Principal will, the willing, which is natural will, as has been shown. Will is also said of the thing willed; which in humans is hypostatic, not the same belonging to the whole nature. For to one of the humans, it may be willed to be alone; to another, to speak freely; and to one, to farm; to another, to sail; and to another again something else is according to his judgment. Often for the same and one person, the thing willed is different at different times. And such a hypostatic will is called a gnomic will. Therefore, since the Lord is confessed to be of two natures, he is believed to possess also two natural wills, both divine and human; that is, two volitional powers differing from one another in the principle of their nature. But since he is known to be of one hypostasis, it is erroneous to speak of different gnomic wills in him. For the thing willed is one, because he who wills is also one, with his human volition moving toward its own proper object of will; when this was willed by his divine will, and for as long as it was willed.
CHAPTER 21.
Since judgment is spoken of in two ways; for judgment is also the simple inclination towards the thing willed, as 77.1161 occurring rationally and with knowledge in rational beings. Judgment is also said of the disposition concerning something that comes from deliberation and decision; it is not safe to speak of either judgment or gnomic will in Christ according to the second meaning of judgment; because of the ignorance that is co-introduced with these. For although the Lord took on an ignorant nature, he shared with it the divine excellences. And the Lord's soul was possessed of all wisdom, both divine and human; all knowledge of things past, present, and future; not by nature, not by grace; but on account of the hypostatic union with him who alone is wise and knows all things before their creation from all eternity. Of what counsel, then, did it have need? Of what things after counsel, seeing that it knows all things, as we have said. If it is ever written that the Lord, being hungry, came to a fig tree that had no fruit, to see if he might find anything on it, and found nothing but leaves; such a formation of speech is according to supposition, as one might have supposed who saw his coming to the fig tree, but did not know the reason of the economy. For to whom even of the common people would the obvious fact be unknown, since it was not the season for figs? But so that he who has power over all might show in due season that he has not only a beneficent power, but also a punitive one; and that whenever he wishes, he will wither by a word alone those who would crucify him; the wise and loving God makes the hunger and the coming to the fig tree precede such a demonstration. For this reason also, contrary to custom, the hunger came in the morning, as it was willed. Therefore, the arrival at the fig tree, and likewise the inquiry about Lazarus as to where he had been laid when he died, and anything similar, is not of ignorance, but of economy and fitting condescension. Therefore, according to the second meaning of judgment and choice, we would not speak of either judgment or choice in Christ. But according to the first, we say that this or that was done according to the judgment of God, that is, that the deed was willed by God, and acceptable; as if we were to say that David reigned according to the judgment of God. And the Word of God indeed has choice; and the Holy Spirit is said to have choice. It is necessary, therefore, in all cases to examine the word, if it signifies more than one thing, and to proceed with clarity in our statements toward the things signified. For great is the deception that comes from homonymy, and this is the first method in sophisms.
θέλημα προηγουμένως, ἡ θέλησις, ἥτις ἐστὶ θέλημα φυσικὸν, ὡς δεδήλωται. Λέγεται θέλημα καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ θελητόν· ὅπερ ἐν ἀνθρώποις ἐστὶν ὑποστατικὸν, οὐ τὸ αὐτὸ πάσῃ τῇ φύσει προσόν. Τῷ μὲν γὰρ τῶν ἀνθρώπων, τὸ ἰδιάζειν τυχὸν τεθέληται· τῷ δὲ, τὸ παῤῥησιάζεσθαι· καὶ τῷ μὲν, τὸ γηπονεῖν· τῷ δὲ, τὸ ναυτίλλεσθαι· καὶ ἄλλῳ πάλιν ἄλλο τι κατὰ γνώμην ἐστί. Πολλάκις δὲ τῷ αὐτῷ καὶ ἑνὶ διάφορον καὶ ἄλλοτε ἄλλο τὸ θελητόν. Καλεῖται δὲ τὸ τοιοῦτον ὑποστατικὸν, θέλημα γνωμικόν. Τοιγαροῦν ὁ Κύριος ἐπειδὴ δύο φύσεων ὡμολόγηται, δύο κεκτῆσθαι καὶ θελήματα πιστεύεται φυσικὰ, θεῖόν τε καὶ ἀνθρώπινον· ἤγουν δυνάμεις δύο θελητικὰς ἀλλήλων διαφερούσας τῷ λόγῳ τῆς φύσεως. Ἐπεὶ δὲ μιᾶς ὑποστάσεως ἔγνωσται, σφαλερὸν εἰπεῖν ἐπ' αὐτοῦ διάφορα θελήματα γνωμικά. Τὸ γὰρ θελητὸν ἓν, ὅτι καὶ ὁ θέλων εἷς, τῆς ἀνθρωπικῆς αὐτοῦ θελήσεως, πρὸς τὸ οἰκεῖον θελητὸν κινουμένης· ὅτε τοῦτο τῇ θεϊκῇ θελήσει αὐτοῦ θελητὸν ἦν, καὶ ἐφ' ὅσον ἦν θελητόν.
ΚΕΦΑΛ. ΚΑʹ.
