Chapter XV.

Even to this objection we are not at a loss for an answer consistent with our idea of God. You ask the reason why God was born among men. If you take away from life the benefits that come to us from God, you would not be able to tell me what means you have of arriving at any knowledge of Deity. In the kindly treatment of us we recognize the benefactor; that is, from observation of that which happens to us, we conjecture the disposition of the person who operates it. If, then, love of man be a special characteristic of the Divine nature, here is the reason for which you are in search, here is the cause of the presence of God among men. Our diseased nature needed a healer. Man in his fall needed one to set him upright. He who had lost the gift of life stood in need of a life-giver, and he who had dropped away from his fellowship with good wanted one who would lead him back to good. He who was shut up in darkness longed for the presence of the light. The captive sought for a ransomer, the fettered prisoner for some one to take his part, and for a deliverer he who was held in the bondage of slavery. Were these, then, trifling or unworthy wants to importune the Deity to come down and take a survey of the nature of man, when mankind was so miserably and pitiably conditioned? “But,” it is replied, “man might have been benefited, and yet God might have continued in a passionless state. Was it not possible for Him Who in His wisdom framed the universe, and by the simple impulse of His will brought into subsistence that which was not, had it so pleased Him, by means of some direct Divine command to withdraw man from the reach of the opposing power, and bring him back to his primal state? Whereas He waits for long periods of time to come round, He submits Himself to the condition of a human body, He enters upon the stage of life by being born, and after passing through each age of life in succession, and then tasting death, at last, only by the rising again of His own body, accomplishes His object,—as if it was not optional to Him to fulfil His purpose without leaving the height of His Divine glory, and to save man by a single command44    Origin answering the same objections says, “I know not what sort of alteration of mankind it is that Celsus wants, when he doubts whether it were not possible to improve man by a display of Divine power, without any one being sent in the course of nature (φύσει) for that purpose. Does he want this to take place among mankind by a sudden appearance of God destroying evil in their hearts at a blow, and causing virtue to spring up there? One might well inquire if it were fitting or possible that such a thing should happen. But we will suppose that it is so. What then? How will our assent to the truth be (in that case) praiseworthy? You yourself profess to recognize a special Providence: therefore you ought just as much to have told us, as we you, why it is that God, knowing the affairs of men, does not correct them, and by a single stroke of His power rid Himself of the whole family of evil. But we confidently assert that He does send messengers for this very purpose: for His words appealing to men’s noblest emotions are amongst them. But whereas there had been already great differences between the various ministers of the Word, the reformation of Jesus went beyond them all in greatness; for He did not mean to heal the men of one little corner only of the world, but He came to save all;” c. Cels. iv. 3, 4., letting those long periods of time alone.” Needful, therefore, is it that in answer to objections such as these we should draw out the counter-statement of the truth, in order that no obstacle may be offered to the faith of those persons who will minutely examine the reasonableness of the gospel revelation. In the first place, then, as has been partially discussed before45    Ch. v., let us consider what is that which, by the rule of contraries, is opposed to virtue. As darkness is the opposite of light, and death of life, so vice, and nothing else besides, is plainly the opposite of virtue. For as in the many objects in creation there is nothing which is distinguished by its opposition to light or life, but only the peculiar ideas which are their exact opposites, as darkness and death—not stone, or wood, or water, or man, or anything else in the world,—so, in the instance of virtue, it cannot be said that any created thing can be conceived of as contrary to it, but only the idea of vice. If, then, our Faith preached that the Deity had been begotten under vicious circumstances, an opportunity would have been afforded the objector of running down our belief, as that of persons who propounded incongruous and absurd opinions with regard to the Divine nature. For, indeed, it were blasphemous to assert that the Deity, Which is very wisdom, goodness, incorruptibility, and every other exalted thing in thought or word, had undergone change to the contrary. If, then, God is real and essential virtue, and no mere existence46    φύσις. of any kind is logically opposed to virtue, but only vice is so; and if the Divine birth was not into vice, but into human existence; and if only vicious weakness is unseemly and shameful—and with such weakness neither was God born, nor had it in His nature to be born,—why are they scandalized at the confession that God came into touch with human nature, when in relation to virtue no contrariety whatever is observable in the organization of man? For neither Reason, nor Understanding47    τὸ διανοητικὸν, nor Receptivity for science, nor any other like quality proper to the essence of man, is opposed to the principle of virtue.

