LECTURE 12 (189 b 30-190 b 15)

IN EVERY COMING TO BE THREE PRINCIPLES ARE TO BE FOUND: THE SUBJECT, THE TERMINUS OF THE PRODUCTION, AND ITS OPPOSITE

             98. After the Philosopher has investigated the number of principles by means of disputation, he here begins to determine the truth. This section is divided into two parts. First he determines the truth. Secondly, where he says, 'We will not proceed . . .' (191 a 23), he excludes from the truth already determined certain difficulties and errors of the ancients.

             The first part is divided into two parts. First he shows that in any natural coming-to-be three things are found. Secondly, where he says, 'Plainly, then . . .' (190 b 16), he shows from this that these three things are principles.

             Concerning the first part he makes two points. First he states his intention, and secondly he pursues his intention, where he says, 'We say that . . .' (189 b 33).

             99. Because he had said above that the question of whether there are only two principles of nature or three involves much difficulty, he concludes that he must first speak of generation and production as common to all the species of mutation. For in any mutation there is found a certain coming-to-be. For example, when something is altered from white to black, the non-white comes to be from the white, and the black comes to be from the non-black. And the same is true of other mutations. He also points out the reason for this order of procedure. It is necessary to speak first of those things which are common, and afterwards to think of those things which are proper to each thing, as was said in the beginning of the Book.

             100. Next where he says, 'We say that one thing . . .' (189 b 33), he develops his position. Concerning this he makes two points. First he sets forth certain things which are necessary to prove his position. Secondly, where he says, 'These distinctions drawn . . .' (190 a 13), he proves his point.

             Concerning the first part he makes two points. First he sets up a certain division, secondly, where he says, 'As regards one . . .' (190 a 5), he points out the differences among the parts of the division.

             101. He says, therefore, first that in any coming-to-be one thing is said to come to be from another thing with reference to coming to be in regard to substantial being [esse], or one comes to be from another with reference to coming to be in regard to accidental being [esse]. Hence every change has two termini. The word 'termini', however, is used in two ways, for the termini of a production or mutation can be taken as either simple or composite.

             He explains this as follows. Sometimes we say man becomes musical, and then the two termini of the production are simple. It is the same when we say that the non-musical becomes musical. But when we say that the non-musical man becomes a musical man, each of the termini is a composite. Yet when coming to be is attributed to man or to the non-musical, each is simple. And thus, that which becomes, i.e., that to which coming to be is attributed, is said to come to be simply. Moreover, that in which the very coming to be is terminated, which is also said to come to be simply, is musical. Thus we say man becomes musical, or the non-musical becomes musical. But when each is signified as coming to be as composed (i.e., both what becomes, i.e., that to which the coming to be is attributed, and what is made, i.e., that in which the coming to be is terminated), then we say that the non-musical man becomes musical. For then there is composition on the part of the subject only and simplicity on the part of the predicate. But when I say that the non-musical man becomes a musical man, then there is composition on the part of each.

             102. Next where he says, 'As regards one . . .' (190 a 5), he points out two differences in what was said above.

             The first is that in some of the cases mentioned above we use a twofold mode of speech, i.e., we say 'this becomes this' and 'from this, this comes to be'. For we say 'the non-musical becomes musical', and 'from the non-musical, the musical comes to be'. But we do not speak this way in all cases. For we do not say 'the musical comes to be from man', but 'man becomes musical'.

             He points out the second difference where he says, 'When a "simple" . . .' (190 a 8). He says that when coming to be is attributed to two simple things, i.e., the subject and the opposite, one of these is permanent, but the other is not. For when someone has already been made musical, 'man' remains. But the opposite does not remain, whether it be the negative opposite, as the non-musical, or the privation or contrary, as the unmusical. Nor is the composite of subject and the opposite permanent, for the non-musical man does not remain after man has been made musical. And so coming to be is attributed to these three things: for it was said that man becomes musical, and the non-musical becomes musical, and the non-musical man becomes musical. Of these three, only the first remains complete in a production, the other two do not remain.

             103. Next where he says, 'These distinctions drawn . . .' (190 a 13), having assumed the foregoing, he proves his position, namely that three things are found in any natural production.

             Concerning this he makes three points. First he enumerates two things which are found in any natural production. Secondly, where he says, 'One part survives . . .' (190 a 17), he proves what he had supposed. Thirdly, where he says, 'Thus, clearly, . . .' (190 b 10), he draws his conclusion.

