Chapter XVI—Analogy of Death and Sleep, and Consequent Argument for the Resurrection.

And let no one think it strange that we call by the name of life a continuance of being which is interrupted by death and corruption; but let him consider rather that this word has not one meaning only, nor is there only one measure of continuance, because the nature also of the things that continue is not one. For if each of the things that continue has its continuance according to its peculiar nature, neither in the case of those who are wholly incorruptible and immortal shall we find the continuance like ours, because the natures of superior beings do not take the level of such as are inferior; nor in men is it proper to look for a continuance invariable and unchangeable; inasmuch as the former are from the first created immortal, and continue to exist without end by the simple will of their Maker, and men, in respect of the soul, have from their first origin an unchangeable continuance, but in respect of the body obtain immortality by means of change. This is what is meant by the doctrine of the resurrection; and, looking to this, we both await the dissolution of the body, as the sequel to a life of want and corruption, and after this we hope for a continuance with immortality,9    [Job xix. 25. On which see St. Jerome, Ad Paulinum, cap. 10, tom. iv. 569, ed. Bened. And, on the text itself, see Pusey on Daniel, p. 504, London, 1864. A fine passage in Calvin, ad locum: “En igitur qualis debate esse nostra Fides,” etc. Opp., tom. ii. p. 260, ed. Amsterdam, 1676.] not putting either our death on a level with the death of the irrational animals, or the continuance of man with the continuance of immortals, lest we should unawares in this way put human nature and life on a level with things with which it is not proper to compare them. It ought not, therefore, to excite dissatisfaction, if some inequality appears to exist in regard to the duration of men; nor, because the separation of the soul from the members of the body and the dissolution of its parts interrupts the continuity of life, must we therefore despair of the resurrection. For although the relaxation of the senses and of the physical powers, which naturally takes place in sleep, seems to interrupt the sensational life when men sleep at equal intervals of time, and, as it were, come back to life again, yet we do not refuse to call it life; and for this reason, I suppose, some call sleep the brother of death,10    [Homer, Iliad, b. xiv. 231, and Virgil, Æn., vi. 278.] not as deriving their origin from the same ancestors and fathers, but because those who are dead and those who sleep are subject to similar states, as regards at least the stillness and the absence of all sense of the present or the past, or rather of existence itself and their own life. If, therefore, we do not refuse to call by the name of life the life of men full of such inequality from birth to dissolution, and interrupted by all those things which we have before mentioned, neither ought we to despair of the life succeeding to dissolution, such as involves the resurrection, although for a time it is interrupted by the separation of the soul from the body.