[15] Οὐκ ἀποροῦμεν καὶ πρὸς τοῦτο θεοπρεποῦς ἀποκρίσεως. ζητεῖς τὴν αἰτίαν τοῦ γενέσθαι θεὸν ἐν ἀνθρώποις; ἐὰν ἀφέλῃς τοῦ βίου τὰς θεόθεν γινομένας εὐεργεσίας, ἐκ ποίων ἐπιγνώσῃ τὸ θεῖον οὐκ ἂν εἰπεῖν ἔχοις. ἀφ' ὧν γὰρ εὖ πάσχομεν, ἀπὸ τούτων τὸν εὐεργέτην ἐπιγινώσκομεν: πρὸς γὰρ τὰ γινόμενα βλέποντες, διὰ τούτων τὴν τοῦ ἐνεργοῦντος ἀναλογιζόμεθα φύσιν. εἰ οὖν ἴδιον γνώρισμα τῆς θείας φύσεως ἡ φιλανθρωπία, ἔχεις ὃν ἐπεζήτησας λόγον, ἔχεις τὴν αἰτίαν τῆς ἐν ἀνθρώποις τοῦ θεοῦ παρουσίας. ἐδεῖτο γὰρ τοῦ ἰατρεύοντος ἡ φύσις ἡμῶν ἀσθενήσασα, ἐδεῖτο τοῦ ἀνορθοῦντος ὁ ἐν τῷ πτώματι ἄνθρωπος, ἐδεῖτο τοῦ ζωοποιοῦντος ὁ ἀφαμαρτὼν τῆς ζωῆς, ἐδεῖτο τοῦ πρὸς τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἐπανάγοντος ὁ ἀπορρυεὶς τῆς τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ μετουσίας, ἔχρῃζε τῆς τοῦ φωτὸς παρουσίας ὁ καθειργμένος τῷ σκότῳ, ἐπεζήτει τὸν λυτρωτὴν ὁ αἰχμάλωτος, τὸν συναγωνιστὴν ὁ δεσμώτης, τὸν ἐλευθερωτὴν ὁ τῷ ζυγῷ τῆς δουλείας κατεχόμενος. ἆρα μικρὰ ταῦτα καὶ ἀνάξια τὸν θεὸν δυσωπῆσαι πρὸς ἐπίσκεψιν τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης φύσεως καταβῆναι, οὕτως ἐλεεινῶς καὶ ἀθλίως τῆς ἀνθρωπότητος διακειμένης; ἀλλ' ἐξῆν, φησί, καὶ εὐεργετηθῆναι τὸν ἄνθρωπον καὶ ἐν ἀπαθείᾳ τὸν θεὸν διαμεῖναι. ὁ γὰρ τῷ βουλήματι τὸ πᾶν συστησάμενος καὶ τὸ μὴ ὂν ὑποστήσας ἐν μόνῃ τῇ ὁρμῇ τοῦ θελήματος, τί οὐχὶ καὶ τὸν ἄνθρωπον δι' αὐθεντικῆς τινὸς καὶ θεικῆς ἐξουσίας τῆς ἐναντίας δυνάμεως ἀποσπάσας πρὸς τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἄγει κατάστασιν, εἰ τοῦτο φίλον αὐτῷ: ἀλλὰ μακρὰς περιέρχεται περιόδους, σώματος ὑπερχόμενος φύσιν, καὶ διὰ γεννήσεως παριὼν εἰς τὸν βίον, καὶ πᾶσαν ἀκολούθως ἡλικίαν διεξιών, εἶτα θανάτου γευόμενος, καὶ οὕτως διὰ τῆς τοῦ ἰδίου σώματος ἀναστάσεως τὸν σκόπον ἀνύων, ὡς οὐκ ἐξὸν αὐτῷ μένοντι ἐπὶ τοῦ ὕψους τῆς θεικῆς δόξης, διὰ προστάγματος σῶσαι τὸν ἄνθρωπον, τὰς δὲ τοιαύτας περιόδους χαίρειν ἐᾶσαι; οὐκοῦν ἀνάγκη καὶ ταῖς τοιαύταις τῶν ἀντιθέσεων ἀντικαταστῆναι παρ' ἡμῶν τὴν ἀλήθειαν, ὡς ἂν διὰ μηδενὸς ἡ πίστις κωλύοιτο τῶν ἐξεταστικῶς ζητούντων τοῦ μυστηρίου τὸν λόγον. