is, being a mixture of all the ages, and light of his own powers and works, the beginning of all things, a luminary in heaven, and father of all, mind and animation of the whole, movement of all circles. Behold, he clearly says that the God of all is one, and the beginning of all things, the worker of his own powers, a luminary and animation, that is, the life-giving of the whole, and the movement of all circles; for nothing is self-moved, but all things have been produced by him, and it appears they have received their motion from non-being into being. And Plato speaks something like this: For to find the father and maker of this universe is a task, and having found him it is impossible to declare him to all. Very rightly indeed; for 'The glory of the Lord conceals a matter,' as it is written, and every word about him is weak and falls short of his worth; for he is beyond all conception, but we see things concerning him through a mirror and in a riddle, as the all-wise Paul says. 1.43 And Porphyry says in the fourth book of his History of Philosophy that Plato both believed and also stated again concerning one God, that no name applies to him nor can human knowledge comprehend him, but that the so-called appellations are predicated of him improperly from his effects. But if we must dare to say anything at all about him from the names we use, the appellation of 'the One' and that of 'the Good' should rather be assigned to him. For 'the One' indicates his simplicity and for this reason his self-sufficiency; for he needs nothing, not parts, not substance, not powers, not energies, but is the cause of all these things, and 'the Good' shows that from him is everything whatsoever that is good, with other things imitating as far as possible his, if one must say so, unique property and being saved through it. And Hermes Trismegistus says something like this: To comprehend God is difficult, but to express him is impossible, even for one who is able to comprehend; for it is impossible to signify the incorporeal with a body, and it is not possible for the perfect to be comprehended by the imperfect, and it is difficult for the eternal to associate with the short-lived; for the one always is, while the other passes away, and the one is true, while the other is shadowed by appearance. Therefore, by as much as the weaker is distant from the stronger and the lesser from the greater, so much is the mortal from the divine and immortal. If, then, there is an incorporeal eye, let it go forth from the body to the vision of the beautiful, and let it fly up, and be suspended, seeking to behold not shape, not body, not ideas, but rather that which is the maker of these, the quiet, the calm, the stable, the unchangeable, the same all and only, the one, the same from itself, the same in itself, that which is like to itself, which is neither like another, nor unlike itself. 