OF SAINT JUSTIN PHILOSOPHER AND MARTYR, AN OVERTHROW OF CERTAIN ARISTOTELIAN DOGMAS.

 And concerning these things, all the prophets sent from God to all men continued to think the same things, and there was no disagreement among them b

 posited, must necessarily come to be by composition but if the mode of generation by composition fits every generation, it has been superfluously dis

 is another thing besides the destruction of all that is, but if matter has this, how is its being matter not also destroyed? Further, if when the form

 by its presence and absence, then the principles will be both generated and destroyed by each other, and not eternal for the eternal does not need th

 ·having been said concerning the philosophers among the Greeks, how they did not make their arguments concerning beings according to demonstrative sci

 animal, but in the generation of the animal simply the substrate was not seed, how is the animal coming to be from not-animal not contrary to nature?

 and matter is deprived of being the matter of something, but it is not deprived of being matter itself, therefore matter will be being and not-being,

 Saying If, when the form is present, then the privation does not remain, it is clear that when the form is not present, the privation remains. How th

 The eternally uncreated has this same [quality] with respect to something coming to be from it by nature and by art. How then was God able to make som

 and of change, but in another way the form and the shape according to reason. For just as art is said to be that which is according to art and the art

 he subjected to generation not only to the spontaneous one, but also to that through intellect and nature which is manifestly absurd, that the one wh

 sible, but it is among the impossible things for that which is going to be to be ungenerated, both without beginning and without end, both having and

 And that, if the infinite in no way exists, many impossibilities occur, is clear: for time will have a beginning and an end, and magnitudes will not b

 is in potentiality, but not in actuality but the amount taken always exceeds any definite quantity. But this number is not definite, nor does infinit

 second to providence but if place is ungeneratedly and without beginning what it is and has what it has, then place is ungenerated and first of all t

 Where is that which is in a place? And if not every being is in a place, how will some beings not be the same as non-being, if indeed not being in a p

 to have come into being. For those things to which belong the generable and having come into being, from these of necessity the eternal and the unorig

 38. From the same discourse. Whatever neither moves nor is at rest, is not in time for to be in time is to be measured by time, and time is the measu

 time to be, so also has the past been. But the future time, just as it has a future coming-into-being, so also it has a beginning and just as there i

 to be straight. The principles of things that always come to be according to nature cannot be eternal. For if they transmit the nature they have to th

 And this is the case for any single one of the things that come to be, but it is necessary for something else to be moved previously among the things

 according to which some things have come to be above nature, and others according to nature. If before and after is ungenerated, then there will b

 we say, of which there is no demonstration. But God and nature do nothing in vain. If there were contrary motions in the locomotion of bodies, either

 worlds to come into being from it, but having been used up for the genesis of one world, did it stop the unwilling god from making more worlds? 51. Fr

 and an enmattered principle in matter, through which 'for heaven to be' is different from 'for this particular heaven to be'? If heaven cannot do by w

 each other. But now this much is clear, for what reason there are more circular bodies: that it is necessary for there to be generation, and generatio

 and the outcome in things that happen by choice is secondary to the choice), how does it exist in eternal things that this particular thing is because

 chance can exist in eternal things, but the heaven is eternal and its circular motion, for what reason then does it move in one direction, and not in

 to suffer it. These things, therefore, are heated because they are carried through the air, which through the striking by the motion becomes fire but

 it was moved by nature the motion by which it is now moved, how was it not bound to the sphere in vain? But if it was not moved this way according to

 always? If to things that are always in motion the spherical shape was given as suitable, how is it that of the things having a spherical shape, one i

 and have what they have? If the stars ought not to move, why do they move at all by means of others? But if they ought to move, why do they not move b

 of an element besides the things here, but at other times from the same elements, how is he not speaking falsely in one of the two ways? 63. From the

 and the bricks. Therefore, since matter is not substance, who is it that has made from it the things that have come from it, since both nature and art

 change, but into the opposite in the same genus, for instance in quality a change does not occur from white to large but to black, in what way then do

Where is that which is in a place? And if not every being is in a place, how will some beings not be the same as non-being, if indeed not being in a place is common to both? And if only a movable body is in a place, how is the heaven, being a movable body, not in a place? 31. From the same discourse. One might suspect from these things, therefore, that it either does not exist at all or only barely and dimly. For one part of it has come to be and is not, and the other is about to be and is not yet. And from these is composed both infinite time and time that is always being grasped. And that which is composed of non-beings would seem unable to partake of substance. For of every divisible thing, if it exists, it is necessary, when it exists, that either some or all of its parts exist; but of time, some parts have come to be, and others are about to be, and nothing is, though it is divisible. But the "now" is not a part; for the part must measure, and the whole must be composed of the parts; but time does not seem to be composed of "nows." If everything that comes to be, before it came to be, was not, then time is not eternal and without beginning; therefore neither is motion eternal and without beginning, of which time is the number. For if the future part of time is not yet, and the past part of time, before it came to be, was future, there was then a time when the past part of time was not. And if the infinite must be without beginning, then time is not infinite, since it has the change from the future as the beginning of its being. And if the past part of time is time in actuality, and the future in potentiality, and actuality and potentiality are among the things that are, then time, which is composed of the past and the future, is not composed of non-beings. And if time does not partake of substance, yet it does partake of being present to substances, so that from this it is also clear that time is among the things that are. And if the past part of time is observed in the past parts of the divisible, how is no part of time existing, though it is divisible? And if the "now" is not the smallest part of time, what is that which is called the sudden and the indivisible and the instant of time? How is it possible for the change to occur from the future into the "now," and from the "now" into the past, if the "now" is not a part of time? For all is a part of time: first, future; later, now; then, past. 32. From the same fourth discourse of the same treatise. That time, therefore, is neither motion nor without motion, is clear. But that time is created and not eternal, having a beginning and not without beginning, finite and not infinite, this too is clear. And if time is such, then necessarily so too is motion, of which time is the number. 33. From the same discourse. For however great the motion is, so great also does the time always seem