Ξενιζέσθω δὲ μηδεὶς εἰ τὴν θανάτῳ καὶ φθορᾷ διακοπτομένην ζωὴν ὀνομάζομεν διαμονήν, λογιζόμενος ὡς οὐχ εἷς τοῦ προσρήματος ὁ λόγος, οὐχ ἓν τῆς διαμονῆς τὸ μέτρον, ὅτι μηδὲ τῶν διαμενόντων φύσις μία. εἴπερ γὰρ κατὰ τὴν οἰκείαν φύσιν ἕκαστον τῶν διαμενόντων ἔχει τὴν διαμονήν, οὔτ' ἐπὶ τῶν καθαρῶς ἀφθάρτων καὶ ἀθανάτων εὕροι τις ἂν ἰσάζουσαν τὴν διαμονήν, τῷ μηδὲ τὰς οὐσίας τῶν κρειττόνων συνεξισοῦσθαι ταῖς καθ' ὑπόβασιν διαφερούσαις, οὔτ' ἐπὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων τὴν ὁμαλὴν ἐκείνην καὶ ἀμετάβλητον ἐπιζητεῖν ἄξιον, ἅτε δὴ τῶν μὲν ἐξ ἀρχῆς γενομένων ἀθανάτων καὶ διαμενόντων μόνῃ τῇ γνώμῃ τοῦ ποιήσαντος ἀτελευτήτως, τῶν δὲ ἀνθρώπων κατὰ μὲν τὴν ψυχὴν ἀπὸ γενέσεως ἐχόντων τὴν ἀμετάβλητον διαμονήν, κατὰ δὲ τὸ σῶμα προσλαμβανόντων ἐκ μεταβολῆς τὴν ἀφθαρσίαν· ὅπερ ὁ τῆς ἀναστάσεως βούλεται λόγος· πρὸς ἣν ἀποβλέποντες τήν τε διάλυσιν τοῦ σώματος ὡς ἑπομένην τῇ μετ' ἐνδείας καὶ φθορᾶς ζωῇ περιμένομεν καὶ μετὰ ταύτην τὴν μετ' ἀφθαρσίας ἐλπίζομεν διαμονήν, οὔτε τῇ τῶν ἀλόγων τελευτῇ συνεξισοῦντες τὴν ἡμετέραν τελευτὴν οὔτε τῇ τῶν ἀθανάτων διαμονῇ τὴν τῶν ἀνθρώπων διαμονήν, ἵνα μὴ λάθωμεν ταύτῃ συνεξισοῦντες καὶ τὴν τῶν ἀνθρώπων φύσιν καὶ ζωὴν οἷς μὴ προσῆκεν. οὐ τοίνυν ἐπὶ τούτῳ δυσχεραίνειν ἄξιον, εἴ τις ἀνωμαλία θεωρεῖται περὶ τὴν τῶν ἀνθρώπων διαμονήν, οὐδ' ἐπειδὴ χωρισμὸς ψυχῆς ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος μερῶν καὶ μορίων διάλυσις τὴν συνεχῆ διακόπτει ζωήν, διὰ τοῦτ' ἀπογινώσκειν χρὴ τὴν ἀνάστασιν. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐπειδὴ τὴν κατὰ συναίσθησιν ζωὴν διακόπτειν δοκοῦσιν αἱ κατὰ τὸν ὕπνον φυσικῶς ἐγγινόμεναι παρέσεις τῶν αἰσθήσεων καὶ τῶν φυσικῶν δυνάμεων, ἰσομέτροις χρόνου διαστήμασιν ὑπνούντων τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ τρόπον τινὰ πάλιν ἀναβιωσκόντων, τὴν αὐτὴν παραιτούμεθα λέγειν ζωήν· παρ' ἣν αἰτίαν, οἶμαι, τινὲς ἀδελφὸν τοῦ θανάτου τὸν ὕπνον ὀνομάζουσιν, οὐχ ὡς ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν προγόνων ἢ πατέρων φύντας γενεαλογοῦντες, ἀλλ' ὡς τῶν ὁμοίων παθῶν τοῖς τε θανοῦσι καὶ τοῖς ὑπνοῦσιν ἐγγινομένων, ἕνεκα γε τῆς ἠρεμίας καὶ τοῦ μηδενὸς ἐπαισθάνεσθαι τῶν παρόντων ἢ γινομένων, μᾶλλον δὲ μηδὲ τοῦ εἶναι καὶ τῆς ἰδίας ζωῆς. εἴπερ οὖν τὴν τῶν ἀνθρώπων ζωὴν τοσαύτης γέμουσαν ἀνωμαλίας ἀπὸ γενέσεως μέχρι διαλύσεως καὶ διακοπτομένην πᾶσιν οἷς προείπομεν, οὐ παραιτούμεθα τὴν αὐτὴν λέγειν ζωήν, οὐδὲ τὴν ἐπέκεινα τῆς διαλύσεως ζωήν, ἥτις ἑαυτῇ συνεισάγει τὴν ἀνάστασιν, ἀπογινώσκειν ὀφείλομεν, κἂν ἐπὶ ποσὸν διακόπτηται τῷ χωρισμῷ τῆς ψυχῆς ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος.