Chap. XV.—Whence Sins Extended to Man.

Here perhaps some one may ask, Whence sins extended to man, or what perversion distorted the rule of the divine institution to worse things, so that, though he was born to justice, he nevertheless performs unjust works. I have already in a former place explained, that God at the same time set before him good and evil, and that He loves the good, and hates the evil which is contrary to this; but that He permitted the evil on this account, that the good also might shine forth, since, as I have often taught, we understand that the one cannot exist without the other; in short, that the world itself is made up of two elements opposing and connected with one another, of fire and moisture, and that light could not have been made unless there has also been darkness, since there cannot be a higher place without a lower, nor a rising without a setting, nor warmth without cold, nor softness without hardness. Thus also we are composed of two substances equally opposed to one another—soul and body: the one of which is assigned to the heaven, because it is slight and not to be handled; the other to the earth, because it is capable of being laid hold of: the one is firm101    Solidum.   and eternal, the other frail and mortal. Therefore good clings to the one, and evil to the other: light, life, and justice to the one; darkness, death, and injustice to the other. Hence there arose among men the corruption of their nature, so that it was necessary that a law should be established, by which vices might be prohibited, and the duties of virtue be enjoined. Since, therefore, there are good and evil things in the affairs of men, the nature of which I have set forth, it must be that God is moved to both sides, both to favour when He sees that just things are done, and to anger when He perceives unjust things.  

But Epicurus opposes us, and says: “If there is in God the affection of joy leading Him to favour, and of hatred influencing Him to anger, He must of necessity have both fear, and inclination, and desire, and the other affections which belong to human weakness.” It does not follow that he who is angry must fear, or that he who feels joy must grieve; in short, they who are liable to anger are less timid, and they who are of a joyful temperament are less affected with grief. What need is there to speak of the affections of humanity, to which our nature yields? Let us weigh the divine necessity; for I am unwilling to speak of nature, since it is believed that our God was never born. The affection of fear has a subject-matter in man, but it has none in God. Man, inasmuch as he is liable to many accidents and dangers, fears lest any greater violence should arise which may strike, despoil, lacerate, dash down, and destroy him. But God, who is liable neither to want, nor injury, nor pain, nor death, can by no means fear, because there is nothing which can offer violence to Him. Also the reason and cause of desire is manifest in man. For, inasmuch as he was made frail and mortal, it was necessary that another and different sex should be made, by union with which offspring might be produced to continue the perpetuity of his race. But this desire has no place in God, because frailty and death are far removed from Him; nor is there with Him any female in whose union He is able to rejoice; nor does He stand in need of succession, since He will live for ever. The same things may be said respecting envy and passion, to which, from sure and manifest causes, man is liable, but to which God is by no means liable. But, in truth, favour and anger and pity have their substance102    Materia. Subjective existence.   in God, and that greatest and matchless power employs them for the preservation of the world.  

CAPUT XV. Unde ad hominem peccata pervenerint.

Hic fortasse quaerat aliquis, unde ad hominem peccata pervenerint, aut quae pravitas divini instituti regulam ad pejora detorserit, ut cum sit ad justitiam genitus, opera tamen efficiat injusta. Jam superius explanavi, simul Deum proposuisse bonum ac malum; et bonum quidem diligere, malum autem, quod huic repugnat, odisse: sed ideo malum permisisse, ut et bonum emicaret, quod alterum sine altero (sicut saepe 0123B docui) intelligimus constare non posse: denique ipsum mundum ex duobus elementis repugnantibus et invicem copulatis esse concretum, igneo et humido, nec potuisse lucem fieri, nisi et tenebrae fuissent; quia nec superum potest esse sine infero, nec oriens sine occidente, nec calidum sine frigido, nec molle sine duro. Sic et nos ex duobus aeque repugnantibus compacti sumus, anima et corpore: quorum alterum coelo ascribitur, quia tenue est et intractabile; alterum terrae, quia comprehensibile est: alterum solidum et aeternum est, alterum fragile atque mortale. Ergo alteri bonum adhaeret, alteri malum: alteri lux, vita, justitia; alteri tenebrae, mors, injustitia. Hinc extitit in hominibus naturae suae depravatio; ut esset necesse constitui legem, qua possent et vitia prohiberi, 0123C et virtutis officia imperari. Cum igitur sint in rebus humanis bona et mala, quorum rationem declaravi, necesse est in utramque partem moveri Deum, et ad gratiam, cum justa fieri videt; et ad iram, cum cernit injusta.

Sed occurrit nobis Epicurus, ac dicit: «Si est in 0124A Deo laetitiae affectus ad gratiam, et odii ad iram, necesse est habeat, et timorem, et libidinem, et cupiditatem, caeterosque affectus, qui sunt imbecillitatis humanae.» Non est necesse ut timeat, qui irascitur; aut moereat, qui gaudet: denique iracundi, minus timidi sunt; et natura laeti, minus moerent. Quid opus est de humanis affectibus dicere, quibus fragilitas nostra succumbit? Consideremus divinam necessitatem; nolo enim naturam dicere, quia Deus noster nunquam creditur natus. Timoris affectus habet in homine materiam, in Deo non habet. Homo, quia multis casibus periculisque subjectus est, metuit, ne qua vis major existat, quae illum verberet, spoliet, laceret, affligat, interimat. Deus autem, in quem nec egestas, nec injuria, nec dolor, nec mors 0124B cadit, timere nullo pacto potest; quia nihil est, quod ei vim possit inferre. Item libidinis ratio et causa in homine manifesta est. Nam quia fragilis et mortalis effectus est, necesse fuit alterum sexum diversumque constitui, cujus permistione soboles effici posset ad continuandam generis perpetuitatem. Haec autem libido in Deo locum non habet; quia et fragilitas et interitus ab eo alienus est, nec ulla est apud eum foemina, cujus possit copulatione gaudere, nec successione indiget, qui semper futurus est. Eadem de invidia et cupiditate dici possunt; quae certis manifestisque de causis in hominem cadunt, in Deum nullo modo. At vero, et gratia, et ira, et miseratio habent in Deo materiam; recteque illis utitur summa illa et singularis potestas ad rerum conservationem.