1.44 And again the same: Therefore, thinking about that one and only good, never say that anything is impossible; for all power is he, nor should you think of him as being in anything, nor again as outside of anything; for he, being boundless, is the boundary of all things, and being contained by nothing, he contains all things. For what difference is there between bodies and the incorporeal, and between created things and the uncreated, and between things subject to necessity and the self-determining, or between earthly things and heavenly, and between corruptible things and the eternal? Is it not that the one is self-determining, while the other is subject to necessity, and that the things below, being imperfect, are corruptible? But indeed Sophocles also speaks thus about God: In truth, there is one, one God, who fashioned both the heaven and the broad earth, and the gleaming swell of the sea, and the might of the winds; But we mortals, many, wandering in heart, have set up consolations for our woes, images of gods from stones and wood, or figures of gold-wrought or ivory, and performing sacrifices to these and empty festivals, thus we think to be pious. And indeed also the most wise Xenophon: He who shakes and stills all things, great and powerful as he is, is manifest; but what sort of form he has, is unmanifest; nor
ἐστι, κρᾶσις ὢν τῶν ὅλων αἰώνων, καὶ φῶς τῶν αὑτοῦ δυνάμεων καὶ ἔργων, ἀρχὰ πάντων, ἐν οὐρανῷ φωστήρ, καὶ πάντων πατήρ, νοῦς καὶ ψύχωσις τῶν ὅλων, κύκλων πάντων κίνασις. Ἰδοὺ δὴ σαφῶς ἕνα τε εἶναι λέγει τὸν τῶν ὅλων Θεόν, καὶ πάντων ἀρχήν, ἐργάτην τε τῶν αὑτοῦ δυνάμεων, φωστῆρα καὶ ψύχωσιν ἤτοι ζωοποίησιν τῶν ὅλων, καὶ κύκλων πάντων κίνησιν· αὐτοκίνητον γὰρ οὐδέν, παρῆκται δὲ τὰ πάντα παρ' αὐτοῦ, καὶ τὴν ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος εἰς τὸ εἶναι κίνησιν λαχόντα φαίνεται. Ὁ δὲ Πλάτων ὧδέ πη φθέγγεται· Τὸν γὰρ πατέρα καὶ ποιητὴν τοῦδε τοῦ πάντος εὑρεῖν τε ἔργον, καὶ εὑρόντα εἰς πάντας ἐξειπεῖν ἀδύνατον. Ὀρθῶς δὴ μάλα· ∆όξα γὰρ Κυρίου κρύπτει λόγον, κατὰ τὸ γεγραμμένον, καὶ πᾶς περὶ αὐτοῦ λόγος ἀσθενεῖ καὶ τῆς ἀξίας κατόπιν ἔρχεται· ἔστι γὰρ ἁπάσης ἐννοίας ἐπέκεινα, βλέπομεν δὲ δι' ἐσόπτρου καὶ ἐν αἰνίγματι τὰ περὶ αὐτοῦ, καθά φησιν ὁ πάνσοφος Παῦλος. 