The Fount of Knowledge I: The Philosophical Chapters

 Preface

 Chapter 1

 Chapter 2

 Chapter 3

 Chapter 4

 Chapter 4 (variant)

 Chapter 5

 Chapter 6

 Chapter 6 (variant)

 Chapter 7

 Chapter 8

 Chapter 9

 Chapter 10

 Chapters 9-10 (variants)

 Chapter 11

 Chapter 12

 Chapter 13

 Chapter 14

 Chapter 15

 Chapter 16

 The term subject is taken in two ways: as subject of existence and as subject of predication. We have a subject of existence in such a case as that of

 Chapter 17

 Chapter 18

 Chapter 19

 Chapter 20

 Chapter 21

 Chapter 22

 Chapter 23

 Chapter 24

 Chapter 25

 Chapter 26

 Chapter 27

 Chapter 28

 Chapter 29

 Chapter 30

 Chapter 31

 Chapter 32

 Chapter 33

 Chapter 34

 Chapter 35

 Chapter 36

 Chapter 37

 Chapter 38

 Chapter 39

 Chapter 40

 Chapter 41

 Chapter 42

 Chapter 43

 Chapter 44

 Chapter 45

 Chapter 46

 Substance, then, is a most general genus. The body is a species of substance, and genus of the animate. The animate is a species of body, and genus of

 Chapter 48

 Chapter 49

 Chapter 50

 Chapter 51

 Chapter 52

 Chapter 53

 Chapter 54

 Chapter 55

 Chapter 56

 Chapter 57

 Chapter 58

 Chapter 59

 Chapter 60

 Chapter 61

 Chapter 62

 Chapter 63

 Chapter 64

 Chapter 65

 Chapter 67 [!]

 Chapter 66 [!]

 Chapter 68

 Explanation of Expressions

Chapter 11

The term individual is used in four senses. Thus, that which cannot be divided or partitioned is called individual, as the point, the instance of the time which is now, and the unit. These are said to be quantitiless (that is to say, without quantity). That also is called individual which is hard to divide, that is to say, is difficult to cut up, as is the diamond and the like. That species is also called individual which is not further divisible into other species; in other words, the most specific species, such as man, the horse, and so forth. The term individual, however, is principally used as meaning that which, although it is divisible, does not maintain its species intact after the division. Thus, Peter is divided into soul and body, but neither is the soul by itself a perfect man or a perfect Peter, nor is the body. It is with this latter kind of individual—namely, that which shows the individuality of the substance—that the philosophers are concerned.

[05] {Περὶ ἀτόμου.} Τὸ ἄτομον τετραχῶς λέγεται. Ἄτομον γάρ ἐστι τὸ μὴ τεμνόμενον μηδὲ μεριζόμενον, ὡς ἡ στιγμὴ καὶ τὸ νῦν καὶ ἡ μονάς, ἅτινα καὶ ἄποσα λέγονται. Ἄτομον λέγεται καὶ τὸ δύστμητον τουτέστι τὸ δυσχερῶς τεμνόμενον ὡς ὁ ἀδάμας λίθος καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα. Ἄτομον λέγεται καὶ τὸ εἶδος, ὅπερ οὐκέτι εἰς ἕτερα εἴδη τέμνεται ἤτοι τὸ εἰδικώτατον εἶδος ὡς ἄνθρωπος, ἵππος καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα. Ἄτομον δὲ κυρίως λέγεται, ὅπερ τέμνεται μέν, οὐ σῴζει δὲ μετὰ τὴν τομὴν τὸ πρῶτον εἶδος, ὥσπερ Πέτρος τέμνεται εἰς ψυχὴν καὶ σῶμα, ἀλλ' οὔτε ἡ ψυχὴ καθ' αὑτήν ἐστι τέλειος ἄνθρωπος ἢ Πέτρος τέλειος οὔτε τὸ σῶμα. Περὶ τούτου τοῦ ἀτόμου παρὰ τοῖς φιλοσόφοις ὁ λόγος, ὅπερ ἐπὶ τῆς οὐσίας δηλοῖ τὴν ὑπόστασιν.