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for the threat to be fulfilled. Since: is not anger greater in punishment? But he does not call this good, if one experiences it, but if anger prevents sins from increasing, so that punishment follows. Since: therefore "anger is better than laughter." Better than taking pleasure in evils. "because by the sadness of a man it will be made good." laughter is made good in the sadness of a man; and the jester brings evil to himself and to others. Therefore, the one who hunts for pleasures, the one who prefers looseness to the austere life, is made good in the sadness of a man. The face of this laughter seems to be cheerful in sadness. But if we say this about the angry person, that the evil appearing in the threat is not the evil opposed to virtue, but that which afflicts those who err, about which it is also written in Amos the prophet: "Is there evil in a city, which the Lord has not done?" there is no afflicting condition occurring in a city without God. The heart of the wise is in the house of mourning, and the heart of fools is in the house of mirth. 201 Behold, he has shown how the face of "anger" is more preferable than that of "laughter" from those who choose; for the heart of the wise rushes to a house of mourning rather than to a house of drinking and laughter. The comparison leading to choosing some things and fleeing others happens in several ways, of which one is from those who choose. The wise man chooses virtue, piety, "to please God," to be zealous for piety, even if it is necessary to die. But the common man, the fool, does not choose these things. And virtue is preferred from those who choose it, because the wise choose it, not the vulgar, not the dissolute, not the fool. And again, the comparison is taken from the things themselves, the aforesaid theory from those who judge and compare. And what is proper is taken, when we say that the soul is more preferable than the body and that one must care for it more than for the body. From the thing, towards which the choice and the comparison is made, we take what is honorable, since the soul is more honorable. The one sparing and caring for it truly cares for what is honorable and better. And sometimes the preference is made from the consequences. Thus one must not simply prefer living to dying. For even if one prefers living to dying by the future chatter or judge or some other persecutor of Christianity and the truth, it is for a short time. For even if he does not die by the hand of the murderer, sometimes a disease, seizing him, removes him from life; it has the difference only in time, that the one immediately subject to the judge's wrath will die, but when life is destroyed by disease is uncertain; however this is not for an infinite time, but it can remain for a longer time. And here the judgment is made from the permanence or the swiftness of the thing. 