             104. He says, therefore, first that, if anyone, taking for granted what was said above, wishes to consider [coming-to-be] in all the things which come to be naturally, he will agree that there must always be some subject to which the coming to be is attributed, and that that subject, although one in number and subject, is not the same in species or nature [ratio]. For when it is said of a man that he becomes musical, the man is indeed one in subject, but two in nature [ratio]. For man and the non-musical are not the same according to nature [ratio]. Aristotle does not, however, mention here the third point, namely, that in every generation there must be something generated, for this is obvious.

             105. Next where he says, 'One part survives . . .' (190 a 17), he proves the two things which he had assumed. He shows first that the subject to which the coming to be is attributed is two in nature [ratio]. Secondly, where he says, 'But there are different . . .' (190 a 32), he shows that it is necessary to assume a subject in every coming to be.

             He shows the first point in two ways. First he points out that in the subject to which the coming to be is attributed there is something which is permanent and something which is not permanent. For that which is not an opposite of the terminus of the production is permanent, for man remains when he becomes musical, but the non-musical does not remain. And from this it is clear that man and the non-musical are not the same in nature [ratio], since the one remains, whereas the other does not.

             106. Secondly, where he says, 'We speak of . . .' (190 a 21), he shows the same thing in another way. With reference to the non-permanent things, it is much better to say 'this comes to be from this' than to say 'this becomes this' (although this latter also may be said, but not as properly). For we say that the musical comes to be from the non-musical. We also say that the non-musical becomes musical, but this is accidental, insofar as that which happens to be non-musical becomes musical. But in permanent things this is not said. For we do not say that the musical comes to be from man, rather we say that the man becomes musical.

             Even in reference to permanent things we sometimes say 'this comes to be from this', as we say that a statue comes to be from bronze. But this happens because by the name 'bronze' we understand the 'unshaped', and so this is said by reason of the privation which is understood.

             From this very fact, then, that we use different modes of speech with reference to the subject and the opposite, it is clear that the subject and the opposite, such as man and the non-musical, are two in nature [ratio].

             107. Next where he says, 'But there are different . . .' (190 a 32), he proves the other point which he had assumed, namely, that in every natural production there must be a subject.

             The proof of this point by argumentation belongs to metaphysics. Hence this is proved in Metaphysics, VII. He proves it here only by induction. He does this first in regard to the things which come to be, secondly in regard to the modes of coming to be, where he says, 'Generally things . . .' (190 b 5).

             He says, therefore, first that since 'to come to be' is used in many ways, 'to come to be simply' is said only of the coming to be of substances, whereas other things are said to come to be accidentally. This is so because 'to come to be' implies the beginning of existing. Therefore, in order for something to come to be simply, it is required that it previously will not have been simply, which happens in those things which come to be substantially. For when a man comes to be, he not only previously was not a man, but it is true to say that he simply was not. When, however, a man becomes white, it is not true to say that he previously was not, but that he previously was not such.

             Those things, however, which come to be accidentally clearly depend upon a subject. For quantity and quality and the other accidents, whose coming to be is accidental, cannot be without a subject. For only substance does not exist in a subject.

             Further, it is clear, if one considers the point, that even substances come to be from a subject. For we see that plants and animals come to be from seed.

             108. Next where he says, 'Generally things . . .' (190 b 5), he shows the same thing by induction from the modes of coming to be.

             He says that of things which come to be, some come to be by change of figure, as the statue comes to be from the bronze, others come to be by addition, as is clear in all instances of increase, as the river comes to be from many streams, others come to be by subtraction, as the image of Mercury comes to be from stone by sculpture. Still other things come to be by composition, e.g., a house; and other things come to be by alteration, as those things whose matter is changed, either by nature or by art. And in all of these cases it is apparent that they come to be from some subject. Whence it is clear that everything which comes to be comes to be from a subject.

             But it must be noted that artificial things are here enumerated along with those things which come to be simply (even though artificial forms are accidents) because artificial things are in some way in the genus of substance by reason of their matter. Or else perhaps he lists them because of the opinion of the ancients, who thought of natural things and artificial things in the same way, as will be said in Book II.

             109. Next where he says, 'Thus clearly . . .' (190 b 10), he draws his conclusion. He says that it has been shown from what was said above that that to which coming to be is attributed is always composed. And since in any production there is that at which the coming to be is terminated and that to which the coming to be is attributed, the latter of which is twofold, i.e., the subject and the opposite, it is then clear that there are three things in any coming to be, namely, the subject, the terminus of the production, and the opposite of this terminus. Thus when a man becomes musical, the opposite is the non-musical, the subject is the man, and musical is the terminus of the production. And in like manner, shapelessness and lack of figure and lack of order are opposites, while bronze and gold and stone are subjects in artificial productions.