On “Not Three Gods.” To Ablabius.

 Ye that are strong with all might in the inner man ought by rights to carry on the struggle against the enemies of the truth, and not to shrink from t

 In truth, the question you propound to us is no small one, nor such that but small harm will follow if it meets with insufficient treatment. For by th

 The argument which you state is something like this:—Peter, James, and John, being in one human nature, are called three men: and there is no absurdit

 What, then, is the reason that when we count one by one those who are exhibited to us in one nature, we ordinarily name them in the plural and speak o

 We say, then, to begin with, that the practice of calling those who are not divided in nature by the very name of their common nature in the plural, a

 Most men think that the word “Godhead” is used in a peculiar degree in respect of nature: and just as the heaven, or the sun, or any other of the cons

 But some one will say that the proof of our argument does not yet regard the question. For even if it were granted that the name of “Godhead” is a com

 As we have to a certain extent shown by our statement that the word “Godhead” is not significant of nature but of operation, perhaps one might reasona

 Since, then, the character of the superintending and beholding power is one, in Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, as has been said in our previous argumen

 If, then, every good thing and every good name, depending on that power and purpose which is without beginning, is brought to perfection in the power

 It does not seem to me absolutely necessary, with a view to the present proof of our argument, to contend against those who oppose us with the asserti

 But if it pleases our adversaries to say that the significance of the term is not operation, but nature, we shall fall back upon our original argument

 As, then, the golden staters are many, but the gold is one, so too those who are exhibited to us severally in the nature of man, as Peter, James, and

 Indeed, it would be a lengthy task to set out in detail from the Scriptures those constructions which are inexactly expressed, in order to prove the s

 If, however, any one cavils at our argument, on the ground that by not admitting the difference of nature it leads to a mixture and confusion of the P

 But in speaking of “cause,” and “of the cause,” we do not by these words denote nature (for no one would give the same definition of “cause” and of “n

 Thus, since on the one hand the idea of cause differentiates the Persons of the Holy Trinity, declaring that one exists without a Cause, and another i

If, however, any one cavils at our argument, on the ground that by not admitting the difference of nature it leads to a mixture and confusion of the Persons, we shall make to such a charge this answer;—that while we confess the invariable character of the nature, we do not deny the difference in respect of cause, and that which is caused, by which alone we apprehend that one Person is distinguished from another;—by our belief, that is, that one is the Cause, and another is of the Cause; and again in that which is of the Cause we recognize another distinction. For one is directly from the first Cause, and another by that which is directly from the first Cause; so that the attribute of being Only-begotten abides without doubt in the Son, and the interposition of the Son, while it guards His attribute of being Only-begotten, does not shut out the Spirit from His relation by way of nature to the Father.

Εἰ δέ τις συκοφαντοίη τὸν λόγον ὡς ἐκ τοῦ μὴ δέχεσθαι τὴν κατὰ φύσιν διαφορὰν μίξιν τινὰ τῶν ὑποστάσεων καὶ ἀνακύκλησιν κατασκευάζοντα τοῦτο περὶ τῆς τοιαύτης ἀπολογησόμεθα μέμψεως, ὅτι τὸ ἀπαράλλακτον τῆς φύσεως ὁμολογοῦντες τὴν κατὰ τὸ αἴτιον καὶ αἰτιατὸν διαφορὰν οὐκ ἀρνούμεθα, ἐν ᾧ μόνῳ διακρίνεσθαι τὸ ἕτερον τοῦ ἑτέρου καταλαμβάνομεν, τῷ τὸ μὲν αἴτιον πιστεύειν εἶναι τὸ δὲ ἐκ τοῦ αἰτίου: καὶ τοῦ ἐξ αἰτίας ὄντος πάλιν ἄλλην διαφορὰν ἐννοοῦμεν: τὸ μὲν γὰρ προσεχῶς ἐκ τοῦ πρώτου, τὸ δὲ διὰ τοῦ προσεχῶς ἐκ τοῦ πρώτου, ὥστε καὶ τὸ μονογενὲς ἀναμφίβολον ἐπὶ τοῦ υἱοῦ μένειν, καὶ τὸ ἐκ τοῦ πατρὸς εἶναι τὸ πνεῦμα μὴ ἀμφιβάλλειν, τῆς τοῦ υἱοῦ μεσιτείας καὶ αὐτῷ τὸ μονογενὲς φυλαττούσης καὶ τὸ πνεῦμα τῆς φυσικῆς πρὸς τὸν πατέρα σχέσεως μὴ ἀπειργούσης.