῷα; βέλτιον οὖν ἡγεῖσθαι πρόσφορον ἑκάστῳ σώματι ψυχὴν ἐνηρμόσθαι, καὶ μηδὲν πλέον ἔχειν κατὰ διάθεσιν τὰ ζῷα τῆς ἐμφαινομένης ἐν τοῖς ἔργοις αὐτῶν φυσικῶς ἁπλότητος· ἕκαστον γὰρ εἶδος τῶν ἀλόγων κατ' οἰκείαν ὁρμὴν κινεῖται, πρὸς ἣν γέγονεν ἐξ ἀρχῆς χρείαν τε καὶ ἐνέργειαν· καὶ πρὸς ταῦτα καὶ τὴν διάπλασιν ἐπιτηδείαν ἔσχεν. οὐ μὴν ἀβοήθητα παντάπασιν αὐτὰ καταλέλοιπεν ὁ δημιουργός, ἀλλ' ἑκάστῳ φυσικήν, οὐ λογικήν, ἐνέβαλεν σύνεσιν· τισὶ δὲ καὶ πανουργίας ἐνέθηκεν, ὥσπερ τέχνης εἰκόνα καὶ σκιὰν λογικήν, δυοῖν τούτων ἕνεκεν, ὑπὲρ τοῦ καὶ τὰς ἐνεστώσας ἐπιβουλὰς ἐκκλίνειν καὶ τὰς μελλούσας προφυλάττεσθαι, καὶ ἐπὶ τῷ συνάψαι τὴν κτίσιν πᾶσαν ἑαυτῇ, ὡς ἤδη εἴρηται. ὅτι δὲ οὐ λογικῶς ταῦτα ποιεῖ δῆλον ἐκ τοῦ κατ' εἶδος ἕκαστον ζῷον ὁμοίως τὰ αὐτὰ ποιεῖν καὶ μὴ διαλλάττειν αὐτῶν ἐν τῷ πλήθει τὰς ἐνεργείας, εἰ μὴ κατὰ τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον, ἀλλὰ κατὰ μίαν ὁρμὴν ὅλον τὸ εἶδος κινεῖσθαι. πᾶς γὰρ λαγωὸς ὁμοίως τεχνάζεται καὶ πᾶς λύκος ὁμοίως πανουργεῖ καὶ πᾶς πίθηκος ὁμοίως μιμεῖται, ὅπερ οὐκ ἔστιν ἐπ' ἀνθρώπου. μυρίαι γὰρ ὁδοὶ τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων πράξεων. ἐλεύθερον γάρ τι καὶ αὐτεξούσιον τὸ λογικόν· ὅθεν οὐχ ἓν καὶ ταὐτὸν πᾶσιν ἔργον ἀνθρώποις, ὡς ἑκάστῳ εἴδει τῶν ἀλόγων ζῴων. φύσει γὰρ μόνῃ ταῦτα κινεῖται· τὰ δὲ φύσει ὁμοίως παρὰ πᾶσίν ἐστιν. αἱ δὲ λογικαὶ πράξεις ἄλλαι παρ' ἄλλοις καὶ οὐκ ἐξ ἀνάγκης αἱ αὐταὶ παρὰ πᾶσιν. εἰ δὲ λέγοιεν ἐπὶ τιμωρίᾳ τὴν ψυχὴν τῶν προημαρτημένων ἐν τῷ ἀνθρωπείῳ βίῳ εἰς τοιαῦτα σώματα καταπέμπεσθαι, ἐκ τῶν ὕστερον ποιοῦνται τὴν ἀπόδειξιν. διατί γὰρ εἰς τὰ πρῶτα γενόμενα σώματα τῶν ζῴων ἐνεβλήθησαν λογικαὶ ψυχαί; οὐ γὰρ δήπου ὡς ἐν σώμασιν ἀνθρωπείοις ἁμαρτήσασαι πρὶν καὶ εἰς σῶμα γενέσθαι ἀνθρώπειον. ἔοικε δὲ ταύτῃ τῇ δόξῃ τίθεσθαι καὶ Γαληνὸς ὁ θαυμάσιος ἰατρὸς καὶ καθ' ἕκαστον εἶδος ζῴου διάφορον εἶναι δοξάζειν καὶ ψυχῆς εἶδος. λέγει γὰρ εὐθὺς ἐν ἀρχῇ τοῦ πρώτου βιβλίου τῆς περὶ χρείας μορίων πραγματείας οὕτως· καὶ εἰ τοῦτο, πολλὰ τῶν ζῴων ἔσται μόρια, τὰ μὲν μείζω, τὰ δὲ ἐλάττω, τὰ δὲ παντάπασιν εἰς ἕτερον εἶδος ἄτμητα· χρεία δὲ πάντων ἐστὶ τῇ ψυχῇ· τὸ γὰρ σῶμα ταύτης ὄργανον καὶ διὰ τοῦτο πολὺ διενήνοχεν ἀλλήλων τὰ μόρια τῶν ζῴων ὅτι καὶ αἱ ψυχαί. πάλιν δὲ προκόπτων ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ βιβλίῳ προστίθησιν ἐπὶ τοῦ πιθήκου καὶ τοῦτο· καὶ μήν, ὦ σοφώτατε κατήγορε, λέξειεν ἂν ἡ φύσις πρὸς σέ, γελοίῳ τὴν ψυχὴν ζῴῳ γελοίαν ἐχρῆν δοθῆναι σώματος κατασκευήν. οὕτως οἶδεν τοῖς διαφόροις κατ' εἶδος σώμασιν διαφόρους ἐνούσας ψυχάς. καὶ ταῦτα μὲν περὶ τούτων. εἰ δὲ τὴν ψυχὴν ἀπεδείξαμεν μήτε σῶμα οὖσαν μήτε ἁρμονίαν μήτε κρᾶσιν μήτε ἄλλην τινὰ ποιότητα, δῆλον ἐκ τούτων ὡς οὐσία τίς ἐστιν ἀσώματος ἡ ψυχή. ὅτι μὲν γάρ ἐστιν ὡμολόγηται πᾶσιν· εἰ