202 It is better to hear the rebuke of a wise man than for a man to hear the song of fools. To many, the rebuke from a wise man seems to be something to be avoided, especially when they are lovers of sin. For he who has a desire to take pleasure and to sin avoids the one who prevents these things. He who has no judgment rejoices in flatterers; he wishes rather to hear the songs of flattery than words of reproof. For it is the part of a wise man to love the one who reproves. For it is said in Proverbs; but the impious and the wicked man hates the one who reproves. For he says that: "He who reproves the impious will get himself a blot." For he who "reproves the impious" blames himself. For the impious man must be rejected and forbidden. And just as a physician who subjects one who cannot be cured by surgery or cautery to these things is rather not a physician, not a knowledgeable physician, so he who subjects the incorrigible to reproof rather blames himself. For he provokes them to speak against him. And it shows him to have this fault, as not knowing whom he should reprove and whom not. Thus the rebuke of the wise is better than the song of fools. The flatterers sing in a way. Even if they speak moral words, they wish to please rather than to benefit the hearers. And a song is a word that awakens pleasure, but a rebuke is one that corrects and persuades one to cease from former works, having pointed them out, namely those which

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τῷ πληρωθῆναι τὴν ἀπειλήν. ἐπερ· ἐν τῇ κολάσει οὐκ ἔστι̣ν̣ μείζων ὁ θυμός; ἀλλ' οὐ τοῦτον ἀγαθὸν λέγει, ἐάν τις αὐτοῦ π̣ειραθῇ, ἀλλ' ἐὰν κω λύσῃ ὁ θυμὸς αὐξῆσαι τὰ ἁμαρτήματα, ἵν' ἐπακολουθήσῃ κόλασις. ἐπερ· τὸ "ἀγαθὸν" οὖν "θυμὸς ὑπὲρ γέλωτα". ὑπὲρ τὸ ἥδεσθαι ἐπὶ κακοῖς. "ὅτι ἐν κακίᾳ ἀνθρώπο̣υ ἀγαθυνθήσεται". ὁ γέλως ἐν κακίᾳ ἀνθρώπου ἀγαθ̣ύνεται· καὶ ἑαυτῷ κακίαν φέρει ὁ γελω τοποιὸς καὶ ἄλλοις. ἀγαθ̣υ´̣νεται οὖν ἐν κακίᾳ ἀνθρώπου ὁ ἡδονὰς θηρεύ ων, ὁ τὴν ὑδαρότητα προκρίνων τοῦ αὐστηροῦ βίου. τούτου τοῦ γέλωτος τὸ πρόσωπον ἐν κακίᾳ δοκεῖ ἱλαρύνεσθαι. ἐὰν δὲ περὶ τοῦ θυμουμένου λέγωμεν τοῦτο, ὅτι κακία ἐστὶν ἡ ἐνφαι νομένη ἐν τῇ ἀπειλῇ, οὐ κακίαν τὴν ἐναντιουμένην τῇ ἀρετῇ, ἀλλ̣α`̣ τὴν κα κοῦσαν τοὺς σφαλλομένους, περὶ ἧς καὶ ἐν Ἀμὼς τῷ προφητῇ γ̣ε´̣γραπται· "εἰ ἔστιν κακία ἐν πόλει, ἣν κύριος οὐκ ἐποίησεν;" οὐκ ἔστιν κακωτικὴ κατά στασις ε᾿̣ν πόλει γινομένη ἄνευ τοῦ θεοῦ. καρδία σοφῶν ἐν οἴκῳ πένθους καὶ καρδία ἀφρόνων ἐν οἴ κῳ εὐφροσύνης. 