makes of themselves, in the same way also God, being ungenerated, ungeneratedly makes all things, not becoming but co-existing, and by the infinity of his power he makes different things. Who then is it that made man, who according to the voice of the respondent came into being generatively, and himself being generated, generatively making generated things? But if it is God, how did the respondent not lie, when he said: God, being ungenerated, ungeneratedly makes ungenerated things? But if not God, how is God not provident for things that are not his own, being provident for men, of whom he is not the maker? But if it is absurd not to call God the maker of man, then it is also absurd to say that God ungeneratedly makes ungenerated things; for behold he has made man, who is generatively generated. If the part of something is generated, of necessity the whole of it is also generated, and man is a part of the world, who according to the voice of the respondent came into being generatively, therefore the world is also generated. If God is ungenerated and makes ungenerated things, how does he not bear the name of ungenerated in common, it not distinguishing him from anything? If God does not make what he is (for that is impossible), but makes what he is not, then he makes generated things, being himself ungenerated. We do not seek first how God makes, but what he makes; for when what he makes is found, how he makes is also found. If God, being ungenerated, ungeneratedly makes ungenerated things, then being without a master, he also makes things without a master masterlessly. But if the second is absurd, then the first is also absurd. Things that co-exist with each other without interval, none of them can be the maker of any of them; otherwise, they will be makers of each other. But if this is absurd, then it is also absurd to call God the maker of things that co-exist with him without interval. If God is able to make infinite things, but by willing, and God is not able to be different things (for he is one and simple and uniform), but wills different things, then he does not make by being, but by willing. If, just as angles co-exist with the combination of lines, so also the world with God, then God makes the world by necessity and without will, accidentally and not in itself; for angles co-exist with the position of lines by necessity and accidentally. He who makes, makes what is not; for what is does not need a maker. But if this is so, then God is not the maker of the things that co-exist with him, as the respondent says. God did not make a house, but he made man, and gave him the power to make a house. Therefore none of these things is ungeneratedly from God, neither the making of man nor the giving of the power. The respondent has set down two rules: one for the making of things that are ungenerated and make ungeneratedly, and one for the making of things that are generated and make generatively. And the works of the ungenerated, he says, co-exist with their own makers ungeneratedly, but the works of the generated are in time. Since, therefore, none of the ungenerated make in time, it is clear that generated things have neither come to be from the ungenerated nor can come to be

