Chapter XVI.—A Series of Dilemmas.  They Show that Hermogenes Cannot Escape from the Orthodox Conclusion.

On the very threshold,150    Præstructione. The notion is of the foundation of an edifice:  here ="preliminary remarks” (see our Anti-Marcion, v. 5, p. 438). then, of this doctrine,151    Articuli. which I shall probably have to treat of elsewhere, I distinctly lay it down as my position, that both good and evil must be ascribed either to God, who made them out of Matter; or to Matter itself, out of which He made them; or both one and the other to both of them together,152    Utrumque utrique. because they are bound together—both He who created, and that out of which He created; or (lastly) one to One and the other to the Other,153    Alterum alteri. because after Matter and God there is not a third. Now if both should prove to belong to God, God evidently will be the author of evil; but God, as being good, cannot be the author of evil. Again, if both are ascribed to Matter, Matter will evidently be the very mother of good,154    Boni matrix. but inasmuch as Matter is wholly evil, it cannot be the mother of good. But if both one and the other should be thought to belong to Both together, then in this case also Matter will be comparable with God; and both will be equal, being on equal terms allied to evil as well as to good. Matter, however, ought not to be compared with God, in order that it may not make two gods. If, (lastly,) one be ascribed to One, and the other to the Other—that is to say, let the good be God’s, and the evil belong to Matter—then, on the one hand, evil must not be ascribed to God, nor, on the other hand, good to Matter.  And God, moreover, by making both good things and evil things out of Matter, creates them along with it. This being the case, I cannot tell how Hermogenes155    The usual reading is “Hermogenes.” Rigaltius, however, reads “Hermogenis,” of which Oehler approves; so as to make Tertullian say, “I cannot tell how I can avoid the opinion of Hermogenes, who,” etc. etc. is to escape from my conclusion; for he supposes that God cannot be the author of evil, in what way soever He created evil out of Matter, whether it was of His own will, or of necessity, or from the reason (of the case). If, however, He is the author of evil, who was the actual Creator, Matter being simply associated with Him by reason of its furnishing Him with substance,156    Per substantiæ suggestum. you now do away with the cause157    Excusas jam causam. Hermogenes held that Matter was eternal, to exclude God from the authorship of evil.  This causa of Matter he was now illogically evading. Excusare = ex, causa, “to cancel the cause.” of your introducing Matter. For it is not the less true, that it is by means of Matter that God shows Himself the author of evil, although Matter has been assumed by you expressly to prevent God’s seeming to be the author of evil. Matter being therefore excluded, since the cause of it is excluded, it remains that God without doubt, must have made all things out of nothing. Whether evil things were amongst them we shall see, when it shall be made clear what are evil things, and whether those things are evil which you at present deem to be so. For it is more worthy of God that He produced even these of His own will, by producing them out of nothing, than from the predetermination of another,158    De præjudicio alieno. (which must have been the case) if He had produced them out of Matter. It is liberty, not necessity, which suits the character of God. I would much rather that He should have even willed to create evil of Himself, than that He should have lacked ability to hinder its creation.

CAPUT XVI.

Igitur in praestructione hujus articuli, et alibi forsitan retractandi, equidem diffinio, aut Deo adscribendum et bonum et malum quae ex materia fecit, aut materiae ipsi, ex qua fecit; aut utrumque utrique, 0211B quia ambo sibi obligantur qui fecit et de qua fecit: aut alterum alteri; tertius enim, praeter materiam et Deum, non est. Porro si Dei erit utrumque, videbitur Deus etiam mali auctor: Deus autem ut bonus, auctor mali non erit; si materiae utrumque, videbitur materia etiam boni matrix; mala autem in totum materia boni non erit matrix; si utriusque erit, utrumque; in hoc quoque comparabitur Deo materia, et partes erunt ambo, ex aequo mali ac boni adfines; aequari autem Deo materia non debet, ne duos deos efficiat; si alterum alterius, utique Dei bonum , et materiae malum; neque malum Deo, neque materiae bonum adscribitur: et bona autem et mala Deus, de materia faciendo, cum ea facit. Haec si ita sunt, 0211C nescio qua possit evadere sententia Hermogenis , qui Deum , quoquo modo de materia malum condidit, sive voluntate, sive necessitate, sive ratione, non putet mali auctorem. Porro, si mali auctor est ipse qui fecit , plane socia materia per substantiae suggestum, excludis jam caussam materiae introducendae. Nihilominus enim, et per materiam Deus auctor mali ostenditur, si ideo materia praesumpta est, ne Deus mali auctor videretur. Exclusa itaque materia, dum excluditur caussa ejus, superest uti 0212A Deum omnia ex nihilo fecisse constet. Videbimus an et mala, cum apparuerit quae mala, et an mala interim ea quae putas. Dignius enim de suo arbitrio produxit, haec quoque producendo de nihilo, quam de praejudicio alieno, si de materia produxisset. Libertas, non necessitas, Deo competit: malo voluerit mala a semetipso condidisse, quam non potuerit non condidisse.