201 ἰδοὺ ἔδειξεν, πῶς τὸ πρόσωπον τοῦ "θυμοῦ" αἱρετώτερόν ἐστιν τοῦ τοῦ "γέλωτος" ἐκ τῶν αἱρουμένων· ἡ γοῦν τω῀̣ν σοφῶν καρδία μᾶλλον εἰς οἶκον πένθους ὁρμᾷ ἢ εἰς οἰ῀̣κον πότου καὶ γέλωτος. ἡ ἀναγωγὴ ἡ συνκρινομένη ὥστε τὰ μὲν αὐτῶν αἱρεῖσθαι, τὰ δε`̣ φυγεῖν κατὰ πλείονας τρόπους γίνεται, ὧν εἷς ἐστιν ὁ ἐκ τ̣ῶν αἱρουμε´̣νω̣ν̣. αἱ ρεῖται ὁ σοφὸς ἀρετήν, εὐσέβειαν, "θεῷ ἀρέσκειν", σπουδάζειν ὑπὲρ εὐ σέβειας, κ̣ἀ`̣ν δέοι ἀποθανεῖν. ὁ δὲ πολὺς ἄνθρωπος ὁ ἄφρων οὐκ αἱρεῖται ταῦτα. ἐκ τῶν αἱρουμένων δὲ προκρίνεται ἡ ἀρετή, ὅτι σοφοὶ αὐτὴν αἱ ροῦνται, οὐ χ̣υδαῖος, οὐκ ἔκλυτος, οὐκ ἄφρων. καὶ ἐκ τῶν πραγμάτων δὲ πάλιν ἡ σ̣ύνκρισις λαμβάνεται, ἡ λεχθεῖσα θε ωρία ἐκ τῶν κρινόντων καὶ συνκ̣ρινόντων. τὸ δέον δὲ λαμβάνεται, ὅταν λέγωμεν ὅτι αἱρ̣ε̣τ̣ώτερά ἐστιν ἡ ψυχὴ τοῦ σώματος καὶ μᾶλλον αὐτῆς ἐπιμελε̣ῖσθαι̣ πρέπει̣ ἢ τοῦ σώματος. ἐκ τοῦ πράγματος, προ`̣ς̣ ὃ η῾̣ αἵρεσις καὶ ἡ σύνκρισις γίνεται, τὸ τίμιον λαμβάνο μεν, ἐπεὶ τιμιωτέρα ἐστὶν ἡ ψυχή. ὁ φειδόμενος καὶ ἐπιμελούμενος αὐτῆς τοῦ τιμίου καὶ κρείττονος κατὰ ἀλήθειαν ἐπιμέλεται. ἔσ̣τι̣ν δὲ ὅτε καὶ ἐκ τ̣ῶν παρεπομένων ἡ πρόκρισις γίνεται. οὕτως οὐ δεῖ τὸ ζῆν ἁπαξαπλῶς προτιμᾶν τοῦ τεθνάναι. κἂν γάρ τ̣ις̣ τὸ ζῆν προτιμᾷ τοῦ τεθνάναι μέλλοντος θρύλου ἢ δικα στοῦ ἢ ἄλλου τινὸς διώκοντος τὸν χριστιανι̣σμὸν καὶ τὴν ἀλήθειαν, πρὸς ὀλίγο̣ν ἐστίν. κἂν γὰρ μὴ ἀποθανῇ ὑπὸ τοῦ φονεύοντος, ἐνίοτε νόσος κα ταλαβου῀̣σα μεθίςτησιν τοῦ βίου· χρόνῳ μόνῳ τὴν διαφορὰν ἔχει, ὅτι ὁ π̣άραυτα ὀργῇ δικαςτοῦ ὑποκείμενος ἀποθανεῖται, τὸ δὲ νόσῳ διαφθεῖραι τὸ ζῆν ἄδηλον, πότε· πλὴν οὐκ ἐπ' ἄπειρον τοῦτο, ἀλλ' ἐν πλείονι χρόνῳ δύνατ̣αι παραμένειν. κα̣ι`̣ ὧδε ἡ κρίσις γίνεται ἐκ τῆς τοῦ πράγματος μονι μότη̣τος ἢ ταχυτῆτος. 202 ἀγαθὸν τὸ ἀκοῦσαι ἐπιτίμησιν σοφοῦ ὑπὲρ ἄνδρα ἀκούον τα ᾆσμα ἀφρόνων. δοκεῖ τοῖς πολλοῖς ἡ παρὰ τοῦ σοφοῦ ἐπιτίμησις̣ παραιτητέα εἶναι, μά λιστα ὅτε φιλαμαρτήμονές εἰσιν. ὁ γὰρ πόθον ἔχων τοῦ ἥδεσθαι καὶ ἁ μαρτάνειν παραιτεῖται τὸν κωλύοντα ταῦτα. ὁ οὐδὲν ἔχων γνώμης χαίρει τοῖς κόλαξιν· θέλει μᾶλλον ἀκούειν κολακείας ᾄσματα ἠ`̣ λ̣όγους ἐλεγκτι κούς. σοφοῦ γάρ ἐστιν ἀγαπᾶν τὸν ἐλέγχοντα. τὸ γὰρ εἴρ̣η̣τ̣α̣ι ἐν παροι μίαις· ὁ δὲ ἀσεβὴς καὶ ὁ κακὸς μισεῖ τὸν ἐλέγχοντ̣α. λέγ̣ει γοῦν ὅτι· "ἐλέγχων τὸν ἀσεβῆ μωμήσεται καὶ ἑαυτόν". ἑαυτὸν γὰρ μω̣μεῖται ὁ τὸν "ἀσεβῆ ἐλέγχων". ἀποδοκιμαστέος γάρ ἐστιν καὶ ἀπαγορευτέος ὁ ἀσεβής. καὶ ὥσπερ ἰατρὸς τὸν μὴ δυνάμενον θηραπευθῆναι ἐκ τομῆς ἢ καύσεως τούτοις ὑποβάλλων μᾶλλον οὐκ ἰατρός ἐστιν, οὐκ ἐπιστήμων ἰατρός, οὕ τως ὁ ὑποβάλλων τοὺς ἀδιορθώτους ἐλέγχῳ ἑαυτὸν μᾶλλον ψέγει. ἐρεθίζει γὰρ κἀκείνους κατ' αὐτοῦ λέγειν. καὶ τοῦτον δ̣ε`̣ μῶμον ἔχοντα δείκνυσιν ὡς οὐκ εἰδότα, τίνα ἐλέγξει καὶ τίνα οὔκ̣. οὕτω δὲ ἔστιν ἡ ἐπιτίμησις τοῦ σοφοῦ ὑπὲρ τὸ ᾆσμα τῶν ἀφρόνων. οἱ κόλακες τρόπον τινὰ ᾄδουσιν. κἂν λόγους λέγωσιν ἠθικούς, τέρψαι μᾶλλον ἢ ὠφελῆσαι τ̣οὺς ἀκούοντας βούλονται. ἔστιν δὲ τὸ ᾆσμα λόγος τέρψιν ἐγεί ρων, ἡ δὲ ἐπιτίμησις διορθουμένη καὶ πείθουσα ἀποπαύσασθαι τῶν προτέ ρων ἔργων, παραδείξασα αὐτά, δηλονότι ἃ