αὑτῶν ποιεῖ, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον καὶ ὁ θεός, ἀγένητος ὤν, ἀγενήτως ποιεῖ πάντα, οὐ γινόμενα ἀλλὰ συνυφιστάμενα, καὶ τῇ μὲν τῆς δυνάμεως ἀπειρίᾳ τὰ διάφορα ποιεῖ. Τίς οὖν ἐστιν ὁ ποιήσας τὸν ἄνθρωπον, τὸν κατὰ τὴν φωνὴν τοῦ ἀπο κριναμένου γεννητῶς γενόμενον, καὶ αὐτὸν ὄντα γεννητόν, γεν νητῶς γεννητὰ ποιοῦντα; Ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν ὁ θεός, πῶς οὐκ ἐψεύ σατο ὁ ἀποκρινάμενος, εἰπών· Ὁ θεός, ἀγένητος ὤν, ἀγε νήτως ἀγένητα ποιεῖ; Eἰ δὲ οὐχ ὁ θεός, πῶς οὐ τῶν ἀλλο τρίων προνοεῖ ὁ θεός, προνοῶν τῶν ἀνθρώπων, ὧν οὐκ ἔστι ποιητής; Eἰ δὲ ἄτοπον τὸ μὴ λέγειν τὸν θεὸν ποιητὴν τοῦ ἀν θρώπου, ἄτοπον ἄρα καὶ τὸ λέγειν τὸν θεὸν ἀγενήτως ἀγέ νητα ποιεῖν· ἰδοὺ γὰρ πεποίηκε τὸν ἄνθρωπον γεννητῶς ὄντα γεννητόν. Eἰ οὗ τὸ μέρος γεννητόν, τούτου ἐξ ἀνάγκης καὶ τὸ ὅλον γεννητόν, μέρος δὲ τοῦ κόσμου ὁ ἄνθρωπος, ὁ κατὰ τὴν φωνὴν τοῦ ἀποκριναμένου γεννητῶς γενόμενος, γενητὸς ἄρα καὶ ὁ κόσμος. Eἰ ἀγένητός ἐστιν ὁ θεὸς καὶ τὰ ἀγένητα ποιεῖ, πῶς οὐ κατὰ κοινοῦ φέρει τὸ τοῦ ἀγενήτου ὄνομα, τὸ μηδενὶ αὐτὸν ἀντιδιαστέλλον; Eἰ ὁ θεὸς ὅ ἐστιν οὐ ποιεῖ (ἀδύ νατον γάρ), ποιεῖ δὲ ἃ οὐκ ἔστι, γενητὰ ἄρα ποιεῖ, ἀγένητος αὐτὸς ὤν. Oὐ ζητοῦμεν δὲ πρῶτον τὸ πῶς ποιεῖ ὁ θεός, ἀλλὰ τὸ τί ποιεῖ· εὑρεθὲν γὰρ τὸ τί ποιεῖ εὕρηται καὶ τὸ πῶς ποιεῖ. Eἰ ἀγένητος ὑπάρχων ὁ θεὸς ἀγενήτως ἀγένητα ποιεῖ, καὶ ἀδέσποτος ἄρα ὑπάρχων ἀδεσπότως ἀδέσποτα ποιεῖ. Eἰ δὲ ἄτοπον τὸ δεύτερον, ἄτοπον ἄρα καὶ τὸ πρῶτον. Τὰ ἀδια στάτως συνυφιστάμενα ἀλλήλοις, οὐδὲν αὐτῶν οὐδενὸς αὐτῶν δύναται εἶναι ποιητής· εἰ δὲ μή γε, ἀλλήλων ἔσονται ποιηταί. Eἰ δὲ τοῦτο ἄτοπον, ἄτοπον ἄρα καὶ τὸ λέγειν τὸν θεὸν ποιη τὴν τῶν ἀδιαστάτως αὐτῷ συνυφισταμένων. Eἰ ἄπειρα μὲν δύναται ποιεῖν ὁ θεός, ἀλλὰ τῷ βούλεσθαι, ὁ θεὸς δὲ διάφορα μὲν εἶναι οὐ δύναται (ἓν γάρ ἐστι καὶ ἁπλοῦν καὶ μονοειδές), διάφορα δὲ βούλεται, οὐκ ἄρα τῷ εἶναι ποιεῖ, ἀλλὰ τῷ βού λεσθαι. Eἰ, ὥσπερ τῇ συνθέσει τῶν γραμμῶν συνυφίστανται αἱ γωνίαι, οὕτως καὶ ὁ κόσμος τῷ θεῷ, ἀναγκαστικῶς ἄρα καὶ ἀβουλήτως ποιεῖ τὸν κόσμον ὁ θεός, κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς καὶ οὐ καθ' αὑτό· ἀναγκαστικῶς γὰρ καὶ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς συνυ φίστανται αἱ γωνίαι τῇ θέσει τῶν γραμμῶν. Ὁ ποιῶν τὸ μὴ ὂν ποιεῖ· τὸ γὰρ ὂν οὐ χρῄζει ποιητοῦ. Ἀλλ' εἰ τοῦτο, οὐκ ἄρα ποιητής ἐστιν ὁ θεὸς τῶν συνυφισταμένων αὐτῷ, καθά φησιν ὁ ἀποκρινάμενος. Ὁ θεὸς οἰκίαν οὐκ ἐποίησεν, ἀλλ' ἐποίησε τὸν ἄνθρωπον, καὶ δέδωκεν αὐτῷ δύναμιν ποιητικὴν τῆς οἰκίας. Oὐδὲν οὖν τούτων ἀγενήτως παρὰ τῷ θεῷ, οὔτε ἡ ποίησις τοῦ ἀνθρώπου οὔτε ἡ δόσις τῆς δυνάμεως. ∆ύο κα νόνας ἔθηκεν ὁ ἀποκρινάμενος· ἕνα μὲν ἐπὶ τῆς ποιήσεως τῶν ἀγεννήτων ὄντων καὶ ἀγεννήτως ποιούντων, ἕνα δὲ ἐπὶ τῆς ποιήσεως τῶν γεννητῶν ὄντων καὶ γεννητῶς ποιούντων. Καὶ τὰ μέν, φησίν, ἔργα τῶν ἀγεννήτων συνυφίσταται τοῖς ἑαυ τῶν ποιηταῖς ἀγεννήτως, τὰ δὲ ἔργα τῶν γεννητῶν ἔγχρονα. Μηδενὸς τοίνυν τῶν ἀγεννήτων ἐγχρόνως ποιούντων, δῆλον ὅτι τὰ γεννητὰ οὔτε γέγονεν ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀγεννήτου οὔτε γενέσθαι