ποῦ τῷ ἐν τόπῳ; Καὶ εἰ μὴ ἅπαν ἐν τόπῳ τὸ ὄν, πῶς οὐκ ἔσται ταὐτὰ τῷ μὴ ὄντι τινὰ τῶν ὄντων, εἴ γε τὸ μὴ εἶναι ἐν τόπῳ κοινόν ἐστιν ἀμφοτέρων; Καὶ εἰ τὸ κινητὸν σῶμα μόνον ἐν τόπῳ ἐστί, πῶς ὁ οὐρανός, σῶμα ὂν κι νητόν, οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν τόπῳ; λα. Ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ λόγου. Ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἢ ὅλως οὐκ ἔστιν ἢ μόλις καὶ ἀμυδρῶς, ἐκ τῶνδέ τις ἂν ὑποπτεύσειε. Τὸ μὲν γὰρ αὐτοῦ γέγονε καὶ οὐκ ἔστι, τὸ δὲ μέλλει καὶ οὔπω ἐστίν. Ἐκ δὲ τούτων καὶ ὁ ἄπειρος καὶ ὁ ἀεὶ λαμβανόμενος χρόνος σύγκειται. Τὸ δὲ ἐκ μὴ ὄντων συγκείμενον ἀδύνατον ἂν δόξειε μετέχειν οὐσίας. Παντὸς γὰρ μεριστοῦ, ἐάν περ ᾖ, ἀνάγκη, ὅτε ἔστιν, ἤτοι ἔνια ἢ πάντα τὰ μέρη εἶναι· τοῦ δὲ χρόνου τὰ μὲν γέγονε, τὰ δὲ μέλλει, ἔστι δὲ οὐθέν, ὄντος μεριστοῦ. Τὸ δὲ νῦν οὐ μέρος· μετρεῖν γὰρ τὸ μέρος καὶ συγκεῖσθαι δεῖ τὸ ὅλον ἐκ τῶν μερῶν· ὁ δὲ χρόνος οὐ δοκεῖ συγκεῖσθαι ἐκ τῶν νῦν. Eἰ πᾶν τὸ γιγνόμενον πρὸ τοῦ γενέσθαι οὐκ ἦν, οὐκ ἄρα ἀΐδιός τε καὶ ἄναρχος ὁ χρόνος· διὸ οὔτε ἡ κίνησίς ἐστιν ἀΐδιός τε καὶ ἄναρχος, ἧς ὁ χρόνος ἐστὶν ἀριθμός. Eἰ γὰρ τὸ μέλλον μέρος τοῦ χρόνου οὔπω ἐστίν, ἦν δὲ καὶ τὸ γεγονὸς μέρος τοῦ χρόνου πρὸ τοῦ γενέσθαι μέλλον, ἦν ἄρα ὅτε οὐκ ἦν τὸ γεγονὸς μέρος τοῦ χρόνου. Καὶ εἰ δεῖ τὸ ἄπειρον ἄναρχον εἶναι, οὐκ ἄρα ἄπειρος ὁ χρόνος, τὴν μετα βολὴν τοῦ μέλλοντος ἔχων ἀρχὴν τοῦ εἶναι. Καὶ εἰ μὲν τὸ γεγονὸς μέρος τοῦ χρόνου ἐνεργείᾳ ἐστὶ χρόνος, τὸ δὲ μέλλον δυνάμει, ἐν δὲ τοῖς οὖσιν ἡ ἐνέργεια καὶ δύναμις, οὐκ ἄρα ἐκ μὴ ὄντων σύγκειται ὁ ἐκ τοῦ γεγονότος καὶ μέλλοντος συγκείμενος χρόνος. Καὶ εἰ τῆς οὐσίας οὐ μετέχει ὁ χρόνος, ἀλλ' ὅμως τοῦ παρακεῖσθαι ταῖς οὐσίαις μετέχει, ὡς καὶ ἐκ τούτου φανερὸν ὅτι τῶν ὄντων ἐστὶν ὁ χρόνος. Καὶ εἰ τὸ γεγονὸς μέρος τοῦ χρόνου ἐν τοῖς γεγονόσι μέρεσι τοῦ μερι στοῦ θεωρεῖται, πῶς οὐθὲν μέρος ἐστὶ τοῦ χρόνου, μεριστοῦ ὄντος; Καὶ εἰ τὸ νῦν οὐκ ἔστιν ἐλάχιστον μέρος τοῦ χρόνου, τί ἐστι τὸ ἐξαίφνης καὶ τὸ ἄτομον καὶ ἡ στιγμὴ τοῦ χρό νου λεγόμενον; Πῶς ἐνδέχεται ἐκ μὲν τοῦ μέλλοντος γί νεσθαι εἰς τὸ νῦν τὴν μεταβολήν, ἐκ δὲ τοῦ νῦν εἰς τὸ παρεληλυθός, τοῦ νῦν μὴ ὄντος μέρους τοῦ χρόνου; Πάντα γὰρ μέρος τοῦ χρόνου, πρῶτον, μέλλον, ὕστερον, νῦν, ἔπειτα, παρεληλυθός. λβ. Ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ τετάρτου λόγου τῆς αὐτῆς πραγματείας. Ὅτι μὲν τοίνυν οὔτε κίνησις οὔτε ἄνευ κινήσεως ὁ χρόνος ἐστί, φανερόν. Ἀλλ' ὅτι γενητὸς ὁ χρόνος καὶ οὐκ ἀΐδιος, ἠργμένος καὶ οὐκ ἄναρχος, πεπερασμένος καὶ οὐκ ἄπειρος, φανερόν ἐστι καὶ τοῦτο. Eἰ δὲ ὁ χρόνος τοιοῦτος, ἐξ ἀνάγκης καὶ ἡ κί νησις, ἧς ἀριθμός ἐστιν ὁ χρόνος. λγ. Ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ λόγου. Ὅση γὰρ ἡ κίνησις, τοσοῦτος καὶ ὁ χρόνος ἀεὶ δοκεῖ