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν, ὅπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς φθάσασιν ἤδη μετρίως ἐξήτασται, τί τῇ ἀρετῇ κατὰ τὸ ἐναντίον ἀντικαθέστηκεν, ἐπισκεψώμεθα. ὡς φωτὶ σκότος καὶ θάνατος τῇ ζωῇ, οὕτω τῇ ἀρετῇ ἡ κακία δῆλον ὅτι, καὶ οὐδὲν παρὰ ταύτην ἕτερον. καθάπερ γὰρ πολλῶν ὄντων τῶν ἐν τῇ κτίσει θεωρουμένων οὐδὲν ἄλλο πρὸς τὸ φῶς ἢ τὴν ζωὴν τὴν ἀντιδιαίρεσιν ἔχει, οὐ λίθος, οὐ ξύλον, οὐχ ὕδωρ, οὐκ ἄνθρωπος, οὐκ ἄλλο τι τῶν ὄντων οὐδέν, πλὴν ἰδίως τὰ κατὰ τὸ ἐναντίον νοούμενα, οἷον σκότος καὶ θάνατος: οὕτω καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς οὐκ ἄν τις κτίσιν τινὰ κατὰ τὸ ἐναντίον αὐτῇ νοεῖσθαι λέγοι, πλὴν τὸ κατὰ κακίαν νόημα. οὐκοῦν εἰ μὲν ἐν κακίᾳ γεγενῆσθαι τὸ θεῖον ὁ ἡμέτερος ἐπρέσβευε λόγος, καιρὸν εἶχεν ὁ ἀντιλέγων κατατρέχειν ἡμῶν τῆς πίστεως, ὡς ἀνάρμοστά τε καὶ ἀπεμφαίνοντα περὶ τῆς θείας φύσεως δογματιζόντων: οὐ γὰρ δὴ θεμιτὸν ἦν αὐτοσοφίαν καὶ ἀγαθότητα καὶ ἀφθαρσίαν, καὶ εἴ τι ὑψηλόν ἐστι νόημά τε καὶ ὄνομα, πρὸς τὸ ἐναντίον μεταπεπτωκέναι λέγειν. εἰ οὖν θεὸς μὲν ἡ ἀληθὴς ἀρετή, φύσις δέ τις οὐκ ἀντιδιαιρεῖται τῇ ἀρετῇ, ἀλλὰ κακία, θεὸς δὲ οὐκ ἐν κακίᾳ, ἀλλ' ἐν ἀνθρώπου γίνεται φύσει, μόνον δὲ ἀπρεπὲς καὶ αἰσχρὸν τὸ κατὰ κακίαν πάθος, ἐν ᾧ οὔτε γέγονεν θεός, οὔτε γενέσθαι φύσιν ἔχει, τί ἐπαισχύνονται τῇ ὁμολογίᾳ τοῦ θεὸν ἀνθρωπίνης ἅψασθαι φύσεως, οὐδεμιᾶς ἐναντιότητος ὡς πρὸς τὸν τῆς ἀρετῆς λόγον ἐν τῇ κατασκευῇ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου θεωρουμένης; οὔτε γὰρ τὸ λογικόν, οὔτε τὸ διανοητικόν, οὔτε τὸ ἐπιστήμης δεκτικόν, οὔτε ἄλλο τι τοιοῦτον, ὃ τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης ἴδιον οὐσίας ἐστί, τῷ λόγῳ τῆς ἀρετῆς ἠναντίωται.