∆ιχῶς δὲ τῆς γνώμης λεγομένης· λέγεται γὰρ γνώμη καὶ ἡ ἁπλῶς ῥοπὴ πρὸς τὸ θελητὸν, ὡς ἐλλό 77.1161 γως γινομένη καὶ μετὰ γνώσεως ἐν τοῖς λογικοῖς. Λέγεται γνώμη καὶ ἡ ἐκ προβουλεύσεως καὶ κρίσεως περί τι διάθεσις· οὐκ ἀσφαλὲς ἢ γνώμην ἢ θέλημα γνωμικὸν εἰπεῖν ἐπὶ τοῦ Χριστοῦ κατὰ τὸ τῆς γνώμης δεύτερον σημαινόμενον· διὰ τὸ συνεισάγεσθαι τούτοις τὴν ἄγνοιαν. Εἰ γὰρ καὶ τὴν ἀγνοοῦσαν ὁ Κύριος φύσιν ἔλαβεν, ἀλλὰ τῶν θείων αὐχημάτων ταύτῃ μετέδωκε. Καὶ ἦν ἡ τοῦ Κυρίου ψυχὴ πᾶσαν ἔχουσα σοφίαν θείαν ἅμα δὴ καὶ ἀνθρωπικήν· πᾶσαν γνῶσιν τῶν γεγονότων, τῶν ὄντων, τῶν ἐσομένων· οὐ φύσει, οὐ χάριτι· διὰ δὲ τὴν πρὸς αὐτὸν τὸν μόνον σοφὸν καὶ πάντα καὶ πρὸ τῆς αὐτῶν γενέσεως εἰδότα προαιωνίως, καθ' ὑπόστασιν ἕνωσιν. Ποίας οὖν ἔχρῃζεν αὕτη βουλῆς; τίνος τῶν μετὰ τὴν βουλὴν, ἡ πάντα γινώσκουσα, καθὼς ἔφημεν. Εἰ δέ ποτε πεινῶντα τὸν Κύριον, ἐλθεῖν γέγραπται πρὸς συκῆν καρπὸν οὐκ ἔχουσαν, εἰ ἄρα εὑρήσει τι ἐν αὐτῇ, καὶ οὐχ εὗρεν εἰ μὴ φύλλα· καθ' ὑπόνοιαν ὁ τοιοῦτος τοῦ λόγου σχηματισμὸς, καθὼς ἂν ὑπενόησεν ἴσως ὁ τὴν αὐτοῦ πρὸς τὴν συκῆν κατιδὼν ἔλευσιν, μὴ μέντοι τὸν τῆς οἰκονομίας λόγον εἰδώς. Τίνι γὰρ ἂν καὶ τῶν τυχόντων ἠγνοήθη τὸ πρόδηλον, ἐπεὶ καιρὸς σύκων οὐκ ἦν; Ἀλλ' ὡς ἂν ὁ τὸ πᾶν ἰσχύων ἐνδείξηται κατὰ καιρὸν, ὅτι μὴ μόνον εὐεργετικὴν ἔχει δύναμιν, ἀλλά γε καὶ τιμωρητικήν· καὶ ὡς ὅπερ ἐθέλοι λόγῳ μόνῳ τοὺς σταυρώσοντας ἀποξηρανεῖ· τὴν πεῖναν, καὶ τὴν πρὸς τὴν συκῆν ἔλευσιν προηγούμενα τίθησι τῆς τοιαύτης ἐνδείξεως ὁ σοφὸς καὶ φιλάνθρωπος. ∆ιά τοι τοῦτο καὶ παρὰ τὸ εἰωθὸς ἡ πεῖνα πρωΐας οὔσης, καθὼς τεθέλητο. Τοιγαροῦν ἡ πρὸς τὴν συκῆν ἄφιξις, ὡσαύτως καὶ ἡ περὶ τοῦ Λαζάρου πεῦσις ὅποι τέθοιτο θανὼν ἐκεῖνος, καὶ εἴ τι παραπλήσιον, οὐκ ἀγνοίας, ἀλλ' οἰκονομίας καὶ προσφόρου συγκαταβάσεως. Κατὰ μὲν οὖν τὸ δεύτερον τῆς γνώμης καὶ τῆς προαιρέσεως σημαινόμενον, οὔτε γνώμην, οὔτε προαίρεσιν εἴποιμεν ἂν ἐπὶ τοῦ Χριστοῦ. Κατὰ δὲ τὸ πρῶτον, καὶ κατὰ γνώμην Θεοῦ τόδε τι διαπεπράχθαι φαμὲν, τουτέστι θελητὸν τῷ Θεῷ, καὶ ἀποδεκτὸν τὸ πραχθέν· ὡς εἰ λέγοιμεν τὸν ∆αβὶδ βεβασιλευκέναι κατὰ γνώμην Θεοῦ. Καὶ προαιρετικὸς μὲν ὁ τοῦ Θεοῦ Λόγος· προαιρετικὸν δὲ τὸ Πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον εἴρηται. ∆έον οὖν ἐρευνᾶσθαι τὴν λέξιν ἐν ἅπασιν, εἰ πλείω δηλοῖ τοῦ ἑνὸς, καὶ μετ' εὐκρινείας τοὺς λόγους προβαίνειν πρὸς τὰ δηλούμενα. Πολλὴ γὰρ ἡ ἐκ τῆς ὁμωνυμίας ἀπάτη, καὶ πρῶτος αὕτη τρόπος ἐν τοῖς σοφίσμασιν.