1.43 Πορφύριος δέ φησιν ἐν βιβλίῳ τετάρτῳ Φιλοσόφου ἱστορίας δοξάσαι τε τὸν Πλάτωνα καὶ μὴν καὶ φράσαι πάλιν περὶ ἑνὸς θεοῦ, ὄνομα μὲν αὐτῷ μηδὲν ἐφαρμόττειν μηδὲ γνῶσιν ἀνθρωπίνην αὐτὸν καταλαβεῖν, τὰς δὲ λεγομένας προσηγορίας ἀπὸ τῶν ὑστέρων καταχρηστικῶς αὐτοῦ κατηγορεῖν. Εἰ δὲ ὅλως ἐκ τῶν παρ' ἡμῖν ὀνομάτων χρή τι τολμῆσαι λέγειν περὶ αὐτοῦ, μᾶλλον τὴν τοῦ ἑνὸς προσηγορίαν καὶ τὴν τἀγαθοῦ τακτέον ἐπ' αὐτοῦ. Τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἓν ἐμφαίνει τὴν περὶ αὐτοῦ ἁπλότητα καὶ διὰ τοῦτο αὐτάρκειαν· χρῄζει γὰρ οὐδενός, οὐ μερῶν, οὐκ οὐσίας, οὐ δυνάμεων, οὐκ ἐνεργειῶν, ἀλλ' ἔστι πάντων τούτων αἴτιος, τἀγαθὸν δὲ παρίστησιν ὅτι ἀπ' αὐτοῦ πᾶν ὅ τί περ ἀγαθόν ἐστιν, ἀπομιμουμένων κατὰ τὸ δυνατὸν τῶν ἄλλων τὴν ἐκείνου, εἰ χρὴ φάναι, ἰδιότητα καὶ δι' αὐτῆς σῳζομένων. Ὁ δὲ τρισμέγιστος Ἑρμῆς οὕτω πώς φησι· Θεὸν νοῆσαι μὲν χαλεπόν, φράσαι δὲ ἀδύνατον ᾧ καὶ νοῆσαι δυνάτον· τὸ γὰρ ἀσώματον σώματι σημῆναι ἀδύνατον, καὶ τὸ τέλειον τῷ ἀτελεῖ καταλαμβάνεσθαι οὐ δυνατόν, καὶ τὸ ἀΐδιον τῷ ὀλιγοχρονίῳ συγγενέσθαι δύσκολον· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀεὶ ἔστι, τὸ δὲ παρέρχεται, καὶ τὸ μὲν ἀληθές ἐστι, τὸ δὲ ὑπὸ φαντασίας σκιάζεται. Ὅσῳ οὖν τὸ ἀσθενέστερον τοῦ ἰσχυροτέρου καὶ τὸ ἔλαττον τοῦ κρείττονος διέστηκε, τοσούτῳ τὸ θνητὸν τοῦ θείου καὶ ἀθανάτου. Εἴ τις οὖν ἀσώματος ὀφθαλμός, ἐξερχέσθω τοῦ σώματος ἐπὶ τὴν θέαν τοῦ καλοῦ, καὶ ἀναπτήτω, καὶ αἰωρηθήτω, μὴ σχῆμα, μὴ σῶμα, μὴ ἰδέας ζητῶν θεάσασθαι, ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνο μᾶλλον τὸ τούτων ποιητικόν, τὸ ἥσυχον, τὸ γαληνόν, τὸ ἑδραῖον, τὸ ἄτρεπτον, τὸ αὐτὸ πάντα καὶ μόνον, τὸ ἕν, τὸ αὐτὸ ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ, τὸ αὐτὸ ἐν ἑαυτῷ, τὸ ἑαυτῷ ὅμοιον, ὃ μήτε ἄλλῳ ὅμοιόν ἐστι, μήτε ἑαυτῷ ἀνόμοιον. 1.44 Καὶ πάλιν ὁ αὐτός· Μηδὲν οὖν περὶ ἐκείνου πώποτε τοῦ ἑνὸς καὶ μόνου ἀγαθοῦ ἐννοούμενος ἀδύνατον εἴπῃς· ἡ πᾶσα γὰρ δύναμις αὐτός ἐστι, μηδὲ ἔν τινι αὐτὸν διανοηθῇς εἶναι, μηδὲ πάλιν κατεκτός τινος· αὐτὸς γὰρ ἀπέραντος ὢν πάντων ἐστὶ πέρας, καὶ ὑπὸ μηδενὸς ἐμπεριεχόμενος πάντα ἐμπεριέχει. Ἐπεὶ τίς διαφορά ἐστι τῶν σωμάτων πρὸς τὸ ἀσώματον, καὶ τῶν γενητῶν πρὸς τὸ ἀγένητον, καὶ τῶν ἀνάγκῃ ὑποκειμένων πρὸς τὸ αὐτεξούσιον, ἢ τῶν ἐπιγείων πρὸς τὰ ἐπουράνια, καὶ τῶν φθαρτῶν πρὸς τὰ ἀΐδια; οὐχ ὅτι τὸ μὲν αὐτεξούσιόν ἐστι, τὸ δὲ ἀνάγκῃ ὑποκείμενον, τὰ δὲ κάτω ἀτελῆ ὄντα φθαρτά ἐστιν; Ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ Σοφοκλῆς οὕτω φησὶ περὶ θεοῦ· Εἷς ταῖς ἀληθείαισιν, εἷς ἐστιν θεός, Ὃς οὐρανόν τ' ἔτευξε καὶ γαῖαν μακράν, Πόντου τε χαροπὸν οἶδμα, κἀνέμων βίας· Θνητοὶ δὲ πολλοί, καρδίᾳ πλανώμενοι Ἱδρυσάμεσθα πημάτων παραψυχάς, Θεῶν ἀγάλματ' ἐκ λίθων τε καὶ ξύλων, Ἢ χρυσοτεύκτων ἢ 'λεφαντίνων τύπους, Θυσίας τε τούτοις καὶ κενὰς πανηγύρεις Τεύχοντες, οὕτως εὐσεβεῖν νομίζομεν. Καὶ μέντοι καὶ ὁ σοφώτατος Ξενοφῶν· Ὁ γοῦν πάντα σείων καὶ ἀτρεμίζων, ὥσπερ μέγας τις καὶ δυνατός, φανερός· ὁποῖος δέ τις μορφήν, ἀφανής· οὔτε